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Introduction
The twentieth century was the century of the state. While liberalism gained trac-
tion later in the century, such that Francis Fukuyama declared its triumph as the 
end of history,1 during the mid twentieth century, state- led development and 
the welfare state were the reigning paradigms that transcended the borders of 
communism and capitalism. In a speech in Italy in 1954, the American sociologist 
Edward Shils declared that ideology had ended.2 The division now was between 
individual liberalism and the state, with the latter winning. The victory of state- 
led development came alongside the expansion of the state itself and its bureau-
cracy. This expansion, during the first half of the twentieth century, was the result 
of several factors: The increasing politicization of the middle and working classes 
and the advent of the Great Depression drove the creation of the welfare state as a 
way to quell popular political unrest.3 Plus, the Second World War culminated in 
the emergence of Total War, in which society and economy were ‘retooled’ under 
state management in order to direct the resources needed to win the war.4 After 
the end of the war, the institutions and relationships that were created between 
the state and the industrial sector continued, necessitating the preservation of the 
position of the state and private managers. The rise of white- collar office work-
ers, the result of an expanding bureaucracy in both the state and the private sec-
tor, was as much due to a need to generate new positions of employment for the 
expanding university- educated population as it was a way to ensure that these 
individuals did not become radicalized by ideas of Marxist class struggle.5 Bureau-
cratic expansion was thus predicated on both external and internal threats and 
the need to create an effective strategy to combat these threats.
The rise of the state also heralded the rise of management as a science. Its 
intellectual origins come from two different fields. The first was the devel-
opment of industrial Taylorism on factory shop floors.6 These engineering 
 1 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006).
 2 Nils Gilman,  Mandarins of the Future:  Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Balti-
more: John Hopkins University Press, 2003), 58.
 3 Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare 
(New York: Vintage, 2012).
 4 Ronald Schaffer, America in the Great War: The Rise of the War Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press on Demand, 1994); Reuel Edward Schiller, ‘St. George and the Dragon: Courts 
and the Development of the Administrative State in Twentieth Century America’, Journal of 
Policy History, 17/ 1 (2005), 110– 24.
 5 Jill Quadagno, ‘Theories of the Welfare State’, Annual Review of Sociology, 13/ 1 (1987), 109– 28.















approaches to minute time- motion studies were meant to increase the effi-
ciency of individual workers and, at the same time, monitor and control their 
movements. The second was the political science approach that was supported 
by American president Thomas Woodrow Wilson and the rise of what came to 
be called public and business administration science.7 Coupled with the ar-
rival of the new business organization, the corporation, these developments 
resulted in the emergence of a new elite for the century: the managerial class. 
Associated with the emergence of the prominence of the manager was that of 
the managerial state itself. The managerial state was the antidote to the exter-
nal and internal threats that loomed large in the twentieth century. It replaced 
the late- nineteenth- century liberal night- watchman state with its limited bu-
reaucracy.8 Yet it was understood by many commentators that the managerial 
state, while promising welfare and efficiency, threatened individual liberty and 
integrated individuals as cogs in the machine, creating one- dimensional forms 
of human experience and outlook and, perhaps most ominously, resulted in 
massive and violent attacks on humankind.9
The twentieth century is thus also known as a violent century. The devel-
opment of the tools of governmentality resulted in their application to disci-
pline, and sometimes eliminate, segments of society. In Europe, the first half 
of the twentieth century was rife with the surgical removal of ethnic minori-
ties and the elimination of unwanted groups in order to fulfil irrational desires 
for ethnic or racial purity, while simultaneously strengthening the state and 
its bureaucracy.10 The Nazi state that committed crimes of aggression and the 
elimination of millions of ethnic, racial, political, and religious minorities also 
presided over an expanding welfare state and public- goods provisions, such as 
the building of thousands of kilometres of Autobahns.11 The violence of the 
managerial state was significant because of its intrusive reach into the heart 
 7 Larry Walker, ‘Woodrow Wilson, Progressive Reform, and Public Administration’, Political 
Science Quarterly, 104/ 3 (1989), 509– 25.
 8 Paul Edward Gottfried, After Liberalism: Mass Democracy in the Managerial State (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 2001). Gottfried critically examined how American liberal 
democracy was salvaged in the face of the ideological domination of the welfare state, 
something that never took place in Indonesia or many other Third World countries.
 9 For more on this, see Charles S. Maier, ‘Between Taylorism and Technocracy: European 
Ideologies and the Vision of Industrial Productivity in the 1920s’, Journal of Contemporary 
History, 5/ 2 (1970), 27– 61; Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology 
of Advanced Industrial Society (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968).
 10 Mark Mazower,  Dark Continent:  Europe’s Twentieth Century (London:  Allan Lane/ The 
Penguin Press, 1998).
 11 One paper pointed out the relationship between the culture of the car and how it prepared 












of society. Society itself came to be recreated in the ideological image of its 
managerial elites.
For the non- Western, colonized world, the nature of the colonial state pre-
cluded a significant expansion of the welfare state because, especially in cases 
like the Netherlands Indies, it was the policy to limit the financial burden of 
the colony. Independence, then, came with the assumption that the provision 
of welfare would be expanded by the post- colonial state. These rising expecta-
tions put a heavy strain on the new national elites because, for many, their ed-
ucation and experience had been shaped through the world of colonial politics 
and revolution. In this world, those that rose up to the first ranks were charis-
matic individuals who were able to create followers through the power of their 
orations or political manoeuvring. Yet, the rising expectations necessitated 
the creation of a managerial/ welfare state and the accompanying manageri-
al elites.12 The managerial elites obtained their legitimacy through the power 
of technical education in fields such as engineering, economics, and adminis-
trative and other social sciences. This know- how was mostly obtained by the 
new generation of students that had access to the educational opportunities of 
Western, especially American, universities.13 The determining characteristic of 
the early post- independence period was thus the transition from the national-
ist political class, which had won independence, to the new class of managers. 
This has been shown convincingly by Herbert Feith in his account of the polit-
ical development of Indonesia in the 1950s and the conflict between what he 
termed the ‘solidarity makers’ and the administrators.14 This book continues 
this analysis by looking at how and in what manner this administrator class 
was created and the kinds of ideologies and ideas about state– society relations 
that it entailed.
A new class of managers emerged alongside the political class, yet their po-
sition was weak. They lacked the charismatic appeal or institutionalized fol-
lowings of the political class.15 The issue of how to create and confer authority 
1900– 30: Violence, War and the Motor Car’, The Journal of Transport History, 24/ 2 (2003), 
238– 58.
 12 See Anthony R.  Oberschall, ‘Rising Expectations and Political Turmoil’,  The Journal of 
Development Studies, 6/ 1 (1969), 5– 22. Oberschall showed that rising expectations in 
poorer nations resulted in social unrest and political turmoil.
 13 They also had access to Soviet curricula and teaching methods. See Joel Andreas, Rise 
of the Red Engineers:  The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China’s New Class 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).
 14 Herbert Feith, ‘The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia’ (Ithaca: Cornell 
University, 1962).
 15 Whole studies were conducted by American social scientists on Asian forms of authority 










became a major problem for the parties of the managerial class, which ob-
tained paltry numbers of votes in national elections. How to control society 
was the big question for the twentieth- century state. The solution was found 
through the rise of so- called military managers and the increasing cooperation 
between the managerial class and the armed forces. The various armed forces’ 
almost monopolistic control of the means of violence allowed them to shape 
society under the legitimizing guise of development, modernization, and the 
creation of the welfare state. The military gradually came to be seen by Amer-
ican social scientists as the prime agents of modernity in the Third World. 
They were seen as rational and goal- oriented, and their position as part of the 
elite of the nation was favourable to the development and modernization of 
their societies. Samuel Huntington and Amos Perlmutter painted the army 
as a Praetorian Guard, with a duty to protect the process of modernization 
against the ravages of the barbaric political class and the political yearnings 
of the masses.16 The position of social scientists was important in this regard. 
They were not merely scientific observers or spectators of the changes in post- 
colonial societies but had key roles in helping to shape and create those soci-
eties.17 Their actions and recommendations were guided by their ideological 
conviction of the good of the welfare state and the importance of modernity 
and development.18
The position of Western social scientists as technical experts operated 
within the new international aid structure that was developed in the post- war 
world. This technical aid structure allowed for the transfer of money, people, 
and ideas from the metropolitan centre to the newly independent states. This 
involved the creation and re- creation of educational institutions that were de-
veloped to produce a technical, managerial class, whose ideologies and the-
ories functioned to legitimize their ruling position in this new society. The 
the post- war world. See, for instance, Mary W. Pye and Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and 
Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009).
 16 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil- Military 
Relations (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1981); Amos Perlmutter, The Military 
and Politics in Modern Times:  On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers 
(New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1977); Amos Perlmutter, ‘The Praetorian State and 
the Praetorian Army:  Toward a Taxonomy of Civil- Military Relations in Developing 
Polities’, Comparative Politics, 1/ 3 (1969), 382– 404.
 17 Arturo Escobar offers a critical study of developmentalism. See Arturo Escobar, 
Encountering Development:  The Making and Unmaking of the Third World 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).
 18 Michael E. Latham and John Lewis Gaddis, Modernization as Ideology: American Social 









technical aid structure also helped to establish the tools of governmentality 
which helped to control society and reinforce managerial authority, and po-
sitioned certain state institutions as command centres for integrated devel-
opmental planning. These structures allowed states with a weak institutional 
endowment to develop a foundation onto which a more robust developmental 
state could later be built.19 This was a massive re- engineering of post- colonial 
societies, turning non- aligned Third World states into client states of the West.
1 Sukarno’s Guided Democracy Revolution
This book will look into the foundation of Indonesia’s New Order (Orde Baru) 
developmental state (1966– 1998) during the tumultuous years of Sukarno’s 
Guided Democracy (Demokrasi Terpimpin, 1957– 1965). The book’s main argu-
ment is that the development of a new managerial class during the 1950s and 
early 1960s resulted in the creation of both the ideological and the institutional 
basis for a military- dominated managerial state. In particular, I want to embed 
this discussion within the international context of technical aid. This technical 
aid, alongside the various institutions that enabled its application  – univer-
sities, national planning agencies, the United Nations (UN), and national aid 
organizations such as usaid20 – produced a global class of national manag-
ers which spread similar ideas of development and control. The rise of a so- 
called community of scholars that worked in a transnational manner to study 
the Indonesian case of underdevelopment included individuals from various 
(mostly English- speaking) Western countries and Indonesia, many of whom 
were taught by the same group of academics during their master’s and doctoral 
studies in America.21
The institutional development of Guided Democracy and Sukarno’s idea of 
revolution was, in many ways, a precursor to the New Order state and Suhar-
to’s idea of development. Major institutions, including the National Planning 
 19 For a closer study of the interventions in Third World societies by America and the ussr, 
see Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of 
Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
 20 usaid had previously been called the Economic Cooperation Administration (eca) 
(1948– 1951), the Mutual Security Agency (msa) (1951– 1953), the Foreign Operations 
Administration (foa) (1953– 1955), and the International Cooperation Agency (ica) 
(1955– 1961). These various names will be used in the book in concordance with their 
period of operation.
 21 David Webster, Fire and the Full Moon:  Canada and Indonesia in a Decolonizing World 









Agency (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, Bappenas), the army, 
and regional and rural control authorities, found their roots during this period. 
The ideology of development had begun to find its voice during this period, 
couched within Sukarno’s revolutionary rhetoric. One major question that 
arises from this is: why did Sukarno build an institutional basis that would later 
on challenge his control of the state? As we will see below, he did so reluctant-
ly. The Guided Democracy was an effort by Sukarno and some others within 
the nationalist political class to co- opt the new managerial class into his revo-
lutionary fold. His rhetoric on revolution included notions about development 
and modernization. During the initial phase, there was an effort to experiment 
with corporatist forms of institution- building, allowing for societal, mostly 
communist, representation in planning bodies and company boards. Yet, by 
the latter part of the Guided Democracy period, the state had become increas-
ingly centralized and Sukarno’s position more dictatorial. This was a result of 
the failure of societal participation. The Eight- Year National Plan (Pembangu-
nan Nasional Semesta Berentjana), the first and only corporatist national plan, 
was published in eight volumes with seventeen chapters and 1945 paragraphs, 
mimicking the date of Indonesia’s independence. The symbolism, while glar-
ingly obvious, hardly inspires confidence. It also taught the New Order’s nas-
cent technocracy the importance of control and hierarchy, cementing their 
belief in the efficacy of a military- dominated state.
Indonesia’s managerial elite was not a replication of the West’s. Most of its 
members hailed from Indonesia’s priyayi class;22 thus, they were mostly Java-
nese and had a strong predilection for its feudal culture. They also differed 
from many of the nationalist politicians because they lacked a colonial educa-
tion and, as a result, had different aspirations and cosmopolitan pretensions. 
The nationalist politicians were beholden to the ideas of their metropolitan 
Dutch model. They were enamoured by the spectacle of modernity as ex-
pressed through the bright, urban lights of European cities. In comparison, the 
managers were less convinced of the superiority of European social democ-
racy. They were also less enamoured by the city and implemented pro- rural 
and pro- poor growth policies during the heyday of the New Order under the 
largesse of the oil boom of the 1970s.23 As we will see, the ideas of society that 
 22 The Priyayi was the mid- to- upper class section of Javanese society that connected the 
government and the common people. They had traditionally worked in the indigenous 
administration of the colonial state. The sons and daughters of the priyayi had provided a 
significant bulk of the Indonesian nationalist intellectual groups.
 23 Anne E.  Booth, Colonial Legacies:  Economic and Social Development in East and 
Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2018); David Henley, ‘The Agrarian 






would later be expressed by these managers have their roots in Javanese feu-
dalism as well as modern management. One of the important shared points 
of both was the idea of control. Indonesia’s managerial control could not have 
been conceptualized by cosmopolitan nationalist politicians, but only by a 
militarized managerial class that operated within the strategies of control. Its 
rural focus, for instance, can be understood as part of a counter- insurgency 
strategy. This idea of control was shared by top echelon managers from both 
military and civilian backgrounds.
Indonesia’s managerial state can thus be seen as a counter- insurgency 
state.24 The cause of this was paranoia about the enemies of the state: a shad-
owy force of potential aggression whose source lay within Indonesian society. 
The terrifying aspect of this enemy was its indistinguishability from ordinary 
Indonesians. This view allowed every Indonesian to become a potential en-
emy of the state. The definition of these enemies was discussed by military 
managers but also by civilian managers and economists, who would analyse 
the structures of Indonesian society based on their function in relation to the 
entire corporatist order. This societal control through indoctrination and ‘re-
tooling’ was introduced during the Guided Democracy. After the rise of the 
New Order, ‘the spectre of communism’25 was invoked as a way to control 
society, yet its intellectual origin predated the 1965– 1966 killings. Managerial 
control replaced democracy and civil society as a means of integrating every 
Indonesian into Sukarno’s vision of Revolusi and later into Suharto’s pemban-
gunan (development). As we will see, fear of the undemocratic nature of the 
managerial state was expressed by nationalist politicians who saw through the 
smoke- screen of efficiency. Yet, instead of steadfastly supporting constitution-
al democracy, Sukarno ended it in a miscalculated effort to co- opt the rising 
managers in a state that he thought he could continue to control.
Africa’, Development Policy Review, 30/ 1 (February 2012), s25- s47. Both Booth and Henley 
have shown that pro- rural and pro- poor policies were implemented in many parts of Asia, 
including Indonesia, during the post- war period. In Indonesia’s case, the transition to the 
New Order was essential in understanding this shift.
 24 Indonesia’s counter- insurgency strategies were built upon the army’s experience of put-
ting down the Darul Islam rebellion in West Java, which comprised getting the locals to 
limit the movement of insurgents (pagar betis) and limited forms of infrastructure assis-
tance; a combination of the Civic Action (Karya) programme and strike force action. 
David Kilcullen, ‘Globalisation and the Development of Indonesian Counterinsurgency 
Tactics’,  Small Wars & Insurgencies, 17/ 1 (2006), 44– 64; D.  J. Kilcullen, ‘The Indonesian 
Approach to Counterinsurgency’,  Journal of the Royal United Services Institution of 
Australia, 24 (2002), 85– 93.







There are two aspects that I want to emphasize in understanding the In-
donesian New Order state. The first is the institutional aspect. While writers 
like Ruth McVey and Benedict Anderson have depicted the historically rooted 
aspect of the institutions of the post- colonial Indonesian state as an old colo-
nial bottle filled with new, elite wines,26 what I hope to show is the importance 
of factoring in the presence of the new institutions that were created through 
both the post- war international aid structure and the institutional Zeitgeist 
of the Cold War period. That is not to say that the New Order state was the 
creation of Western social scientists; no doubt many of the technical experts 
became quite disappointed with the direction of the New Order which, in their 
minds, should have gone on to become a democratic welfare state in the image 
of the United States.27 Instead, the Indonesian managers developed their own 
form of state– society relations that adapted to include both old feudal and 
modern management values.
The second feature of the New Order I  want to emphasize is its cultural 
or ideological aspect. The book does not take a deterministic cultural view of 
Indonesia. As Benda says, why would Indonesians be enthusiastic about de-
mocracy when it was never part of their cultural repertoire?28 No doubt, some 
elements of traditional and feudal culture must have seeped into the modern 
conception of the Indonesian state, yet these will also have been tempered by 
the context of modern management and ideas of control. Rather, culture is 
related to the institutions; that is, the working institutions of the New Order 
cannot be understood without taking into account the world view of the elites 
that determined those institutions – in this case, the managerial elite of this 
managerial state. Douglass North and others have pointed out the importance 
of belief systems in determining the functioning of institutions.29
Ideas of how the world works, of the relationship between society and the 
state, and of how the state functions are very much related to the ideology 
of scientific management. Management functioned more than merely as tools 
to create an efficient workplace. In fact, one may argue that the existence of 
 26 Benedict Richard O’Gorman Anderson, ‘Old State, New Society:  Indonesia’s New Order in 
Comparative Historical Perspective’, The Journal of Asian Studies, 42/ 3 (1983), 477– 96; Ruth 
McVey, ‘The Beamtenstaat in Indonesia’, in Benedict Richard O’Gorman Anderson and Audrey 
Kahin (eds), Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate (1982), 84– 91.
 27 See, for instance, Benjamin Howard Higgins and Jean Higgins, Indonesia: The Crisis of the 
Millstones (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1963), 10.
 28 Harry J. Benda, ‘Democracy in Indonesia. Review Article’, The Journal of Asian Studies, 23/ 3 
(May 1964), 449– 56.
 29 Arthur T.  Denzau and Douglass C.  North, ‘Shared Mental Models:  Ideologies and 










managers certainly does not automatically result in increased efficiency. What 
being a manager does, however, is to inculcate a certain sense of how the 
world works into the individual and give them a sense of their position in that 
world.30 It brings forth a certain clarity of purpose and shapes the actions tak-
en in the interest of the future. This idea was cemented in place by the reigning 
Zeitgeist of the period. Planning was certainly going to make the world a better 
place: state control would ensure the allocation of resources and manpower 
in a socially optimal way, and in a much better way than the market could 
achieve.
Discussing the ideology of managers is a central component of the book. 
The discussion looks into the relationship between scientific management and 
its suspicion of the inefficiency of the rule of law, party- based democracy, the 
separation of powers (trias politica), and the sanctity of property, all of which, 
amongst others, are meant to ensure individual freedom. In his seminal 1942 
book titled The Managerial Revolution, James Burnham expounded the dan-
gers of the managerial state, pointing out its anti- liberal and anti- democratic 
values. Burnham argued in the 1940s that both the Soviet Union and Germany 
were, in effect, managerial states and that America’s New Deal welfare state 
represented ‘primitive managerialism’.31 Although Burnham wrote his book 
during the Second World War and prior to the collapse of Western colonial-
ism, it was prescient in that the post- war world would continue on this path 
of state- led control of society. In the West, the rise of this managerial class was 
received by a public that was conscious of its dangers in a society that was, 
to a large extent, supportive of liberal values. This was not the case in Indo-
nesia in the late fifties and early sixties. On the contrary, a large segment of 
the nationalist politicians, most prominently Sukarno, deeply resented liberal-
ism and considered individualism to be a Western construct that endangered 
Eastern societies and values. Instead, they advocated corporatism and commu-
nalism, self- reliance and traditional village values as the core ideology of the 
Indonesian state. In this regard, scientific management contained no values 
that were contradictory to those supported by the political elite of Indonesia 
at the time. Thus, the modernization of Indonesian society often took the form 
of re- traditionalization.
 30 For more on scientific management and its ideological nature, see Judith A.  Merkle, 
Management and Ideology:  The Legacy of the International Scientific Management 
Movement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).







The managers were not oligarchs, as Winters has used the term; that is, the 
situation was not one of ‘massive wealth in the hands of a small minority cre-
at[ing] significant power advantages in the political realm’.32 They were elites 
as a result of their institutionalized relationship with the state and the inter-
national aid structure that produced them. In this sense, the managers and the 
managerial state could not have come into existence without the specific his-
torical context of the post- war period. Their main power lay in the absence of 
alternative, educated individuals to fill state positions. The success of Europe-
an social democracy as a compromise between socialism and capitalism was 
something that was difficult to replicate. The educated Indonesian– Chinese 
middle class was prohibited from holding state positions, especially during the 
New Order period. Nor did they organize themselves in a coherent way so as 
to exert influence on the direction of development for a specific, imagined fu-
ture Indonesian society. This absence of a capitalist class with a strong political 
pull resulted in the monopolization of power by the managerial bureaucracy, 
creating what Karl T. Jackson termed a bureaucratic polity, that is, ‘a political 
system in which power and participation in national decisions are limited al-
most entirely to the employees of the state’.33 This bureaucratically controlled 
society allowed the formation of what would then be called the developmen-
tal state. Atul Kohli pointed out that ‘the creation of effective states within 
the developing world has generally preceded the emergence of industrializing 
economies’.34 The Guided Democracy provided the blueprint for an eventually 
effective state.
2 Position in the Academic Literature
This book is situated in the discussion surrounding the rise of modernization 
theory during the Cold War and that of the rise of the New Order state itself. 
 32 Jeffrey A. Winters, Oligarchy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 5.
 33 Karl Jackson, ‘Bureaucratic Polity: A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Power and 
Communications in Indonesia’, in Karl Jackson and Lucian Pye (eds), Political Power and 
Communications in Indonesia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 3.
 34 The image of the New Order as a corporate/ technocratic state or bureaucratic pol-
ity conflicts with the view of those who see its powers as highly intertwined with the 
image of the patron– client. For more on the variety of ways specialists view the New 
Order state, see Donald K.  Emmerson, ‘Understanding the New Order. Bureaucratic 
Pluralism in Indonesia’, Asian Survey, 23/ 11 (November 1983), 1220– 41; and Atul Kohli, 
State- Directed Development, Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery 









The historical discussion of modernization theory placed the development of 
this ideologically based social science within the context of mid century Amer-
ican imperialism. According to historian Nils Gilman, the change in policy 
during the Kennedy administration pushed social scientists to become ‘man-
darins of modernity’.35 These social scientists were promoters of American 
modernization theory, which, in many respects, had as one of its main aims 
the legitimization of the ending of democracy and the creation of military- 
dominated states in many of America’s Cold War client states. Modernization 
theory assumed a staged developmental plan developed by W. W. Rostow,36 in 
which a military leadership would provide guidance along the lines of Hun-
tington’s idea of the Praetorian state.37 Within Indonesian history, this dis-
cussion is grouped around work by Richard Robison that takes a dependency 
approach to the New Order state, and includes the writings of David Ransom 
and Peter Dale Scott, leftist writers who ‘exposed’ the Berkeley Mafia and their 
complicity with the communist extermination of 1965/ 1966.38 The depend-
ency approach sees the New Order and their managerial elites as American 
agents who were subverting Indonesia in the context of American imperial-
ism. Within Indonesia, this is best exemplified by the writings of the exiled 
Sukarnoist Ernst Utrecht who, along with Malcolm Caldwell, wrote a history of 
the New Order that characterized it as an instance of neocolonialism.39
The relationship between aid and American modernization theory has 
been discussed by a variety of scholars, including Michael Latham and John 
Lewis Gaddis in their book Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science 
and ‘Nation Building’ in the Kennedy Era, which looks at how social science 
affected America’s foreign policy, especially in relation to the Third World.40 
This idea was further explored in Latham’s edited volume titled The Right Kind 
of Revolution: Modernization, Development and us Foreign Policy from the Cold 
 35 Gilman, Mandarins of the Future; David C.  Engerman et  al. (eds),  Staging Growth: 
Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War (Amherst:  University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2003).
 36 Walt Whitman Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth (New York: WW Norton, 1952).
 37 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale University Press, 2006).
 38 Richard Robison,  Power and Economy in Suharto’s Indonesia (Manila:  Journal of 
Contemporary Asia Publishers, 1990); Richard Robison, ‘Culture, Politics, and Economy 
in the Political History of the New Order’, Indonesia, 31 (1981), 1– 29; David Ransom, ‘Ford 
Country:  Building an Elite for Indonesia’,  in Steve Weissman (ed.), The Trojan Horse:  A 
Radical Look at Foreign Aid (Palo Alto, CA: Ramparts Press, 1975), 96; David Ransom, ‘The 
Berkeley Mafia and the Indonesian Massacre’, Ramparts, 9/ 4 (1970), 27– 49.
 39 Malcolm Caldwell and Ernst Utrecht, Indonesia: An Alternative History (Sydney: Alternative 
Publishing Co- operative, 1979).














War to the Present, which used various case studies from during and after the 
Cold War to show how modernization theory was put to use in the US imperial 
effort to recreate national societies during the period.41 Specific case studies 
of modernization theory include Larry Grubbs’s Secular Missionary: Americans 
and African Development in the 1960s42 and Joao Feres’s The Concept of Latin 
America in the United States: Misrecognition and Social Scientific Discourse,43 
amongst many others. Bradley Simpson’s Economists with Guns examines the 
relationship between authoritarian developmentalism and American eco-
nomic aid in Indonesia.44 Many of these books on American modernization 
theory tend to place too significant an emphasis on the role of the American 
State Department and its social scientists, as the discussions within them often 
focus on American history. While this book considers American engagement 
with Indonesia as crucial, I  still place the role of Indonesian politicians and 
managers at the centre of the story. This is because, despite the strong influ-
ence of US social scientists and State Department bureaucrats, these American 
individuals never led the process and were mostly in the position of reacting to 
conditions on the ground.
Amongst political scientists there have been long discussions on the nature 
of the New Order state. Richard Robison has classified the various theoretical 
approaches used to deal with the New Order into three groups: the political- 
order approach, the economic- technocracy approach, and the dependency 
approach. We could perhaps add another one to the group, of which he is a 
part: the patronage/ oligarchy approach. The political- order approach is basi-
cally part of the modernization theory discussed above. In Indonesia’s case 
this was brought forth by the writings of Donald Emerson, Karl Jackson, and 
William Liddle.45 It draws upon Talcott Parson’s structural- functional analysis, 
which saw all parts of society as having functional relationships with the rest. 
The main problem it addresses is the contradiction between modern political 
 41 Michael E.  Latham,  The Right Kind of Revolution:  Modernization, Development, and us 
Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2010).
 42 Larry Grubbs,  Secular Missionaries:  Americans and African Development in the 1960s 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2009).
 43 Joao Feres, The Concept of Latin America in the United States: Misrecognition and Social 
Scientific Discourse (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2010).
 44 Bradley R. Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and us– Indonesian 
Relations, 1960– 1968 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).
 45 See, for instance, Donald K.  Emmerson, Indonesia’s Elite:  Political Culture and Cultural 
Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976); Jackson, ‘Bureaucratic Polity’, 3– 22; Liddle, 
R. William. ‘Soeharto’s Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions’, Pacific Affairs, 












structures and traditional political cultures; that is, how to create modern 
states when they are burdened by traditional culture. In my view, there is no 
major contradiction here. Javanese feudalism’s inherent collectivism meshed 
well with modern corporatist and developmental political structures. The de-
pendency approach has also been discussed above and looks at the develop-
ment of the New Order state as part of a neocolonialism in which Indonesia 
maintained its prone position as a provider of natural resources.46 Within this 
approach, the New Order elite were merely the compradors of vested global 
interests in the form of foreign governments and foreign multinational corpo-
rations. This structural integration would forever doom the Indonesian nation 
to peripheral servitude of Western- based global capitalism. This position be-
came less convincing during the late 1980s and the 1990s, when the significant 
growth in manufacturing caused a structural transformation of the Indonesian 
economy that resulted in an economic ‘take- off ’, seemingly allowing Indonesia 
to join the capitalist core economies, before collapsing in the 1998 Asian Finan-
cial Crisis which ended the New Order regime.
The third group uses a technocratic approach. This approach assumes ‘state 
policy can be conceived and implemented by technocrats on the basis of crite-
ria provided by objective and scientific theories of economics, transcendental 
to and autonomous of social and political conflict’.47 These include many of 
the developmental- state scholars who view technocratic development as an 
apolitical process. Economists have tended to praise the developmental state, 
despite being fully aware of the lack of rights accorded by the state.48 Peter 
Evans’s strategy of embedded autonomy points to the importance of a politi-
cally protected technocracy and its relationship with industrialization.49 Atuh 
Kohli has pointed out the importance of building a strong state as a precondi-
tion for the creation of a developmental state.50 Linda Low acknowledged the 
lack of political rights accorded by the state, yet Low’s technocratic approach 
assumes an empirical position in which moral value judgement was not part 
of the consideration. The third group’s comparative approach was meant to 
pinpoint the specific institutional, ideological, and structural peculiarities that 
 46 See, for instance, Ernst Utrecht, Indonesië’s nieuwe orde:  Ontbinding en neokolonisatie 
(Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 1970) and Arief Sritua and Adi Sasono, Indonesia, Dependency 
and Underdevelopment (Jakarta: meta, 1981).
 47 Richard Robison, Power and Economy, 34.
 48 Linda Low, ‘Introduction and Overview’, in Linda Low (ed.), Developmental States. 
Relevancy, Redundancy or Reconfiguration? (New York: Nova, 2004), 10– 11.
 49 Peter B.  Evans, Embedded Autonomy:  States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995).












allowed certain countries, such as South Korea, to succeed in becoming ad-
vanced economies.
The last group has flourished recently, in conjunction with the rise of the 
idea of the oligarchy. This represents a new approach that looks at the state 
not as a unified entity, but as a collection of groups functioning along patron-
age lines. Thus, state policy is the product not of some rational technocratic 
decision- making process but of intense competition between differing patron-
age groups. While this condition is much easier to discern during the post- New 
Order period, what people like Robison, Vedi Hadiz, Christopher Chua, and 
Jeffrey Winters argue is that group competition within the New Order oligar-
chy was always present.51 The development of the New Order state was based 
on the relationship between patronage groups within the state bureaucracy 
and with both multinational corporations and local capitalist groups. The fall 
of the New Order was thus not the result of a civil society movement against 
the state, but of a fracturing of the oligarchic order that resulted in the aban-
donment of Suharto by many of the oligarchs surrounding his power base. In 
such a context, the institutionalist approach taken by the World Bank to push 
forth good governance will not result in any changes because the problems 
have always been political in nature.
In the context of the political science discussion of the nature of the New 
Order state, the book situates itself with less certainty. This is not a social 
science book; rather it is a historical work. In theoretical matters, I have not 
placed much emphasis on discussion of the New Order state, but there are sev-
eral points to make in conjunction with this. The first is that the belief in mod-
ernization theory appeared before the rise of the so- called oligarchy. When 
Sukarno fell, many of the business people closely identified with his palace, 
including Markam, Karkam, and Jusuf Muda Dalam, not only lost their wealth 
but also their personal freedom. Thus, they did not represent an oligarchic 
force independent of the state but were merely clients of Sukarno. While this 
may have changed during the interim developmental years of the New Order, 
during the rise of the Guided Democracy there was effectively no real oligar-
chy. Robison has further argued that Indonesian capitalism was forged as a re-
sult of state- building and thus was beholden to state interests. Second, the in-
troduction of new ideologies and institutions during this period had an effect 
 51 Yuki Fukuoka, ‘Oligarchy and Democracy in Post- Suharto Indonesia’,  Political Studies 
Review, 11/ 1 (2013), 52– 64; Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz,  Reorganising Power in 
Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets (London: Routledge, 2004); Jeffrey 
A. Winters, ‘Oligarchy and Democracy in Indonesia’, Indonesia 96 (2013), 11– 33; Christian 




on the path dependency of Indonesia’s state formation and, alongside that, the 
formation of Indonesia’s capitalist class. This conjunction between the colo-
nial state and the developmental state represented an important change that 
determined Indonesian state– society relations for a long time to come. I argue 
that the ideological position that was forged during this period had an effect 
on the structural changes and determined a path- dependent bias that still re-
verberates today.
3 Division of the Book
The book consists of seven chapters and is divided into three parts. Chapters 1 
and 2 will deal with elite ideology and formation. The first chapter discusses 
the fragility of the new, managerial elite, ‘the experts’ as they were called by na-
tionalists. I look into the rationale for the dislike shown by Sukarno and some 
of his close nationalist entourage towards the experts as an upstart generation. 
I argue that it was a generational problem; in a sense, the mental framework of 
each elite group’s thought process was the product of, to use the Marxist term, 
the relations of production: a colonial, empire- dominated and a post- colonial, 
American- dominated environment. The second chapter discusses the rise of 
the military elite as the result of two general developments: the experience of 
the revolutionary war that bifurcated the military into a similar division of na-
tionalists/ solidarity makers and experts/ administrators; and the expansion of 
American education and the introduction of counter- insurgency strategies un-
der both the Kennedy Administration and Sukarno’s increasingly belligerent 
Konfrontasi policy. This then divided the military elite into territorial/ mana-
gerial and counter- insurgency/ strike groups. These two chapters will hopefully 
help us to understand the rising elite of the period and their stance on the 
relationship between state and society
The second part of the thesis focuses on the development of institutions 
and the importation of ideas and ideologies during the 1950s, when Indone-
sia was nominally a ‘liberal’ democracy. Chapter  3 discusses the Indonesian 
effort to produce experts through the expansion of higher education, send-
ing Indonesians abroad to study, and the importation of technical advisers. 
This resulted in the formation of what one expert has called a community of 
scholars, whose power and authority was disdained by many nationalists and 
communists. Many of these scholars clustered around that growing institution 
so typical of the 1950s: the institution of national planning. Chapter 4 discusses 
another significant import of the 1950s: scientific management. Its purpose is 







liberal institutions in the country, in particular, the rule of law and the sepa-
ration of powers, or trias politica, during the 1950s. The rise of the managerial 
experts legitimized both their authority in policymaking and the need to re-
vamp state– society relations to enable their smooth control. These chapters 
show that the international developments of the 1950s were very important 
in understanding the rise of the Guided Democracy by the end of the decade.
The last section of the thesis covers three chapters and examines the de-
velopment of both national planning and scientific management within the 
context of the Guided Democracy. Chapter 5 discusses the implementation of 
national planning, the transition from corporatist to technocratic institution-
al forms, and the rise of a new generation of social scientists. The recentrali-
zation of the decision- making process under the office of the president and 
the incorporation of the regional and departmental heads within and under 
a planning body were testament to the shift away from corporatist ideas to-
wards the implementation of the idea of a strong state. Chapter 6 considers 
the expansion and implementation of managerial ideas and their relationship 
with the implementation of the control techniques that the state imposed on 
both civil servants and civil society. Structural and behavioural control by the 
state became a pre- eminent strategy of the Guided Democracy state. This was 
then continued by the New Order state in ways very similar to the Guided De-
mocracy effort. Chapter 7 discusses the latter phase of the Guided Democracy 
(1962– 1965) by looking at the way in which both the nascent technocracy and 
the communists argued about their ideas of state– society relations. The pur-
pose of the chapter is to show the extent to which the defining characteristics 
of the difference lay not between capitalism/ liberalism and communism but 
between a state- centred and a participative type of ideology.
It is important to demystify the hallowed classification that is used in 
understanding the moral positions of the actors in this particular period. 
Classifications such as leftist or liberal, communist or Berkeley Mafia, the 
United States of America or the Soviet Union/ People’s Republic of China, 
force us to make easy moral choices while interpreting the 1950s and 1960s. 
By re- evaluating these labels, Indonesians can re- engage with a troubled 
past and move beyond the generally accepted interpretation made by the 
state and its elites. By widening our viewpoint and seeing the ideas of the 
modern Indonesian nation- state through a long- range lens, we can begin to 
understand the limitations of looking at our history from the perspective of 
what Hobsbawm called the ‘age of extremes’.52 It is, perhaps, necessary for 








the Indonesian intellectual to start to deal in an honest and engaging manner 
with the liberal tradition, or the lack of it. In the present liberal age, it is time 
we shed our petrified twentieth- century perspectives and look anew at our 
recent past.
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 chapter 1
The Indonesian Elite and Its Authority
 Abstract
This chapter looks at the shifting ideology and elite production in Indonesia as a re-
sult of decolonization. Changing elite identity markers from traditional feudal towards 
modern education and expertise represented changes in relations between elites and 
the new postcolonial state. The problem of endowing authority towards the new ed-
ucated elites was perennial in the history of Indonesian state- society relations and 
the Guided Democracy period represented a transitional phase in the ideological un-
derpinnings of this authority. The new educated elite had to wait for the creation of 
an ideological scaffolding that would protect them within a cocoon of authority. This 
authority had been challenged by the older Republican political elites headed by Pres-
ident Sukarno because they saw the new upstart generation as undermining the elite 
position of the old political class. The formation of a foundational ideology for the 
Indonesian state had been a product of compromise and strategies of the old elite to 
ensconce the new educated managerial class within a state ideology that placed at the 
center the old political class. This structure would remain after the replacement of that 
political class with an army elite during the New Order.
 Keywords
Indonesian elite – political class – managerial class – 1945 generation – elite authority
Throughout the 1950s, efforts by both the government and the military to root 
out corruption put some of Indonesia’s most prominent financial and eco-
nomic policymakers behind bars. In a large round- up of corruption suspects 
carried out by the military in 1957 many prominent policymakers, including 
Bank of Indonesia’s first governor, Jusuf Wibisono, and economists such as 
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Ong Eng Die, and Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, were 
implicated.1 Throughout the nation’s history, the position of policymakers has 
been precarious. Only during the New Order did the offices of those in charge 
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of determining Indonesia’s policy direction become relatively safe from scru-
tiny. A strong state was what was needed to create this ‘safe space’, something 
that was achieved by both the colonial and the New Order regimes.
How to ensure bureaucratic authority in an open and politically active so-
ciety was the big question of the 1950s. The priyayi class formed the Javanese 
bureaucracy, and its claim to rule was based on traditional notions of authority 
and the support of the Dutch colonial state.2 However, the roots of its author-
ity were deteriorating by the 1950s. The anti- feudal rhetoric of the nationalists 
attacked core priyayi privileges, while their support from the general populace 
weakened. The miracle, perhaps, was how they managed to survive relatively 
well as a group into the 1950s and 1960s. In an analysis of the country’s elite in 
the early New Order period, Donald Emmerson showed that the fundamental 
classification of the Indonesian elite remained the same until the early 1970s, 
with abangan3 in control of the bureaucracy and santri4 in control of Parlia-
ment, and both aliran having an equal share of control of the military.5
As a social group, the priyayi had institutional assistance in overcoming the 
difficulties of transitioning to a modern Indonesian state. They had two main 
strengths. First, they monopolized the local administrations. Nationalists, 
most of whom hailed from a priyayi background, did not inherit or develop 
a bureaucracy to counter the official bureaucracy of the colonial state. Sug-
gestions of destroying the priyayi bureaucracy early on in the independence 
year of 1945 came to naught, as most of the state leaders, including Sukarno, 
Mohammad Hatta, and Sjahrir, understood that they were dependent on the 
Pangreh/ Pamong Praja (indigenous bureaucracy).6
Second, their access to state power allowed them access to education.7 
Their near- monopoly on higher education meant that they could equip 
 2 Heather Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite. The Colonial Transformation of the 
Javanese Priyayi (Singapore: Heinemann, 1979), 144– 51.
 3 Javanese Muslims who practise a syncretic form of Islam.
 4 Javanese Muslims who practise an orthodox form of Islam.
 5 The military elite, though, was by the early 1960s overwhelmingly Javanese (60– 80% of the 
officers). Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1987), 37. These figures changed from the 1960s onwards as access to education expanded. 
See Theodore M. Smith and Harold F. Carpenter, ‘Indonesian Students and Their Career As-
pirations’, Asian Survey, 14/ 9 (September 1974), 807– 26.
 6 Sukarno very much supported the Pangreh Praja and extolled their virtues in many of his 
speeches to the corps during the revolution. The republican elite gave priority to the Pangreh 
Praja for the top echelon posts during early independence, for instance. Anthony Reid, Indo-
nesian National Revolution, 1945– 1950 (Hawthorn: Longman, 1974), 32.














themselves to meet the needs of the modern state. Even more important-
ly, they were able to obtain the power needed to determine state– society 
relations through the new authority that they acquired from education: the 
authority of experts. The modernization theory model based on the author-
ity of experts, crafted by development economics, sociology, scientific man-
agement, and public administration specialists, was a model of modernity 
that the priyayi found inherently attractive. The most important aspect of 
the model was the monopolistic position of the managers as a special group 
of educated supermen.
Yet it would be a mistake to think that a mere diploma was enough to confer 
the magic of authority on these newly graduated students. Java’s pre- colonial 
bureaucracy employed gangs of jago (strongmen) and hoodlums as tools of 
societal control. As Heather Sutherland has remarked, in pre- colonial times, 
‘under Mataram [rule] terror and torture had been essential instruments of 
control; under the Dutch, in theory, there was the rule of law. In practice, many 
priyayi had recourse to intimidation and bribery.’8 Discussions of the criminal-
ity of the state and the role of strongmen and gangsters (preman) as clients or 
extensions of the state illustrate the inherent flaw in abstracting the state as a 
specific set of bounded institutions with specific authorities. In fact, the state 
extended beyond its legal boundaries.9 This dichotomy of the official, legal, 
professional, and modern against the other side – the unofficial, illegal, unpro-
fessional, and traditional – continued in the post- colonial state. The Pangreh 
Praja, the indigenous bureaucracy that originated from Java but was assigned 
to positions throughout the archipelago, arose from a pre- colonial bureaucra-
cy whose claim to authority was based on military power.10 Its accession to be-
ing part of the state was based on a prior demonstration of real military pow-
er. Robert Cribb showed that this notion of violence as conferring legitimate 
 8 Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite, 26.
 9 The jago and preman element as part of the state- extension in society is discussed in all 
periods of Indonesian history. See, for instance, Schulte Nordholt and Sutherland for the 
colonial period, Barker for the New Order, and Lindsey for the post- New Order period. 
Henk Schulte Nordholt, ‘The Jago in the Shadow: Crime and Order in the Colonial State’, 
Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs, 25/ 1 (Winter 1991), 74– 91; Joshua Barker, ‘State 
of Fear: Controlling the Criminal Contagion in Suharto’s New Order’, Indonesia, 66 (Octo-
ber 1998), 6– 43; Tim Lindsey, ‘The Criminal State: Premanisme and the New Indonesia’, in 
Grayson Lloyd and Shannon L. Smith (eds), Indonesia Today. Challenges of History (Singa-
pore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), 283– 97.
 10 Henk Schulte Nordholt, ‘A Genealogy of Violence’, in Freek Colombijn and Thomas 
Lindblad (eds), Roots of Violence in Indonesia:  Contemporary Violence in Historical 
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authority was what caused many of the members of Jakarta’s underworld to 
fight in the revolution.11
Although the Dutch prided themselves on their ability to enforce the rule 
of law in the archipelago, there continued to be something of a modus vivendi 
between the priyayi bureaucrats and the criminal elements/ local bullies who 
kept order in rural society. The local bureaucracy had to have protection from 
above and collaboration from local strongmen. These two long arms of the bu-
reaucracy would increasingly be provided by the military, as both the overseer 
of the state and its enforcer on the ground.
The history of the modern Indonesian state is thus a history of its bureau-
cracy and, by extension, the nation’s priyayi elite. As Professor James Mackie 
contends, Indonesia’s elite and growing middle class were ‘essentially bureau-
cratic elites or, as in the Sukarno era, a party- political elite. To the extent that 
an Indonesian middle class has been emerging over the last three decades, it 
is primarily a salaried and professional middle class, not an entrepreneurial 
or propertied [one].’12 This is, of course, a simplification of the reality. First, 
although the majority of Indonesian bureaucrats were Javanese, there were 
large numbers of non- Javanese who became important members of the elite; 
this was particularly true for the military.13 Many of the economists that were 
to play an important part during the New Order, such as Emil Salim and Frans 
Seda, were not Javanese.14 Second, the priyayi class itself, as a result of educa-
tion, was undergoing significant changes.
Franklin Weinstein divided Indonesia’s twentieth- century elite into three 
groups based on their respective generations:  1928, 1945, and 1966. The 1928 
generation had enjoyed a good colonial education and furthered their studies 
at Dutch universities. Their world view was highly influenced by the works of 
Karl Marx and other European social theorists, and although initially they had 
a positive view of the United States, the ‘betrayal’ of America during the revo-
lutionary struggle made them wary of the US.15
 11 Robert Cribb, Gangsters and Revolutionaries. The Jakarta People’s Militia and the 
Indonesian Revolution, 1945– 1949 (North Sydney: Allen Unwin, 1991), 89– 99.
 12 J. A. C. Mackie, Property and Power in New Order Indonesia (n.p.: n.n., 1983), 1.
 13 Ann Gregory has noted, though, that the number of Javanese occupying important gov-
ernment positions increased during Guided Democracy and the New Order. Ann Gregory, 
‘Recruitment and Factional Patterns of the Indonesian Political Elite: Guided Democracy 
and the New Order’, PhD dissertation, Columbia University, New York, 1976, 108.
 14 Many of the technocrats were also non- Muslim, including the Catholic Frans Seda and 
J.  B. Sumarlin and the Protestant Radius Prawiro, among others. Hamish McDonald, 
Suharto’s Indonesia (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1981), 76.
 15 Franklin Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence (Ithaca: 












The second group was the 1945 generation. The majority of this generation 
joined student or youth militias set up and led by the Japanese during the Sec-
ond World War. Some of the Japanese propaganda determined their world view 
after the war. Unlike the 1928 generation, the 1945 generation did not receive a 
full colonial education. The government’s reduction of the education budget 
in the 1930s, owing to the Depression and the increasing availability of ‘nation-
alist’ schools that competed with Dutch education in the colony, affected their 
outlook.16 Aside from becoming soldiers and participating in the war, many 
youngsters also had the chance to become low- and mid- level civil servants 
before going off to universities in Indonesia, with some continuing with post- 
graduate study in the United States. Although less Marxist in their outlook in 
comparison to many of the nationalists of the 1928 generation, they were gen-
erally open to the ideas of the left. Their involvement in the Indonesian state 
as administrators or army officers and their formative educations abroad were 
important factors that meant that they had a different view of state– society 
relations to the earlier generation, which had had little opportunity to work 
in managerial government services, had received an almost exclusively Dutch 
education, and were Dutch- speaking.17
The 1966 generation was the one that grew up during the Guided Democra-
cy and cheered at the ending of Sukarno’s regime and the rise of the New Or-
der.18 This generation was generally deeply anti- Marxist, if not apolitical, but 
for our purpose will not be referred to further because of its limited relevance 
to the discussion.
The shift from the democracy of the 1950s to Guided Democracy and the 
New Order can be seen in terms of the shift from the 1928 generation to the 
1945 generation. The gradual control of the bureaucracy and state by the 1945 
generation occurred under the aegis of the 1928 generation. The Guided De-
mocracy was a period of transition and many in the 1928 generation saw their 
powers being eroded. The younger members of the generation, just graduating 
from American universities, were able to obtain government positions but saw 
their influence as highly limited to middle management or academic positions.
 16 A process of politicizing the teachers in government- owned Indonesian schools also 
occurred during the period, signifying the increased attention being paid to participatory 
pedagogy, which Agus Suwignyo has termed ‘public intellectuality’. This process appeared 
again as part of the participatory discourse of Indonesian nationalism, which will be 
discussed further in the next chapters. Agus Suwignyo, ‘The Breach in the Dike: Regime 
Change and the Standardization of Public Primary- School Teacher Training in Indonesia, 
1893– 1969’, Dissertation, Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, Leiden, 2013, 152– 207.
 17 Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy, 42– 65.
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Yet, the Guided Democracy was anything but under the full control of the 
1928 generation. Many of its influential policymakers espoused ideas that were 
a reaction against the upstart 1945 generation. In an age where the iconic im-
age of the white- collar office leader or plant manager was a man employing 
mathematically inclined science and social science,19 even in such an under-
developed society as 1950s’ Indonesia, the old elite was educationally inade-
quate. In the face of the new perspectives on efficiency and its associated man-
agerial tools, the old elite came from another time. They came from a period 
when leadership was earned through revolutionary capabilities, and where 
history and literature, rather than the graphs of economists, the analyses of 
psychologists, and the theories of sociologists guided the workings of human 
society and the paths of nations; a period in which understanding how the 
state worked and how government functioned meant studying the law, instead 
of time- motion or other Taylorist tools.
Ann Gregory wrote:
There is no continuity between the Guided Democracy non- party elite 
segment and the technocrats of the New Order. The very nature of the 
two segments differs. The technocratic segment contains a high number 
of professionals for whom politics is a secondary career begun after suc-
cess was achieved in their primary occupation, whereas for most of the 
Guided Democracy non- party elite politics was their primary career.20
This difference, as we will see, resulted in a deep distrust of the new genera-
tion of expert social scientists. According to MacDougal, ‘their emergence in 
policy making roles represents a fundamental shift in the nature of the ruling 
elite’.21 It was this inherent tension between what Roeslan Abdulgani termed 
the ‘professionals’ and ‘unprofessionals’, Herbert Feith called the ‘administra-
tors’ and ‘solidarity- makers’,22 Pye called the ‘administrators’ and ‘politicians’ 
in Burma,23 and Franz Schurmann called the ‘experts’ and ‘reds’ in China,24 or 
 19 C. Wright Mills, White Collar. The American Middle Class (New York: Galaxy, 1956), 142– 60.
 20 Gregory, ‘Recruitment and Factional Patterns’, 349.
 21 John James MacDougall, ‘Technocrats as Modernizers. The Economists of Indonesia’s 
New Order’, PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1975, 15.
 22 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy, 24– 6 and 113– 22.
 23 Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation- Building: Burma’s Search for Identity (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), 97– 109.
 24 Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University 













indeed amongst Indonesians themselves that worried the authorities.25 The 
bureaucracy’s authority was made possible due to an international protocol 
that was determined by educational and ideological status. To understand the 
Indonesian state and society without considering this important international 
dimension would omit a basic component in determining the reasons why a 
certain group of people, who were American- trained, came to dominate poli-
cymaking in what was essentially a military dictatorship.
1 Tensions in the Guided Democracy: The 1928 Generation and Their 
Ideology
Roeslan Abdulgani said that ‘we are therefore faced with the peculiar situation 
where economists, stern anti- communists all, present us with a plan which 
politicians believe impossible without economic and social coercion along 
communist lines’.26 What those of the older generation feared from economists 
and other social scientists was what they considered the inherently authoritar-
ian nature of their ideology. The premise of both communism and Western 
social science was an authoritarian state wherein people of intelligence and 
good faith were excluded from participation and authority. This dislike was 
obviously shared by Sukarno. In his address at the Bandung Non- Alignment 
Summit (Konferensi Asia– Afrika, kaa), he expounded:  ‘I beg of you, do not 
think of colonialism only in the classic form which we of Indonesia, and our 
brothers in different parts of Asia and Africa, knew. Colonialism has also its 
modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, actual 
physical control by a small but alien community within a nation.’27 The fear 
of authoritarianism seemed to be a peculiar irony, considering the fact that 
 25 For instance, in the discussion on the creation of expert manpower and the university 
system in the 1960s, which emphasized the creation of both ‘reds’ and expert cadres. 
See Bachtiar Rifai, Perkembangan Perguruan Tinggi selama 20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka 
(Jakarta: Departemen Perguruan Tinggi dan Ilmu Pengetahuan, 1965), 26.
 26 Roeslan Abdulgani, Beberapa Soal Demokrasi dan Ekonomi. Buah Karangan Roeslan 
Abdulgani dalam ‘The Far Eastern Survey’ dan ‘United Asia’ (Jakarta:  Dewan Nasional, 
1958), 33. Of course, Abdulgani was a politician first and a thinker second. He was to sur-
vive the transition to the New Order and become part of the new regime, one that was to 
be dominated by those professional, textbook thinkers he had once derided. Whatever his 
belief, his position as a spokesperson of the Guided Democracy state gave credence to his 
announcement, if not purely of his own devising, then as a perfectly capable filter from 
which the state produced its discourse.
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Guided Democracy itself limited the participation of parties and organizations 
it deemed dangerous, the most significant of which were Sjahrir’s Indonesian 
Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, psi) and the santri- based Masyumi 
Party. Both the psi and Masyumi were banned in 1960.
Yet, the attack on these parties was also explicitly an attack on the nascent 
technocracy, whose ‘liberal’ credentials had been built up through its control 
of the liaison institutions that connected the pools of financial aid and the 
educational opportunities of the international community with its Indonesian 
protégé. These institutions were often managed by the psi, whose members 
and sympathizers became prominent authorities in important bodies such as 
the National Planning Body (Badan Perantjang Nasional, bpn) and the Army 
Staff and Command School (Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat, Ses-
koad). The formation of various Guided Democracy institutions was intend-
ed to replace these bodies, which had become dominated by ‘administrators’. 
There was one important and major exception: the Army Staff and Command 
School under General Abdul Haris Nasution. Although Nasution had little 
sympathy for the psi,28 he was considered a relatively able administrator.
Sukarno needed the support of the military, yet the development of the 
army in the 1950s resulted in the reduced influence of peta- based army com-
manders,29 who had similar ideological views to Sukarno and who were just as 
suspicious of the educated ‘professionals’.30 However, the group was initially 
successful in ousting Nasution from power after the attempted putsch of 1952.31 
Despite this, after 1955, Nasution saw his star rise again. In fact, it was Sukarno 
who appointed him chief of staff of the army in 1955, thus placing Nasution at 
the head of a vast and growing military government that mimicked and then 
took over many of the administrative duties of civilian institutions within the 
state and the economy. Nasution thus, by the end of the 1950s, had control of 
both the military government and the military schools.32 As newly graduated 
 28 clm Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution. A  Political Biography (St. 
Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1985), 125– 6. Sjahrir calling the headquarters of the 
army ‘a fascist military clique headed by Nasution’ further distanced him from this party.
 29 peta stands for Pembela Tanah Air (Defenders of the Homeland).
 30 In an article in Vrij Nederland, the Dutch journalist J. Eijkelboom called Abdulgani a par-
rot. The parroting nature of the elites of the Guided Democracy may point to the weak-
ness in saying that there was a whole generation of pro- Sukarnoist elements, but it is 
undeniable that there was a coterie of people within the elite who risked their fortunes 
on supporting Sukano throughout the entire Guided Democracy.
 31 Penders and Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution, 82.
 32 Splits within the army elites occurred at the regional level instead of the national level, 













Indonesian social scientists started to arrive from the United States in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, they found a state that was suspicious of receiving them 
but at the same time keen to benefit from their expertise. One major institu-
tion that opened its arms to incoming social scientists was Nasution’s army. His 
successor, General Ahmad Yani, although loyal to Sukarno, kept the doors of 
the military open to these recent graduates.
The tension of the Guided Democracy can be understood, albeit simplisti-
cally, as a tension between Sukarno and Nasution, each representing an ide-
ology produced from totally different eras. Nasution was born on 3 December 
1918, seventeen years after Sukarno (6 June 1901). They came from different 
generations, maturing intellectually in different periods and under different 
social conditions. While Sukarno was a typical 1928- generation member, form-
ing his ideas on state– society relations during the colonial period, Nasution’s 
formative period was during the revolutionary struggle. The revolution was a 
formative period that forged the 1945 generation. For instance, many of the 
people in the ‘Berkeley Mafia’, the notorious name coined for Suharto’s cabal 
of technocrats, had been soldiers during the revolution.33
2 Sukarno
Sukarno was born in Surabaya in the year 1901. Unlike many of his fellow na-
tionalists, he had never gone to Europe. He did, however, consume a large num-
ber of books written by European social theorists, from Marx to Weber. His 
father was Javanese and his mother Balinese, and despite his depiction of pov-
erty in his autobiography, his family was wealthy enough as minor members 
 33 For instance, Suhadi Mangkusuwondo joined the Student Army of the Republic of 
Indonesia (Tentara Republik Indonesia Pelajar, trip) militia in Malang, Emil Salim 
was active in the student army in Palembang, and Subroto joined in the fight with the 
peta army. Those who had not been active in fighting during the revolution, amongst 
them Mohammad Sadli and Sarbini Sumawinata, were slightly older and thus were more 
intellectually active. See Suhadi Mangkusuwondo, ‘Recollections of My Career’, Bulletin 
of Indonesian Economic Studies, 31/ 1 (April 1996), 34– 5; Subroto, ‘Recollections of My 
Career’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 34/ 2 (August 1998), 68– 70; Emil Salim, 
‘Recollections of My Career’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 33/ 1 (April 1997), 47; 
Mohammad Sadli, ‘Recollections of My Career’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 
39/ 1 (April 1993), 36; and Sarbini Sumawinata, ‘Recollections of My Career’, Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies, 28/ 2 (August 1992), 34– 5. Lastly, the doyen of the Berkeley 
Mafia, Widjojo Nitisastro, also took part in the revolutionary war for independence. Peter 
McCawley and Thee Kian Wie, ‘In Memoriam: Widjojo Nitisastro, 1927– 2012’, Bulletin of 
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of the priyayi.34 His father, being a theosophist, was deeply into the Javanese 
religion. Sukarno himself grew up within a Javanese milieu and would forever 
remain enthralled by the history and culture of Java.35 Although a follower of 
the Javanese religion, Sukarno was happy enough to venture into explorations 
of Islam during his period of banishments in the 1930s.36
A peculiar and enduring theme of Sukarno’s belief was corporatism, the 
possibility of reconciling the fragmented divisions of Indonesia’s aliran into 
one imposing unity. In a 1926 article, Sukarno expounded his Nasakom37 vi-
sion, which reasoned away the differences by stressing the commonalities of 
the major strands of Indonesia’s radical political movements: radical nation-
alist, Islamic revivalist, and communist.38 The most significant commonality 
was their anti- capitalist, anti- imperialist, and anti- liberal drives, and their 
calls for Indonesian independence.39 Sukarno was unusual in that the ideas 
he espoused never fundamentally changed throughout his life. Imprisonment 
and banishment had left him distrustful of both the state and its institutions, 
particularly the courts. Like many of his fellow nationalists, he was enthralled 
by the ideas of Marxists, who subscribed to the anti- colonial cause. Reading 
the works of Karl Kautsky, Rudolf Hilferding, Karl Renner and H. N. Brailsford, 
he came to equate colonialism, the state, and capitalism with each other.40 
For him, the promise of technical and material progress made by the West/ 
capitalism was a lie. Sukarno kept pointing to people’s suffering as a result of 
imperialism. He saw capitalism as a big pipe that drains the wealth and pros-
perity away from those on the negative end of the modern imperial project.41
 34 Leslie H. Palmier, ‘Sukarno: The Nationalist’, Pacific Affairs, 30/ 2 (June 1957), 101– 19.
 35 His Nasakom vision was influenced by Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo’s Taman Siswa philos-
ophy. clm Penders, Life and Times of Sukarno (Rutherford: Farley Dickinson University 
Press, 1974), 24. Mangoenkoesoemo, according to Dutch administrator Charles van der 
Plas, played an important role in Westernizing Sukarno. Bob Herring, Soekarno: Founding 
Father of Indonesia, 1901– 1945 (Leiden: kitlv Press, 2002), 132– 4.
 36 Lambert Giebels, Soekarno, Nederlands onderdaan. Een biografie, 1901– 1950 
(Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1999), 214– 18. Also see Sukarno, Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, Vol. 
I (Jakarta: Panitya Penerbit Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 1964), 325– 455.
 37 Nasionalisme- Agama- Komunisme – Nationalism, Religion, Communism.
 38 Herring, Founding Father, 95.
 39 Penders, Life and Times of Sukarno, 30.
 40 Sukarno, ‘Swadeshi dan Massa- Aksi di Indonesia’, in Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 121– 57. 
His own idea, which led to the coining of the term Marhaenism, was rooted in the Marxist 
ideas of Karl Kautsky and Bakunin. Giebels, Soekarno, Nederlands onderdaan, 80– 1. 
Although borrowing from many Western thinkers, he did not bind himself to a single 
Western frame of thought. Herring, Founding Father, 102.


















Sukarno was suspicious of liberalism. Although the Netherlands espoused 
a social- democratic ideology, the liberal elements of the Dutch state were the 
mainstay that endured in the Netherlands throughout the inter- war period 
when many other European states turned to fascism or communism. The 1920s 
and 1930s saw many parts of Europe ending their experiments with parliamen-
tary democracy and the rise of strongmen as the leaders of unified, racially 
purified nations – in the process displacing hundreds of thousands of people 
in Eastern Europe, and later, during the war, killing millions.42 Although the 
Netherlands never fell into extremism, its imperialist policies strengthened 
Sukarno’s disdain for liberals. Here was a liberal, democratic, and enlightened 
European state and yet it was also the agent of Western capitalism, draining 
the wealth of the people of the Indies.
Growing up in the aftermath of the First World War, Sukarno believed in 
the Marxist criticism of capitalism and heralded the end of the liberal order as 
the result of the loss of political control over the masses. Sukarno, like many 
of his nationalist compatriots, had a much more positive view of the United 
States of America prior to Indonesia’s revolution. There was thus a perception 
that democratic states were different from authoritarian ones. Sukarno grew 
up being explicitly anti- fascist in this regard: ‘The Indonesian soul is the soul 
of democracy, the soul of the common people (kerakyatan), while the fascist 
soul is anti- democratic, anti- people.’43
He placed the rise of fascism within the logic of capitalism as an expression 
of the last phase of the decline of capitalism.44 From this Marxist viewpoint, 
fascism was the product of cooperation between the corporation and the pe-
tite bourgeoisie.45 In a speech to Parliament during the Guided Democracy, 
he said:
We can no longer follow the politics of liberalism […] our revolution is 
a multi- complex revolution, a summing up of many revolutions in one 
generation, all of which generates conflicts. Without the leadership in 
providing planning in each of the fields and complexity of this revolu-
tion, we will achieve a complexity in chaos. We must have a planned 
 42 Mazower, Dark Continent, 1– 75.
 43 Sukarno, ‘Indonesia versus Fasisme. Faham jang bertentangan dengan Djiwa Indonesia’, 
in Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 457.
 44 Sukarno, ‘Beratnja Perdjoangan melawan Fasisme. Perlunja Menarik Simpati Kaum 
Kleinburgertum dan Kaum Tani di Djerman’, in Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 549. All trans-
lations in the book is made by the author.
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policy. This is the central idea of Guided Democracy. Our revolution is 
not a revolution for the sake of revolution, it is a highly planned, clear and 
certain type of revolution.46
In fact, the word ‘Guided’ itself has a somewhat similar ring to the ‘expert and 
manager- led’ state and society. It is a rearrangement of the entire society, to-
wards the creation of a ‘Socialism à la Indonesia’.47
The role of the state was to guide the revolution, produce elites, and recreate 
society in the most logical and scientific fashion possible. Replacing an atom-
ized society, the state would eventually take over the economy. In the words of 
Abdulgani:
Within the framework of Indonesian society, economic cooperation 
and collective action will be effective, not nineteenth- century Western 
individualism. In any case, the fact is that such individualism is out-
moded, even in the West. It has been displaced by state enterprise and 
monopoly, which leave little scope for the idealized capitalism of an 
earlier day.48
Liberalism was the ideology that was imposed on Indonesia to allow for the 
sinister neocolonial domination of international capitalism over society. Here 
we see a major conundrum in the Guided Democracy revolution:  despite 
Sukarno’s sincere intention to apply his ideals of corporatism and unite the 
various strands of national ideologies in the country, his championing of the 
state as the prime agent of revolution meant, in essence, giving more authority 
to the bureaucrats than to anyone else. Within the National Planning Council 
(Dewan Perantjang Nasional, Depernas) development plan, this danger was 
acknowledged. As E. H. Carr states in his book The Soviet Impact on the West-
ern World:
If on the other hand we neglect the ‘social’ aspect, we shall fall into the 
heresy of efficiency for efficiency’s sake and conclude that planning is sim-
ply the instrument of national power and national aggrandizement – the 
doctrine of fascism. Hitlerism took the name of national socialism. But 
the fact that it was not capitalist did not make it socialist: it approximated 
 46 Sukarno, Handbook on the Political Manifesto, 31.
 47 Sukarno, Handbook on the Political Manifesto, 31.








far more nearly to the conceptions of the American ‘technocrats’ or of Mr 
Burnham’s ‘managerial revolution’ – the cult of efficiency for the sake of 
power.49
As we will see, in the initial Guided Democracy state, there was a genuine ef-
fort to involve a variety of people within the state.50 This only lasted briefly 
and acted to strengthen the idea that the country needed the experts it once 
thought it could do without. The focus on planning or retooling, the institu-
tional approach to revolution, and the centralization of power within bodies 
and experts highlights the difficulties of allowing ‘society’ into the ‘state’ while 
at the same time applying a planning programme that was to be meticulous, 
scientific, and efficient. In the words of D. H. Assegaff: ‘In the practice of devel-
opment, there needs to be firm leadership. Without leadership, the develop-
ment would be shaky, and could even result in the failure of a well- thought- out 
plan.’51
This state- controlled idea, embodied in Keynesianism and communist in-
dustrialism, represented the Weltanschauung of the era. This explains why 
Guided Democracy was so successful in bringing together a range of wide-
ly disparate groups within the government. The application of Nasakom to 
Guided Democracy, which entailed giving equal roles to the three major al-
iran in the various institutions, transcended the ideological divide. It also 
meant that the nation- state could go either way:  becoming a communist 
state or a military state. The real possibility of a communist takeover seemed 
slim, even in the middle of the 1960s. Yet, the fear of one was enough to push 
the army to position itself comfortably within the ever- expanding state insti-
tutions that were replacing the ‘nineteenth- century individualism’ of Indo-
nesian liberalism. Many of the ideas of the army were established, or at least 
voiced, by its most important member, army chief of staff General Abdul 
Haris Nasution.
 49 Quoted in Rantjangan Dasar Undang- undang Pembangunan Nasional Semesta- 
Berantjana Delapan Tahun: 1961– 1969, Buku ke I, Djilid ii: Sosialisme Tripola Pembangunan, 
236. Carr was quoted in Dutch and Abdulgani omitted the line ‘Hitlerism took the name 
of national socialism’ to avoid any comparison between socialism à la Indonesia and 
fascism. E. H. Carr, The Soviet Impact on the Western world (London: MacMillan and co., 
1946), 27.
 50 This was also Lenin’s policy in his attack on the bureaucracy and his wish to draw the 
masses into the direct management of state affairs. Carr, The Soviet Impact, 17– 19.
 51 D. H. Assegaff, ‘Aspek Management dalam Pembangunan Semesta Berentjana’, Manager, 
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3 Nasution
In many ways, Nasution was the opposite of Sukarno. Unlike Sukarno’s Javanese 
credentials, Nasution was a Batak, a term referring to a people living in the in-
terior of North Sumatra in the Lake Toba region. He was thus an ‘Outer Island-
er’. Unlike Sukarno’s abangan religious beliefs, Nasution was a devout Muslim 
and continued to be so throughout his life.52 Sukarno was brash and impulsive; 
Nasution was reflective and pragmatic. He studied to become a teacher at the 
Training School for Indigenous Teachers (Hogere Inlandse Kweekschool, hik) 
in Bandung in 1935. Sukarno and other nationalists influenced Nasution in the 
1930s, as he was reaching intellectual maturity.53 Nasution’s essentially prag-
matic character saw him deciding to join the colonial army at the outbreak 
of the Second World War in what he ironically considered to be a nationalist 
gesture.54
When the Netherlands capitulated to Germany in May 1940, Nasution 
volunteered as a cadet officer and was admitted, along with five other Indo-
nesians, to the newly created Royal Military Academy (Koninklijke Militaire 
Akademie, kma) in Bandung. Nasution specialized in infantry studies. After 
the fall of the Netherlands East Indies to Japan in 1942, Nasution went into 
hiding in various places on Java. After three months, he returned to Bandung 
when the Japanese released all Indonesian Royal Netherlands Indies Army 
(Koninklijke Nederlands- Indisch Leger, knil) soldiers. Knowing full well that 
the Japanese would ultimately be defeated, Nasution worked with a number of 
his knil colleagues, university students, and youth leaders. He did this initially 
by joining the paramilitary organizations created by the Japanese. Instead of 
joining peta, he joined the Priangan Soldier’s Aid Society (Barisan Pemuda 
Priangan) and was elected to the governing board. He also worked as an army 
instructor for the Seinendan, Keibodan, and other organizations. During the 
first year of the revolution, Nasution was promoted from an army instructor 
to commander of the Siliwangi Division (Komando Daerah Militer Siliwangi) 
(1946). He would then rise to commander- in- chief of the armed forces in Java 
(1948) and chief of staff of the army (1949– 1952 and again 1955– 1963).55
Many of his ideas concerning state– society relations were formulated 
during the revolutionary period, especially during the military emergency 
 52 Penders and Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution, 3.
 53 A. H. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Jilid I: Kenangan Masa Muda (Jakarta: Haji 
Masagung, 1990), 38– 40.
 54 Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Jilid I, 64– 5.











of the Second Dutch Aggression (19 December 1948– 5 January 1949), which, 
as he was chief of operational staff at the Army Headquarters (Markas Besar 
Tentara), resulted in the publication of his guerrilla instructions. Because 
of a lack of focus on the part of the political leadership, the army was not 
able to form a conventional ground force before the arrival of the Dutch. 
Nasution blamed this indecision squarely on the bickering politicians. In 
contrast, he resented the ability of the Dutch to create, from scratch, a func-
tioning army within a short period of time that was able to be deployed to 
the Indies.
For the early part of the revolution, Nasution was busy trying to create a 
professional army within his West Java Siliwangi Division. The division was 
to become the most professional part of the army. Based in Bandung, it also 
contained most of the knil military elements that had decided to join the 
Indonesian revolution. There were plenty of military thinkers and strategists 
within the division, which enabled the sharing of ideas. Nasution’s main ideas 
somewhat resembled those of Mao Zedong and can be summed up by Mao’s 
statement about the military being a fish and the people being the water. A fish 
out of water is akin to an army without the people’s support.56 As mentioned 
above, the idea of a guerrilla war was put forth and executed by Nasution dur-
ing his tenure as commander- in- chief of the armed forces in Java, when he also 
published a pamphlet on guerrilla warfare. As a military strategist, Nasution 
saw the implementation of ‘total war’ as a central component of Indonesia’s 
current and future security strategy.
Nasution’s 1948 guerilla strategy reduced the whole of state– society rela-
tions to within the dictates of a military strategy. As he phrased it:  ‘In this 
framework of total warfare, the leadership could recruit and plan a strategy 
of the whole people for one aim.’57 During the 1948 aggression, Nasution 
created a ‘guerrilla administration’, in which civilian administrators, who 
were not keen on cooperating with the Dutch administration, left for the 
countryside and recreated the state. The experience reduced the legitimacy 
of the politicians and the assertion of their necessary presence to the func-
tioning of the state. In Nasution’s words: ‘The leadership is held by civilian 
authorities, with the assistance of the “territorial” forces, but in its relation-
ship to war, everything must be brought under the supervision of the mili-
tary  leadership.’58
 56 Penders and Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution, 47– 50.
 57 Abdul Haris Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare (London:  Pall Mall Press, 
1965), 26.







The Indonesian Elite and Its Authority 33
Conforming to this idea, a military administration was created to mirror the 
civilian one. Guerrilla warfare was based on decentralized leadership and, in 
essence, had to be conducted on a local basis.59 Much of this was modelled on 
the German military district or Wehrkreise system, with the formation of seven 
independent military district (Tentara & Territorium).60 The military district 
was a product of militarized states such as America and Britain during the Sec-
ond World War, and the Chinese and Vietnamese variants that continued af-
ter the war. Thus, a Military Sub- District Command (Komando Onder- District 
Militer, kodm) was created at the kecamatan (or sub- district) level; a Military 
Region Command (Komando Distrik Militer, kdm), at the kabupaten (or dis-
trict) level; and a Military Sub- Territorium Command (Sub- Territorium Militer, 
stm), at the residency (karesidenan) level, with a commander appointed in 
every province. This idea was continued during the Guided Democracy under 
the Tjatur Tunggal61 system.
The assumption of territorial decentralization limited the national leader-
ship to coordinating and directing. As Nasution explained, ‘The military, po-
litical, psychological, economic and social wars are conducted on a regional 
basis. Complete decentralization is an essential feature of a guerrilla war.’62 
Basic schooling, with the aim of eradicating illiteracy, and mobile health clin-
ics were envisaged as being provided by the military administration.63 The 
militarization of the administration would allow a degree of decentraliza-
tion within the bounds mandated by the army’s vertical command structure. 
While decentralization offered flexibility, it was predicated on the highly re-
duced roles of civilian politicians and the civil administration. This ‘territori-
alization’ of command allowed the central military authority to have greater 
control of the regions. For Nasution, the village had proven to be the most im-
portant component in guerrilla warfare. The territorial structure started from 
the village level. The lurah (village leaders) were integrated into the lowest 
level of military government. It was thus also in the villages that much of the 
social and economic development work carried out by the guerilla adminis-
tration occurred.
 59 In fact, ‘[t] he most salient characteristics of the army was its local character’. Gregory, 
‘Recruitment and Factional Patterns’, 242.
 60 Penders and Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution, 55.
 61 Tjatur Tunggal literaly means rour- in- one, a regional system of government in which the 
executive is replaced by a four- section committee; composed of the governor, the military 
commander, the police head and the head of the regional parliament. The system was 
dominated by the army.
 62 Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare, 52.












4 The Idea of Guided Democracy
Both the ideas of Sukarno and Nasution focused on the state as the provider 
of action. In Sukarno’s case, as a leadership that guides society on to the path 
to revolution; in Nasution’s, as an extension of the military, whose tentacles 
embraced the village and community. These ideas tried to solve the problem, 
outlined at the beginning of this chapter, of how to ensure the authority of the 
bureaucracy during the tumultuous years of revolution and parliamentary de-
mocracy in the 1940s and 1950s. On the one hand, revolution, as an ideological 
banner, inadvertently became a way to legitimize the guiding authority of the 
bureaucracy. As Sukarno stressed over and over again, Guided Democracy was 
a planned policy to enact a corporatist, national plan.
Nasution’s idea of total and territorial warfare elevated the role of the 
military to that of an essential component of state bureaucracy. The Guided 
Democracy state experienced the extension of military, that is, army, involve-
ment throughout the bureaucracy and the economy. One might cynically 
surmise that this was an effort to spread corruption on a grand scale. Yet, 
that would be to miss the more important point about state authority and 
control. The military presence at the village level was an affirmation of the 
authority of the bureaucracy- cum- military state leadership. The army’s deep 
relationships with parts of civil society, students, criminals, labour organi-
zations, and so forth not only competed with those of its communist coun-
terpart during the Guided Democracy; it was also used to regulate a specific 
kind of state– society relationship in which society was to be fully subordi-
nated through these civil society clienteles that were, in effect, extensions of 
the military.64
In the New Order, the army would thus provide the two things that the colo-
nial state had provided, but which had been lost during the revolutionary and 
the pre- New Order period. The first was the safety of bureaucratic legitimacy 
and authority. The army as the purveyor of power would convey authority to 
the bureaucracy through its power to protect them from state and non- state 
civil actors, such as Parliament and political parties. It also conveyed legitima-
cy through the implementation of a state ideology that put these bureaucratic 
experts on a pedestal: the ideology of development. Today, we think of devel-
opment as inherently different from Sukarno’s revolution; yet, this is purely a 
result of the failure of Guided Democracy.
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The second was the bureaucratic extension of control to rural areas. Dur-
ing the colonial era, the state used traditional authority and its local- bul-
ly clientele to provide this control.65 In the post- colonial period, this job 
was taken on by the army, along with its clients, to ensure state control at 
the lowest levels, thus leaving the bureaucracy with the job of planning 
 development.
Although the core leadership of the Guided Democracy displayed a lack of 
coherence over key issues regarding the Guided Democracy state and ideology, 
there was one person who succeeded in becoming Sukarno’s main ideologue, 
a person who was capable of translating ‘His Master’s voice’ with fidelity. This 
man was Roeslan Abdulgani, politician par excellence and former minister of 
information, who was, on several occasions, accused of corruption and who, 
along with Nasution, was one of only two members of Sukarno’s inner circle to 
have made the transition to the New Order alive and well. It is difficult to gauge 
the sincerity of Abdulgani’s words during this period. Yet, there is no doubt 
about his influence on Sukarno and the regime as a whole. Casper Schuuring 
claims that ‘Roeslan had a “steering hand” in the so- called guided democra-
cy’.66 Sukarno entrusted him with producing important papers and informa-
tion on the Guided Democracy and Economy, and it was Roeslan who was 
asked to confer with Professor Djokosoetono to develop a constitutional order 
for the new state.67
Perhaps one of the most enduring features of early Guided Democracy 
thought was the deep distrust of so- called experts. There was a particular dis-
trust of Western economists. In the words of Abdulgani: ‘I am no economist, 
and I have reservations about the purely professional approach of the econo-
mist. Particularly, I have reservations about the purely professional approach 
of the non- Indonesian economist, who, while putting his great skill and knowl-
edge at our disposal, is still outside the stream of our life, our hopes and de-
sires.’68 Roeslan Abdulgani’s explicit dislike of economists can be summed up 
in another of his quotes. Siding with what he called the ‘unprofessionals’ as 
 65 Schulte Nordholt, ‘Genealogy of Violence’, 33– 63. Schulte Nordholt argued that the colo-
nial state was a violent state and that ‘criminal elements’ such as the jago were an integral 
part of the state’s expression of power.
 66 Casper Schuuring, Abdulgani. 70 jaar nationalist van het eerste uur (Zutphen:  Walburg 
Press, 2003), 47. ‘Roeslan had een “sturende hand” gehad in de zogenoemde geleide 
democratie.’
 67 Sukarno, ‘Pidato Presiden Sukarno tentang “Demokrasi Terpimpin” dalam Sidang Dewan 
Nasional Ke- VIII Tanggal 23 Djuli 1958’, in Demokrasi Terpimpin, 2.










opposed to the professional experts, he said, ‘it was these unprofessionals who 
created and forwarded the Indonesian Nationalist Movement which proved 
capable of leading the country to shake off the bonds of colonialism […] There 
is no reason why such persons should be any less successful in the task of con-
tinuing the revolution.’69
The problem, then, was not simply economics per se, but its particular 
Western version. The Indonesian must search for his own economic theory 
and experiment:
It is here, in connection with this effort to attain perfection, there lies 
the appropriateness of my recommendation to always ‘think and rethink’, 
‘shape and re- shape’ […] and not to immerse ourselves in textbook think-
ing alone, not to immerse ourselves in only swallowing everything stuffed 
down our throats from the outside, not just to immerse ourselves in the 
atmosphere of Hollandsdenken – Dutch way of thinking.70
Roeslan lamented on the failure of the first Five- Year Plan that had been 
hatched by the State Planning Bureau (Badan Perantjang Negara, bpn):
Perhaps the plans have failed, and perhaps they have not even been ap-
plied, because they run counter to certain basic truths about our coun-
try. They are plans based on Western conceptions, and do not necessarily 
have validity in another political and social environment. I am prepared 
to admit that, in the realm of pure economics, they are certainly ideal, 
but no economic planning can exist in a vacuum. It is dealing with people 
living in a society. I know of no reason to support the idea that Indone-
sian people will react in the same way to the same incentives as Western 
people do.71
 69 Roeslan Abdulgani, ‘The Lessons of Indonesia’s Experience of Planning’, in Politik dan 
Ilmu (Jakarta: Prapantja, 1962), 159.
 70 Sukarno, The Resounding Voice of the Indonesian Revolution. Supplements: Manipol- Usdek 
and the Birth of Pancasila (Jakarta: Department of Information, 1965), 34. The dislike of 
economists was obviously also well known amongst economists themselves. Widjojo 
Nitisastro commented that ‘there was a strong view among the public at the time that 
the science of economics was totally useless textbook thinking. Some even viewed this 
as something that could harm the way of life of the people.’ In Widjojo Nitisastro, The 
Indonesian Development Experience (Singapore:  Institute of South East Asian Studies, 
2011), 3.
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That the West failed to provide an adequate economic plan for the nation 
meant that Indonesia needed another plan, one that would throw away the 
constraints of textbook thinking:
To solve the economic problems of a nation that has been already formed, 
especially for nations that are called nations arrivés, perhaps the person 
of outstanding skills in the routine of economics would be required, very 
precise knowledge of economic science would be required, very highly 
technical, very ‘expert’, knowledge of economics would be required. But 
praise be to God, I know that our economic problems do not have to be 
solved in a routine fashion.72
The revolutionary character of the Guided Democracy was to be placed in 
the hands of what he termed the ‘non- professional’ – those who had had ex-
perience in the real world, with a broad education and broad interests: ‘Gov-
ernment by experts is no substitute for democracy, any more than good gov-
ernment is any substitute for self- government. Again, that pattern of thinking 
shows a deplorable lack of faith in the good sense and intelligence of the 
 people.’73
This belittling of the professional was a major theme of Sukarno’s speeches, in 
which he often attacked those ‘bald headed non- political individuals and text- 
book thinking teachers’.74 This sentiment was to be displayed by the Depernas, 
which was to be composed of ordinary people, with a smattering of intellec-
tuals. As Abdulgani phrased it: ‘Differing from the planning and development 
boards of the past, who restricted their membership to the expert- intellectuals, 
the Depernas will supply its membership from the golongan karya,75 who are 
 72 Sukarno, The Resounding Voice, 44.
 73 Abdulgani, Demokrasi dan Ekonomi, 19.
 74 Selo Soemardjan, The Changing Role of Intellectuals in Indonesian National Development: A 
Socio- Historical Interpretation (n.p.: n.n., 1976), 14. The particular attack on the Economics 
Faculty of the University of Indonesia after the prri rebellion and Sumitro’s role was 
directed by the leftist element and President Sukarno. The faculty’s relationship with 
Berkeley and the Ford Foundation made it an even easier target. John Bresnan, At Home 
Abroad. A Memoir of the Ford Foundation in Indonesia, 1953– 1973 (Jakarta: Equinox, 2006), 
41. For more on the prri rebellion, see Chapter 2, fn. 33.
 75 Golongan karya (or Golkar) functional groups are groups of associations based on their 
role in society (youth, women, farmers, journalists, intellectuals, and so forth), which in 
Sukarno’s ideal society were to replace political parties as the main components of politi-
cal participation. Golkar was continued under the Suharto regime as a method of political 











rooted and live in the community, without ignoring the advice and opinion of the 
experts.’76
Expert- intellectuals are motivated only by careerism and professionalism, 
which, according to Abdulgani, was the root problem of modern bureaucracy. 
Instead, the membership of the Depernas was to be comprised of the cultivat-
ed man, being ‘a person who has a general education and a wide and forward- 
looking perspective, who may not be or has not yet become a specialist, but 
who is not yet infected by the disease of modern bureaucracy’.77
Thus, the assumption of the Guided Democracy must be seen as an appeal 
for collectivism and the raising of the Indonesian masses as participants in 
its development. As discussed previously, the true ‘socialism à la Indonesia’ 
incorporated the masses as political subjects in the development process. In 
a speech in front of the Depernas in August 1959, Sukarno said: ‘Within man-
agement there must be decentralization and the democratization of control.’78 
The state was to be decentralized and democratized by opening up its man-
agement, which had previously been strongly monopolized by the experts. By 
empowering the non- professional, the people, that is, the masses, were em-
powered. Socialism à la Indonesia was not merely a means to reach the goals 
of the nation- state:  it was the goal itself. It required deep and wide- ranging 
changes within the Indonesian psyche.
The need to balance Western rationality and Indonesian spirituality was a 
touchy subject:  ‘The scientific/ rational way of thinking is something new to 
us Indonesians, because previously our culture has placed an emphasis on 
spiritual issues. This rational way of thinking is the result of Western culture, 
where a harmonious relationship has been achieved between rationality and 
the core values of Western culture.’79 Because of the divide in Indonesian 
 76 Roeslan Abdulgani, Sosialisme Indonesia (Jakarta: Jajasan Prapantja, 1963), 63. ‘Berbeda 
dengan dewan2 perantjang dan pembangunan jang dulu2, jang menitik- beratkan keang-
gautaannja kepada para intelek- ahli dan intelek- expert, maka Depernas mengutamakan 
keanggautaannja untuk golongan2 karya jang berakar dimasjarakat dan ditengah- tengah 
rakjat tanpa mengabaikan nasehat dan pendapat para ahli dan para expert.’
 77 Abdulgani, Sosialisme Indonesia, 63. ‘seorang jang berpendidikan umum, dan berpandan-
gan luas serta djauh kemuka, jang mungkin tidak ada atau belum gespecialiseerd, tetapi 
tidak kena tularan kesempitan pandangan dari penjakit birokrasi modern.’
 78 Quoted in Runturambi, Problim Management Ekonomi di Indonesia (Jakarta:  Sumber 
Tjahaja, 1963), 8.
 79 Rantjangan Dasar Undang- Undang Pembangunan Nasional Semesta- Berentjana 
Delapan Tahun: 1961– 1969, Buku ke iii, Bidang Mental/ Ruhani dan Penelitian, Jilid V: Pola 
Pendjelasan, Bidang Kebudajaan dan Pendidikan (Jakarta:  Dewan Perentjanaan, 1960), 
1024. ‘Tjara berfikir setjara ilmiah/ rasionil ini merupakan sesuatu jang baru bagi kita di 
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culture between belief and rational thought, it was important that the school 
system did not purely focus upon rationalism. The intellectualist foundation of 
the colonial education system had resulted in the estrangement of its Indone-
sian pupils from their own culture, leading them to consider their own culture 
worthless. This had led to the formation of a Westernized man: individualistic, 
materialistic, capitalistic, liberal, and intellectual, thus differing from the East-
ern man, who was a collectivist and a socialist, with a sense of family (kekeluar-
gaan), and a focus on harmony and giving weight to spiritual matters.80
The main appeal was thus to Indonesia’s newly educated youth, that is, the 
future elite of the nation. The universities therefore had a very important role 
in the process. Instead of liberal theories, they were expected to cultivate the 
ideas of scientific socialism. The universities thus were not expected to confine 
themselves to producing experts; they were also to produce militant, revolu-
tionized youths between the ages of 20 and 25 years. They were not to be a 
sanctum sanctorum saevis tranquillis in undis, an island of peace amongst the 
revolutionary upheaval, producing cynical, sceptical, hyper- intellectual, and 
hedonistic young people. Universities were not to be ivory towers that allowed 
the importation of ideas that would become barriers to progress and social-
ism.81 Sukarno reiterated the dangers of these types of intellectuals: ‘Cynicism 
would appear. The faith in the ability of their own nation would be shaken. 
The inlander souls would look down upon their own nation and praise to high 
heavens the foreigners. Especially amongst the intellectuals.’82
Abdulgani used the image of the helmsman assisted by experts to depict the 
Indonesian ‘elite’ under Guided Democracy. The experts would thus be relegat-
ed to the position of assistants to the more broadly cultivated elite. In speeches 
to the National Council (Dewan Nasional) conferences during the early years of 
Guided Democracy, Sukarno never once used the term experts (ahli); instead, 
he used the word ‘intellectuals’. In comparison, Djuanda and Nasution both 
used the word ‘experts’ in a positive light. Sukarno reiterated several times the 
experimental nature of the revolution and asked students and intellectuals to 
Tjara berfikir setjara rasionil ini adalah hasil kehidupan kebudajaan di Barat, dimana 
telah tertjapai harmoni antara tjara berfikir setjara rasionil itu dengan dasar2 kehidupan 
kebudajaan bangsa2 Barat itu.’
 80 Rantjangan Dasar Undang- undang Pembangunan Nasional, Buku Ke iii, Jilid v, 1024.
 81 Abdulgani, Sosialisme Indonesia, 98.
 82 Sukarno, ‘Penemuan Kembali Revolusi Kita’, in Tudjuh Bahan2 Pokok Indoktrinasi 
(Jakarta:  Dewan Pertimbangan Agung, 1962), 103. ‘Sinisme lantas timbul. Kepertjajaan 
kepada kemampuan bangsa sendiri gojang. Djiwa inlander jang memandang rendah 
kepada bangsa sendiri dan memandang agung kepada bangsa asing muntjul disana- sini, 








fill in the blanks: ‘It is you, the youths who are pursuing knowledge, the experts, 
the professors, all those with intelligence of the mind, that I ask to enrich my 
ideas.’83 The idea of having intellectual supremacy over the more technical ex-
perts was, of course, an elite conception that would allow the position of the 
1928 generation to continue despite the onslaught of the new generation. By 
positioning the politician as the helmsman in a boat, helped by the experts, 
the politician, as the purveyor of the revolution, would still have a role to play.
Sukarno always stressed his ideology’s universal nature, putting the Indone-
sian revolution within the spectrum of a humanity- wide revolution. He was to 
equate it favourably with the Chinese revolution. The roots of this fascination 
with China were based on the alleged efficacy of Chinese collectivism:
It is not to be denied that the development in the People’s Republic of 
China is a development under the policy of a New Democracy or a Peo-
ple’s Democracy, a type of state– society relations (ketatanegaraan) that 
is in accordance with the character of the Chinese nation. This is similar 
to the Guided Democracy, which we are implementing today in order to 
replace a worn and outdated liberal democracy. The wish of the people 
to be directed so as to participate in the development with efficiency of 
funds, time and forces should be made real.84
The Guided Democracy state shares a number of similarities and differences 
with the New Order state. Both saw the revolution and Indonesian socialism 
as having deep roots in Indonesia’s ancient cultural past. This cultural root 
is the source of Indonesian socialist ideals. ‘The Javanese concept of “Ratu 
Adil”, the Goddess of Justice’ is used by the Guided Democracy state, ‘for it is 
 83 Rantjangan Dasar Undang- Undang Pembangunan Nasional, Buku ke iii, Djilid v, 202. 
‘Kepadamulah, hai pemuda- pemudi jang sedang mengedjar ilmu, kepada Saudara2 ahli2, 
mahaguru2, kepada semua orang jang mempunjai intelligensi untuk berfikir, berusaha 
memperkaja ide saya ini.’
 84 Rantjangan Dasar Undang- Undang Pembangunan Nasional, Buku Ke I, Djilid 
I:  Pendahuluan, 22. ‘Dan suatu kenjataan jang tidak dipungkiri ialah, bahwa pemban-
gunan di rrt tersebut, adalah pembangunan dengan rentjana keseluruhannja dibawah 
pimpinan kebidjaksanaan daripada Demokrasi Baru atau Demokrasi Rakjat, jaitu suatu 
bentuk ketata- negaraan jang sesuai dengan kepribadian bangsa Tionghoa, seperti 
Demokrasi Terpimpin ditanah Indonesia jang akan kita laksanakan dewasa ini untuk 
menggantikan Demokrasi liberal jang telah usang dan tidak memenuhi tuntutan zaman. 
Terutama hasrat Rakjat jang dikerahkan tenaganja untuk ikut membangun dengan meli-
hatkan tendens untuk berhemat pembiajaan, waktu dan tenaga, hendaklah diperhatikan 
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again social justice which is meant here, not merely the implementation of 
laws, regulations and other social codes’.85 The Indonesian past is an agrarian- 
communitarian past, an ur- communist society whose latent socialism is inher-
ent in its deepest make up.86 The ancient past is thus shown to be socialist and 
leftist, not the glorification of a rightist, culturalist aristocratic culture:
Since ancient times, Indonesian society has been averse both to dicta-
torship and to the individualism of liberalism. The old system of govern-
ment was based upon musjawarah and mufakat (consensus) with the 
leadership of a single central authority in the hands of a ‘sesepuh’ or el-
der, who did not dictate, but led and protected.87
This idea of an elder who was not dictatorial was also used by the New Order 
to depict the ideal leadership. This is different from the feudal aristocratic as-
sumption of authority based on heredity. Alluding to the ideas of the aristo-
cratic nationalist Noto Soeroto, Abdulgani said that
Guided Democracy was not an Aristo- democracy or a Demo- aristocracy 
[…] This is because the term Guided Democracy is not a combination of 
the term Demos with Aristos, or the Kawulo with the Gusti. In other words, 
the Demos is not combined with Hero, Führer, Held or Il Duce, but with the 
idea of social justice; it is the synthesis between Democracy and Socialism.88
The body politic of the nation was to be pictured within the harmonious image 
of the family. In Abdulgani’s words:  ‘Guided Democracy is the democracy of 
the family system, without the anarchy of liberalism, without the autocracy 
of dictatorship.’89 Sukarno, though, rarely used the image of himself as father 
of the revolution for his position in Indonesian society. In comparison to Su-
harto, who fashioned himself as the father of development, Sukarno’s depic-
tion of himself was as an active man, who was part of the youth.90 Thus the 
 85 Roeslan Abdulgani, Manipol and usdek in Questions and Answers (Jakarta: Department 
of Information, 1961), 36.
 86 Abdulgani, Sosialisme Indonesia, 12.
 87 Abdulgani, Manipol and usdek, 40.
 88 Roeslan Abdulgani, Resapkan dan Amalkan Pantjasila (Jakarta:  Jajasan Prapantja, 
1964), 110.
 89 Abdulgani, Manipol and usdek, 39.
 90 Instead of father of the revolution, he was its mouthpiece, signifying vigour and partici-
pation. This was inherently different from Suharto, who looked on with the benign and 














leadership of the Guided Democracy was actually the leadership of an idea, 
of the nationalist ideology of Pancasila. Perhaps the most peculiar of the ideas 
that were discussed surrounding the Guided Democracy was its stated ideal of 
democracy. By extension, it was coupled with keeping a healthy distance from 
the military. Obviously, the period in question was to see a greater increase in 
military participation in all walks of life, but within the writings of its main 
ideologues, with the exception of Nasution, the military was always assumed 
to be a state apparatus.
5 The Ideology of the 1945 Generation
Selo Soemardjan, secretary to Sultan Hamengkubuwono ix and one of the 
pioneers of sociology in Indonesia, explicitly divided the elite into three 
groups:  the aristocrats, the religious leaders, and the intellectuals. Differing 
from Geertz’s broad classification of the abangan and santri, Soemardjan 
placed greater emphasis on the third group, whose legitimacy was created 
purely through education and technical capabilities: ‘It can even be said with-
out exaggeration that a university degree in modern Indonesian social life 
functions in the same way as did the now de- socialized aristocratic titles be-
fore the 1945 revolution for national independence and democracy.’91 It is of no 
little irony, though, that many of the Indonesian intellectuals were those men 
who had fought during the revolution and had the good luck of being family 
members of bureaucrats.92
There were two reasons for this. First, the revolutionary credential was an 
important component of legitimacy. Several of Suharto’s most important eco-
nomic policymakers, including Widjojo Nitisastro, Mohammad Sadli, and Sub-
roto, were active in the war in a student battalion.93
Second was the American educational experience. For the top policymak-
ers, America represented a formative influence that was not only important 
because it helped to determine the kinds of ideas that they had for the nation 
and the state, but more importantly, because their stay in the usa was punc-
tuated by an increasing sense of togetherness and a feeling of solidarity and 
common goals. In terms of economic policymaking, it was in the dormitories 
of the University of California, Berkeley and in the halls of the Army Staff 
 91 Soemardjan, The Changing Role of Intellectuals, 4.
 92 Gregory, ‘Recruitment and Factional Patterns, 52. The technocrats and the military came 
from the highest social- status origins (97% and 71% respectively).
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and Command School that the ideas for a future Indonesian economy were 
thought out. The head of the school, General Suwarto, often asked the econ-
omists to stay the night at the compound to discuss the Indonesian econ-
omy.94 Widjojo Nitisastro came to be the natural leader of the small team 
of economists (seventeen people in total) that determined policymaking 
during the entire New Order period.95 The American experience also under-
scored the importance of a university education as a binding force among 
the group. As Gregory stated, ‘The technocratic elite led primarily academ-
ic lives, before and after the completion of their degrees.’96 The universities 
represented a mechanism for elite recruitment and for forging solidarity, just 
as the officer school and the military legal school reflected the military side 
of the equation.
As David Bourchier and Vedi Hadiz explained, the New Order national dis-
course seemed to be a mishmash of ideas that at first sight appeared to clash 
with one another. On the one hand, the state was seen to be organicist,97 that 
is, state– society relations were seen through familial, nativist, and organic 
metaphors, with the state or elite being the father and the nation being the 
children. In line with Eastern ideals of family relationships, the emphasis was 
on harmony: the children were obliged to respect and follow the orders of the 
father. The roots of this organic notion were plucked from the ideas of the 
noted legal scholar Soepomo and then carried over into the New Order under 
Brigadier General Soetjipno and the Military Law Academy (Akademi Hukum 
Militer, ahm).98
The second strand of state– society relations was the emphasis on the com-
munitarian and agricultural basis of Indonesian society, which came from the 
army’s experience during the revolution and their anti- communist strategies 
at the end of the 1950s and 1960s, when they actively created and promoted 
civilian organizations that were extensions of the army in various sectors of 
society. Fearing social revolution from the agrarian population as a result of 
 94 Emil Salim, ‘Tanpa Tedeng Aling- aling’, in Ekonomi Indonesia di Era Politik Baru: 80 Tahun 
Muhammad Sadli (Jakarta: Kompas, 2002), 6.
 95 Ahmad Helmy Fuadi, ‘Elites and Economic Policies in Indonesia and Nigeria, 1966– 1998’, 
PhD dissertation, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam, 2012, 75.
 96 Gregory, ‘Recruitment and Factional Patterns’, 334.
 97 David Bourchier and Vedi R.  Hadiz (ed.), Indonesian Politics and Society. A  Reader 
(London:  RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 27; see also Anthony Reid, ‘Political Tradition in 
Indonesia: The One and the Many’, Asian Studies Review, 22/ 1 (March 1998), 23– 38; Barry 
Turner, ‘Nasution: Total People’s Resistance and Organicist Thinking in Indonesia’, PhD 
dissertation, Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne, 2005, 1– 28.












communist agitation, the army’s main aim was to develop and create pro-
grammes that would involve the military in rural areas on a more- or- less per-
manent basis.99
What was significant about the ideas of the New Order was actually how 
widely it was accepted amongst the elite. There were certainly differences of 
opinion as to whether the economy should be opened up to investment or 
whether an import- substitution industrialization model was the better option. 
Another significant aspect was how many of the New Order’s ideas were actu-
ally a continuation of those that had been developed during the Guided De-
mocracy. As General Panggabean remarked during his opening speech at the 
second army seminar in 1966:
What we mean by the New Order is not a political, economic or societal 
order that is totally different from the Old Order […] What we want is 
to do away with some of the Old Order way of thinking and social sys-
tem that would be a hindrance to our goals of achieving our national 
dream.100
As Bourchier and Hadiz wrote, ‘the regime’s managerial and developmental-
ist character grew partly out of Soeharto’s close relations with Lieutenant- 
General Suwarto, the man who brought together Indonesia’s first generation 
of US- trained economists and senior officers at the Army Staff and Command 
School (Seskoad)’.101 According to Koentjoro- Jakti, ‘the culmination of these 
trends emerged when all the ideas finally appeared as an ideological package 
under the authoritarian systems of Guided Democracy, and later, the New Or-
der’.102 The traditionalist ideas of New Order organicism and rural bias had 
been developed earlier, as part of the revolutionary war or even as part of the 
 99 Guy Pauker, ‘Political Consequences of Rural Development Programs in Indonesia’, Pacific 
Affairs, 41/ 3 (Autumn 1968), 386– 402.
 100 Sarbini Sumawinata, Amanat/ Pidato, Prasaran dalam Seminar AD Ke- II, 1966 (Jakarta: 
Pertjetakan Negara, 1967), 3.  ‘Jang kita maksudkan dengan Orde Baru bukanlah suatu 
tata politik, tata ekonomi atau tata masjarakat jang sama sekali berbeda daripada jang 
dinamakan Orde Lama. […] Jang kita mau buang djauh2 dari Orde Lama adalah beberapa 
tjiri tata fikir dan tata kehidupan jang tidak mungkin dapat membawa kita ketudjuan 
nasional jang kita idam- idamkan dahulu.’
 101 Bourchier and Hadiz (eds), Indonesian Politics and Society, 27.
 102 He defined the trends as technocracy, elitism, populism, and nationalism, all of which were 
at some variance with each other similar to Bourchier and Hadiz’s analysis. Dorodjatun 
Kuntjoro- Jakti, ‘The Political Economy of Development: The Case of Indonesia under the 
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effort by Indonesian intellectuals to understand the nature of Indonesian 
society during the colonial period.103 What Sukarno called a ‘revolution’ was 
what many of the New Order intellectuals termed ‘development’: its modernist 
and planned character, its managerial component, and its need to control and 
change society.
In 1965– 1966, several conferences were held at Seskoad and the University 
of Indonesia (Universitas Indonesia, ui) to discuss what the change in regime 
meant for Indonesian state– society relations. Reading the speeches given at 
these conferences, one gains an insight into a project that entailed moulding 
a traditional society into its modern form. A persistent theme of many of the 
papers given at this conference was the almost logically assumed position of 
the military within a leadership position. Thus Emil Salim stated that there 
was good reason for the launching of the Guided Economy by Sukarno be-
cause ‘economic activities cannot be left to the mercy of market powers alone, 
but would need to be controlled and commanded’.104 The Guided Democra-
cy’s effort at militarily controlling the economy and Sukarno awarding military 
ranks to himself and the state’s economic policymakers, such as Abdulgani, 
Soebandrio, and Chairul Saleh, were seen not so much as a break with the 
perceived normal route towards modernity but as a lack on the part of the 
leadership to orient themselves with development. Thus, Sarbini Sumawinata 
contends:  ‘Only a leadership that was “developmentally oriented” could face 
the challenges of development. A leadership that failed to orient its goals to-
wards development would fail to maintain stability within the community.’105
The doyen of the technocracy, Widjojo Nitisastro, based his support for a 
militarized economy on the natural quality of military leadership:  ‘The raw 
determination to overcome economic difficulties in a responsible and disci-
plined manner can only be achieved if all of the government’s apparatus can 
 103 To what extent the rural bias of the army was a fully Indonesian invention is open to 
doubt. Although generally speaking the roots of the army’s Civic Action programme were 
attributed to Ibrahim Adjie’s Siliwangi Division’s efforts to develop the community after 
a successful counter- insurgency programme against the di/ tii rebels, it is also possible 
that it had American roots.
 104 Emil Salim, ‘Politik dan Ekonomi Pantjasila’, in Widjojo Nitisastro (ed.), Masalah- masalah 
Ekonomi dan Faktor- faktor Ipolsos (Jakarta: Terbatas, 1965), 103. ‘Oleh karena itu kebutu-
han untuk melansir konsep Ekonomi Terpimpin. Kegiatan ekonomi tidak dapat dibebas-
kan pada kekuatan2 didalam pasar semata akan tetapi perlu dikendalikan dan dipimpin.’
 105 Sarbini Sumawinata, ‘Masalah Stabilisasi Politik’, in Amanat/ Pidato, Prasaran dalam 
Seminar AD Ke- II, 1966 (Jakarta: Pertjetakan Negara, 1967), 48. ‘Hanjalah leadership jang 
“development oriented”- lah jang akan menghadapi tantangan2 tersebut. Suatu leader-









work as one harmonious team with an effective “unity of command” in the 
economic sector.’106
Nitisastro would actually run a relatively tight ship within his group of 
technocrats and so his reference to a ‘unity of command’ was to a large extent 
aimed at technocratic policymakers. Yet, the militarized language conceded 
the necessity of a military- run state, one which the technocrats would eventu-
ally, hopefully, help in directing towards development.
The people were reconfigured in a new imagery: the masses. According to 
Barli Halim, ‘the masses have a temporary relationship with the individual 
members, one based on emotion and less on rationality. The masses feel that 
they are “more powerful and more potent” than other people/ groups or have 
a tendency to blame other groups for something despite a lack of evidence.’107 
As a managerial specialist with an mba, Halim reduced the people and their 
political aspirations to the form of a mob or homogenous mass. Sumawinata’s 
discussion on stability panders to this image of the masses, noting that a soci-
ety transitioning from the traditional masses to a modern citizenship contains 
within it political, social, and cultural powers that will have to be channelled 
by the authority in a way that benefits the development process.
The goal of political stability should be a dynamic stability, in which so-
cial forces should neither be suppressed nor equalized, but should be 
channelled and guided toward positive and productive activities. This 
type of stability is not in ‘static equilibrium’, but must be understood as 
a type of control and supervision, in which all tensions and conflicts are 
resolved in a peaceful manner, without killing its dynamism.108
 106 Widjojo Nitisastro, ‘Persoalan Ekonomi- Tehnis dan Ekonomi- Politis dalam Menanggulangi 
Masalah2 Ekonomi’, in Masalah- masalah Ekonomi dan Faktor- faktor Ipolsos (Jakarta: 
Terbatas, 1965)  13. ‘Kebuletan tekad untuk menaggulangi kesulitan2 ekonomi dengan 
konsekwen dan dengan penuh self- discipline hanjalah dapat dijadikan kenjataan apabila 
alat2 pemerintah bisa bergerak sebagai satu team jang serasi dengan “unity of command” 
dibidang ekonomi jang effektif.’
 107 Barli Halim, ‘Massa dan Media’, in Widjojo Nitisastro (ed.), Masalah- masalah Ekonomi 
dan Faktor- faktor Ipolsos (Jakarta: Terbatas, 1965), 64. ‘Massa bersifat sementara dalam 
hubungan diantara para anggautanja, sedangkan tiap anggautanja lebih banjak bere-
mosi dan kurang rationil. Berdasarkan ini massa mempunjai perasaan “lebih kuat dan 
lebih perkasa” dari orang/ golongan lain, atau massa itu tjepat menjalahkan golongan lain 
walaupun bukti2 tidak tjukup lengkap dan sebagainja.’
 108 Sumawinata, ‘Masalah Stabilisasi Politik’, 47. ‘[S] tabilitas politik jang harus ditjapai 
ialah stabilitas jang dinamis, dimana kekuatan sosial tidak ditekan ataupun diim-
bangkan, melainkan harus dapat disalurkan dan didjuruskan ke arah kegiatan2 jang 
positif dan produktif. Stabilitas jang demikian ini bukanlah suatu “static equilibrium”, 
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The people as the masses were seen as being in opposition to the nurturing 
and managing capability of the elite. In fact, the military elite was seen as the 
opposite of the masses. Kartomo Wirosuhardjo’s article paints the inevitable 
picture of societal harmony. If each group knows where it belongs within the 
pyramidal structure of social stratification, then peace and harmony will reign 
in the body politic. This traditionalist and static view of society was couched 
within a depiction of modern transition.
In fact, the top tier of the pyramid should be filled with a combination of 
three groups of elites. First, the military elite with their ‘discipline, initiative, 
militancy, and earnestness in doing their duty’. Second, the secular intelli-
gentsia, which are those ‘people who have obtained an expert education, for 
instance doctors, economists, lawyers, engineers, agricultural experts, edu-
cational experts, journalists, and others. This is a group of people who use 
science and technology in their line of work. They have expertise in their 
field but sometimes lack the push to conduct real change.’ The third group 
consists of the entrepreneurs, who are ‘creators or people who use new ways 
to obtain great profits. They are drivers of industry and trade and are com-
posed of people who are always searching for greater success.’109 These three 
groups working together would strengthen modernity among the masses. 
The people, on the other hand, required the guiding hands of disciplined 
experts and creators. In fact, instead of power, the masses would be given 
culture.
A national culture based on the nation’s history was essential in indoctri-
nating the people to accept this pyramidal structure with its military- expert- 
business elite at the helm. Wirosuhardjo again argued for the need to create 
a culture that would be immune to the outside cultural influences that had 
had a devious tendency to seep into the Old Order’s national culture which 
semua ketegangan2 dan konflik2 dapat diselesaikan setjara damai, tanpa mematikan 
dinamiknja.’
 109 Kartomo Wirosuhardjo, ‘Masalah Kekaryaan ABRI’, in Sarbini Sumawinata, Amanat/ 
Pidato, Prasaran dalam Seminar AD Ke- II, 1966 (Jakarta:  Pertjetakan Negara, 1967), 197. 
‘Golongan militer mempunjai disiplin, inisiatif, militansi dan kesungguhan dalam mel-
aksanakan satu tugas.’ […] ‘Golongan seculer intelligentsia ini terdiri dari orang- orang 
jang mendapatkan pendidikan keahlian, jakni dokter, sardjana ekonomi, hukum, teknik, 
pertanian, pendidikan, wartawan dan lain- lain. Golongan ini terdiri atas orang- orang jang 
dalam pekerdjaannja mengetrapkan ilmu dan tehnologi modern dalam praktek. Mereka 
ini mempunjai ketjakapan dalam bidangnja tetapi sering kurang mempunjai dorongan 
untuk perubahan- perubahan jang njata.’ […] ‘Golongan entrepreneur ini merupakan 
pentjipta- pentjipta atau orang- orang jang menggunakan tjara- tjara baru untuk memper-




included flags, traditional dances, language, paintings and songs.110 The New 
Order would thus have to search for its own specific forms of national culture; 
and a return to tradition was what was offered by many social scientists. Selo 
Soemardjan called for a revival of the traditional idea of the role model (pa-
nutan), which had deep roots in Javanese society. The Javanese word manut 
means to follow, specifically to follow the leadership. The Javanese role model 
is passive, while its modern role would be active.
In other words, the role model of the past requires only tut wuri han-
dayani, which means pushing their influence from behind. But now role 
models within Indonesia’s modern society are expected to take the lead 
and fulfil their role as ing ngarsa sung tulada, i.e. to lead by example. The 
appreciation of society in today’s democratic age for their role models 
would surely increase if they also situated themselves as ing madya man-
gun karsa, which is to live in society and work together with society to 
build a strong spirit in an effort to create societal happiness and state 
magnificence.111
What is significant about Soemardjan’s imagery is again the deeply feudal form 
taken from Java’s long feudal past, something that the nationalists, leftists, and 
many Islamists in Indonesia abhorred. Soemardjan, though, himself an aris-
tocrat and a loyal follower of, and personal secretary to, Sultan Hamengkubu-
wono ix, must have had few qualms about painting this picture of modern 
Indonesian society through an aristocratic Javanese frame of reference. Even 
more significant is, of course, his credential as the ‘father of Indonesian soci-
ology’. His American education did not conflict with what he saw as a rational 
way of ordering society. Wirosuhardjo’s ideas on indoctrination are also rooted 
 110 Kartomo Wirosuhardjo, ‘Re- Thinking dalam Indoktrinasi’, in Widjojo Nitisastro (ed.), 
Masalah- masalah Ekonomi dan Faktor- faktor Ipolsos (Jakarta: Terbatas, 1965), 40– 41.
 111 Selo Soemardjan, ‘Sifat2 Panutan didalam Pandangan Masjarakat Indonesia’, in Widjojo 
Nitisastro (ed.), Masalah- masalah Ekonomi dan Faktor- faktor Ipolsos (Jakarta: Terbatas, 
1965), 53. ‘Dengan perkataan lain, para panutan dalam zaman dahulu tjukup mengambil 
peranan “tut wuri handajani”, jaitu memberikan pengaruh dari belakang. Tetapi sekarang 
para panutan didalam masjarakat Indonesia modern diharapkan tampil kemuka dan 
menempati kedudukan “ing ngarsa sung tulada”, jaitu tampil kedepan untuk memberi-
kan contoh. Penghargaan masjarakat dalam zaman demokratis sekarang terhadap para 
panutannja akan memuntjak tinggi apabila mereka itu djuga menempatkan diri “ing 
madya mangun karsa”, jaitu hidup ditengah- tengah masjarakat dan bersama- sama den-
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in his time spent studying in America. A modern take on Indonesian culture 
thus primarily took the form of feudal revivalism.
6 Conclusion
The development of Indonesian ideas about authority and state– society rela-
tions evolved during the Guided Democracy. The change was partly brought 
about by a generational shift from the 1928 generation to the 1945 generation 
(terms I have borrowed from Weinstein’s analysis). More importantly, the roots 
of these changes were entwined with the developments of the 1950s and the 
expansion of education, which will be discussed in Chapter  5. The clash of 
ideas between Sukarno and expert economists represented a conflict over 
authority. The expert elite of the 1950s was considered a threat to Sukarno’s 
corporatist ideas. What Sukarno wanted was not to destroy and eliminate the 
experts, professionals, and economists but merely to discipline them and force 
them to conform to his ideas of state– society relations.
Two things happened. The major decision- makers of the 1950s were side-
lined, and, more importantly, a new generation of experts was brought in to 
develop the new Guided Democracy state corporate discourse. As we will see 
in Chapter  7, their study of communist institutions increasingly drew them 
closer to the military managerial elites. The development of the military in 
relation to the corporatist state was an essential part of the Guided Democ-
racy and one that cemented Indonesia’s long- lasting twentieth- century mili-
tary rule. The coalescence of experts and the military elite was a side effect of 
Sukarno’s anti- expert ideology. The Guided Democracy thus had a profound 
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 chapter 2
The Military Expansion into the State
 Abstract
This chapter looks into the development of the Indonesian military after independence 
and the doctrinal development of the army that would provide the ideological and stra-
tegic foundation of the army’s role in Indonesia’s postcolonial state and society. It looks 
specifically into the army’s territorial and rapid strike doctrines and its relationship to the 
rise of education for army officers. The influence of American doctrines of Civic Action 
and strike doctrines like the Pentomic Doctrine was channeled through the copying of 
American army officer curriculum in Indonesia’s main army officer school, the Seskoad. 
American ideas of population capture through rural control and development was mir-
rored by the Indonesian army’s development of counter- insurgency strategies. This strate-
gy envisioned greater cooperation between the military and social scientists in developing 
strategies of control and development. It also envisioned the army as community leader 
and social engineers. Indonesia’s developmental state can only function if the state can 
capture the population. Indonesia’s counterinsurgency state is thus a central component 
for the New Order’s developmental state and its roots can be found during the shift in 
army elite production in the 1950s.
 Keywords
Indonesian military doctrine  – counter- insurgency state  – civic action  – army dual 
function – army elite education
The formation of the dual function (dwifungsi) of the military was one of 
the cornerstones of both the Guided Democracy and the New Order. This 
chapter looks into the structural transformation that gave the military le-
gitimacy within the ‘developmentalist’ project of the Guided Democra-
cy state. I will first look at the gradual centralization of the army command 
around General Abdul Haris Nasution and the simultaneous creation of 
the military elites. Following the work of both Rudolf Mrazek1 and Ernst 
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Utrecht,2 I will look at the development of two different army doctrines: the 
territorial doctrine and the Tri Ubaya Cakti (Three Sacred Pledges). These doc-
trines represented ideological responses to two army factions:  the territorial 
elite, who saw territorial management as the answer to problems of coordina-
tion; and the para- military elites, who focused on forward capability.
The question of control is essential here. The territorial doctrine aimed to 
expand military control over other institutions within the central and region-
al governments. The Tri Ubaya Cakti wanted the military, as a forward force, 
to be under the command of Sukarno. In both cases, the formation of terri-
torial and strike- command elites required education. The creation of both 
a military managerial elite and a para- command elite was often predicated 
on American help. This was especially true for the para- command elites of 
the Guided Democracy, who obtained educational grants from the Kennedy 
Administration to go to the United States for training in the latest counter- 
insurgency tactics.
1 The Revolutionary Period
During the war, the Japanese controlled Indonesia through three separate 
military administrations run by the army and the navy, respectively.3 Because 
the politicians working under the Japanese were not allowed to coordinate 
at these levels, the local state presence took on a military form. As Kilcullen 
phrased it, ‘The system was a means of coercion, propaganda, information col-
lection, aid distribution and control over the population.’4 Indigenous military 
organizations were prevalent in Java.5 peta was the first military organization 
during the Japanese occupation that was commanded and controlled by Indo-
nesians. By December 1944, peta had sixty- six battalions in Java, with a total 
estimated force of over thirty- seven thousand soldiers by 1945. The number of 
Indonesians involved in the various military and para- military organizations 
was estimated to be in the order of 2 to 2.2 million people.
 2 Ernst Utrecht, The Indonesian Army: A Socio- Political Study of an Armed, Privileged Group in 
the Developing Countries (Townsville: Southeast Asian Studies Committee, 1978).
 3 The 25th army division held sway in Sumatra and the 16th division in Java. East Indonesia was 
under administration of the navy.
 4 David Kilcullen, ‘The Political Consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia’, PhD dis-
sertation, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 2000, 33.
 5 Paramilitary organizations and schools were effectively used to instil radical nationalism. 











Military control of the territories contributed to ideas surrounding Indone-
sia’s state– society relations. Guerilla operations weakened central command, 
resulting in the regionalization of military power.6 Robert Cribb writes that 
Nasution’s principal contribution to the study of guerrilla warfare was his abil-
ity to depoliticize it, which contrasted with the politicization of people regard-
ing social change that was espoused by generals such as Vo Nguyen Giap.7 The 
depoliticized nature of Indonesia’s guerrillas stemmed from both Nasution’s 
modernist aspiration to create a professional army and what can only be re-
garded as the Indonesian elite’s distrust of the masses.8
Nasution’s idea of guerrilla warfare was conceived while he was command-
er of the Java army in 1948, in which capacity he was the executive leader of 
both the military and the civilian authority.9 With the formation of a military 
government, the heads of the divisions automatically became military gov-
ernors in their respective provinces. At the highest level (the district level, or 
tingkat keresidenan) was the Sub- Regional Military Command. Beneath this 
was the District Military Command,10 paralleling the district (kabupaten) lev-
el. Lastly, at the sub- district level (kecamatan) was the Sub- District Military 
Command.11 Only at the village level was there a non- militarized executive. 
Yet, the lurah were now to report, not to their civilian line of command, but 
to the kodm.12 The Wehrkreise, or independent units, formed the main sub-
stance of the mobile units. Most stm commanders were also Wehrkreise com-
manders. Indonesian political parties were never able to form a comparable 
administrative or organizational presence at the local or village level during 
this period.
This system predated the 1948 reorganization of a parallel military gov-
ernment and was created in October 1947 after the First Dutch Military 
 6 Kilcullen, ‘Military Operations in Indonesia’, vii.
 7 Robert Cribb, ‘Military Strategy in the Indonesian Revolution. Nasution’s Total People’s 
War in Theory and Practice’, War and Society, 19/ 2 (2001), 150.
 8 The masses were seen as a destabilizing and destructive force that required a vigilant 
redirection to productive purposes, in an image that equates it with river torrents and 
the government with the engineer’s ability to redirect flows toward irrigation purposes. 
This is something that came up during the seminars held by the military and economists 
during the transition period of the Guided Democracy and New Order periods.
 9 Salim Said, The Genesis of Power: Civil and Military Relations in Indonesia during the Rev-
olution for Independence, 1945– 1949 (Singapore:  Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
1981), 195– 6.
 10 The Komando Distrik Militer was later known for its abbreviation Kodam.
 11 Said, The Genesis of Power, 195– 6.
 12 Salim Said, ‘The Political Role of Indonesian Military: Past, Present and Future’, Southeast 
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Aggression. The aim was to create the illusion of the Siliwangi Division be-
ing under one command, even though many of its troops had spread out 
after the attack and partial occupation of West Java by Dutch forces in July 
and August 1947. The paralleling and subordination of the civilian admin-
istration to the military was followed by the decentralization of the local 
territories by the local military administration.13 The ‘guerilla- ization’ of the 
civilian administration was not limited to the executive administration but 
included many of the public services, including the police, judicial courts, 
taxation, information services, public health, education, manufacturing, 
and so forth.14
What happened during the revolutionary war was thus the development 
of a segmented army, whereby guerrilla warfare led to the creation of mil-
itary fiefdoms at various local levels. The result was a territorial army, in 
which army divisions were manned and officered by people of the same 
locality.15 The failure of the political elites to extend their administrative 
authority outside the capital was compounded by the failure to effective-
ly integrate the segmented military under civilian supremacy. The govern-
ment had a modern vision of the army and backed ex- knil officers to lead 
the military. In 1945, when the army voted for Sudirman (1916– 1950), an ex- 
peta officer, to lead the military, the government had no choice other than 
to accept.16
Yet, as Ruth McVey has shown, the segmentation of the military was more 
than made up for by the fact that the army came out of the revolution without 
a significant divergence in ideological background. The left- leaning part of the 
army was destroyed during the Madiun rebellion. The conservative- colonial 
part of the army, the knil, achieved such notoriety that its participation after 
the transfer of sovereignty was made impossible, although some of those oc-
cupying positions at the chief- of- staff level were of knil extraction. Lastly, Is-
lamic influence had been reduced by the end of the revolution, at which point 
the Muslims embarked on a protracted guerrilla war for the establishment of 
an Indonesian Islamic State.17
 13 Said, The Genesis of Power, 199– 200.
 14 Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare, 26.
 15 Daniel Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy:  Indonesian Politics, 1957– 1959 (Ithaca: 
Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1966), 12.
 16 Said, The Genesis of Power, 98– 103.
 17 Ruth McVey, ‘The Post- Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army’, Indonesia, 












2 The Centralization of the Army in the 1950s
Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey highlighted the division of the Indonesian 
army between the Dutch- educated knil officers and the Japanese- educated 
peta, Laskar (paramilitary), and Youth (Pemuda) officers. The latter was the 
group that coalesced around the venerable war hero General Sudirman. Sudir-
man acquired mythical status for his role as the military, but also spiritual, 
leader of the wider army. The Sudirman group was based in the Diponegoro 
Division of Central Java and was highly motivated by the notion of the spirit of 
1945 (semangat 45), an almost spiritual concept that attributed a positive value 
to the feelings of revolutionary fervour.18 This group was highly homogenous, 
with the majority of its officers being local Javanese.
The former group coalesced around the figure of former knil officer 
General Urip Sumohardjo. The group was based in the former colonial- army 
headquarters in Bandung and in the Siliwangi Division of West Java, and was 
composed of Dutch- trained, Westernized individuals, including Nasution and 
Tahi Bonar Simatupang. In 1945, Sumohardjo convened with thirteen former 
knil officers to pledge allegiance to Indonesia and to create a modern mili-
tary. Thus, the divide in the military was between a Javanese- speaking, priyayi- 
centred, peta- trained group and a Dutch- speaking, cosmopolitan- intellectual, 
knil- trained group that contained a large proportion of Outer Islanders.19 The 
latter group’s ‘ability to deal with administrative problems, Republic- level pol-
itics and Dutch counterparts brought them into top positions in the course of 
the war for Independence’.20
Although lacking some of the wider support that Sudirman enjoyed, the 
Sjahrir, and later Hatta, cabinets were supportive of the Bandung group and 
proceeded to elect people from the group to head the failed army moderniza-
tion programme, the ‘reconstruction and rationalization’ (rekonstruksi dan ra-
sionalisasi, re dan ra),21 coined by Nasution in 1948. Nasution was appointed to 
the position of army chief of staff following the death of General Sumohardjo 
 18 Benedict Anderson and Ruth T. McVey, A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup 
in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971), 4. ‘For soldiers of this kind, 
revolution is more drama than reconstruction, violent action rather than transformation 
of institutions. Soldiering itself is less a matter of techniques and skills, than the devel-
opment of moral and spiritual faculties through a kind of modernized asceticism. A good 
soldier is identified by the kind of man he is rather than by his effectiveness on military 
exercises.’
 19 Anderson and McVey, A Preliminary Analysis, 1– 6.
 20 Ruth McVey, ‘The Post- Revolutionary Transformation’, 134.
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in 1948. Taking up the reins during the second military clash with the Dutch, 
Nasution would start to shape his ideas of the role of the military in society.22
With the end of the revolutionary war and the formation of the cabinet of 
the United States of the Republic of Indonesia, Prime Minister Hatta’s policy 
to reduce the number of civil servants was followed by a focus on the military, 
which aimed to reduce the number of fighters through a series of rehabilita-
tion programmes that would enable the transition of soldiers to civilian life. 
Unfortunately, the project was a failure. Transmigration and community de-
velopment schemes would have helped thousands of former fighters to start 
new lives,23 but the implementation was less than satisfactory.24 In the new 
and democratic society of the 1950s, many of these former fighters became 
gangsters and henchmen, or took up roles in party and mass- membership or-
ganizations. At any rate, there was resentment of the civilian leadership’s lack 
of concern for the well- being of the veterans of the revolutionary war.25
As chief of staff, Nasution would initiate the re dan ra again in 1950, with the 
consent of Prime Minister Hatta, in the hope of creating a small but modern 
army. This modernization was backed by many of the former knil officers, 
Minister of Defence Sultan Hamengkubuwono ix, and Secretary General of 
Defence Ali Budiardjo, a psi sympathizer. Half of the partisan membership 
left the army, including officers. Consequently, there was a shift in the social 
background of the military officers.26
Members of Parliament voiced their support for the partisan grievances, at-
tacking Nasution’s efforts to modernize the army and his willingness to work 
with the Netherlands Military Mission (Nederlandse Militaire Missie, nmm).27 
The parliamentary attack on the military leadership of Nasution and Sima-
tupang led to the 17 October 1952 affair, in which Nasution’s military faction 
tried to force President Sukarno to dissolve Parliament to allow Nasution to 
 22 Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare, 25.
 23 Report of the Social Ministry to the Prime Minister on the National Planning Board, 
Jakarta, 15 June 1951, Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta (hereafter anri), Kabinet 
Presiden Republik Indonesia, 1950– 1959. inv. no. 1277.
 24 Abdul Haris Nasution, Tjatatan Sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia (Jakarta:  Pembimbing, 
1955), 349– 50.
 25 Nasution, Tjatatan Sekitar Politik Militer, 204.
 26 Ernst Utrecht, ‘The Indonesian Army as an Instrument of Repression’, Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, 2/ 1 (1972), 58; Utrecht, The Indonesian Army: A Socio- Political Study, 
7; R.  E. Elson, Suharto, a Political Biography (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 
2001), 61.
 27 The Dutch military mission was created in accordance to the Round Table Agreement to 
train the Indonesian armed forces in modern warfare for a period of five years. It ended in 













take over as a dictator. Sukarno managed to defuse the situation and prevent-
ed the death of parliamentary democracy until later in the 1950s. This action 
disgraced Nasution, who had his position as chief of staff annulled. Parliament 
voted in a new and more neutral army chief of staff: Major- General Bambang 
Sugeng.28
The shift of power towards the peta faction in the military might have 
signalled a weakening of the modernizer faction that had supported recon-
struction and modernization. Yet, chief of staff Sugeng made an honest ef-
fort to bridge the gap, culminating in the Yogyakarta Charter of February 1955 
(Piagam Jogja 1955). With the support of the peta faction, Nasution was able 
to swiftly move to dominate the army leadership. With the Indonesian Com-
munist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, pki) emerging as the fourth- largest 
party in Parliament after the 1955 election, Nasution increasingly called for 
the dissolution of the parties. In 1956, Nasution announced plans to rotate 
territorial commanders, which would weaken the hold of these military men 
and their fiefdoms, in order to slowly bring the fragmented and decentralized 
military under the leadership of Jakarta. Regionalist displeasure with Jakarta 
resulted in the prri29 rebellion. Some of the psi and Masyumi leadership were 
involved in the rebellion.30 From 1955, a relatively solid army was being creat-
ed, supporting the position of Nasution.31 Units and commanders reluctant 
to support Jakarta rebelled and eventually merged into the prri/ Permesta32 
movement, whose core consisted of Masyumi and psi members.
3 Anti- corruption and the Road to Power
During Nasution’s civilian stint (1952– 1955), he published his ideas concerning 
the role of the military in modern Indonesian society.33 The hope that the 1955 
 28 Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power. Indonesian Military Politics, 1945– 1967 (Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982), 74– 5.
 29 prri stands for Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government 
of the Republic of Indonesia). It was a rebel movement led by regional army officers who 
were dissatisfied with Jakarta’s policies and conduct.
 30 Herbert Feith and Daniel Lev, ‘The End of the Indonesian Rebellion’, Pacific Affairs, 36/ 1 
(Spring 1963), 32– 46.
 31 Sundhaussen, The Road to Power, 79– 88; Crouch, The Army and Politics, 32.
 32 Permesta was a rebellion based in Eastern Indonesia that centred on the city of Manado 
and was led by two tni officers, Alexander Evert Kawilarang and Ventje Sumual.
 33 Including the publication of his most important work on guerilla warfare. This was later 
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election would create a non- corrupt and stable government was dashed when 
the elected cabinet proved to be as corrupt and incapable as previous ones.34 
The period 1955– 1957 thus represented a litmus test of the ability of the civilian 
leadership to stave off the increasingly hostile camp of anti- liberals.35 In 1955, 
at the Technical Faculty of the University of Indonesia, Sukarno reiterated his 
feelings for the democratic system by saying that ‘parties can disappear but the 
universities must not’.36
On 14 September 1956, Nasution held a meeting with the National Security 
Board (Dewan Keamanan Nasional) specifically to design the course to be tak-
en by the military to regulate the press and eradicate corruption.37 This was 
the public rationale for greater military involvement in civilian affairs, an effort 
justified by the failure of Parliament to enact an anti- corruption bill.38
The end of the Second Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet paved the way for aggres-
sive military participation in executive affairs. When Sastroamidjojo handed 
over his mandate to the president at 10 am on 14 March 1957, it took Sukar-
no just thirty minutes to declare martial law.39 On 9 April, chief of staff and 
military ruler Nasution issued a Regulation on the Eradication of Corruption 
(Peraturan Pemberantasan Korupsi), whose broad definition of corruption 
included activities by persons or bodies which would, directly or indirectly, 
result in financial or economic loss to the state and persons holding a position 
and receiving a salary from the state, who, through the authority, power, or 
opportunity provided by their position, had, directly or indirectly, received a 
financial or material benefit as a result.40 On the same day, Nasution set up a 
system of military observers within the civilian bureaucracy to keep an eye on 
the government departments.41
On 28 March 1957, one day after Nasution’s announcement that there would 
be an investigation of allegedly corrupt government officials, twelve civil serv-
ants were called in by the commander of the Military Police Corps (Corps 
 34 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy, 462– 73.
 35 In particular, the Murba party, which came out as a supporter of Sukarno’s Konsepsi 
later on.
 36 Tangkas, 10 February 1955.
 37 Duta Masyarakat, 17 September 1956.
 38 Duta Masyarakat, 11 April 1957 and anri, Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia, 1950– 
1959, inv. no. 1939.
 39 State of War and Siege (Staat van Oorlog en Beleg, sob).
 40 Duta Masyarakat, 11 April 1957.



















Polisi Militer, cpm).42 In total, thirty- seven people were investigated, with 
eleven officially held by the cpm. Among these, several very important names 
stood out: Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo, former minister of the first Ali Cabinet; Ong 
Eng Die, former finance minister of the first Ali Cabinet; and Jusuf Wibisono, 
the Masjumi finance minister in the second Ali Cabinet. Sumitro Djojohadik-
usumo avoided incarceration as he was in Tokyo at a finance conference.43 He 
went to West Sumatra to join the prri rebellion.44
The 9 April Regulation on the Eradication of Corruption was a milestone 
for Indonesia as it represented the first legal move to eradicate corruption; 
yet it was part of broader changes enacted by the military.45 A series of in-
creasingly stringent regulations were created.46 In June 1958, a team was 
formed for the investigation of personal wealth and was ordered by the Jus-
tice Ministry (Kementerian Kehakiman) to carry out their work in all prov-
inces other than those actively rebelling or under Dutch occupation.47 On 
the instructions of the executive, in 1958 the Anti- Corruption Commission 
(Komisi Anti- Korupsi), headed by Prime Minister Djuanda, completed a draft 
plan concerning the composition, tasks, and working methods of the Coor-
dination Body for the Investigation of Personal Wealth and Property (Badan 
 42 Keng Po, 28 March 1957. These included Dr A. K. Gani, Mr Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo, Dr Ong 
Eng Die, Mr Kasman Singodimedjo, Mr Tan Po Goan, Dr Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, 
Mr Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Mr Jusuf Wibisono, Dr Lie Kiat Teng, Dr Saroso, Arudji 
Kartanegara, Djamaluddin Malik, and others.
 43 Duta Masyarakat, 9 May 1957; Bevelschrift voor aanhouding Prof. Soemitro, Nationaal 
Archief, The Hague (hereafter na), inv. no. 382.
 44 Duta Masyarakat, 30 May 1957.
 45 ‘Lampiran Perundang- undangan Peraturan Penguasa Militer’, Hukum, 7– 8 (1957), 16– 166.
 46 Panitya Anti Korupsi. Pemberantasan Korupsi, Kabinet Perdana Menteri Republik 
Indonesia, Jakarta, 20 May 1960, anri, Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, inv. 
no. 518; Nasional, 19 November 1958. On 27 May 1957, Nasution enacted a regulation to 
supervise property, followed by a 21 June 1957 regulation on the confiscation of mate-
rials gained through unlawful acts. A series of regulations was enacted throughout the 
period: on 16 October 1957, a regulation on the supervision of property owned by the 
military rulers and other state officials; on 28 October 1957, on the formation of a super-
vision team and its work programme and the guidelines for supervisors of property; on 
16 December 1957, on the selling and limitation of use of confiscated materials; on 18 
March 1958, on the supervision of the circulation of essential items; on 16 April 1958, 
on the investigation and prosecution of corruption and supervision of materials; on 14 
May 1958, on the formation of a Coordination Body on Property Investigation; and on 9 
August 1958, on the supervision, limitation of use, and sale of confiscated property. The 
Committee on Corruption Eradication finally created the Property Investigation Unit 
on 12 June 1959.
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Koordinasi untuk Penjelidikan Kekayaan dan Harta Pribadi, bkpkhp) Be-
cause of the novelty of the entire approach, there were major difficulties to 
be overcome.48
The bkpkhp created an inventory of the property of civil servants and state 
organizations. The law forced people to disclose land, houses and other prop-
erty purchases, and wealth.49 Dozens of corruption cases had been brought to 
the courts by the end of 1959. Yet, it was also quite clear that the effects were 
rather disappointing.50 The military ruler had decreed the need to create a list 
of trustworthy companies that should be screened regularly and controlled by 
the Ministry of Finance and Trade (Kementerian Keuangan dan Perdagangan). 
The military ruler also saw the need to create financial supervision posts in 
each department and at the provincial and lower levels of government. The 
final regulation stipulated the formation of a Committee on Government Em-
ployee Rules (Panitya Negara Perantjang Undang- undang Kepegawaian) in 
an effort to stop civil servants from taking part in business and party politics. 
These anti- corruption efforts paved the way for the formation of the Nation-
al State Apparatus Retooling Committee (Panitia Retooling Aparatur Negara, 
Paran).51
Despite this flurry of institution- building, army corruption expanded, 
linked to its takeover of the economy and the administration. A notable case 
included Suharto’s demotion from his position as head of the Diponegoro Di-
vision on charges of corruption. Yet, for the most part, Nasution’s institution-
al campaign failed.52 Nasution did not have the fortitude to push through his 
anti- corruption campaigns against army colleagues. He was also under attack 
from the communists, especially in the early 1960s, who accused these insti-
tutions of building a power base for him for an eventual takeover. In any case, 
his efforts to assert his presence within the Guided Democracy state in institu-
tions that he had built up were thwarted by President Sukarno, who replaced 
 48 naa, Indonesian Corruption (1956– 1970), A1838.
 49 Pemberantasan Korupsi, Kabinet Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, 20 May 
1960, anri, Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, inv. no. 518.
 50 Pemberantasan Korupsi, Kabinet Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, 20 
May 1960, anri, Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, inv. no. 518. The results for 1959 
were: forty- eight cases in West Java, ten cases in Central Java, twenty cases in East Java, 
292 persons required to give property details in Jakarta, nine cases in West Kalimantan, 
four cases in Aceh, and nine cases in North Sumatra. The Regional Military Government 
(Komando Distrik Militer or Territorium) handled these corruption cases.
 51 Laporan Panitia Retooling Aparatur Negara, anri, Bapekan, inv. no. 345.
 52 He did take action against Colonel Ibnu Sutowo for smuggling in Tanjong Priok; see 












Nasution’s institutions with ones controlled by himself and appointed Ahmad 
Yani in 1962 to replace Nasution as head of the army.53
4 Officer Education
Army training had been conducted since the early years of independence. The 
National Military Academy (Akademi Militer Nasional, amn) opened on 28 
October 1945 in Yogyakarta and was the first of its kind. Its curriculum was 
modelled on the basic training of shoodan- tyoo, or platoon training, during the 
Japanese occupation.54 Complementing the colonial state’s military academy 
in Bandung, the Royal Military Academy (kma) was founded in 1940. On the 
Republican side, a school for officers opened in Malang, although it closed in 
1948 after the Second Dutch Military Aggression. In 1953, a committee was es-
tablished to design a complete military academy. This finally opened on 1 Sep-
tember 1957 as the amn in Magelang, Central Java.55
In terms of staff and command schools there were two other academies, and 
these were more important to elite creation. The first was the Tjandradimuka 
School, which focused more on the ideological education of army officers; the 
second was the Staff and Command School (Sekolah Staf dan Komando Ang-
katan Darat, sskad). Both were located in Bandung. President Sukarno was 
a frequent lecturer at Tjandradimuka, a school that aimed to foster the spir-
it of the 1945 revolution. The school was built in 1951 under the directorship 
of Colonel Bambang Supeno, an ex- peta officer. Tjandradimuka’s nationalist 
and Javanese- oriented stance contrasted with sskad’s social- democratic and 
psi- dominated orientation. The school was considered by Nasution and Sima-
tupang to be the centre of agitation against military modernization and they 
succeeded in closing it down in 1952.56
The sskad was founded on 17 October 1951 and aimed to equip future 
army officers with modern skills, including scientific administration, mil-
itary analysis, and organizational know- how. Hatta made the needs of the 
 53 Abdul Harris Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Jilid V: Kenangan Masa Orde Lama 
(Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1985), 214. ‘Yani gradually ended the autonomous position of the 
army and brought the head of the army directly under the authority of Sukarno and, later, 
as pioneered by the police, ensured that the army was obedient to the whims of Sukarno 
“without reserve”.’
 54 20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka, Vol. iii (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1965), 217.
 55 National Military Academy (Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, n.y.), 5.
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post- revolutionary army clear:  ‘The revolutionary period needs officers with 
flaming passion, burned by the dream of fighting and independence. In this 
period, bravery is rewarded more than capability […] Often, assertiveness in 
action is more precious than the ability to estimate strategies and tactics in 
a thorough manner.’57 After the revolution, ‘aside from passion and assertive-
ness, the capability to weigh and decide, based on military knowledge, strategy, 
tactics, and knowledge of society is needed’.58
By 1953, around 129 officers were being educated in the Netherlands.59 Oth-
ers went to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and Fort Benning, Georgia, in the Unit-
ed States. After 1954, the Netherlands wound down Indonesian attendance at 
its military academies, with the last Indonesian cadet leaving in 1957.60 In the 
same year, plans were laid for a command and staff college along the lines of 
Fort Leavenworth. sskad instructors went to the United States, Great Britain, 
Yugoslavia, and the Middle East to study the command and staff colleges there. 
In 1959, the sskad was renamed Seskoad.61 By the early 1960s, people were 
also being sent to study in the ussr, Yugoslavia, Pakistan, and China.
In the initial years, the army relied heavily on the nmm as the main source 
of technical and tactical training. This included many of the teachers at the 
sskad. The nationalists and ex- peta members were suspicious of the fact that 
the roles of instructors and teachers were being taken by former Dutch and 
knil enemies.62 Early in 1951, Simatupang reiterated why the nmm might not 
 57 Buku Peringatan Lustrum Ke I sskad, 17 Nopember 1951– 17 Nopember 1956 (Bandung: sskad, 
1956), 6. ‘Masa revolusi menghendaki perwira yang semangatnja berapi- api, dibakar oleh 
tjita- tjita perdjuangan dan kemerdekaan. Dalam masa revolusi seringkali keberanian 
didahulukan dari ketjakapan, jang dianggap akan diperoleh berangsur- angsur didalam 
perdjuangan dan pertempuran. Seringkali ketegasan bertindak lebih berharga dari per-
hitungan strategi dan taktik jang dipikirkan dengan teliti.’
 58 Of those 129 officers, twenty- nine went to the Royal Military Academy (Koninklijk 
Militaire Academie), sixty to the Royal Navy Institute (Koninklijk Instituut der Marine), 
and twenty- one to the Officer Reserve School (School Reserve Officieren); the rest went to 
a variety of schools and courses. Nota Menteri Pertahanan A. L. tanggal 26 Djanuari 1953, 
anri, Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia, inv. no. 1855.
 59 Since 1951, a stream of Indonesian officers went to the United States and Western 
Europe, including the Netherlands, to finish their studies. In September 1951, twenty- 
seven Indonesian cadets went to the kma in Breda. See Wim Cappers, ‘Nasi goreng en 
negerzaad. De opleiding van de Indonesische cadetten aan de Koninklijke Militaire 
Academie’. Armamentaria, vol. 38. 2003- 2004. 258- 283.
 60 The ending of the Dutch– Indonesian Union in 1956 was important in the ending of Indo- 
Dutch military cooperation. Cappers, ‘Nasi goreng en negerzaad’.
 61 Gregory, ‘Recruitment and Factional Patterns’, 301.
 62 Part of Nasution’s Five- Year Plan for the army was to end the military mission. He thought 
the nmm was an imperialist ploy to weaken the army. A.  H. Nasution, tni (Jakarta: 














be the most appropriate source of know- how: first, the Dutch did not have a 
deep knowledge and experience of military matters; second, there were psy-
chological problems plaguing Indonesian– Dutch relations; and lastly, Indo-
nesia’s focus on defence was not in line with the more conventional warfare 
doctrine of the Netherlands.63
The nmm’s role was to help Indonesia build up its army and it was paid to do 
so by the Indonesian government.64 Before 1953, the nmm supplied the largest 
number of teachers for the college. Of the twenty- four teachers in total, six 
Dutchmen were permanent employees and twelve were temporary employees 
of the nmm. There were only three teachers from the Indonesian army and 
three civilian lecturers. By 1953, President Sukarno and the nationalists– left- 
wing coalition, alarmed by the 17 October 1952 affair, were pushing for the end 
of Dutch influence. In 1953, Indonesian teachers replaced all the nmm teach-
ers.
The formal cessation of the nmm’s involvement by March 1953 was followed 
immediately by overtures to Australia, Switzerland, West Germany, Sweden, 
and Norway to replace it. These proved unsuccessful and Indonesia then ap-
proached ‘less neutral’ countries such as the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and Canada but was equally frustrated. Attitudes in Indonesia had also 
become less positive towards foreign intervention in the military. By October 
1953, however, the Australian embassy in Washington, DC had learned that the 
Americans had in principle agreed on the need for a Western military mission 
in Indonesia, although this had not resulted in a formal American military mis-
sion programme.65
By 1956, there were a total of fifty- six teachers at the sskad:  five civilian 
lecturers, seventeen permanent lecturers, and thirty- four temporary lecturers. 
The permanent lecturers were either graduates of the sskad or from foreign 
feeling was mutual. The paternalistic attitude of the Dutch instructors did not help either. 
Hans Meijer, Den Haag- Djakarta:  De Nederlands- Indonesische betrekkingen, 1950– 1962 
(Utrecht: Het Spectrum, 1994), 391– 3.
 63 T. B. Simatupang, ‘De Nederlandse Militaire Missie’, translated from Indonesian, Perwira, 
5 (1951), 182; na, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Hoge Commissariaat Bandung, 1950– 
1957, inv. nos. 563– 573.
 64 Nota omtrent de ontwikkeling van zaken in Indonesië in zoverre de verhoudingen bin-
nen de Nederlands- Indonesische Unie en de belangen van Nederland daarbij betrokken 
zijn, Ministerie voor Uniezaken en Overzeesche Rijksdelen, Afd. Wetgeving en Juridische 
Zaken, no.  1, ‘s- Gravenhage, 23 Mei 1950. De Minister voor Uniezaken en Overzeesche 
Rijksdelen, J.H.  van Maarseveen, na, The Hague, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 
Hoge Commissariaat Bandung, 1950– 1957, inv. nos.: 556– 566.
 65 East Indies– Australian Educational and Cultural Interest in Indonesia, 1946– 1951, 
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institutions such as the Higher School for Warfare (Hogere Krijgsschool, hks) 
in the Netherlands or Fort Benning and Fort Leavenworth in the usa.66 Much 
of the curriculum focused on military themes, including military law, military 
administration, tactical knowledge, use of artillery, military geography, mili-
tary history, the maintenance of military technology, and so on. In 1956, out of 
a total of 2,210 classroom hours, 136 were dedicated to general knowledge, in 
particular political science, sociology, anthropology, and economics. Prior to 
1956, only political science was taught. In the same year, military management 
was introduced.67 Between 1953 and 1958, six classes with curriculum B courses 
ran, with 357 officers attending. In March 1958, a new curriculum called the 
C- 1 course was inaugurated, which had three classes and sixty- four attending 
officers.68 With the implementation of the C- 1 course, socio- political themes 
expanded to fill 50 per cent of the curriculum.69 This copied the curriculum of 
the American military staff and command school at Fort Leavenworth,70 with 
its eight teachers translating the field manuals, advanced sheets, and lesson 
plans for the sskad.71
In 1961, Seskoad opened up to non- military students from the Ministries of 
the Interior (Kementerian Dalam Negeri), Foreign Affairs (Kementerian Luar 
Negeri), Immigration (Dirjen Imigrasi), the Attorney General’s Office (Kejak-
saan Agung), the State Administrative Institute (Lembaga Administrasi Ne-
gara, lan), and other institutions.72 There was greater inclusion of the social 
sciences and cooperation with other learning institutions, including the High-
er Learning Institute for Police Science (Sekolah Tinggi Institut Ilmu Politik), 
and the political and social science faculties of Gadjah Mada University in 
Yogyakarta (since 1960), the Economics Faculty of the Universitas Indonesia 
(Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Indonesia, feui) in Jakarta, and Padjadjaran 
University in Bandung (since 1962). A political science course on state defence 
 66 Wilujo Puspojudo, ‘Perkembangan sskad’, in Buku Peringatan Lustrum ke I sskad 
(n.p.: n.n, n.y.), 35.
 67 Puspojudo, ’Perkembangan sskad’, 36– 7.
 68 ‘Sedjarah Perkembangan Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat’, Karja Wira Djati, 9/ 
31 (July 1969), 9.
 69 Gregory, ‘Recruitment and Factional Patterns’, 302.
 70 Gregory, ‘Recruitment and Factional Patterns’, 302. Course C also expanded work of the 
Seskoad from purely educational to research and development.
 71 ‘Perkembangan dan Kegiatan Seskoad sedjak Didirikan hingga Sekarang’, Karja Wira 
Djati, 9/ 31 (July 1969), 40– 1.
 72 ‘Sedjarah Perkembangan Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat’, 11. This was 

















was taught at Padjadjaran University.73 From 1961, the experiences of the Man-
dala and Bhakti operations were used as case studies,74 as well as the anti- 
guerrilla policies in Malaya and China and Yugoslavia’s territorial warfare.75 
The civic action part of the curriculum was strengthened.76 The Seskoad would 
play a central role in defining the civilian- military relationship and policy.77 
The school thus had the important social functions of unifying the perspective 
of army leadership and creating an ‘old boys’ network.78
Nasution’s second appointment as army chief of staff on 27 October 1955 
gave the impetus for a stronger relationship between the sskad and other 
Staff and Command schools in many countries. Although the United States 
of America became one of the most important foreign centres for army 
training, with around one quarter of the army officers getting some educa-
tion in American schools, Nasution was very eager to find places for sskad 
graduates at other army training schools. His trips abroad in the second half 
of the 1950s brought possibilities for expanding the educational experience 
of the army, including to the ussr’s Frunze Academy, the Fuhrungsakade-
mie des Bunderswehr in West Germany,79 and the British Imperial Defence 
College.80
 73 ‘Perkembangan dan Kegiatan Seskoad sedjak Didirikan hingga Sekarang’, 53.
 74 The Mandala operation was Indonesia’s first forward intrusion into enemy territory as 
part of the military campaign against Dutch forces in West Papua inaugurated in 1961. 
The Bhakti operation was the locally based Civic Action programme conducted by the 
Siliwangi Division under General Ibrahim Adjie.
 75 The territorial concept of Lieutenant General Dushan Kveder of Yugoslavia was published 
in Foreign Affairs magazine in October 1953 and Military Review magazine in July 1954. It 
was translated by the sskad at the end of the 1950s and was published in Indonesian in 
the army magazine Territorial in June 1961.
 76 ‘Perkembangan dan Kegiatan Seskoad sedjak Didirikan hingga Sekarang’, 46.
 77 Between 1959 and 1966, Seskoad organized seven important seminars discussing 
Indonesia’s military doctrine and its relation to the state and society. These included 
the First Seminar on Military Issues (1959– 1960); the Second Seminar on Military Issues 
(January 1962); the First Army Seminar on the Tri Ubaya Cakti Doctrine (April 1965); and, 
lastly, the Revision Seminar on the Doctrine Tri Ubaya Cakti (August 1966). There was 
also a seminar on Civic Mission in July 1967, on Infantry doctrine in July 1968, and a pre- 
seminar on the Indonesian intelligence doctrine in February 1969.
 78 Charles Donald McFetridge, ‘Seskoad:  Training the Elite’, Indonesia, 36 (October 
1978), 87– 98.
 79 This is where Sumitro, the important early New Order general, received his education. 
Saleh As’ad Jamhari, Sugiharta Sriwibara and Ramadhan K. H., Perjalanan Seorang Prajurit 
Pejuang dan Profesional: Memoir Jenderal tni (Purn.) Soemitro (Jakarta: Sinar Cakra Sakti, 
1999), 11.
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Aside from the Seskoad, there was another school that was highly important 
to the creation of the army elite. This was the Military Law Academy (Akademi 
Hukum Militer, ahm), which was initially founded to offer a legal course for 
military personnel between May 1951 and June 1952. Nasution issued the or-
der to form a Military Law Academy and appointed the general secretary of 
the Ministry of Defence (Kementerian Pertahanan), Ali Budiardjo, to head its 
formation.81 In the whole of the 1950s, only two generations graduated. The 
first group started their studies in September 1952, but due to the 17 September 
coup- like event and the havoc it wreaked throughout the military the cadets 
did not finish their two- year courses in less than four years.82
A second batch of students was enrolled in September 1954, but they did 
not finish their courses until 1960. This group had an even more interesting 
side job: helping to manage the nationalization of Dutch- owned companies.83 
Many, like Major General Soekamto Sajidiman (who would play an impor-
tant role in nationalizing the large trading firm Jacobson van den Berg into 
the state- owned company Juda Bhakti),84 Lieutenant Colonel Soedjiwo, and 
Lieutenant Colonel Sukotriwarno85 would continue their managerial roles af-
ter their military roles and ease themselves into longer careers in the business 
sector.86 The extent to which alumni of the Military Law Academy played a 
role in the nationalization is unclear. According to Sajidiman, he and his ‘class-
mates from the Military Law Academy were instructed by the government 
to take over Dutch- owned corporations for the purpose of nationalization’.87 
A commemoration booklet for the academy was sponsored by advertisements 
for various state- owned corporations, indicating the extensive spread of the 
cadets into state- owned businesses.88
 81 D. Djiwapradja and E. Soewarna, Buku Peringatan Tudjuh Tahun Akademi Hukum Militer 
(Jakarta: Akademi Hukum Militer, 1960), 27.
 82 Djiwapradja and Soewarna, Buku Peringatan Tudjuh Tahun, 35.
 83 Djiwapradja and Soewarna, Buku Peringatan Tudjuh Tahun, 35.
 84 Soekamto Sajidiman, The Tender Power. An Autobiography (Jakarta:  Grafikaria Utama 
Sakti, 1978), 44.
 85 O. G. Roeder, Who’s Who in Indonesia (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1971), 388– 9 and 404.
 86 For more on military business, see Bambang Purwanto, ‘Economic Decolonization and 
the Rise of the Indonesian Military Business’, in J.  Thomas Lindblad and Peter Post 
(eds), Indonesian Economic Decolonization in Regional and International Perspective 
(Leiden: kitlv Press, 2009), 39– 58.
 87 Sajidiman, The Tender Power, 44. ‘Aku ditugaskan oleh Pemerintah untuk mengoper peru-
sahaan Belanda bersama rekan- rekanku lainnya dari Akademi Hukum Militer dalam 
rangka nasionalisasi perusahaan2 Belanda.’
 88 Djiwapradja and Soewarna, Buku Peringatan Tudjuh Tahun. Including Juda Bhakti (for-
merly Jacob van den Berg), Indevitra (formerly Borsumij), Ralin (formerly Philips), Satya 


















Like the Seskoad, the Military Law Academy was reliant on lecturers from 
Indonesia’s major universities. Professor Djokosoetono, the University of In-
donesia’s legal specialist, was appointed as head of the teaching board. feui 
economists Tan Goan- Po and Widjojo Nitisastro taught economics, Soediman 
Kartohadiprodjo taught introductory law, Satochid Kartanegara taught crimi-
nal law, and Hazairin Adat, general law. Pieter Nicholaas Drost and Hendrik Jan 
Heerens were the only Dutch professors who taught at the academy, lecturing 
on international law and sociology, respectively.89 Many of the cadets at the 
academy and at the sskad/ Seskoad not only had regular contact with profes-
sors and lecturers, especially from the ui, but also continued their educations, 
either at a university or through further courses (for instance, the management 
courses that were to become common in the latter part of the 1950s). Thus, 
they would not only be destined to meet in the classrooms but also in board-
rooms and on government committees.
5 Guided Democracy and the Army
The civilian political elite and the military elite translated the concept of Guid-
ed Democracy in very different ways. Although the ideas of efficiency, moder-
nity, and the use of technical and managerial know- how were voiced by both 
these groups, the politicians never saw themselves as the primary executors 
of the technical details. If they did, this idea was immediately dashed by the 
failure of the Eight- Year Overall National Plan introduced in 1960 and the deep 
economic malaise that set in in 1962. The military elite, meanwhile, because of 
their stronger corporate sense and more ‘technocratic’ education, expanded 
into civilian jobs without concerns about the primacy of technical know- how. 
General Suwarto, commander of the Seskoad, summed this up succinctly: ‘De 
wereld van amateurisme is al voorbij.’90
The army’s crème de la crème had no qualms about experts and expertise. 
Unlike the politicians, many military officers were trained in technical fields 
and were open to educating themselves further, either at educational facili-
ties in Indonesia or abroad. When the army expanded into the administration 
of government entities and companies, opportunities in civilian educational 
institutions opened up. Traditionally, military officers were trained in various 
 89 F. X. Sunatra, ‘Beberapa Soal tentang Text- Book Thinking’, in Djiwapradja and Soewarna, 
Buku Peringatan Tudjuh Tahun, 88.
 90 Suwarto, Himpunan Karangan Djenderal Anumerta Suwarto (Bandung: Karya Wira Jati, 
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technical fields such as engineering, medicine, and administration, but by the 
early 1960s, the employment of economists, sociologists, psychologists, and 
other social scientists was considered as standard in civilian engagement. This 
can be seen, for instance, in the use of sociologists and economists by the Army 
Rapid Strike Force (Resimen Pasukan Komando Angkatan Darat, rpkad) dur-
ing the West Irian infiltration campaign.91 Similarly, the Staff and Command 
School was opening the door to the social sciences.92
Rudolf Mrazek contends that there was a bifurcation of the Indonesian mil-
itary elite that started in the late 1950s but had become especially pronounced 
by the 1960s. This bifurcation was a result of the expansion of help with mili-
tary training from various US military colleges, and the establishment of a new 
military doctrine and a new military elite with striking units that had a more 
outward, offensive spirit than Nasution’s territorial ideas. The mid Guided De-
mocracy period, the years 1962 and 1963, were a watershed of major impor-
tance. As we will see, these were equally important years in the relationship 
between social science experts and the state, starting with the initially promis-
ing but latterly disappointing Economic Declaration (Deklarasi Ekonomi, De-
kon).93 This period saw hope for greater expert participation in national poli-
cymaking and planning. The rise of General Yani to replace General Nasution 
as army chief of staff was one of the pivotal points in this change. As a member 
of one of the army’s strike groups, Yani had no qualms with publicly opposing 
military involvement in the state and the economy.
In Chapter  1, elite divergence was explained as a generational difference 
between the old, colonially educated intellectuals of the 1928 generation and 
the newer, American- educated experts of the 1945 generation. If we follow 
Mrazek’s line of reasoning, the divergence among the military elite was one of 
educational experience and generational difference:
Until the mid- sixties, the Indonesian army had been officered by the first 
generation of officers who had matured during the forties or before, and 
who were now reaching an age close to retirement. We know for sure that 
by the mid- sixties there served in the Army a great number of young of-
ficers trained either in the United States or elsewhere abroad, as well as 
several thousands of new Magelang Military Academy graduates.94
 91 Kenneth Conboy, Kopassus. Inside Indonesia’s Special Forces (Jakarta: Equinox, 2003), 71.
 92 Pauker, The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare, 28 and 37– 41.
 93 Simpson, Economist with Guns, 92; Eric J.  Chetwynd, ‘The Indonesian Stabilization 
Attempt of 1963:  A Study in the Economics and Politics in Indonesia’, Master’s thesis, 
American University, Washington DC, 1965, 38– 9.











6 The Territorial Management Doctrine
The territorial doctrine would become the basis for the civic action programme 
and other military activities in civilian areas. As we saw above, Nasution began 
to formulate the doctrine during the Indonesian revolution. In 1958, Nasution 
appointed Commodore Siswadi and Colonel Soewarto, the psi- leaning deputy 
commandant of Seskoad, to head an ad hoc committee for the development of 
the armed forces, which included the implementation of this doctrine.
The idea of a territorial doctrine lay in the concept of total warfare, one that 
incorporated the entirety of the nation within a defence strategy. This strat-
egy was assumed to be the only means by which Indonesia could effectively 
defend its national interests in time of war. Because of the weaknesses of the 
military, the only way in which Indonesia could offer any effective form of re-
sistance was through a guerilla- based strategy that utilized Indonesian socie-
ty as part of its heavy warfare.95 Many within the military elite assumed that 
there would be another catastrophic world war within their lifetime. Thus, war 
was to be waged as an economic, social, political, and even cultural offensive, 
instead of a merely military offensive. Mao Zedong’s conception of the army as 
a fish and the people as water meant that it was important for the fish to have 
the support and control of the people. Kveder’s idea of territorial warfare also 
leaned heavily on this assumption of mass control.96
It is not hard to see how total warfare would mean greater control of society 
by the military. An article in the magazine Territorial stated:  ‘We (the army) 
shall manage and we shall control so that they (the people) can be invited, 
moved, and deployed with their positive power in the general goal of state de-
fence, security, and development.’97 This was achieved through the expansion 
of military duties into civilian areas. Civic Action programmes were used by 
the military for rural population control and to limit the communist influence.
Civic Action was part of the army’s idea of territorial management. The ex-
pansion of military leaders into nationalized businesses and the application of 
Civic Action happened before the formal announcement of the doctrine. Civic 
Action did legitimize, however, the position of army officers as the managers of 
companies, rural areas, and whole provinces. The army was transformed into a 
managerial elite and, in the process, its officers mingled with the nascent civil-
ian managers. Because of the expansion of military jobs into the civilian field, 
 95 Pauker, The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare, 11– 17.
 96 Pauker, The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare, 34– 7.
 97 ‘Suatu Konsepsi Pembinaan Wilajah sehubungan dengan Perang Wilajah dalam rangka 
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organizations such as Seskoad followed suit and expanded their educational 
offerings, as the shift towards the C- 1 course has shown. Thus, there was an in-
clination to connect young army officers with young, American- trained social 
science experts in order for them to share ideas. This idea of military- cum- 
civilian managerial elite control runs counter to the Guided Democracy’s focus 
on the societal incorporation of the intellectual politician within the leader-
ship. Instead, education fostered the creation of a military- civilian expert, thus 
creating a leadership that saw control as more important than incorporation.
The idea of military men as managers was legitimized through publications. 
Magazines like Manager and Fortuna, both targeting an audience of nascent 
professional managers, were very accommodating to the voices of military 
managers. Nasution and Ibrahim Adjie, for instance, wrote various pieces for 
these magazines.98 The magazines themselves discussed Civic Action and 
other military managerial programmes without a hint of suspicion. Likewise, 
army- issued magazines, such as Karya Wira Djati and Territorial, offered space 
for expert civilian managers to discuss management issues, including military 
management ones.
Territorial control, like its civilian managerial counterpart, thus required 
mass control: ‘[W] e must control mass opinion in our effort to develop our na-
tional morals.’99 Terms such as psy- war were bandied about in military articles 
on Indonesia. Counter- insurgency tactics used methods to effectively counter 
or reduce the hostility of the population in enemy territory. The military man-
agers needed to implement several basic elements within their territory: the 
management of the ideology and psychology of the community; the manage-
ment of the social, economic, political, and logistical issues of the community; 
the management of the human mindset as the subject of people’s resistance; 
the management of the government in times of war or danger; and the imple-
mentation of a special rural development programme.100
Territorial management was an important subject for army leaders like 
Nasution, but this conflicted with Sukarno’s efforts to use the military for his 
foreign policy. In this regard, it is important to understand the shift in power 
from Nasution to Yani and the shift in doctrine from territorial to Tri Ubaya 
Cakti. Under attack from both Sukarnoists and the communists, civilian 
 98 For instance, A. H. Nasution, ‘Kata Sambutan’, Manager, 4/ 36 (April 1963), 4– 9; Ibrahim 
Adjie, ‘tni dan Civic Mission’, Manager, 4/ 36 (April 1963), 10– 15.
 99 ‘Suatu Konsepsi Pembinaan Wilajah’, 8. ‘[…] kita harus mengendalikan opini masa untuk 
ditudjukan ke arah pembentukan moril nasional jang tinggi dengan semangat melawan 
jang berkobar- kobar.’








experts and military managers alike sold the territorial doctrine as one that 
could support the Guided Democracy’s development plans.
7 American Influence and Its Counter- balance
The new generation that had had a foreign military education understood the 
territorial doctrine and had the technical capabilities that would result in a 
further bifurcation of the military elites. Before 1958, some 250 Indonesian 
officers had been trained in the United States. Another five hundred officers 
were trained between 1958 and 1962. The spike between the years 1962 and 1964 
was significant, with more than three thousand military officers going to the 
United States for further training. The total number of officers with American 
exposure was thus around four thousand, a very significant proportion with-
in the armed forces.101 Many officers had been educated at Fort Leavenworth, 
which supported a social scientific approach to counter- insurgency.
The military’s strike groups – including the Army General Reserve (Tjadan-
gan Umum ad, or Tjaduad, later Kostrad); the Army Special Command (rp-
kad, later Kopassus); the Police Mobile Brigade (Brigade Mobil, Brimob); the 
Marines (kko); the Flying Corps; and the Special Air Force Group Airborne 
(Linud) – had had a different educational experience. They had learned tech-
nical skills and the latest counter- insurgency methods applied in the Vietnam 
War. The Indonesian military elite aimed to make the country’s strike units 
comparable to American ones, borrowing the American Pentomic doctrine.102 
The United States Senate Committee responsible for aid to Indonesia heard 
the testimonies of experts who ‘consider[ed] the Indonesian army as one of 
the most skilful in the world at small unit operations in swamps and jungles’.103 
American assistance also came in the form of providing Indonesian strike 
units with some of the latest US military gadgets. This strike force elite grew 
to differentiate themselves from the territorial elite, because they considered 
the territorial elite to be slothful, corrupt, and wealthy because of their civilian 
assignments. At the same time, the territorial officers were jealous of the para- 
command units and their better equipment and greater prestige.104
 101 Peter Dale Scott, ‘Exporting Military- Economic Development: America and the Overthrow 
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It would be too hasty to conclude that the difference between these elites 
was profound. Differences between the army, navy, air force, and police had 
bigger consequences in the later New Order period. Ernst Utrecht inter-
prets the relationship differently. He divides the elites into ‘Field Officers’ 
and ‘Managers’ and, accordingly, defines their relationship as one of mutual 
symbolism rather than the antagonistic competition implied by Mrazek. The 
managers provided the para- commanders with the money to operate their 
units and also to indulge in the lifestyle of the elite.105 The expansion of the 
‘experts’ developed along two general lines: a pinnacle level of professional 
scientists whose duty was to design national policies and plans, and a middle 
level of managers whose duty was to run the government offices and state- 
owned factories.
The relationship between the Indonesian army, American- educated intel-
lectuals, and their American counterparts has been a leitmotif of leftist Cold 
War literature on the cia. This was perhaps most succinctly expressed in David 
Ransom’s paper, which coined the term the ‘Berkeley Mafia’, the name given to 
the economic technocracy that engineered much of the New Order’s econom-
ic policies.106 Such an analysis tends to overlook the weaknesses of the pro- 
American factions, especially the American- educated economists and social 
scientists and, by 1964, the despair of the US State Department’s Indonesian 
planners, as Sukarno lurched towards intensifying the friendship with Mao-
ist China.
One of the most important individuals in this relationship was Guy Pauk-
er. He collaborated on a report funded by the Council on Foreign Relations, 
published in 1959, that saw the Indonesian army as ‘among the most capable 
leaders of Indonesia’.107 Pauker had first visited Indonesia in 1954 as research-
er with the Ford Foundation- mit Modern Indonesia project. In 1958, he be-
came a rand consultant whose role was paid for by the cia. In 1959, he took 
up residence as chairman of Berkeley’s Department for South and Southeast 
Asian Studies. In his role at Berkeley, he formed good relationships with not 
only Sumitro Djojohadikusumo but also Widjojo Nitisastro and Mohammad 
Sadli. He also grew close to Nasution and the commander of Seskoad, Colonel 
 Soewarto.108
 105 Utrecht, ‘The Indonesian Army as an Instrument of Repression’, 61.
 106 Ransom, ‘The Berkeley Mafia’.
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Peter Dale Scott reasons that Pauker was central to the introduction of the 
dual function of the military and that he persuaded Nasution to convince 
Sukarno to let the army participate in the government and the economy. There 
is no doubt that the ideas of military development were, in part, inspired by 
American thinking, yet thoughts about the dwifungsi had already clearly been 
part of Sukarno’s corporatist idea and Nasution’s revolutionary manual. On 30 
August 1956, an ad hoc committee was created, headed by Colonel Azis Saleh, 
to study the ways in which the Indonesian National Armed Forces (Tentara Na-
sional Indonesia, tni) could participate in the development of the state.109 In 
1958, Nasution set up the Committee on Army Doctrine (Panitya Doktrin Ang-
katan Darat), headed by Lieutenant Colonel Suwarto and Colonel Mokoginta, 
which would result in the introduction of the army doctrine of Territorial War-
fare (Perang Wilayah).110
The United States played a key role in the rise of Civic Action, especially 
in its 1960s ‘ form. In 1962, Pauker invited Soewarto to the rand Institute to 
show him how rand organized the ‘academic resources of the country as 
consultants’. At the same time, the Ford Foundation provided a $2.5 million 
grant for training courses. David Ransom pointed out that the Ford Foun-
dation used their contacts at the feui to influence officers within the Ses-
koad. By 1962, University of Indonesia economists were regularly visiting the 
Seskoad, where they taught the ‘economic aspects of defence’ and would 
discuss the national situation, sometimes late into the night.111 According to 
Pauker, after Suwarto’s visit to the rand Institute, he appointed four or five 
economists as the army’s high- level civilian advisers. According to Robert 
Shaplen,
The task of Suwarto and his staff […] was to convince as many as possible 
of the army’s 150 general officers and 400 colonels that it was their re-
sponsibility to maintain the delicate balance between the representative 
democratic principle, which makes parties and policemen a ‘necessary 
evil’ in any polity, and the corporatist principle which gives the army 
the means to participate in the government without creating a military 
 dictatorship.112
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There is no doubt that the army had a close affinity with the United States, 
but, as among the wider Indonesian elite, there was a degree of suspicion 
towards it. Nasution was always looking for potentially useful doctrines and 
curricula among those used by other nations. Chinese and Yugoslavian ma-
terials were translated and used. The territorial doctrine was also inspired by 
Mao Zedong’s interview with Edgar Snow in Red Star Over China and the ar-
my’s experiences in the revolutionary war.113 According to Suwarto, the article 
‘Territorial War: The New Concept of Resistance’, written by the Yugoslavian 
general Dushan Kveder, was very influential, with an Indonesian translation 
available at the Seskoad from 1958; the officers were also required to read 
Vladimir Dedijer’s ‘Tito Speaks’ and other translated Yugoslavian texts.114 It 
was planned that by 1965, the army would use Indonesian doctrines for 60 
per cent of its curriculum; in 1964, it was stipulated that all departments that 
focused on doctrinal research and development would be assigned an officer 
who had graduated from the Soviet Frunze Academy as a counterbalance to 
the American influence.115
8 The Military Strike Force and the Shift in Military Doctrine  
(1962– 1965)
During the revolutionary war, the tni had used both guerrilla and counter- 
insurgency tactics. This two- method approach was rare amongst the experi-
ences of twentieth- century independent revolutions. Guerrilla warfare, with 
its unique command- and- control structure, is inherently decentralized, less-
ening the control of the centre, while counter- insurgency tactics tend to in-
crease the degree of control of local military leaders at the expense of both 
local political leaders and the centre. The tendency on both accounts is to 
weaken the central command structure of the army and enhance control by 
regional and local army commanders.116
David Kilcullen has argued that the expanding political influence of the tni 
during the period 1945– 1965 was the result of a continuous but uneven devel-
opment and deployment of tni’s insurgency/ counter- insurgency measures.117 
However, the control of local territories had its roots as far back as the Japanese 
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occupation. Although strike forces had existed much earlier, the early 1960s 
were a watershed in the Guided Democracy. The development of a military- 
wide strike force, the Army General Reserve, in 1963,118 which functioned as an 
umbrella force composed of selected battalions of various strike groups, was 
a culmination of the shift in military emphasis from territorial commands to 
strike groups.
Hidajat Moekmin, writing after the fall of the Guided Democracy, said:
Without declaring the reasons, the (active and free foreign) policy was si-
lently left behind. It was then replaced with the politics of confrontation 
and political axes. Not satisfied, they wanted the defence policy to follow 
the confrontation policy. Without understanding the requirements, they 
forced a change to the defence policy so that it would be more ‘offensive- 
revolutionary’, a term that is often used more to refer to the fighting spir-
it (semangat) than the facts. These opportunists were everywhere, even 
within the armed forces. This group was always searching for personal 
aggrandizement by proclaiming themselves to be the most revolutionary, 
discrediting the Territorial Doctrine as a worn- out concept that was not 
revolutionary, and suggesting that it should be replaced with something 
new.119
The period after 1960 also saw the development of a specific military doctrine 
within the Seskoad that would result in the creation of the Tri Ubaya Cakti 
doctrine expounded in 1965.120
 118 This was the embryo for the Kostrad, an important, influential para- military unit during 
the New Order.
 119 Hidajat Moekmin, ‘PKI versus Perang Wilajah. Penilaian Kembali suatu Doktrin’, Karya 
Wira Djati, 6/ 21 (1966), 13. ‘Tanpa menjebutkan setjara djelas sebab2nja maka politik ini 
kemudian ditingalkan. Itupun setjara diam2 sadja. Selandjutnja diganti dengan Politik 
Konfrontasi dan Politik Poros. Tidak terbatas hanja sampai sekian mereka menghendaki 
agar djuga Politik Hankam disesuaikan dengan Politik Konfrontasi itu. Tanpa meli-
hat persjaratan jang ada mereka mengusahakan agar politik Hankam kita dibuat lebih 
“offensive- revolutioner”, kata2 jang sudah terlalu sering hanja diisi dengan semangat 
daripada kenjataan. Golongan opportunis dengan “pamrihisme” memang ada dimana2, 
djuga dalam tubuh AD sendiri. Golongan inilah jang selalu berusaha mentjari “grandeur” 
pribadi dengan menepuk dada bahwa mereka jang paling revolusioner dan mentjap 
Konsep Perang Wilajah sebagai konsep jang using, jang tidak revolusioner dan harus 
diganti dengan Doktrin jang sama sekali baru.’
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9 Strike- Force Units
The most important strike force of the army was the Army Rapid Strike Force, 
which was created by the Siliwangi Division under Colonel Alex Kawilarang. 
On 16 April 1952, Kawilarang formally authorized the establishment of the 
Command Unit (Kesatuan Komando, Kesko). In early January, the Kesko unit 
was transferred by central command to be under the direct authority of the 
army chief of staff. On 18 March, it was rechristened the Army Command 
Corps (Korps Komando Angkatan Darat, kkad). On 25 July 1955, the Army 
Command Corps was upgraded to the Army Commando Force Regiment (Res-
imen Pasukan Komando Angkatan Darat, rpkad). After the success of ending 
the prri/ Permesta rebellion in February 1958, educational assistance for the 
army was offered by both the US and England, in an effort to mend the rela-
tionship between Jakarta and the rebellions.121
The American Special Forces model was very different from what had exist-
ed in Indonesia. The Indonesian model was based on ‘self- sustained units that 
performed unconventional tasks for long periods far behind enemy lines’. The 
units were intended to win the hearts and minds of the people and included 
an interpreter and a medic to help the villagers. Each unit included four com-
bat engineers to assist in demolition duties, two doctors, two social scientists, 
and an economist, and was called a Special Forces Detachment (Detasemen 
Pasukan Chusus, dpc).122
The shift in assistance and funds towards training mobile forces represented 
a shift of attitude among the elites away from the concept of territorial forces. 
As Mrazek contends, ‘[T] hus the development after 1958 and during the ear-
ly sixties left its deep imprints in the structure and ideology of the Indonesian 
armed forces. While before 1958 the mobile striking units represented only very 
small islands in the vast sea of the territorial army, during the early sixties they 
acquired in many aspects a decisive position in the Indonesian military estab-
lishment.’123 An important development that mirrored other areas of the mili-
tary elite was the use of social scientists as a viable part of military missions.124
With the change from the pro- Territorial General Nasution to the pro- 
Mobile Force General Yani as Sukarno’s chief of staff, the ideological shift 
towards an offensive military policy became more pronounced. Yani had 
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received military training in Tokyo during the Japanese occupation. He was 
also among the first Indonesian officers to attend the Command and Gener-
al Staff School at Fort Leavenworth in 1955. Before returning to Indonesia, he 
took a two- month course on special warfare in England.125 Nasution appointed 
him chief of operations and then deputy director of intelligence. Under him, 
American- trained officers were given the most influential positions within the 
staff and command. It was, of course, ironic that as Nasution was being re-
moved from office, the Americans were fully backing his territorial doctrine 
because they believed that a military focus on population capture was much 
more in line with the idea of stamping out communist influence.126 The ag-
gressive doctrine espoused by the mobile- force elite was a cause for concern, 
since it destabilized the domestic situation, something which the communists 
could take advantage of.127
The rise of Ahmad Yani and his outward- looking, aggressive stance was 
in line with Sukarno’s views and his increasingly agitated policy towards the 
Dutch presence in West Papua. With massive Soviet help, the military, espe-
cially the navy and air force, was equipped with impressive hardware, the likes 
of which were non- existent in any other Southeast Asian country. By 1962, the 
Soviet Union had provided hundreds of tanks, armoured personnel carriers, 
artillery pieces and guided missiles, jets and fighter bombers, and ships. Indo-
nesia felt far more prepared to make the move towards an offensive strategy 
against the Dutch, which was a noticeable difference to the guerrilla warfare 
that had been Indonesia’s default strategy during the revolutionary war.
10 Tri Ubaya Cakti
The declaration of the Tri Ubaya Cakti doctrine was made during a military 
seminar held at the president’s request from 2 to 9 April 1965 at the Seskoad in 
Bandung. A total of fifty- one high- level officers, eighty- nine mid- level officers, 
and thirty- two civilian and military experts converged to discuss military doc-
trine.128 The seminar was to cover three doctrines/ issues: the military Karya, 
the revolutionary war, and the development of the potential for an Indone-
sian revolution. These discussions envisaged a new government programme 
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that would use the military in a creative- destructive (penjebolan- penciptaan) 
nation- building programme. The military was to harness total participation 
by the people within a specific offensive and defensive programme. Socially, 
culturally, and economically, the entire society was to participate in the pro-
tection of the nation- state.
This active call for the state to destroy elements within and without society 
was telling for subsequent state- society relations. Sukarno asked:
What is the goal of our revolution, and what is the work that we want the 
revolution to accomplish? To destroy. Our revolution is to destroy and to 
plant. Now, if we think deeply, what is it that we must destroy? What we 
have to destroy and destroy right now is imperialism, colonialism, neo-
colonialism, capitalism, all of which has been written in the preamble to 
our constitution.129
Such theoretical enemies were fleshed out as per the discussion at a previous 
Seskoad seminar. Discussions on territorial management as early as 1962 had 
highlighted the enemies of the state.130 Ideologically, these were individual-
ism and liberalism, international communism, religious fanaticism, atheism, 
isolationism, autarchy, and chauvinism. Politically, they were imperialism and 
colonialism, federalism and separatism, dictators, tribalism, and regionalism. 
Socio- economically, they were capitalism, feudalism, cosmopolitanism, nega-
tive foreign culture, reformism, conservatism, cynicism, and apathy.131
The state, through military coercion, was to root out the infiltration of for-
eign ideas in the minds of its populace. In order to achieve this, indoctrina-
tion programmes were devised to reach various sectors of society. Thus, the 
‘educated sector’ of the population was to be indoctrinated through rational 
persuasions. The general public was to be seduced by material incentives. The 
 129 In Doktrin Perdjuangan tni ‘Tri Ubaya Cakti’. Buku Induk (Malang: lp ikip, 1965), 20. ‘Apa 
tudjuan revolusi kita, dan jang kita kerdjakan dengan revolusi kita itu apa? Menggempur. 
Revolusi kita itu mendjebol kataku, dan menanam. Nah, kalo kita fikir benar2, revolusi 
adalah mendjebol; apa jang harus kita djebol, dan apa jang sedang kita djebol. Jang harus 
kita djebol dan jang sekarang kita djebol jaitu imperialisme dan kolonialisme, neokoloni-
alisme dan kapitalisme, sebagaimana jang tertulis dalam kalimat jang pertama daripada 
preambul.’
 130 The focus of these discussions was to debate and create regional operational, logistical, 
and management patterns, but eventually a much wider and intrusive population control 
at the individual level was discussed. The rise of the New Order Man must be attributed 
to the ideas discussed within these seminars.








orthodox groups were to be given informative seminars that would broaden 
their horizons, and the separatists would be corrected through political in-
centives. The major enemies of the state were thus defined as its own pop-
ulation:  the educated person and his ‘liberal and capitalist’ tendencies, the 
general public and its ‘communistic ideas’, the orthodox group and its Islamic 
fanaticism, and the separatists and their wayward ideas of nationhood.132
The idea of a Total People’s Defence (Pertahanan Rakjat Semesta) had 
been discussed in earlier seminars at the Seskoad and this envisaged a three- 
pronged approach towards defence:  a conventional force consisting of the 
military, a non- conventional force consisting of a Civil Defence (Pertahanan 
Sipil or Hansip), and a People’s Resistance Force (Perlawanan Rakjat). The Civ-
il Defence would be organizationally under the head of state to ensure unity 
of command.133 The roots of this strategy were derived from the total- warfare 
doctrine that the Japanese had introduced to the Indonesian youth through 
the formation of military units (daidan) within community organizations 
(tonarigumi).134
Yet, the Revolusi component of the doctrine represented a change from ear-
lier ideas, from a focus on internal enemies to external ones. This shift was 
possible on the condition that Sukarno’s control of the army was total; this was 
only possible after Nasution had been neutralized and Ahmad Yani installed. 
Sukarno’s speech during the seminar provided a glimpse into the difference. 
Sukarno said:
… our revolution has been side- tracked. Our army followed along with 
a side- tracked defence policy. This was a side- track from the revolution. 
Our defence policy has been force- fed by the neocolonialist powers. 
Several of our officers who have obtained foreign educations […] were 
taught defence strategies, large and small tactics, all of which aimed to 
convince us that ‘the possible enemy will come from the north’. We have 
been ‘force- fed’ those words. Thus, we were taught that if we want to 
defend the country, we have to face the north, not the south, west, or 
east.135
 132 ‘Seminar Seskoad Kedua, 3– 8 Januari 1962’, Karja Wira Djati, 2/ 8 (1962), 70– 1.
 133 ‘Pertahanan Rakjat’, Karja Wira Djati, 3/ 1 (July 1963).
 134 20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka, Vol. iii, 22.
 135 In Doktrin Perdjuangan tni ‘Tri Ubaya Cakti’, 21. ‘… revolusi kita menjeleweng, Angkatan 
Bersendjata kitapun ikut2 didalam ia punja defence policy menjeleweng, njeleweng 
daripada revolusi itu. Defence policynja pada waktu itu, kita “ditjekokkin”, djustru oleh 
fihak Nekolim. Beberapa hal jang salah misalnja saja kenal beberapa Opsir, Perwira, dapat 
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Sukarno insisted that the enemy was the West, the neocolonialist powers head-
ed by the United States of America.
This ‘rediscovery of the revolution’ was a realignment of Indonesian inter-
national interests, with Indonesia’s confirmation of its position within the 
non- aligned Third Power Bloc, the Newly Emerging Forces. The military played 
an important part. Sukarno continued:  ‘So the military, that word is closely 
inherent, very much inherent to the idea of the enemy. What is the purpose 
of war? It isn’t purely for self- defence. The purpose of war is to destroy the 
enemy; no one conducts war without having this purpose to destroy, to defeat 
the enemy.’136 This doctrine was in line with Sukarno’s increasingly erratic view 
of the world (the Nefo and Oldefo classification) and Indonesia as a beacon of 
revolution.
This doctrine was significantly revamped after the fall of Sukarno in 1965. 
By the Second Army Seminar, held from 25 to 31 August 1966, after the fall of 
the Guided Democracy, the belligerent tone had disappeared. Instead of a rev-
olutionary army, the army was depicted as a modern one: an organization with 
experts and their expertise. Thus, the values of military leadership were still 
extolled, with leadership ideals based on almost feudal characteristics along-
side modern, managerial leadership ideals.137 ‘The New Order wants a more 
realistic and pragmatic order, although it does not leave behind the idealism 
of struggle.’138
diadjarkan, hal2 jang mengenai defence strategy, taktik besar, taktik ketjil, pada dasarnja 
jalah, diadjarkan kepada kita itu “the possible enemy will come from the North”. Kita “dit-
jekokkin” begitu “the possible enemy will come from the North”. Malahan segala susunan 
defence policy itu didasarkan atas itu. “The enemy is the North, the possible attack of the 
enemy will come from the North”. Djadi, diadjarkan kepada kita, kalau kau mau defence, 
menghadaplah keutara, djangan ngadap kidul, ngadap ngulon, ngadap ngetan, mengh-
adaplah keutara.’
 136 In Doktrin Perdjuangan tni ‘Tri Ubaya Cakti’, 20. ‘Djadi Angkatan Bersendjata, perkataan 
itu adalah closely inhaerent, inhaerent serapat2nja dengan musuh. Malahan “doel’ dari 
perang jaitu apa? Bukan sadja mempertahankan diri sendiri. “Doel” daripada perangnja 
itu, mengalahkan musuh; tidak ada orang mengadakan perang, kalau tidak dengan mak-
sud untuk menghantjurkan, mengalahkan musuh.’
 137 Thus, the panutan characters discussed earlier and within the Javanese proverbs: ing 
ngarsa sung tuladha, ing madya mangun karsa, and tut wuri handayani, extolling the 
virtues of leadership within the common people, but also more modern ideals of effi-
ciency, transparency, humbleness, and planning capabilities. See Doktrin Perdjuangan 
tni- ad. ‘Tri Ubaya Cakti’. Buku Induk ( Jakarta:  Skodik Wala dan Pawamil abri, 
1968), 38.
 138 In Doktrin Perdjuangan tni- AD, 9. ‘Orde Baru mengingini suatu tata- fikir jang lebih real-








11 Mass Control and Job Expansion
The discussion of the definition of the state enemy in the Seskoad above has al-
ready identified the elements that the military wished to control: communists, 
separatists, federalists, atheists, religious extremists, imperialists, isolationists, 
liberals, and even cynics. What this meant was that the enemy existed both 
outside of and within Indonesian society itself. In accordance with the rule 
book of the Cold War, the government was fighting against ideas and ideolo-
gies as well as armed militias and other radicals. The fight was to have a variety 
of psychological, ideological, and military dimensions. There were two major 
approaches that the military took with regard to state enemies. The first was 
the deployment of conventional strike forces against separatists, imperialists 
and, later on, communists and leftists through the use of military violence. The 
second was the so- called military Karya programme.
Nasution initially introduced the Karya programme in order to allow the 
military access to positions and influence in the various sectors of civilian 
life that had been off- limits before the programme’s formal inauguration at 
the end of the 1950s. Another significant reason for the programme was mass 
population control, especially to protect against communist influence in rural 
areas. The pki, with good reason, wanted the army to abandon the territorial 
doctrine which the Karya programme was partially based upon. Communist 
support for the Tri Ubaya Cakti doctrine and its legitimation of foreign adven-
tures provided the pki cadres with relief from the military harassment that 
was being inflicted on them by the army during the late Guided Democray 
period.139
By the early 1960s, several ideologies had effectively been banned in national 
politics. Liberalism, with its perceived supporters as epitomized by the psi, was 
banned. By the late 1950s, Nasution had earnestly begun controlling civil society 
through the formation of various Military Cooperation Bodies (Badan Kerdjasa-
ma Militer, bks). The bks mirrored party- based onderbouw organizations, the 
largest of which were usually communist organizations. The move to integrate 
civil society organizations first started with veterans through the formation of 
the Veteran’s Legion of the Republic of Indonesia (Legiun Veteran Republik In-
donesia, lvri), a new veteran’s organization that was to replace all other veter-
ans’ organizations, some of the largest of which were the All- Indonesia Union 
of Former Fighters (Persatuan Bekas Pedjuang Bersendjata Seluruh Indonesia, 
 139 Aidit in his many speeches to military personnel in the various officer schools repeat-
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Perbepsi), associated with the pki, and the Former Islamic Fighters Union 
(Bekas Pedjuang Islam Bersendjata), associated with Masjumi. The extensive 
opposition to this military move resulted in a change of tactics and the setting 
up of the bks. The first bks was the Cooperation Body between Youth and Mil-
itary (Badan Kerdjasama Pemuda Militer, bkspm), an organization that used 
preman youths with a thuggish reputation. As Loren Ryter has shown, the bk-
spm was the nucleus of the later powerful Pemuda Pancasila group that existed 
during the New Order and played an important part in the early years of the 
regime, including during the 1965– 1966 communist massacres.140
Job expansion for army personnel occurred at a variety of levels. At the 
highest levels were those military officers who were asked to sit in Parliament 
or to head various ministries, departments, and provinces, or fill other high- 
level administrative posts. The expansion of the military territorial district 
(Kodam) during the Guided Democracy was significant: from seven to sixteen 
districts.141 The root of this expansion was the willingness of the army under 
Nasution in 1958 to avert a military dictatorship and instead implement a Mid-
dle Way (Dwifungsi). This concept, as planned between Sukarno, the cabinet, 
and the leaders of the armed forces, would give wide- ranging opportunities to 
military officers on an individual basis, but as exponents of the military they 
would be able ‘to participate in non- military fields and […] determin[e] na-
tional policies of the highest levels including such fields as state finance, econ-
omy, and so on’.142
The takeover of formerly Dutch- owned businesses resulted in a sudden ex-
pansion in the number of managerial posts that required filling, and Indonesia 
had a hard time finding replacements for these roles. Parliamentary Decree 
No. II/ mprs/ 1960 is an important document, as it legalized army participation 
and proposed a fundamentally different economic framework for the country. 
In A/ III/ 402/ 5, it stated that ‘the Indonesian armed forces and the state police 
shall participate in the process of production without diminishing their main 
respective tasks’. In A/ III/ 69/ 415, it stated that ‘the role and activities of the 
armed forces in the field of production bring them closer to the people more 
intensively in the process of state development especially in matters of indus-
trialization and the carrying out of land reform’.143 Many of the military men 
 140 Ryter, ‘Youth, Gangs and the State in Indonesia’, 36 and 82. Many of those in the gangs of 
the New Order were sons of bureaucrats and army officers, indicating the tight connec-
tions that the elites had to various sectors of Indonesian society.
 141 Sundhaussen, The Road to Power, 125.
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had some measure of education. The army officer corps represented an espe-
cially highly educated group, with 71 per cent having experience of higher edu-
cation and some having attended management courses in the United States.144
As part of the Karya group, the military was entitled to thirty- five seats in 
Parliament. In practically all newly created institutions of the Guided Democ-
racy, the military was to play a role and hold prominent roles. Military members 
were appointed as governors and in other executive civil- service positions. In 
fact, there were more members of the military in important government posts 
during the final years of the Guided Democracy than in the early years of the 
New Order.145
The territorial- affairs section of the general staff had been developing the 
regional authority of the military since the proclamation of martial law in 1957. 
The structure of this authority was commonly known as the Tjatur Tunggal.146 
At the highest regional (provincial) level, under martial law, the role of the 
army was supreme within a governmental structure that incorporated other 
civilian authorities. The Tjatur Tunggal structured regional government in a 
hierarchy, placing the territorial military commander in charge of a committee 
that was formed of the civilian governor, the chief of police, and the district 
attorney. If martial law were to be lifted, the civilian governor would replace 
the military commander as chairman of the committee. However, when mar-
tial law was finally lifted in 1963, the military regional structure of the Tjatur 
Tunggal effectively remained in place
The Seskoad further developed the territorial doctrine on the orders of Gen-
eral Nasution. In 1958, Colonel Soewarto, then assistant commander of the 
Seskoad, was ordered to conduct a series of meetings to define the territorial 
doctrine. Prior to Sukarno’s visit to Washington in April 1961, General Edward 
Lansdale proposed a Civic Action programme for Indonesia that involved the 
Indonesian army in rural reconstruction and development projects.147 Accord-
ing to Frederick Bunnell, the chief of staff approached US officers in Jakarta 
in July 1962 for American assistance in Civic Action programmes as one of the 
 144 Roeder, Who’s Who in Indonesia, 460.
 145 In September 1962, officers of the Karya operation attended the Graduate School of 
Business Administration at Harvard University, among others. Laporan Tahunan 1963 Staf 
Angkatan Bersendjata, Direktorat Keamanan Dalam Negeri, Territorial dan Perlawanan 
Rakjat (Jakarta: Direktorat Keamanan Dalam Negeri,Territorial dan Perlawanan Rakjat, 
1964), 11– 12.
 146 Translated as ‘Four in One’ from Javanese, providing a picture for the structure of regional 
governments.
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tni’s post- West Papuan military strategies.148 In 1963, the Americans started 
implementing the Civic Action programme as part of their assistance pro-
gramme, along with schemes in five other Asia– Pacific countries.
President Kennedy offered the Military Assistance Program (map) agree-
ment during President Sukarno’s visit to Washington in 1961. In the spring of 
1962, army chief of staff General Maxwell Taylor visited Indonesia and con-
cluded a Civic Action agreement at the Indonesian army headquarters. Near 
the end of the year, an inter- agency Civic Action Advisory Team arrived in 
Indonesia and established the office of Special Assistant for Civic Action at 
the US embassy in Jakarta. Colonel George Benson, former military attaché to 
Indonesia and close friend to many of the Indonesian military elite, became its 
first special assistant.149 By early 1963, American bulldozers, road scrapers, and 
power hammers were arriving in Indonesia. Fifty US officers from the Fort Bel-
voir Civic- Action training centre, Virginia, were expected to train Indonesian 
army engineers on the use of the machinery. A group of Indonesian officers was 
also sent to army engineering training centres at Fort Belvoir and Fort Leonard 
Wood, Missouri. General Yani officially opened the Civic Action course in late 
1963. Civic Action centres were being opened throughout the archipelago for 
the purpose of training those in the ‘development’ brigade. The programme 
was conceived as counter- insurgency training and the plan was to equip thirty- 
five to forty infantry battalions and thirteen engineering battalions.150
Under the command of the Siliwangi Division’s General Kosasih and, later, 
General Ibrahim Adjie,151 the Bhakti operation was launched specifically to im-
plement the Civic Action programme within former di areas in West Java. By 
1962, the civic mission was absorbing 40 per cent of the army’s manpower in 
rural development projects.
The expansion of Civic Action, and the implementation of the military’s 
Karya role, meant an expansion of military education into sectors previously 
limited to civilians.152 Like the formation of the Civic Action training centres 
 148 Frederick P. Bunnell, ‘The Kennedy Initiatives in Indonesia, 1962– 1963’, PhD Dissertation 
Cornell University, Ithaca, 1969, 147; Mrazek, The United States and the Indonesian 
Military, 78.
 149 Mrazek, The United States and the Indonesian Military, 77; Brian Evans iii, ‘The Influence 
of the United States Army on the Development of the Indonesian Army, 1954– 1964’, 
Indonesia, 47 (April 1989), 25– 48.
 150 Bunnell, ‘The Kennedy Initiatives’, 148.
 151 Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Jilid V, 182.
 152 For instance, the production of rice, in which the military increasingly played a part 
through the People’s Welfare Operation Command (Komando Operasi Gerakan Makmur, 
kogm), created in 1959. The effort to achieve sustainability in rice production was thus 












above, some educational institutes were created specifically for military train-
ing in civilian fields. They focused on the development of the military’s engi-
neering capabilities in building roads and other infrastructural projects, sim-
ilar to the American Military Engineering Corps. Special managerial courses 
for military students were held at various universities, including a course in 
administration science at the Faculty of Social and Political Science at Padja-
daran University in Bandung. Padjadjaran social scientists regularly lectured 
at the Seskoad and army officers could complete degree courses there. Ahmad 
Yani said:  ‘We know for certain that the development of our country should 
be in the hands of the experts and those responsible. This requires technical 
education in all fields. Administrative science involving managerial know- how 
is one of the most important sciences, because administrative capabilities de-
termine the smoothness of our efforts and increase efficiency.’153
Even when US aid to Indonesia was significantly reduced in 1964, and was 
expected to be stopped in 1965, the amount of money going into the map was 
actually increasing. Between 1962 and 1965, $39.5 million of US aid was given to 
the map in comparison to the $28.3 million of US aid that had been disbursed 
between 1949 and 1961. In fact, military aid for the Civic Action programme 
was increased in 1965, when many thought that the United States had stopped 
all aid. As early as May 1965, US military suppliers were negotiating equipment 
sales to Indonesia. In July 1965, Rockwell– Standard delivered two hundred 
light aircraft for the army as part of the Civic Action programme.154
Suwarto, in an article co- written with ui economist Kartomo Wirosuhard-
jo, laid bare the importance of territorial development and the Civic Action 
programme. The rationale for Civic Action from a military standpoint was ob-
viously security, yet the goal of the programme was in line with the constitu-
tion: the creation of a peaceful, wealthy, and just society. In order to reach that 
important role, together with the agricultural ministry and the Depernas. The produc-
tion of rice was coordinated with the Food Source Board (Dewan Bahan Makanan) and 
the various Tjatur Tunggal at the provincial level, thus securing a truly state- controlled 
food production institution. The military was an essential component in this command 
structure.
 153 Ahmad Yani, tni Membina Revolusi (Jakarta:  Delegasi, 1964), 112. Yani, in a speech 
titled ‘Beladjar dengan Tekun dan Penuh Kesadaran’ at the Social and Political Faculty, 
Padjadjaran University. ‘Kita mengetahui dengan pasti bahwa pembangunan Negara kita 
ini hendaknjalah berada didalam tangan para achli dan jang bertanggung- djawab. Untuk 
itu diperlukan pendidikan kedjuruan dalam segala bidang. Kedjuruan administrasi jang 
meliputi managerial Know how adalah salah satu kedjuruan jang sangat penting, karena 
keberesan administrasi akan membantu melantjarkan setiap usaha kita dan meninggi-
kan efficientie.’
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goal, the military would have to do its part in directing social change. Thus, 
Civic Action implied bringing about modernization by channelling villagers 
toward other modes of social, political, and cultural being than the ones of-
fered by political parties, in particular the communists. In the words of Suwar-
to and Kartomo: ‘By introducing the spirit of gotong royong,155 which is one of 
the principles of Indonesian socialism, Civic Action will already have helped in 
moving Indonesian socialism forward.’156
This was a result of the changing attitude the army had to security. Accord-
ing to Soewarto, ‘in the Cold War there is no difference between peace and 
war’,157 a statement that implied the need to build a doctrine that would func-
tion during both war and peacetime. Like the bks organizations, the purpose 
of Civic Action was population control. In accordance with the Seskoad’s clas-
sification of the potential enemies of the state, the uneducated and simple 
peasants could potentially have been attracted to communist ideas. The ar-
my’s anti- communist campaign was thus achieved through the dissemination 
of material incentives; that is, through military- sponsored economic develop-
ment. Suwarto and Kartomo imagined a rurally based army with military bar-
racks built throughout the rural heartlands.
For the army, the introduction of army personnel to manual work provided 
them with abilities that would help them transition to a future civilian life. In 
an article in Karya Wira Djati, Soewarto noted that army personnel must learn 
to become community leaders. It thus asked the individual soldier to develop 
his social skills.158
It was hoped that developing the rural areas would lessen the perceived jeal-
ousy of villagers towards the cities. In fact, the main security threat perceived 
by the army was rural poverty. Development was an essential component of 
the protection of the national and urban elite from the threat of a communist 
 155 Gotong royong (or rojong) means mutual assistance, it also denotes a political discourse 
on authority in Indonesian in the tradition of the familial state.
 156 Suwarto and Kartomo Wirosuhardjo, ‘Bantuan Angkatan Perang dalam Pembangunan 
Suatu Persiapan Pembinaan Wilajah’, in Suwarto, Himpunan Karangan Letnan Djenderal 
Anumerta Suwarto (Jakarta: Karya Wira Jati, 1967), 57. ‘Jang terpenting ialah adanja kes-
adaran bahwa perbaikan desa mungkin ditjapai dan telah ditjapai dengan gotong roy-
ong. Dengan kembalinja semangat gotong rojong jang merupakan salah satu sendi dari 
Sosialisme Indonesia, civic action ikut membantu langsung pelaksanaan Sosialisme 
Indonesia.’
 157 Suwarto, ‘Tjeramah tentang Perang Wilajah’, in Suwarto, Himpunan Karangan Letnan 
Djenderal Anumerta Suwarto (Jakarta:  Karya Wira Jati, 1967), 25. The full sentence 
was: ‘Djadi oleh karena dalam cold war ini pada hakekatnja tidak ada perbedaan antara 
perang dan damai dikatakan bahwa war is never our goal.’










insurrection. Kartomo’s idea, which has been elaborated above, of a military- 
expert- business tripartite ruling class is a continuation of this idea. Thus, mass 
control was not merely conceived through the lens of a projection of violent 
power, but also as a projection of modernity.159 It was an attempt to turn sol-
diers into social engineers.160
12 Conclusion
The relationships between social scientists, military officers, and managers 
developed during this period. Military officers routinely undertook economic 
research and many, like Nasution and Adjie, published articles in professional 
managerial magazines. It is also no coincidence that those officers with mana-
gerial careers were the ones who supported the territorial doctrine. The territo-
rial doctrine legitimated their participation in the management of Indonesian 
public life and the country’s economy. As a result, civilian experts and territori-
al officers had the same affinities, as both were managers. It was because of this 
that they maintained a strong connection and, perhaps, even a feeling of es-
prit de corps. Soehardiman credited Suharto’s success ‘especially to his capable 
managerial skills’.161 This says a lot about his position as a military manager, but 
it also leads us to the view of many from within the New Order: its success was 
the result of the application of the managerial ideology that had become avail-
able and was taught to many military officers during the period. The growing 
relationship between the military and both social science and social scientists 
strengthens the view that this was not merely a momentary strategic decision 
but a basic strategy of the New Order state and the modernist view it had of 
itself, which included its rational and scientific foundation and its managerial 
capabilities.
 159 Latham, The Right Kind of Revolution, 123– 4.
 160 Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942– 
1976 (Washington: Center of Military History, 2006), 225; Suwarto and Kartomo, ‘Bantuan 
Angkatan Perang’, 56– 7.
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 chapter 3
Expertise and National Planning
 Abstract
This chapter looks into the development of Indonesia’s postcolonial higher education 
system and the international technical assistance protocol in developing Indonesia’s 
new managerial class. It looks into the rapid expansion of higher education and the 
effort of the Indonesian society to decolonize its education system away from the 
Dutch model. Because of the swiftness of this process, Indonesianization looked a lot 
like Americanization. International aid through technical assistance was the primary 
means through which Western ideas on development planning and expert production 
through international higher education became cemented. Aid money helped create 
personal and institutional relationships between Indonesian and American govern-
ment institutions and universities. In particular, the relationship between experts 
like the economist Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Indonesia’s state planning institution, 
the faculty of economics of the University of Indonesia and UN and usaid technical 
experts and Western social scientists from American within mit’s Indonesia Project 
and others. These forms of transnational relationships legitimized the position of In-
donesian planning experts within planning institutions that had strong institution-
al relationship with the West. This pattern would continue throughout much of the 
twentieth century.
 Keywords
Indonesianization of higher education  – Americanization  – international technical 
aid – modernization theory – Indonesia project
This chapter discusses two developments concerning the post- colonial crea-
tion of expertise during the 1950s. The first was the development of higher edu-
cation in both quantitative and qualitative terms: this included the expansion 
of domestic tertiary education and the Americanization of the curriculum and 
study methods, as well as the introduction of the Guided Study method. The 
second was the development of the various institutes for national planning 
and economic development, which was the result of a new institutional rela-
tionship forged by Sumitro Djojohadikusumo with the untaa (United Nations 
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Technical Assistance Administration) and American aid in the form of an in-
tellectual association with the Charles River (Harvard- mit) community of 
scholars.
The developments above represented the defining characteristics of the chang-
ing elite culture of the 1950s. First, the decade was a period in which efforts to 
erase the colonial legacy were made in various aspects of national life. One of the 
most famous of these efforts was the nationalization of Dutch- owned enterprises. 
Yet, Indonesianization occurred in more areas than just the economy. It was prev-
alent in the education, legal, and administrative systems, among others. Indone-
sia sought foreign expertise and consultants through the only channel available 
in that period: the international aid structure dominated by the United States of 
America. In many respects, Indonesianization was Americanization.
Second, the establishment of institutions for national planning and eco-
nomic development resulted in a new protocol for elite creation that was ce-
mented during the decade. The shift towards being educated as a marker of 
elite status was significant, with education surpassing nobility as a class mark-
er. A new elite emerged from the social and cultural shift brought about by the 
introduction of the fetish of efficiency and the lexicographic assault of English 
terminology to denote modernity: efficiency, planning, manager and manage-
ment, and so forth. Terms such as ‘expert’ and ‘manager’ became markers of 
status.
1 Expert Creation
When the Dutch transferred sovereignty, the problem of the lack of expertise 
was already apparent. The number of Dutch experts in Indonesia fell through-
out the 1950s. In 1950, there were more than sixteen thousand Dutch employ-
ees in leading positions; by 1951, the number had already dropped to seven 
thousand; and by 1956, it had atrophied to around six hundred.1 Difficulties 
at the office owing to the unclear division of tasks and responsibilities, which 
were exacerbated by the rising cost of living, lack of security, poor housing, and 
the disappearance of good schools for their children, determined the decision 
of many Dutch to repatriate.2 This occurred despite efforts by the Dutch and 
 1 Meier, Den Haag- Djakarta, 176.
 2 Nota omtrent de ontwikkeling van zaken in Indonesië in zoverre de verhoudingen binnen 
de Nederlands- Indonesische Unie en de belangen van Nederland daarbij betrokken zijn, na, 
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Indonesian governments to retain their presence. For instance, the Dutch em-
ployees of the Republic were reassured by a regulation issued on 1 January 1950 
by the Dutch government regarding the continued payment of pensions and 
other support for those who worked for the Indonesian government.3
The government’s efforts to improve expertise in the civil service entailed 
two approaches: retaining or conscripting foreign employees and, at the same 
time, expanding education opportunities for Indonesian employees, either in 
Indonesia or abroad. Dutch employees were preferred by Indonesia’s admin-
istrative elites. They knew Indonesia far better than experts from other coun-
tries. The higher- echelon Indonesian civil servants spoke Dutch and thus com-
munication between Indonesian and Dutch experts was less of a problem. The 
abilities of the Dutch employees were not in doubt and, to some extent, were 
considered to be superior to those of other Western nations.4 There were quite 
a number of new Dutch employees who were generally progressive.5
Indonesia also began sending students abroad to foreign universities and 
expanding its own higher- education offering. In 1960, the Depernas tried to get 
an overall picture of the number of experts in the country from government 
departments and institutions. The outcome was not accurate, because some 
departments failed to provide or provided incomplete information, but the ag-
gregate number offers an indication of the expansion of expert manpower by 
the end of the decade. In all, there were 4,453 Masters/ Doctorandus degrees 
held, comprised of 1,659 medical doctors, 803 legal specialists, 650 engineers, 
219 social/ political scientists, and 200 economists, among others. In addition, 
there were 2,519 employees with bachelor’s degrees (469 majoring in social/ 
political sciences, 221 in economics, 282 in law, and 198 in engineering).6
Related to this was a serious lack of executive managers. A look at the sta-
tistics for 1941 reveals a ratio of three executives to five non- executives. The 
top- level executives were university graduates, while the upper mid- level ex-
ecutives were graduates of college- level academies7. In comparison, the 1961 
data show that the executive and top- executive level had shrunk to just 3.5 per 
 3 Antara, 30 December 1952.
 4 With the exception of the Netherlands Military Mission, which was disparaged by Simatu-
pang in a newspaper article. anri, Delegasi Indonesia, inv. no. 1267.
 5 Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Indonesia Dipersimpangan Djalan (Djakarta: Abadi, 1951), 37– 8.
 6 Rantjangan Dasar Undang- undang Pembangunan Nasional Semesta, Buku Ke iii, 1388– 9.
 7 Such as the hbs (Hogere Burger School), the Dutch High School; gymnasia are Dutch pre-
paratory schools for higher or university education; the Mosvia (Middelbare Opleiding 
School voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren, High School for Indigenous Civil Servants), the college 













cent of the total civil service (E and F group). In order to return to 1941 levels, 
the creation of eight to ten thousand public administration experts would be 
required, something which the four universities teaching public administra-
tion were not equipped to handle with their annual graduations of just two 
hundred people.8 In Table 2 below, the A and B columns represent workers, 
C and D represent supervisors, E represents executives, and F represents top 
executives. The third row shows the ratio; thus there were five executives for 
every ninety- five non- executive civil servants.
2 putaba (Pusat Tenaga Bangsa Asing)
The Centre for Foreign Employees (Pusat Tenaga Bangsa Asing, putaba) was 
established in 1951 at the Indonesian High Commission in The Hague. It was 
created after a team headed by Prof Gunarso from the itb, Prof Sukarja, and 
Masoro, head of the General Directorate of the Ministry of Personnel Affairs 
(Kementerian Negara Urusan Pegawai), led a team on a visit to the city in June 
of that year. They were sent to Europe to look into the possibility of importing 
 8 Prajudi Atmosudirdjo, ‘Masalah Pendidikan Ilmu Administrasi pada Perguruan- perguruan 
Tinggi’, in Lapuran Musjawarah Ilmu Administrasi Negara dan Niaga (Jakarta: Lembaga Ad-
ministrasi Negara, 1962), 32– 4.
















Dutch 355 5,045 7,909 2,808
Indonesian 49,662 8,830 5,023 221
Chinese 157 337 240 – 
Total 50,178 14,212 13,172 3,029
Percentage 61.78% 17.49% 16.21% 3.75%
Ratio 20 6 5 1
source:  prajudi atmosudirdjo, ‘masalah pendidikan ilmu administrasi pada 
perguruan- perguruan tinggi’, in lapuran musjawarah ilmu administrasi nega-
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experts. The team’s itinerary included the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, and 
Switzerland. The team did not go to the uk, instead focusing on ‘German- 
speaking’ countries.9
In 1950, the commission set up to study the matter of hiring foreign employ-
ees surveyed various ministries to determine the number of vacancies availa-
ble. Between one thousand seven hundred and two thousand foreign experts 
were needed. Foreign employees on temporary contracts were offered all kinds 
of perks and benefits, and paid higher wages than Indonesians in the same po-
sitions. Yet, by September 1951, only one hundred people had been recruited for 
a three- year contract. The government provided residences in the Kebajoran 
Baru district of Jakarta. In the advertisements published in Austria, a very large 
salary of Rp 1,810 a month was promised, in addition to a fl. 13,000 bonus to be 
paid out in Austria after the three- year contract period. On 21 August 1952, sev-
enteen medical doctors from various European countries arrived in Jakarta.10 
They were among the 416 people that the putaba had successfully recruited 
in 1952, far fewer than the target of twelve hundred workers. Of these 416,229 
were Dutch, 111 were German, thirty- nine were Austrian, and eighteen were 
Italian. In total, 186 were doctors and pharmacists.11 For the year 1952, the gov-
ernment decided to budget to import eight thousand foreign workers, based 
on a tally coordinated with the various ministries. The quality of many of the 
table 2 Levels of employment of civil servants, Indonesia, January 1961
A B C D E F
228,889 408,302 170,901 100,568 28,687 7,679
21.9% 39.1% 16.28% 9.63% 2.74% 0.72%
84 36 4 1
Note: The A and B columns represent workers, C and D represent supervisors, E represents ex-
ecutives, and F represents top executives. The third bracket shows the ratio, thus there were five 
executives for every ninety-five non-executive civil servants.
source:  atmosudirdjo, ‘masalah pendidikan ilmu administrasi’, in Lapuran 
Musyawarah Ilmu Administrasi Negara dan Niaga, 33
 9 The East Asian Society (Ost- Asiatische Gesselschaft) and the Institute for Tropical Medi-
cine (Institut fur Tropen Medizin) in Hamburg received the visitors with some enthusiasm 
and a German– Indonesian Association was created, but little seems to have come of it.
 J. Krol, ‘Internationale technische hulp aan Indonesia’, Cultureel Nieuws uit Indonesia, 2 
(August 1951), 12.
 10 Antara, 21 August 1952.









applicants was disappointing. Some of the Swiss youths sent to Indonesia had 
received only very basic training.12 According to Syafruddin Prawiranegara, the 
problem then seemed to be less one of getting them into the country than one 
of getting them out of it.13 In general, Indonesian efforts to obtain foreign ex-
pertise to work directly and organically within the national civil service were 
a failure. The putaba continued its work until the mid 1950s, but the number 
recruited lagged far behind what was needed.14
3 Post- colonial Dutch Higher Education
Prior to the cessation of the colonial relationship, the Netherlands provided a 
significant amount of schooling for Indonesians. In fact, in the year after the 
signing of the rtc, the Netherlands was practically the sole provider of foreign 
higher education to Indonesian youths.15 The list below shows the number of 
Indonesian students who went to the Netherlands to study during the 1950s. 
While this number was relatively limited during the revolutionary period, it 
had climbed by the end of the 1940s, peaking briefly between 1950 and 1953, 
before falling towards the end, in 1957. The number sent during this period was 
comparable to the total number of Indonesians studying in the Netherlands in 
the period 1924– 1940 (344). Not included in this number were 360 Indonesian 
Chinese students.16
Basuki Gunawan’s study of Indonesian students in the Netherlands showed 
that the similarity in the educational curriculum and methods, the use of the 
Dutch language, and the prestige of going to the Netherlands to study were 
factors valued by early Indonesian students, but that feelings of inferiority 
and a fear of not being able to find a permanent government position at home 
were negative considerations.17 The Malino scholarship, announced after the 
 12 These Swiss youths were receiving Rp 1,500 per month, with a 10,000 Swiss franc bonus 
per year.
 13 na, Hoge Commissariaat Indonesië, inv. no. 442.
 14 putaba paid for Dutch professors to teach in Indonesia, including K. Posthumus and J. A. 
L. Cuisiner at Universitas Gadjah Mada; P. L. van den Velden, F. Weinreb, and P. N. Drost 
at Universitas Indonesia; and C. G. G. van Herk at Universitas Indonesia in Bogor in 1952. 
Putusan2 Rapat ke- 31 Kabinet Ali Sastroamidjojo Tanggal 19 Djanuari 1954, anri, Kabinet 
Presiden Republik Indonesia, inv. no. 9h.
 15 Basuki Gunawan, Indonesische studenten in Nederland (The Hague:  W. Van Hoeve, 
1966), 31.
 16 Murray, A Chronicle of Indonesian Higher Education, 29.
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Malino conference in 1946, allowed for a continued Indonesian presence in 
the Dutch education system,18 at least until the complete cessation of the re-
lationship with the Netherlands in 1957. Unease about the steadily worsening 
Dutch– Indonesian relationship impacted the desirability of Dutch higher edu-
cation. Of the two hundred Indonesian students interviewed between 1955 and 
1957, 70 per cent admitted their desire to study elsewhere.19
The government sent 284 Indonesians with civil service obligations (ikatan 
dinas) and 142 with foreign aid scholarships to study in the Netherlands during 
the period 1950– 1956. In total, 426 Indonesians studied in the Netherlands in 
this period. In comparison, the number of students who went to the United 
States to study between 1950 and 1962 totalled just fifty- nine. In fact, the coun-
try that the government sent the next largest number of students to was West 
 18 na, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Hoge Commissariaat Bandung, 1950– 1957, inv. 
nos. 514– 523.
 19 Gunawan, Indonesische studenten in Nederland, 31. Especially in the United States, the uk, 
Scandinavia, Switzerland, and Egypt.
table 3 The number of Indonesian students 
coming to the Netherlands per year






















Germany, where 242 studied.20 In the academic year 1952– 1953, 1,540 students 
from Indonesia went to study in Dutch colleges and universities, compared to 
just eight Indonesian students who studied in Paris. Of these 1,540, 188 were on 
civil service scholarships and 187 on military scholarships. Higher education 
for Indonesian students in the Netherlands experienced a significant shift in 
the post- colonial period. Between 1924 and 1940, the majority of Indonesian 
students studied at Leiden, especially at its law school, while only a limited 
number went to the engineering school in Delft. In fact, out of the total of 344 
Indonesians who pursued Dutch higher education at this time, 199 studied in 
Leiden and just twenty- five in Delft.21
There were two reasons for the shift in educational emphasis. First, the ma-
jority of Indonesians who could afford to go to Dutch universities during the 
colonial period hailed from the traditional aristocracy, whose main role was 
within the colonial bureaucracy. Since the colonial bureaucracy focused on the 
application of Dutch laws, there was an emphasis on legal studies for aspir-
ing bureaucrats. This contrasted with the motivations of students in the post- 
colonial period. Second, many of those who went to the Netherlands in the 
1950s were paid for by the government or received a Malino scholarship, and 
thus they were expected to supply the manpower needs of the state. Economic 
deterioration and inflation meant that many, including former members of the 
aristocracy, had diminished incomes that did not allow them to send their chil-
dren abroad to study. The state and its access to state and foreign scholarship 
thus determined who was able to obtain a foreign education.
4 Expansion of Universities and Academies
Glassburner remarked that Indonesia ‘has probably accomplished more by 
way of eliminating her high- level manpower gap than she has in any other area 
of economic development policy’.22 In 1949/ 1950, there were only six higher- 
learning institutions in Indonesia,23 with the number of students totalling 3,377. 
By 1955, there was a total of twenty- seven higher- learning institutions, with 
 20 Rifai, Perkembangan Perguruan Tinggi di Indonesia, 224– 6.
 21 Murray, A Chronicle of Indonesian Higher Education, 29.
 22 Glassburner, ‘High- Level Manpower for Economic Development’, 201.
 23 Universitas Indonesia, Universitas Gadjah Mada, nias (Nederlands Indische Artsen 
School), stovit (School tot Opleiding van Indische Tandartsen, which became 
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18,122 students enrolled. By 1964/ 65, there were 355 institutions of higher learn-
ing, with a total student body of 278,000. In comparison, in the academic year 
1939/ 1940 there had been just 1,693 students enrolled. Between 1950 and 1959, 
eight universities were founded. Based on Law No. 22/ 1961, every province was 
to be furnished with one higher- education institute, preferably a university, and 
the ratio between the science and engineering faculties and the social/ behav-
ioural sciences and humanities was to be seven to three.24 As a result, from 1960 
to 1966, twenty- eight universities were founded throughout the archipelago.25
There were several ways in which universities were created: some started 
out as individual faculties that were incorporated into fully fledged universi-
ties, while others were created from scratch, either by individuals or groups 
in civil society or the government. A number of universities started as private 
institutions that were later incorporated into state universities. These institu-
tions were usually created by prominent regional and national civilians and 
military elites, who were concerned about providing their areas with higher 
education while they were at the same time intent on elevating their status 
table 4 Indonesian students studying in the 
Netherlands in the early 1950s
The universities Number of 
Indonesian students
Technische Hogeschool Delft 68





Middelbare Technische School 
Rotterdam
17




 24 Rifai, Perkembangan Perguruan Tinggi, 8.
 25 Gerhard Junge, The Universities of Indonesia. History and Structure (Bremen:  Bremen 







by becoming the founder of a higher- education institute.26 A large number of 
private universities were not incorporated into state universities. For instance, 
the University of Res Publica (present- day Trisakti) was created by the Chinese 
organization Baperki and was also highly influenced by the communists.27 By 
1959, there were around eighty private universities/ schools and, as part of the 
enthusiasm for the early Guided Democracy developmental push, this had 
grown to 114 by 1961.28
Aside from universities, ministries and private institutions also created 
academies. By 1954, fifteen academies had been created with courses at them 
ranging from two to five years’ duration. The Ministries of Education and Cul-
ture (Kementerian Pendidikan dan Budaja), Foreign Affairs (Kementerian Luar 
Negeri), Commerce and Industry (Kementerian Perdagangan dan Industri), 
Public Works (Kementerian Pekerdjaan Umum), and Defence (Kementerian 
Pertahanan) each had an academy, while the Ministry of Agriculture (Kemen-
terian Pertanian) had three and the Ministry of Transportation (Kementerian 
Perhubungan) had four. The total number of people taught in ministerial acad-
emies in 1955 totalled 1,128, with the largest number studying the three- year 
course at the Academy of Military Law.
The total number of government employees studying in 1958 was 25,672. 
About 43 per cent, or 11,042, were students with civil service obligations. Of 
those 11,042 students, 1,427 were enrolled in a course of more than three years’ 
duration, 4,068 were on a three- year course, 3,383 were on a two- year course, 
2,115 were on a one- year course, and just forty- nine were on a short course of 
six months’ duration. The largest group came from the Ministry of Agricul-
ture (8,111), followed by the Ministry of Health (7,055), the Ministry of Edu-
cation and Culture (2,351), and the Ministry of Transportation (1,634).29 This 
expansion of civil service obligations was in line with the massive expansion 
of government academies, but also with the expansion of government- owned 
universities. The number of academies would reach a total of 128 by 1970, with 
the largest growth occurring between the years of 1961 and 1970, when seventy- 
two academies opened.30
The government realized early on that the idea of educating civil servants 
on a four- year university course would not meet contemporary needs. The ur-
gent demand for trained workers for the business world could not be covered 
 26 Murray, A Chronicle of Indonesian Higher Education, 145– 54.
 27 Murray, A Chronicle of Indonesian Higher Education, 150– 1.
 28 Murray, A Chronicle of Indonesian Higher Education, 87.
 29 Kursus- kursus Departemen dan Djawatan, vii- viii.
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table 5 List of academies run by Indonesian ministries
Name of school Overseen by No. of 
students
1 Academy of Indonesian Art Ministry of Education and 
Culture
173
2 Academy for the Foreign 
Service
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 80
3 Academy for Foreign 
Economic Relations
Ministry of Commerce/ 
Industry
72
4 Academy of Forestry Ministry of Agriculture 28
5 Academy of Agricultural 
Research
Ministry of Agriculture 76
6 Governmental Sucrose College Ministry of Agriculture 65
7 Academy of Technical 
Education- Foundation
Ministry of Public Works 142
8 Higher Education for the ptt





10 Academy of Navigation Ministry of 
Communications
44
11 Academy of Commercial 
Navigation
12 Academy of Military Law Ministry of 
Communications
16





14 Indonesian Academy of 
Commerce
Ministry of Defence 223
15 Academy of Economics Subsidized (less than 100%) 307
Private n/ a
Private n/ a
source:  development of education in indonesia ( jakarta:  ministry of educa-
tion, instruction and culture, 1955), 13
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either. Efforts to hire Dutch specialists from the Dutch- controlled Indonesian 
business world had been unsuccessful. Many of the people entering business, 
regardless of whether their background was administrative or technical, were 
former government civil servants of Dutch origin. Importing them from the 
Netherlands was expensive and many of the prospective workers were not at-
tracted unless they were given some guarantee of safety and financial security.
5 Indonesianization and Americanization
The development of new curricula and modes of study was an essential com-
ponent of the Indonesianization effort and was dependent on the presence 
of American faculty teachers, which was a requirement of the university- to- 
university cooperation agreements. By the mid 1960s, the new Indonesian 
curriculum was based on the American model.31 We will take a closer look at 
the cooperation between Kentucky University and the Institute of Agriculture 
Bogor (Institut Pertanian Bogor, ipb) to see how this shift from the Dutch to 
the American educational system occurred. It was not purely a re- creation of 
Indonesian universities as exact clones of American ones:
With Indonesian acuity, the staff at IPB was maintaining some of the 
system they had learned from the Dutch, studying systems elsewhere in 
Europe and Asia, refining their own expectations, and utilizing the inno-
vative judgments of Ken- team colleagues. Out of all this it was finding 
identity as the Indonesian Agricultural University.32
It was thus a selective process of de- Europeanization, Indonesianization, and 
Americanization.
On 30 January 1950, the government issued an emergency law on universi-
ty education that replaced Staatsblad 1947 no. 47. The formation of an Inter- 
University Committee (Panitya Antar- Universitas) signalled the end of the du-
alism that had existed between the Republican and Federal systems of higher 
education. The Dutch domination of administrative functions had ended; the 
 31 Since the early 1950s, calls for a shift from the use of Dutch to English had been made 
by various educational organizations. anri, Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia, inv. 
no. 1090.
 32 Howard W.  Beers, An American Experience in Indonesia. The University of Kentucky 
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new president of the new and unified Universitas Indonesia was an Indone-
sian, Soerachman Tjokroadisoerjo, who resigned in 1951 and was replaced by 
Professor Soepomo. The process of reshuffling professors continued through-
out the 1950s, as faculties that were politically sensitive moved into Indonesian 
hands, while Dutch professors were permitted to teach courses in specific tech-
nical fields that were non- political.33 Thus 80 per cent of the professorial staff 
table 6 American university cooperation programs
University and faculty Affiliation Financial 
support
Universitas Gadjah Mada
Economics University of Wisconsin Ford Foundation
Mathematics/ physics/ 
technology
uc Los Angeles ica
Universitas Indonesia
Medicine ucsf Medical Center ica
Economics uc Berkeley Ford Foundation
Agriculture and Forestry University of Kentucky ica
Animal Husbandry University of Kentucky ica
Universitas Airlangga
Medicine ucsf Medical Center ica
Teaching college Institut 
Teknologi Bandung




chemistry/ biology/ physics University of Kentucky ica
Universitas Sumatera Utara
Teaching college suny, Albany Ford Foundation
Universitas Padjadjaran
Teaching college suny, Albany Ford Foundation
source:  bruce glassburner, ‘high- level manpower for economic develop-
ment:  the indonesian experience’, in f.  h. harbison and c.  a. myers, manpower 
and education. country studies in economic development (new york:  mcgraw- 
hill, 1965), 186. affiliation agreements in 1960
 33 The university presidents also held a meeting in April 1952 and decided that the Dutch 
language should be replaced as soon as possible with Indonesian. anri, Kabinet Presiden 





in the faculties of law in all state- owned universities was Indonesian, while 
engineering faculties had no Indonesian teachers.34 As explained by the chair 
of the Council of Curators (Dewan Kurator): ‘It is a consequence of our free-
dom that we must push through this nationalization. This applies especially 
for courses that are concerned with national administrative leadership.’35
The government responded to the lack of lecturers in several ways. First, 
experts working in government services were required to temporarily allocate 
time for teaching. A second effort was made to import lecturers from abroad. 
A  dozen Dutch professors were invited to teach at various universities for a 
period of six to twelve months. Throughout the 1950s, Indonesia imported a 
number of lecturers for the universities. In July 1957, there were 148 permanent 
foreign lecturers, consisting of eighty- five professors, sixty- three assistant lec-
turers, and 120 non- permanent lecturers. Indonesia imported thirty- one lec-
turers in 1955, thirty- seven in 1956, and just eight in 1957. Many of these were 
brought to Indonesia under the aid schemes of unesco, the Colombo Plan, 
and the Ford Foundation.36 By the end of the 1950s, the increase in the num-
ber of Indonesian faculty members had resulted in the gradual but significant 
Indonesianization of the university system. For instance, at the Universitas In-
donesia in 1951– 1952, of 471 members, only 190, or 40 per cent, of the faculty 
were native Indonesians, with the remaining 241, or 60 per cent, consisting 
of non- native Indonesians, including around two hundred Dutch professors. 
By 1953, seventy- five Dutch professors remained; by 1956, there were perhaps 
only some thirty- five Dutch lecturers.37 By 1962– 1963, 99 per cent of the 1,273 
faculty members were Indonesian. As most professors in the early 1950s were 
still Dutch, this Indonesianization resulted in a lower level of education among 
the teaching staff.38
In his acceptance speech as the new president of the ui in 1951, Professor 
Soepomo indicated that the post- colonial university was functioning in a pe-
riod rife with internationalism. Aside from receiving professors, Indonesian 
universities also regularly sent professors on short- term stints abroad. The UN 
and its panoply of new international organizations provided some relief in the 
 34 Locomotief, 25 November 1950.
 35 Notities no. 18 over ‘concordant’ onderwijs (A) cultuur en Indonesisch onderwijs (B), na, 
Hoge Commissariaat Bandung, inv. nos. 514– 523.
 36 ‘Rapat Kerdja Menteri pp&k dengan Seksi E dpr’, Suara Guru, 7/ 2 (September 1957), 4– 5; 
anri, Kabinet Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, inv. no. 529.
 37 Bruce Lannes Smith, Indonesian– American Cooperation in Higher Education (East 
Lansing: Institute of Research on Overseas Program, Michigan State University, 1960), 28.
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provision of professors. In 1951, Gadjah Mada acquired two professors from the 
World Health Organization (who) and one from unesco, and in May of that 
year, Professors Sardjito and Johannes attended unesco conferences.39
The need to educate civil servants, especially in the executive and admin-
istrative branches, was acknowledged by the Ministry of the Interior (Kemen-
terian Dalam Negeri) early on, especially in connection with decentralization 
and regional autonomy. The ministry focused on providing academic and 
semi- academic education, providing more teaching opportunities at local uni-
versities. Prospective civil servants were screened at local and national levels 
and then admitted to the social science, law, and political faculties of the Uni-
versitas Gadjah Mada (ugm).40 In 1952, the ugm was the only university in 
the country that provided the kind of education required for executive and 
administrative civil servants.
Aside from civil servants, the Ministry of Education and Culture also provid-
ed scholarships for up to 150 non- civil servants with an ikatan dinas. This re-
quired them to work for the government after they had finished their studies.41 
The need to expand the education of civil servants paralleled the expansion of 
Gadjah Mada itself. In 1954, the university created a sister faculty at Surabaya’s 
new Airlangga University, focusing on law, economics, and social and political 
science. Airlangga was developed from an extension of its Medical Faculty and 
had once been part of the Universitas Indonesia. A  Surabaya branch of the 
Gadjah Mada Law Faculty was inaugurated on 9 April 1955, whereby lecturers 
from Gadjah Mada would be appointed as extraordinary lecturers at Airlang-
ga. Airlangga’s first president was Abdoel Gaffar Pringgodigdo, who also hailed 
from Gadjah Mada.42
6 The Rise of the Guided Study
The shift towards a new curriculum was part of what was called the ‘total reor-
ganization’ that affected old and new universities alike. Unsurprisingly, the old 
core universities – Universitas Indonesia, Universitas Gadjah Mada, and some 
of their earlier offshoots including Padjadjaran, Hasanuddin, and Universi-
tas Sumatra Utara – had difficulty coping with the transition. Many of these 
 39 M. Sardjito, ‘Laporan Tahunan Universitit Negeri Gadjah Mada’, 19 Desember 1951, 6– 10.
 40 Education for the staff of the Ministry of Justice was also to be provided through the ugm, 
according to Justice Minister Wongsonegoro, Harian Indonesia, 13 March 1951.
 41 Antara, 14 August 1952.











universities still hosted Dutch professors and Dutch- educated teaching staff. 
Although most Dutch professors had left by 1957, the teaching staff required a 
bit of cajoling before they were truly comfortable with the new curriculum. An 
Indonesian member of the teaching staff at the ipb commented that everyone 
used the system that they were familiar with:
This is natural because it is difficult to switch to another system with 
which one is not familiar. It was not so much that they were ‘pushing’, 
but that they were used to their own system and naturally considered it 
better. In the early stages of the affiliation this was felt more than now 
because IPB participants after returning began to use more of the Ameri-
can system which they had learned, so prevalence [of the guided system] 
gradually grew.43
The main reason for this change was not merely the need for Indonesia to 
break out of its colonial mould and take the reins in education. It was, in fact, 
a matter of efficiency, or the extreme lack of it, within the national education 
system.44 To begin with, although the expansion of Indonesians studying in 
the national university system was very rapid, there was a lag in the number of 
graduates. On average only 20 per cent of the student body passed the yearly 
exams. Although the duration of a sardjana muda (equivalent to a bachelor’s 
degree) was four years, it took many students eight or even ten years to com-
plete their degrees.
The ‘inefficient’ Dutch system, which was called the ‘Free Study’ system, was 
contrasted with the ‘efficient’, American- inspired ‘Guided Study’ system, a ter-
minology that paid homage to the Guided Democracy experiment. Under the 
Dutch Free Study system, a secondary- school leaver was not required to pass 
an entrance exam to get into university. Students had no obligation to attend 
lectures. Exams were oral and if the student failed, the exam could be retaken. 
In fact, 60 to 70 per cent of students failed their exams the first time. Little 
guidance or structure existed within this system. In addition, the lack of facil-
ities, books, and laboratories in Indonesia’s fledgling university system result-
ed in many drop- outs and demotivated students.45 The Guided Study method 
 43 Beers, An American Experience in Indonesia, 156.
 44 This was not simply related to the curriculum. Problems persisted with the issue of fund-
ing and the bureaucratic relationship with the central government. Kesukaran- kesukaran 
pada Universitas Indonesia, anri, Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia, 1950– 1959, inv. 
no. 1217.
 45 See, among others, Smith, Indonesian– American Cooperation in Higher Education; Murray, 
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introduced the entrance exam. The student was required to attend mandatory 
courses and take written exams. The semester was introduced. Rote memori-
zation and lectures were replaced with discussion groups. Students were ex-
pected to complete their degrees within the required time frame.
7 The International Aid Protocol
President Truman’s administration was pivotal in constructing the global gov-
ernance structure that was predicated on efforts to reduce the possibility of 
another conflagration and thus was a systematic plan for peace.46 As well as 
the Keynesian Bretton Woods institutions of the International Monetary Fund 
(imf) and the World Bank, the Marshall Plan and the Point Four Program, a 
technical assistance programme for ‘developing countries’, were created to re-
duce the possibility of communist expansion.47 The focus on Asia was mainly 
directed towards China and Japan. The Economic Cooperation Administration 
(eca) did provide technical assistance for smaller Asian countries (not includ-
ing Indonesia), but these represented small, technical aid projects. The Point 
Four Program, announced in 1949, created a bureaucratic infrastructure for 
international technical assistance and focused on foreign direct investment, 
working under the assumption that economic expansion could forge peace 
and democracy.48
The provision of technical assistance was a multilateral exercise involv-
ing a variety of nations, with the United States taking the reins and initially 
providing some 60 per cent of the total aid of the United Nations Technical 
Assistance Administration.49 Commonwealth countries that were members 
of the Colombo Plan also provided help, mirroring American initiatives. The 
aim was to reduce the appeal of communism and redefine the asymmetri-
cal relationship away from the colonial one in which, as people within the 
a National Development Context: Indonesia, a Case Study’, PhD dissertation, American 
University, Washington DC, 1965; Beers, An American Experience in Indonesia.
 46 Robert A. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945– 1950 (Colombia 
University Press: New York, 1985), 10– 32.
 47 Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 133– 67.
 48 Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 205– 9.
 49 David Webster, ‘Development Advisors in a Time of Cold War and Decolonization: The 
United Nations Technical Assistance Administration’, Journal of Global History, 6/ 2 (July 
2011), 249– 72. Aside from the untaa, there were also other forms of assistance organ-
ization, such as the who, the Food and Agricultural Organization (fao),  unesco, 












dependency school would put it, the creation and management of the Third 
World was manifested.50 At the other end of the spectrum, Soviet assistance 
after the death of Stalin in 1953 shifted towards a less military approach and 
the adoption of a subtler attitude towards the underdeveloped parts of the 
world.51 Communism would also be promoted through the power of aid.52 This 
crusading zeal for modernity and modernization, often expressed through the 
images of industrialization, mega- infrastructure, and the technological capa-
bility of humans to revamp whole landscapes, was a modern fetish that was 
revered everywhere in the post- war society.
This confluence of ideology in the specific modernity brought about by tech-
nical assistance experts and the development- minded politicians and leaders 
of newly independent nations was significant. Soviet aid to Indonesia dwarfed 
that of the United States, yet no pro- Soviet economists ever came close to the 
influence that American or Western economists had on Indonesia’s planning 
community or intellectuals. Three- quarters of all Soviet aid delivered between 
1954 and 1968 was in the form of military assistance, and those experts that 
had been sent to help with industrialization were, for the most part, engineers. 
In fact, as Indonesian economists would find out in their study of Eastern Eu-
ropean societies during the Guided Democracy, most Soviet managers were 
engineers.53
These elite engineers may not have been the preachers of modernity that 
the social scientists of the West were. Yet, many Western technical experts wer-
en’t capitalist themselves in the traditional sense. They had to sell the idea of 
state- sponsored development in the capitalist West. David Webster grouped 
many of them as Fabian Socialists, a political term which, according to Anne 
Booth, equated well with Indonesian social democrats.54 Many of them saw 
planning as the holy grail of development. As Webster phrases it, ‘Colombo 
Plan members approached planning with an attitude approaching “worship”.55 
 50 Arturo Escobar, ‘Power and Visibility: Development and the Invention and Management 
of the Third World’, Cultural Anthropology, 3/ 4 (November 1988), 428– 43.
 51 Jeffrey F. Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy. The Alliance for Progress in Latin America 
(Hoboken: crc Press, 2007), 14.
 52 Orah Cooper and Carol Fogarty, ‘Soviet Economy and Military Aid to the Less Developed 
Countries, 1954– 1978’, Soviet and Eastern European Foreign Trade, 21/ 1– 3 (Spring- Fall 
1985), 54– 73.
 53 Panglaykim and Hazil, Struktur Management dan Organisasi dalam Beberapa Negara 
Sosialis (Jakarta: Pembangunan, 1962), 16– 18.
 54 Anne Booth, ‘The Colonial Legacy and its Impact on Post- Independence Planning in 
India and Indonesia’, Itineratio, 10/ 1 (1986), 13.
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As we will see, the 1950s’ Indonesian technical elite also shared the same po-
litical ideology, with many of them having been influenced by Dutch social 
democracy, the political system that they were exposed to during their sojourn 
in the Netherlands; by socialist ideas; and, perhaps, even by Japanese fascist/ 
corporatist notions. The social scientist and technical expert Benjamin Hig-
gins, for instance, believed that state- owned companies could effectively stim-
ulate economic growth.56 This was a sentiment shared by many Indonesian 
experts, especially considering the utter lack of an indigenous entrepreneurial 
class and the seeming impossibility of imagining a free, market- based econo-
my within the Indonesian society of the 1950s.57
On 4 December 1949, a UN resolution was passed on the composition of 
technical assistance. It covered aspects such as the deployment of a team of ex-
perts to assist countries as advisers, the training of experts from less- developed 
countries abroad, the training of experts and auxiliary personnel within the 
country, the deployment of personnel and materials for specific projects, and 
the exchange of information. In May 1950, a mission from the UN Secretari-
at visited Indonesia, along with agents from unesco, the fao, and the who. 
 unesco, the who, and unicef would help Indonesia to develop an educa-
tion system for the people, and with rural reconstruction and various health 
initiatives.58
8 Development of Indonesian– American Aid Relations
During the revolutionary war, a group of Indonesian officials, comprising most-
ly psi intellectuals, went to establish a lobbying organization in the United 
States. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and Soedjatmoko were hosted by an Ameri-
can group concerned about the growing clout of communism in Asia, and met 
with the established circle, especially members of the Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, one of the most influential think tanks in the United States.59 It was Su-
mitro’s duty to drum up American support for the Indonesian side during the 
revolution as part of the charm offensive intended to reassure America that a 
post- colonial Indonesia would not hastily nationalize Western companies and 
 56 Benjamin Higgins, ‘Thoughts and Action: Indonesian Economic Studies and Policies in 
the 1950s’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 26/ 1 (1990), 37– 47.
 57 Benjamin Higgins, ‘Introduction’, in Benjamin Higgins (ed.), Entrepreneurship and Labor 
Skills in Indonesian Economic Development: A Symposium, 22– 8.
 58 Krol, ‘Internationale hulp aan Indonesia’, 2– 15.











assets.60 The fear that Indonesia would become communist made America 
cautious about supporting the Republican cause.61
In a speech about the Point Four Program and Southeast Asia, Soedjatmoko 
reiterated the cautiousness of the Asian approach to aid:  ‘Why is it that no 
leaders in Southeast Asia immediately hailed this plan, as Marshall’s proposals 
had been immediately seized upon and embraced by the leaders of Europe?’ 
The answer to this was that it was a result of the disillusionment of the elite 
with America’s dithering stance towards Asian independence movements. In 
particular, it was ‘America’s failure to make a sufficiently early stand on the 
issues of colonialism’ that had ‘left very serious doubts in the minds of many 
Asians as to America’s true intentions’.62 Although there was no doubt about 
the support that the providers of technical assistance had had from within 
the Indonesian intellectual class, suspicion remained among other groups of 
Indonesian elites. The suspicion was rooted in, as Soedjatmoko said, the fail-
ure of America to act quickly to support the Republic against Dutch aggres-
sion during the revolution but was also due to the reservations of many of the 
elites, who were leftists, about submitting to American control. The fall of the 
Sukiman Cabinet (April 1951– April 1952) as a result of the signing of the Mu-
tual Assistance Agreement with the United States illustrates this ambivalence 
towards the West.63
During the Second Dutch Military Aggression, Sumitro, who had become 
a permanent financial and trade representative to the United States and a 
member of the Indonesian delegation negotiating at the UN in New  York, 
met with the acting US minister of foreign affairs, Robert A. Lovett, on 20 De-
cember 1948. The Republican elites had realized that the Netherlands were 
having difficulty funding their operations without the help of the Marshall 
Plan. Lovett reassured him that while the Marshall Plan funds for the Neth-
erlands would not be stopped, the money intended for Indonesia had been 
completely halted. Sumitro held news conferences to gauge the opinion of 
the American public and thus cemented Indonesia’s first important post- 
independence relationship with the US. His position on Indonesia’s econom-
ic diplomacy with the United States was stated clearly in his report to the 
 60 This also included the visit by Soedjatmoko to New York in support of the Marshall Plan. 
See Ransom, ‘Ford Country’, 93– 116.
 61 Frances Gouda and Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, American Visions of the Netherlands East 
Indies/ Indonesia. us Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism, 1920– 1949 (Amsterdam 
University Press: Amsterdam, 2002), 209– 14.
 62 Soedjatmoko, ‘Point Four and Southeast Asia’, Indonesië, 4 (1950– 1951), 3– 4.
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Indonesian foreign minister, H. Agus Salim, titled Indonesian Economic Ma-
noeuvres in America.
Initial contacts with America were strictly through US companies and these 
were mostly failures. In the various efforts to break through the Dutch block-
ade of the Republic during the revolutionary war, shipping companies such 
as Isbrandtsen and the Overseas Corporation tried to smuggle goods to Singa-
pore. Dutch authorities confiscated the Isbrandtsen ship, while the Overseas 
Corporation got away with the money, costing the Republic some $500,000 
worth of rubber and quinine. In 1947, Sumitro, who at the time was the Re-
publican trade representative, along with Minister of Prosperity Adnan Kapau 
Gani, met with Matthew Fox, a well- known American businessman and vice 
president of Universal Pictures, to create the Indonesian– American Corpora-
tion.64 The contract, signed in Havana, Cuba, on 3 January 1949, allowed the 
corporation to be granted a monopoly over the right to sell some Indonesian 
commodities. This contract was not valid after the transfer of sovereignty. Ho-
man indicated that as much as $550,000 might have been loaned to support 
the Indonesian delegation in New York.65
American aid was institutionally realized through the eca. In the early 
1950s, the aid was diverted to Asia as a result of the Korean War and the open-
ing up of East Asia, including Southeast Asia, as an important military front 
against communism. In June 1950, the director of the Far East Division of the 
eca, R. Allen Griffin,66 toured Asia in order to be able to recommend the scope 
and amount of aid needed for the countries/ colonies of Southeast Asia. Ac-
cording to his recommendations, Indonesia was to receive the second- largest 
amount of eca help (after Indo- China), totalling $14.5  million. Griffin also 
recommended that sixty- three technical experts be sent to Indonesia.67 The 
amount that was ultimately given to Indonesia in October 1951 was $13 million, 
which was what was left over from eca money spent on the Republic of Chi-
na.68 Aside from eca aid, the US also provided $100 million of import credit 
 64 According to Peter Dale Scott, there was a possibility that Matthew Fox was a front- man 
for the cia. Scott, ‘Exporting Military- Economic Development’, 213. This seems quite 
unlikely, though, as the US Secretary of State was quite critical of Fox’s relationship with 
the Indonesian government.
 65 Gerlof D. Homan, ‘American Business Interests in the Indonesian Republic’, Indonesia, 35 
(April 1983), 125– 32.
 66 Griffin was an army intelligence veteran and later a trustee of the Asia Foundation, a cia- 
funded organization. See Scott, ‘Exporting Military- Economic Development’, 212.
 67 Australian Embassy, Washington, 5 June 1950, Memorandum for the Secretary, 
Department of External Affairs, Canberra, naa, series no. A1838.












from the Exim Bank in February 1950, and a $5 million military grant linked to 
the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty at the San Francisco Conference in 
1951,69 which had resulted in the fall of the Sukiman Cabinet.
As well as technical help, the Americans were also eager to provide institu-
tional links to ensure that the Indonesian military remained anti- communist. 
On 3 October 1950, a US mission headed by Mr John F. Melby and Major Gen-
eral Graves B.  Erskine arrived in Indonesia with the task of persuading the 
Indonesian government to accept arms free- of- charge from the US in return 
for participation in an American military aid programme. The mission was re-
ceived by the president on 5 October and the American gentlemen held talks 
with Prime Minister Muhammad Natsir, Foreign Minister Mohammad Roem, 
Vice Premier Sultan Hamengkubuwono ix, and the chief of staff of the armed 
forces, General Simatupang. Indonesia was promised a $100- million package 
of aid in goods.70 The military aid programme required a certain degree of US 
control of both the organization and the training of the armed forces, elements 
that the Indonesian government found hard to accept, even though it was felt 
that the military needed help in acquiring modern military hardware.71
Acceptance of the US military mission was politically impossible, consid-
ering the degree of suspicion in which the US was held by many of the leftist- 
leaning parliamentarians. At the same time, the Dutch were carrying out a 
similar military assistance programme through the Nederlandse Militaire Mis-
sie, which made the offer rather redundant. The failure of the Melby Mission 
did not, however, affect non- military American aid. Griffin had discussed the 
Colombo Plan mission with the Australians and stressed that each aid pro-
gramme should be carried out on an individual basis with each country, with-
out the need to create a complex organization. On 6 August 1951, Dr Samuel 
Perkins Hays was appointed chief of the eca Special Technical and Economic 
Mission to Indonesia, replacing Shannon McCune.72
Lester Pearson, Canada’s first ambassador to Indonesia, called the country 
‘the first child of the United Nations’. There was a belief amongst many in the 
West that left to its own devices, Indonesia would fail to develop and mod-
ernize.73 In fact, quoting the Colombo Plan’s technical aid chief, Geoffrey 
 69 Usha Mahajani, Soviet and American Aid to Indonesia, 1949– 1968 (Athens:  Center for 
International Studies, 1970), 6.
 70 Krol, ‘Internationale hulp aan Indonesia’, 7.
 71 Australian Embassy, Jakarta, 12 October 1950, naa, series no. A1838.
 72 dmr, ‘US Economist Named Head of Indonesian Mission’, 25 June 1950, naa, series 
no. A1838.











Expertise and National Planning 109
Wilson:  ‘[The] United Nations plays a much more important role here (in 
Jakarta) than in any other country in the area he had visited. Indonesia is 
desperately short of good Ministers and officials, but many of the United 
Nations people are good and they have had a long time there to acquaint 
themselves with local conditions. The result is that they pretty much decide 
what should be done in the fields in which they operate.’74 The strength of 
influence of these foreign experts probably contributed considerably to the 
contempt and displeasure that people such as Roeslan Abdulgani and Sukar-
no felt for experts.
Initially, the foreign aid relationship was regulated by the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry (Kementerian Perdagangan dan Industri) through its Coordinat-
ing Bureau for Foreign Assistance (Biro Ko- ordinasi Bantuan Luar Negeri, bk-
bln), which was created on 29 December 1950 under the command of C. v.d. 
Straaten, Achmad Ali, and J. Kramer. After the formation of the National Plan-
ning Council (Depernas), an Inter- Departmental Coordinating Committee 
(Panitia Koordinasi Interdepartemental, Pakin) was formed as a liaison agen-
cy for all the government bodies connected with foreign aid. Within the State 
Planning Bureau (bpn), a section was created to handle foreign assistance, 
headed by the future economists Ir. Mohammad Sadli and Ir. Sie Kwat Soen. 
During the Guided Democracy, with the creation of the Depernas and the ter-
mination of the bpn in 1959, foreign assistance was transferred to the Finan-
cial and Economic Bureau of the Office of the First Minister, usually called the 
Finek (Finansial dan Ekonomi).75
Within the Finek, throughout both the parliamentary and Guided De-
mocracy periods, foreign- assistance relationships, at least civilian ones, were 
handled by social democrats or psi- linked individuals at both the bpn and 
the Finek, which were both pro- Western and anti- communist. These bureaux 
were positioned under the Office of the Prime Minister (and, later on, the First 
Minister). Outside the top level of Indonesia’s policymaking elite, enthusiasm 
for foreign assistance was low amongst Indonesian officials. The government 
was reluctant to allow foreign experts to work at middle or village levels. Two 
types of foreign personnel were sought:  trainers, who would be given little 
 74 Webster, Fire and the Full Moon, 83.
 75 It came under the auspices of the Finek (Biro Ekonomi dan Keuangan) in what was 
named the Office of Overseas Development (Bagian Kerdjasama Luar Negeri), which 
was similar to the Coordinating Bureau under the National Planning Bureau. All overseas 
cooperation had first to be approved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ‘Laporan Bagian 
Kerdjasama Luar Negeri. Biro Ekonomi dan Keuangan, Sekretariat Negara’, anri, Menteri 






authority, and experts, who would fill mid- range technical positions within the 
civil  service.76
There were two forms of international relations. The first was through a di-
rect contract signed by an expert with an aid agency and its respective nation-
al counterpart. For instance, much of the early aid to the National Planning 
Bureau occurred through this type of relationship, including the sending of 
economic experts such as Benjamin Higgins and companies such as the J. G. 
White Engineers Corporation to work on creating Indonesia’s national plan. 
These relationships bypassed the universities, and the experts were contract-
ed to work in a specific government unit, usually policymaking bodies. The 
second form of relationship was the university affiliation network. These rela-
tionships bypassed the structure of foreign recruitment developed by the Min-
istry of Public Service Employees (Kementerian Urusan Kepegawaian) and the 
putaba office and were regulated by the National Planning Bureau, which had 
a desk that controlled all international aid relationships. The two institutional 
matrices are presented in the diagram below. The third diagram shows the reg-
ular route for the establishment of a new international aid relationship.
The period 1950– 1965 was thus one of massive interaction and transfers be-
tween Third World and First and Second World countries. In Indonesia’s case, 
the most significant were the relationships with the American aid organiza-
tion, the various UN organizations, and the Ford Foundation. The investments 
from these organizations established institutions within the landscape of the 
Indonesian state and provided Indonesians with the opportunity to study at 
various universities in the West in order to ‘correct’ their mindset and prepare 
them to run the institutions on their return to their home country.
The data sets above were obtained from the Finek.77 They show the number 
of experts sent to the country by various international agencies throughout 
the period. America was the country most visited by Indonesians looking to 
obtain a higher education or technical training. American Aid, meanwhile, 
consistently provided the most aid money from Western nations throughout 
the period.
Soviet offers of aid had started relatively early on, in 1948. But as long as In-
donesia was under the rule of social democrats, as exemplified by prime min-
isters Hatta, Natsir, and Wilopo, hostility towards the Soviet Union was strong. 
 76 ‘Foreign Technical Assistance in Economic Development in a Newly Independent 
Country. Some Observations in Indonesia’, Economic and Cultural Change, 1/ 1 (March 
1952), 78– 9.
 77 The Finek took on the management of foreign relations after the disbandment of the bpn 
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 figure 1  University affiliation network
  source: author.
 figure 2  Experts funded by aid agency network
  source: author.






When the Wilopo Cabinet fell, in July 1953, there was a shift in Indonesian atti-
tudes towards the Eastern Bloc, due to the dependence of Ali Sastroamidjojo’s 
government on the support of the pki. This coincided with the death of Stalin 
and the shift of power to Kruschev and his overtures towards the Third World. 
Trade and payment agreements were signed with China, Czechoslovakia, East 
 figure 4  Aid per year from American aid, the UN, and the Colombo Plan. Figures 
represent thousands of dollars. anri, Menteri Negara Ekonomi, Keuangan dan 
Industri, inv. no. 2358. UN and Colombo numbers for 1963 and 1964 were not 
available
table 7 UN assistance to Indonesia, 1950– 1962, anri, Menteri 
Negara Ekonomi, Keuangan dan Industri, inv. no. 2358
Year Experts Trainees
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table 8 usaid/ eca/ ica assistance, anri, Menteri Negara 
Ekonomi, Keuangan dan Industri, inv. no. 2358
Year Experts Trainees








1963 230 n/ a
1964 (April) 181 n/ a
Total (1950– 1962) 2.049 3,314
table 9 Colombo Plan assistance, anri, Menteri Negara 
Ekonomi, Keuangan dan Industri, inv. no. 2358
Year Experts Trainees














Germany, Poland, and the Soviet Union. In 1956, a large Soviet mission con-
cluded a treaty with Indonesia, whereby a $100 million long- term, low- interest 
loan was provided. This was used for road building and various other projects. 
It was envisaged that technical aid for the Five- Year Plan (Rantjangan Lima 
Tahun) would be provided by the Soviet Union.78
The number of people sent to the Eastern Bloc, especially during the 1960s, 
was quite significant, with over three hundred people sent to study in the So-
viet Union at higher- education institutions. Kruschev’s visit to Jakarta in 1960 
concluded an aid deal in excess of $700 million, with a $250 million military 
grant followed by a $400 million military grant in 1961 to assist with the strug-
gle for West Papua.79 By 1961, Indonesia had become one of the largest non- 
communist recipients of Soviet military aid.80 Over a billion dollars in military 
aid would be given to Indonesia throughout the Guided Democracy period, 
meaning that aid to Indonesia amounted to a third of all aid given to non- 
communist countries by the Soviet Union. According to Guy Pauker, the ra-
tional reason for Soviet willingness to spend so much on the Indonesian mili-
tary was to bribe the military to support a communist takeover of the country.81
table 10 Eastern European assistance in the form of scholarships for Indonesian trainees, 
anri, Menteri Negara Ekonomi, Keuangan dan Industri, inv. no. 2358
Countries 1961 1962 1963 1964
ussr 50 135 150 - 
Yugoslavia - 10 20 6
Poland - 7 8 - 
Czechoslovakia - 30 30 2
East Germany 45 - 3 7
Romania 11 2 10 - 
Hungary - 5 11 - 
Bulgaria - 2 5 - 
Total 106 191 237 12
 78 Mahajani, Soviet and American Aid to Indonesia, 7– 15.
 79 Mahajani, Soviet and American Aid to Indonesia, 15– 16.
 80 A fifth of all Soviet aid to non- socialist countries went to Indonesia. Ragna Boden, ‘Cold War 
Economics: Soviet Aid to Indonesia’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 10/ 3 (Summer 2008), 116.
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Most of those sent to the Soviet Union went to study engineering and gain 
the technical know- how needed to run the various Soviet industrial- aid pro-
grammes, including the 1962 Asian Games, the Cilegon Steel Plant, the Super-
phosphate project in Sumatra, the farming mechanization project, and the 
projected oceanographic institute in Ambon. Over one hundred Indonesian 
trainees were sent to study petroleum engineering as part of Indonesia’s wish 
to reduce its dependence on Western oil companies, and 125 were sent to study 
at the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow.82 Conversely, five hundred 
Soviet experts were sent to Indonesia to supervise the execution of Sukarno’s 
grandiose projects.83
9 National Planning and Technical Assistance
Two important men figured throughout the 1950s in connection with the crea-
tion of the Indonesian development plan: the Rotterdam economics graduate 
Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and the engineer Djuanda Kartawidjaja. Sumitro 
Djojohadikusumo, the son of well- to- do aristocrat Margono Djojohadikusumo, 
was born on 29 May 1917 in Kebumen, Central Java.84 After completing his sec-
ondary education at a European school in Java, he went on to study economics 
at Rotterdam. He completed his doctorate in 1943 under the Indologist Profes-
sor Gonggrijp with a dissertation on small- scale credit.85
Because connections between Indonesia and the Netherlands had all but 
ceased during the war, Sumitro remained in Rotterdam until the end of the 
war, working at the Rotterdam Hogeschool. After the war, Sumitro initially 
joined the Dutch delegation as an adviser.86 In 1945, Sumitro returned to Indo-
nesia to edit Berita Perekonomian. He then became an assistant to the Ministry 
of Finance (Kementerian Keuangan) and to Prime Minister Sjahrir’s office.87 
He became one of the Indonesian representatives in the Office of Perma-
nent Observers of Indonesia at the UN Security Council, alongside Soedarpo 
 82 anri, Menteri Negara Ekonomi, Keuangan dan Industri, inv. no. 2358.
 83 For more on foreign aid numbers, see Donald Hindley, ‘Foreign Aid to Indonesia and its 
Political Implications’, Pacific Affairs, 36/ 2 (Summer 1963), 107– 19.
 84 For more on his biography, consult Aristides Katoppo et  al., Sumitro Djojohadikusumo. 
Jejak Perlawanan Begawan Pejuang (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2000).
 85 Katoppo et al., Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, 1– 15.
 86 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, ‘Recollections of My Career’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies, 3/ 22 (1986), 42– 4.















Sastrosatomo, Soedjatmoko, and Nicodemus Lambertus Palar. Benjamin Hig-
gins described him as ‘one of the most brilliant economists in all Asia’.88
By 31 March 1950, the Indonesian ambassador to the United States and fu-
ture premier, Ali Sastroamidjojo, gave a talk at a dinner held in his honour in 
New York on the Indonesian plea for technical assistance which, according to 
him, was ‘fundamentally a social rather than an industrial reform which must 
begin with education and technological assistance from all countries of the 
world which have the advantage of experience’.89 Later, in June 1951, Sumitro 
Djojohadikusumo, then adviser to the minister of economic affairs, undertook 
his European– American tour to look for experts for the State Planning Bureau 
and the various banks in Jakarta. He had with him a list of 180 expert roles that 
were needed to formulate and carry out Indonesia’s first national plan. Although 
initially Sumitro wanted to obtain Dutch expertise for at least six important po-
sitions in the bpn, he failed to find anyone willing to leave for Indonesia.90
In the end, he found help from unesco in New  York, which promised 
twelve financial economic experts, who would be paid for by the organization. 
The bpn was to be headed by an Indonesian, with the foreign experts serving 
as executive staff members and senior officers. The bureau’s position was not 
that of a ‘super department’, thus its coordinating capabilities with respective 
ministers depended much on the tact and capability of its leadership to gain 
trust and respect amongst the other ministerial members.91 The UN’s Techni-
cal Assistance Board approved Indonesia’s request in a meeting on the 24– 28 
July 1951.92 The Indonesian project was greeted with much approval from many 
within the untaa. Indonesia was ‘one of the most significant among those we 
have been privileged to assist in developing’.93
10 State Planning Bureau– untaa Cooperation
The bpn was one of the most important expert bodies in the 1950s. It was cre-
ated in 1952 and placed under the Office of the Prime Minister. The bpn also 
 88 Higgins and Higgins, Crisis of the Millstone, 81; naa, United States of America – Relations 
with other countries – Pacific – Indonesia, A1838.
 89 ‘Indonesia Wants Technical Assistance, Envoy Says’, 31 March 1950, naa, A1838.
 90 ‘Internationale technische hulpverlening’, 18 Juni 1951, na, Hoge Commissariaat Indonesië.
 91 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Bunga Rampai Ekonomi (Jakarta: Indira, n.y.), 259– 61.
 92 Bureau voor Internationale Technische Hulp, Buitenlandse Deskundigen voor Indonesië, 
25 September 1951, na, Hoge Commissariaat te Bandoeng, 1950– 1957.
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contained the largest number of experts working on the Indonesian economy. 
Its control over foreign aid meant that the bpn also controlled the nation’s 
creation of experts. The bpn was not only essential in creating experts but was 
also important in forging an esprit de corps amongst policymakers and econo-
mists. According to the engineer Koesoediarso Hadinoto,
The BPN effectively and productively creates cadres. The experts of the 
BPN are given the tools to act rationally and capably and also to always 
act in a nationalist manner to contribute to the state and the nation. 
These experts are then sent to a variety of government offices and state- 
owned companies. The emotional bonds that have been created amongst 
them are kept alive and contribute to aiding cooperation between the 
offices they lead, in accordance with the approach and problem- solving 
methods they’ve learned during their stay at the BPN.94
Prior to the arrival of untaa experts, the government contracted the engi-
neering consultancy firm J. G. White Engineering Corporation in January 1951, 
which was financed by the eca.95 By mid January 1951, the corporation’s team 
of consultants had arrived in Jakarta under the leadership of Mr Henry Tarring. 
The J. G. White consultants worked behind the scenes, drawing little press at-
tention. This suited the Indonesian government, which was wary of being seen 
to be too dependent on foreign consultants.96 Their presence, however, was 
 94 Ali Budiardjo, ‘Abdi Negara dan Abdi Bangsa’, in Awaloeddin Djamin (ed.), Ir. H. Djuanda: 
Negarawan, Administrator, Teknokrat Utama (Jakarta:  Kompas, 2001), 255. According 
to Koesoediarso Hadinoto, ‘Biro Perancang Negara benar- benar efektif dan produktif 
sebagai wadah dan sarana kaderisasi. Para tenaga ahli Biro Perancang Negara dibekali 
metode berfikir dan bertindak yang rasional dan andal, serta selalu berjiwa kebangsaan 
dengan itikad berbakti kepada negara dan bangsa. Kemudian para tenaga ahli itu disebar-
kan ke berbagai instansi Pemerintah serta Badan Usaha Milik Negara. Ikatan batin antara 
mereka terpelihara secara berlanjut, sehingga memperlancar kerjasama antara instansi- 
instansi yang mereka pimpin, berdasarkan metode pendekatan dan penyelesaian masa-
lah yang dulu mereka pelajari bersama di Biro Perancang Negara.’
 95 Australian Embassy, Jakarta, Memorandum no. 63, 14 February 1951, naa, A1838, Republik 
Indonesia Serikat – Foreign Aid to Indonesia. The J. G. White Engineering Corporation 
were, however, quite successful in developing parts of the Taiwanese industry, includ-
ing the development of its plastic industry. Nan Wiegersma and Joseph E.  Medley, us 
Economic Development Policies toward the Pacific Rim. Successes and Failures of us Aid 
(Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 2000), 55.
 96 The uproar over the presence of former Nazi finance minister Hjalmar Schacht, whom 
Sumitro Djojohadikusumo invited to conduct a three- month study of the financial posi-
tion of the country, offered a good lesson in focusing on low- key deployment. Hjalmar 








met with irritation and suspicion amongst the Dutch consultants still work-
ing for the government, especially as they feared that long- established Dutch 
methods would be called into question and that the consultants’ involvement 
would function as a backdoor for American enterprises to gain access to In-
donesia.97 In terms of creating a national plan, however, the government did 
not consider the J. G. White Engineering consultants to be very useful. Their 
suggested plan for industrialization was considered less than stellar.
In June 1952, Professor Benjamin Higgins, who had previously been working 
in Libya for the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (untea), was 
appointed as a UN adviser on monetary and fiscal matters to both the Indone-
sian Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (Kementerian Keuangan dan 
Urusan Perekonomian) and the State Planning Bureau. In 1954, he returned to 
Indonesia as director of the mit Center for International Studies project on 
Indonesia. In 1959, he left the mit project to teach at the University of Texas 
and decided to study Latin America because of his frustration with Southeast 
Asia’s lack of development at the time.98 Higgins was one of the world’s lead-
ing authorities on development economics. He had begun his career teaching 
economics at the University of Melbourne in 1948 and had worked for the ilo 
during the war. The importance placed on Higgins’s advice by Sumitro was il-
lustrated by the location of his office, which was next door to Sumitro’s.99
Although the eca funded much of the research in Indonesia during this pe-
riod, the coterie of experts had an international character. The first UN techni-
cal mission to the bpn consisted of nine experts, four of whom were Canadians, 
including Benjamin Higgins and Nathan Keyfitz.100 In fact, Higgins, as head of 
the untaa mission in Indonesia, hand- picked the entire team, which includ-
ed American Edgar McVoy, a labour expert who would introduce Indonesia to 
the Training Within Industry (twi) labour management programme;101 South 
African income expert Daniel Neumark; British industrial economist Peter 
 97 Australian Embassy, Jakarta, Memorandum no. 63, 14 February 1951, naa, A1838, Republik 
Indonesia Serikat – Foreign Aid to Indonesia.
 98 Higgins, ‘Thoughts and Action’, 37– 47.
 99 J. A.  C. Mackie, ‘In Memoriam:  Professor Benjamin Higgins, 1912– 2001’, Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies, 37/ 2 (2001), 183– 8. He also regularly saw Sjafruddin 
Prawiranegara, head of the Bank of Indonesia, and attended the bank’s weekly board 
meetings. Higgins, ‘Thoughts and Action’, 37– 47.
 100 Webster, Fire and the Full Moon, 78– 9. T. R. Smith from New Zealand was to consult on 
management issues. anri, Kementerian Keuangan 1950– 1969, inv. no. 276.
 101 He had previously introduced the twi programme to Japan and Malaya. Alan G. Robinson 
and Jean M. Schroeder, ‘Training, Continuous Improvement and Human Relations: The 
us twi Program and the Japanese Management Style’, California Management Review, 35/ 
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Diebold; migration expert D. M. Deane; and New Zealand education specialist 
T. R. Smith.102 Many of the UN technical assistance experts were civil servants 
who believed in Keynesian economics and Fabian social- democratic ideals. 
British Fabian values were cherished in the psi circle.103 This meant that there 
was a considerable ideological affinity between Sumitro and Higgins.104
Higgins wielded his huge authority without much democratic oversight. Al-
though Djuanda was the head of the bpn,105 it was Higgins who went abroad 
to seek international aid and it was he who reviewed these aid programmes. It 
was his decision to renew the J. G. White Engineering Corporation contract, for 
instance.106 He wrote that the Indonesian government accepted his advice with 
‘frightening willingness’. In a Colombo Plan meeting, one observer wrote that 
people had mistaken him, instead of Djuanda, as head of the bpn.107 Such enor-
mous freedom for the technical assistance team saw Higgins praising the country:
In Sjafruddin and Sumitro, the country had a duumvirate on economic 
policy that few underdeveloped countries could match for competence 
and commitment to the national interest. The Wilopo Cabinet was com-
posed of extraordinarily able and honest men. In the Planning Bureau 
and its relationship to other government agencies abroad, the country 
had an effective instrument for development planning.108
In 1957, when Djuanda was appointed prime minister, leadership of the bpn 
went to his right- hand man, Ali Budiardjo. Budiardjo had been secretary gen-
eral to the minister of defence under Sultan Hamengkubuwono ix,109 another 
 102 anri, Kementerian Keuangan, inv. nos. 293, 294.
 103 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy, 130.
 104 Webster, Fire and the Full Moon, 80– 1. ‘psi policies were “remarkably similar” to those 
being developed by the national ccf in the same period.’ The ccf was the Co- Operative 
Commonwealth Federation of the government in Saskatchewan, Canada, which relied on 
social- democratic planning.
 105 anri, Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia 1950– 1959, inv. no. 1381.
 106 Memorandum from Benjamin Higgins to Minister of Finance Sumitro Djojohadikusumo 
on the renewal of the J. G. White contract, anri, Departemen Keuangan 1950– 1969, inv. 
no. 294. According to a bpn file, the J. G. White Engineering Corporation was still working 
for the bpn in January 1955. anri, Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia, 1950– 1959, inv. 
no. 1381 and Departemen Keuangan 1950– 1959, inv. no. 294.
 107 Webster, Fire and the Full Moon, 84.
 108 Higgins and Higgins, Crisis of the Millstone, 88.
 109 I. O. Nanulaita, ‘Ir. Haji Djuanda Kartawidjaja’, in Awaloeddin Djamin, Pahlawan Nasional 



















technocratic figure, from 1950 to 1953. In May 1953, Sumitro had offered him 
the job as interim director general of the bpn before Djuanda took the reins. 
Like many intellectuals, he was close to Sjahrir during the Japanese occupa-
tion. He earned a master’s degree at mit’s School of Industrial Management 
in 1962.110 Djuanda and Budiardjo worked closely with one another until the 
dissolution of the bpn in 1959 and the transfer of Budiardjo into Djuanda’s Fi-
nancial and Economic (Finek) Bureau under the Office of the Prime Minister. 
He played a seminal role in helping to create the Depernas. Thus, during the 
transition to Guided Democracy, there was some continuity for the planning 
bureau due to the existence of this relatively small bureaucratic body placed 
deep within the government.
With a highly fragmented government and little ability to coordinate 
amongst themselves, new institutions were created to take over the jobs that 
the ministries were supposed to accomplish, all of which were placed under 
the control of the Office of the Prime Minister. The universities were part of 
that institutional framework. The Institute for Economic and Social Research 
(Lembaga Penjelidikan Ekonomi dan Masjarakat, lpem) at the Jakarta School 
of Economics (Fakultas Ekonomi), University of Indonesia fulfilled the role of 
the ministries. The institute, along with the National Planning Bureau and the 
Department of Industry, studied the development of industry after independ-
ence, publishing its findings in January 1954. Because it was a university- based 
institution, it was able to compile, interpret, and appraise the data in an inde-
pendent and objective way.111
11 Fakultas Ekonomi- Universitas Indonesia (feui)
Perhaps no other higher- learning institution held such an important place in 
modern Indonesian history as that of the feui. This was due to the role Sumi-
tro Djojohadikusumo, institution builder par excellence, played in its develop-
ment. He built the faculty from the ground up and persuaded Dutch professors 
who were in Indonesia to teach, even though many of them were not trained 
economists and taught ‘old- fashioned’ economics. Sumitro reformed and 
overhauled the economics curriculum of the country:  the legal- continental 
approach taught by Dutch professors was replaced with a more Keynesian ap-
proach. Sumitro wanted to create a Jakarta School of Economics that would be 
 110 With a thesis titled ‘Management Education in Indonesia’.
 111 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, The Government’s Program on Industries. A Progress Report by 
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at the leading edge of economics research. He wanted to introduce develop-
mental economics in which the state, not the firm, would be the main focus of 
analysis. According to Emil Salim, it was he who introduced macroeconomics 
to Indonesia, away from the focus on the firm, in which many of the Dutch 
professors had specialized.112
Sumitro’s relationship with the Americans provided access to scholarships 
and research money from the West. In 1951, he signed an agreement with Ever-
ett Hawkins, who was working at the eca at the time. The eca gave a $400,000 
grant to finance American economists to teach at the faculty. Although he was 
in contact with the Ford Foundation when it opened its office in Jakarta in 
1952, he was only able to coax an agreement from them by 1956. His agreement 
with the Ford Foundation and the University of California, Berkeley enabled 
some of the brightest economics students in Indonesia to continue their stud-
ies in the US. Twenty students were sent to various universities in the United 
States in several batches.113 This, of course, enabled the rise of the notorious 
‘Berkeley Mafia’, which was headed by Sumitro’s most able student and the 
lead technocrat of the New Order, Widjojo Nitisastro.114
Sumitro also played a central role in the creation of the lpem, which was 
funded by the Ford Foundation and became a centre for research and a place 
where young social scientists were able to obtain practical experience through 
internships at the bpn. In 1955, Sumitro founded the Association of Indonesian 
Economists (Ikatan Sardjana Ekonomi Indonesia, isei), a professional organ-
ization.115 Through the formation of such institutions and through the links 
they had with American funding organizations, a class of experts, or in Higgins’ 
words, a ‘community of scholars’, was created that had both an esprit de corps 
and a similar ideological approach to the main questions plaguing the nation.
The shift in education also represented a shift in the thinking of the nation. 
The Ford Foundation thus made English- language education a central compo-
nent of its aid.116 What had to change was not merely the language, but how 
that language conveyed a different set of assumptions about the perception 
of reality. The 1950s thus not only saw a shift from Dutch to English, but also a 
shift in the sound bites that peppered elite speech. A look at the newspapers of 
 112 Goenawan Moehammad, Celebrating Indonesia. Fifty Years with the Ford Foundation. 1953– 
2003 (Jakarta: Ford Foundation, 2003), 48– 60.
 113 Moehammad, Celebrating Indonesia, 48– 60.
 114 Other members included Ali Wardhana, Soebroto, Daoed Joesoef, J. B. Soemarlin, Emil 
Salim, J. E. Ismael, and Dorodjatun Kuntjoro- Jakti.
 115 Moehammad, Celebrating Indonesia, 46– 7.












the decade shows an increasing use of English words such as efficiency, nation-
al planning, and management. Thus, the expansion of American education, 
books, and other materials created a significant cultural change. These chang-
es were wrought through magazines and other cultural media, which heralded 
what Vickers called ‘the atomic age’.117
12 Ford Foundation– mit– cenis
The first Ford Foundation delegation visited Indonesia on 7 July 1952. They 
stayed from 12 August to 11 September 1952 and visited Jakarta, Bandung, Yo-
gyakarta, and Surabaya. The report of the visit outlined the importance of In-
donesia to the foundation:  ‘Because of the speed with which Indonesia has 
advanced from colonial to sovereign status, because of the complex and diffi-
cult problems it faces with few resources in trained personnel, and because its 
ability to transform itself into a modern state without becoming a totalitarian 
regime or falling into anarchy is important to all of the free world, Indonesia is 
today a country of unique significance.’118 The report concluded that Indone-
sia needed trained personnel, as there were more ‘economists in Washington 
working on the Indonesian problem than there are in all Indonesia’. Sukarno 
had impressed Brown and Arnold immensely and they were able to confirm 
the approval of a $150,000 grant to send American English teachers to Indone-
sia in 1953– 1954. They offered help to train vocational teachers and to establish 
an institute for public administration.119
They also stressed the need for greater knowledge of the country. In 1951, the 
Ford Foundation provided a grant to Stanford University to investigate the state 
of Asian studies in the US, and in 1952 it granted eighty- three fellowships in the 
study of Asia and the Middle East. In 1953, the Foundation gave a $125,000 
research grant to mit to study economic development in Indonesia, India, 
and Italy. This was part of a larger research initiative at the mit Center for In-
ternational Study, which included research into communist societies by Walt 
Rostow and a study of the formation of public opinion in France led by Daniel 
Lerner.120 The Indonesia Program was the result of a three- week discussion 
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between the director of the centre, the director of the project, and various In-
donesian officials, both in the government and at Universitas Indonesia. The 
focus of the research was on financing economic development, patterns of 
trade, the technological aspects of economic development, management and 
administrative techniques, and quantitative studies.121
The programme also researched a wider variety of topics related to econom-
ic growth in Indonesia. These studies were meant to offer a precision instru-
ment to understand the underlying problems of the economy, thus ‘providing 
the analytical knowledge which must precede the use of the surgeon’s correc-
tive knife’.122 The programme’s focus on government administration and the 
labour supply led to more extensive political change becoming one of the rec-
ommendations of the study. Studies in collaboration with Universitas Gadjah 
Mada painted a picture of a passive Indonesian society, waiting for govern-
ment intervention: ‘The government is regarded as the accepted agent for in-
troducing new techniques of production and exchange, and the population is 
quite willing to accept changes in economic institutions so long as they do not 
greatly alter the existing social and cultural patterns.’123
The project supported the shift to a welfare- state system of government, un-
der which the state would provide infrastructural development such as trans-
portation infrastructure, education, and social welfare programmes in order to 
create a labour force ready for the coming industrialization. A study of the tax 
base, government efficiency in utilizing this tax base, the economic impact of 
taxation, patterns of government expenditure, and the relationship between 
the government’s capacity for developmental investment and government bor-
rowing and structures were all important areas of study for helping to under-
stand the relationship between the government and economic development. 
A  history of trade union movements and their relationship with economic 
development, the political structure of the country and its relationship with 
foreign aid, and other forms of social science research all provided a multi-
disciplinary approach to tackling the problems of economic development.124
The funds provided by the International Training and Research Institute 
enabled Max Millikan, head of the Center for International Studies at mit, to 
send, among others, Douglas Paauw to study fiscal structure, Benjamin Higgins 
to look at national income, and Guy Pauker to study the political environment. 
 121 Higgins, ‘The Indonesia Project’, 155– 7.
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Guy Pauker would become influential during the 1960s, helping to strengthen the 
relationship between the new generation of economists and the military officers 
within the Seskoad.125 The mit project was the result of cooperation amongst 
social scientists at Harvard and mit to study various problems of the post- war 
world, from communication to communism and economic development.126 
Benjamin Higgins, head of mit’s Indonesian Project, questioned the professional 
quality of the research being carried out by these academics,127 signalling his dis-
satisfaction with the programme. Unlike the untaa programme, their relation-
ships with, and attachment to, the National Planning Bureau were unsuccessful.
Benjamin Higgins was struck by how his work with the mit project was 
practically the same as when he had been an official adviser to the government 
under the untaa. At no other time in Indonesian history have so many foreign 
experts had such a large amount of authority within the Indonesian govern-
ment. They were not only researching, designing institutions, and developing 
new systems, but also actively producing Indonesia’s next wave of economists 
and social scientists. Discussions on economic policy were conducted within 
what was called Sumitro’s ‘kitchen cabinet’:128 by the board of directors of the 
Bank of Indonesia, by the bpn and its working group, at the Harmonie Club, 
and in the journal Keuangan dan Ekonomi Indonesia.
In 1956, in cooperation with Sumitro, the foundation started shipping in 
American economists, mostly from the University of California, Berkeley, to 
take over the roles left by departing Dutch professors. A  new post- graduate 
economics programme had begun and Indonesian faculty members had the 
opportunity to study abroad at prestigious universities in the US for a PhD in 
economics. The first group included Widjojo Nitisastro and Mohammad Sadli. 
The second group included economist Emil Salim. By 1962, the Ford Founda-
tion, through the University of California had trained some forty economists. 
Between 1953 and 1965, the Ford Foundation funnelled $15 million worth of 
aid to Indonesia, practically all in the form of education. Around four hundred 
Indonesians had been given fellowships to study abroad  – most of them as 
part of a long- term plan to build a national system of teaching colleges, focus-
ing on English, science, and mathematics.129 Many of these American- trained 
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economists would teach the courses run for higher- echelon military personnel 
at the Military Academy (Seskoad) in Bandung as part of the Leknas– Seskoad 
cooperation agreement. It was on these courses that Suharto met with many of 
the economists who would craft the economic policy of the New Order for him.
13 The 1956– 1960 National Plan and Guided Democracy
The National Plan was finally written in 1956, but only ratified by Parliament 
in 1959. Later, during the transition to Guided Democracy, Benjamin Higgins’s 
idea of the Big Push was central; it was ‘big mainly in the ratio of savings and 
investments to national income’,130 that is, in calculating the incremental 
capital- to- output ratio to determine the rate of efficiency of investment both 
from foreign investment and domestic savings. Although Higgins contributed 
to writing the plan, he had no final say.
Higgins was quite critical of the plan and thought it weak, especially in re-
lation to statistics and numbers. The population growth assumption of 1.7 per 
cent was considerably on the low side. The Incremental Capital Output Ratio, 
put at two to one, was also considered too low. The targets were too modest 
and indicated compromises with the political elites. Take- off growth was as-
sumed to happen at the level of Rp 12– 15 billion investment per year, yet the 
plan targeted Rp 6 billion in investment in the first five years and it was only 
in the fourth Five- Year Plan that a figure would be reached that would support 
take- off growth. No austerity measures on consumption were taken to reallo-
cate capital to the productive sector; in fact, only 40 per cent of the increase 
on per capita income would be reinvested, the rest would go to consumption. 
The plan also assumed that private and foreign investment would supply 60 
per cent of capital needs, yet the necessary reform measures for investment in-
centives in areas such as land policy, squatting policy, tax, and monetary policy 
had not been carried out, although a foreign investment, mineral, and oil bill 
was passed.131
By the time that the plan was ratified by Parliament, the period it covered 
had almost ended. Significant changes in economic and political aspects of 
the country had made it redundant. Inflation had spiked as a result of mas-
sive deficit spending when the country lurched into civil war, and Sumitro, 
along with colleagues from the psi and Masjumi, joined the prri rebellion in 
 130 Higgins and Higgins, Crisis of the Millstones, 71.
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Sumatra. The National Planning Board (Dewan Perantjang Nasional, Deper-
nas) had replaced the State Planning Bureau, and this new planning agency 
was focused on a broader range of issues in line with the Guided Democracy’s 
revolutionary intention, producing an eight- year national plan that was writ-
ten by non- economists and heavily criticized for being unrealistic.
Yet, social scientists like Benjamin Higgins were initially positive about the 
early Guided Democracy. Prime Minister Djuanda was seen to be a sensible, 
technocratic choice, which augured well for sober, less grandiose, and more ra-
tional planning. Sumitro’s earlier industrial plans had failed because of the lack 
of administrative and entrepreneurial capabilities. Higgins pointed out several 
changes in the way that the Indonesian leaders viewed the situation. The rela-
tionship between political stability and economic growth was much clearer; 
economic growth was a precursor to redistribution. Higgins believed that com-
munist involvement had been discredited due to its role in nationalization, and 
he thought that the cultural idea of a village consensus had been discredited 
too.132 This upbeat view of the Guided Democracy was shared by many in the 
modernist camp of the Kennedy Administration of the United States.133 There 
was a deep underlying belief that rational Indonesian technocracy was just un-
der the surface, struggling to break free and take over the national leadership.
14 Foreign Experts and Indonesian Authority
American aid was a rather sensitive subject in Indonesia. Although the country 
was more predisposed to the Western bloc in the early 1950s, Suraputra noted 
that ‘most Indonesians feel that their country lies much more exposed to the 
economic and military power of the United States and associated countries 
than it does to Soviet Russia or China’.134 The root of this elite ambivalence for 
the US was the perceived notion that the US had backed the Netherlands dur-
ing the revolutionary period, later had approved Dutch control of West Papua, 
and, after the outbreak of war in 1958, had given clandestine support to the 
rebels in Sumatra, West Java, and South Celebes. This view of America affected 
the way Indonesia interacted with the US throughout the period.135
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Foreign experts were concentrated within the office of the bpn and around 
Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and Benjamin Higgins. Others, such as Edward Li-
chtfeld and Alan C. Rankin, or the Kentucky Team at the Agricultural Institute 
in Bogor, were part of a panoply of specific projects for the development of 
certain parts of the Indonesian expert production system. The Five- Year Plan, 
with its focus on a Big Push dependent on foreign investment, was politically 
unacceptable. Yet, the failure of the bpn’s Five- Year Plan showed how weak the 
authority of this expert group was. Sukarno’s Guided Democracy achieved a 
coup d’état over this weak authority. Parliamentary democracy and the political 
party system were often considered the primary quarry of Sukarno’s Guided 
Democracy policy, yet his main target was the psi and their Masjumi political 
supporters and, by extension, the main intellectual experts in the country.
By 1958, a large proportion of the intellectual experts, including Sumitro, 
had defected to the prri rebellion. Asked by Kennedy whether Indonesia’s 
intellectuals backed Sukarno’s government, Soebandrio, who had accompa-
nied the president on his 1961 trip to the US, had answered, ‘The Indonesian 
intellectuals are a reactionary group. They cannot be asked to participate in 
the revolution.’136 When Soedjatmoko, a leading intellectual and friend of Soe-
bandrio, asked Soebandrio why, his answer was that Sukarno deeply resented 
intellectuals. For those within the intellectual circles, the first shock came from 
the result of the 1955 election, in which the psi, the intellectual party par ex-
cellence, garnered a measly 5 per cent of the vote. Four parties came out of 
the election as major players in Indonesian politics: the nationalist Sukarnoist 
pni, the modernist Muslim Masyumi, the traditional Muslim nu, and the com-
munist pki.137
Despite being politically weak, those surrounding the bpn, primarily Indo-
nesian and American, Canadian, and Australian experts, formed what Benja-
min Higgins called a ‘community of scholars’. This included economists such 
as Higgins, Douglas Paauw, and William Hollinger; political scientists such as 
Guy Pauker, Jean Mintz, and Ruth McVey; and anthropologists such as Clif-
ford Geertz and the members of his field team, which included Alex Dewey, 
Donald Fagg, Hildred Geertz, Edward Ryan, and Robert Jay.138 The ‘community 
of scholars’ also transcended geographic boundaries and created connections 
between places, from the bpn and feui to the Boston– Cambridge area, Wis-
consin and Ithaca in the US, and Windsor and Montreal in Canada.
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These geographical points, the headquarters of universities, perfectly char-
acterized the institutionalized technical aid world, which functioned as a pro-
vider of experts and as a legitimizer of its own brand of modernization theory. 
Within the mit Center for International Studies, these experts included sociol-
ogist Daniel Lerner, whose work on the passing of traditional society had made 
a significant contribution on Anglo- Saxon modernism.139 The economists in-
cluded Paul Samuelson, Evsey Domar, and Robert Solow, whose work on the 
Solow– Domar growth equation later earned them Nobel prizes. George Ka-
hin at Cornell; Everett Hawkins, Hans Schmidt, and Ted Morgan in Wisconsin; 
Bruce Glassburner in California; and scholars from McGill and the University 
of British Columbia represented an array of very distinguished names in the 
social sciences who were working to decipher Indonesian modernity. Especial-
ly important in this regard was the group’s access to President Kennedy when 
he was making policy decisions. Walt W. Rostow recalled the situation: ‘Ken-
nedy sought out and found in cenis a group whose ardent commitment was 
to enlarged development aid rather than to party or political personality. He 
understood this clearly and used us well.’140 Rostow, along with Max Millikan, 
became what Nils Gilman called Kennedy’s ‘mandarin of modernity’.141
There was an expansion of intellectual interest in Indonesia. New books on 
Indonesia gradually replaced Dutch works after the shift from Dutch experts 
and advisers to American ones around 1957.142 Significantly, these social sci-
entists were, as Higgins admitted, clueless about economic development, and 
tried to figure out the system that was most suited to the Indonesian condition. 
Albert O’Hirschman, another technical expert and modernization theorist, 
said:  ‘I went to Colombia in 1952 without any prior knowledge of […] devel-
opment […] [I later] discovered I had acquired a point of view of my own that 
was considerably at odds with current doctrines.’143 Knowledge production 
was thus a confluence of the anti- communist ideology of American moderni-
zation and the harsh realities of localized context.
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In terms of the role of government, there was no doubt among anyone who 
had been to Indonesia that a government- led economic plan was the only way 
in which Indonesia could move forward.144 This role differed considerably 
from the state planning of the Soviet Union or communist China, but it was 
also very different from the freewheeling capitalism of yesteryear. Yet, for all 
the state- led ideas that had been discussed during the period, the situation 
of the Indonesian state as a parliamentary democracy was never disputed. It 
was accepted that the political problems and the country’s instability were is-
sues that were negatively affecting the capability of the state, resulting in what 
Gunnar Myrdal called a ‘soft state’,145 but there never seems to have been any 
discussion of a change in the political landscape of Indonesia. It would obvi-
ously have been impudent for foreign experts to suggest something that was 
definitely outside their area of authority, but even in discussions with Indone-
sian economists such as Sumitro Djojohadikusumo or Sjafruddin Prawiranega-
ra no one seems to have brought up the idea of changing the political system.
Awareness that the military was becoming a major proponent of both po-
litical stability and economic development grew only gradually and not obvi-
ously. Political scientists like Guy Pauker would gradually realize the poten-
tial of military men and think of them as the most promising and rational of 
the Indonesian elite, but this realization would not come about until the late 
1950s. When Sukarno started his campaign to bury the party and initiate a ma-
jor change in state– society relations, Sumitro, Sjafruddin, Mohammad Natsir, 
and many of the more technocratic- minded elite of Indonesia rebelled against 
the central government. It was this discrepancy between the old intellectuals 
of the 1950s and the new intellectuals who had started to emerge by the late 
1950s that was to be one of the more significant factors of the period.
At the international level, the 1950s was a rather naïve decade. President Ei-
senhower’s policy on aid contained no specific strategy other than to support 
economic and social development. It was hoped that such assistance would 
push economic growth and thus reduce the temptation of communism in 
much of the developing world. By the end of the 1950s, the world had seen a 
series of developments which had toppled democracies in many developing 
nations. Parliamentary democracy was being discredited on an international 
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scale and the American response was to change its aid strategy. Instead of 
development per se, the Kennedy- era approach to aid was to connect it inti-
mately with the war on communism, thus redirecting aid to military purposes. 
The Kennedy Doctrine and the creation of the Alliance for Progress shifted the 
provision of aid towards a political goal.
Through education and community development, an increase in the capa-
bilities of the individual went a long way towards easing the transformation 
of Indonesia from a traditional society to a modern, industrial one. But there 
were no discussions in the 1950s that talked about the kinds of pervasive and 
invasive action that would be conducted by the Guided Democracy state, nor 
did anyone talk about the role of the military in this regard. This idea of control 
was what was missing within the discourse of 1950s’ experts. This was to be the 
main idea developed during the Guided Democracy by both its proponents 
and its intellectual opponents, whose shared ‘chameleon- like’ hypocrisy, to 
use a phrase coined by the journalist Mochtar Lubis for the second- generation 
economists, allowed both groups to cultivate a new relationship of power 
within a new notion of population control and development.
15 Conclusions
The Americanization of various aspects of the creation of an Indonesian elite 
was met with resistance in many forms. The inertia of the bureaucracy pushed 
for the continuation of ‘Dutch’ ways of doing business and, in fact, these con-
tinued as a result of the sheer limitation of the American impact on the large 
Indonesian bureaucracy. At the regional and local level there was little Amer-
ican presence; the changes occurred in the central institutions  – the major 
universities and schools created through expert recommendations  – and at 
national planning institutions. As a result, the Americanization was a flimsy af-
fair, with changes occurring within small, almost separate institutions, whose 
effects on the vertical level were generally unknown but considered to be very 
limited. Yet, these developments paved the way for the Guided Democracy’s 
institutional experiment. The next two chapters discuss the Guided Democ-
racy state and the implementation of the various ideas that shaped it. These 
include the corporatist ideas that stemmed from the colonial and Japanese 
period, and were succinctly expressed in the 1945 Constitution, and the vari-
ous developments that occurred during this period. This development of the 
idea of Indonesian society was important, for it cemented in place models of 
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 chapter 4
Scientific Administration and the Question 
of Efficiency
 Abstract
This chapter delves into the import and development of American scientific manage-
ment for both business management and public administration education in post- 
independence Indonesia. Indonesian realization of its managerial and administrative 
limits came from the failure of the country’s first industrialization plan, the Sumitro 
Plan, published in 1951. The creation of management and administration education 
was assisted by the consult of American management experts who visited the country 
in the mid- 1950s with usaid money. This process of legitimizing the role of manag-
ers and the managerial class was criticized by people like Ernst Utrecht which saw 
the belief of scientific management as panacea to Indonesia’s administrative woes as 
unwarranted. The dangers of scientific management and the managerial state ideolo-
gy it engendered were rooted in its anti- liberal and anti- democratic stance. Scientific 
management became an ideology that legitimized the creation of a welfare state in 
which administrative efficiency would trump political rights. It placed administrative 
efficiency as a paramount goal of the state. America’s managerial ideology was thus in-
strumental in supporting the rise of the New Order’s corporatist, familial state, whose 
foundations were developed in the context of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy state. The 
merging of the corporatist and developmental state was bridged through the ideology 
of scientific management.
 Keywords
scientific management – managerial ideology – corporatist ideology – gotong royong
Like national planning, scientific administration was new in the sense that 
although colonial antecedents existed, the incorporation of American ideas 
provided new ways of dealing with state– society relations. And, like national 
planning, scientific management was part of the international aid structure 
provided by the US to newly independent states across the world. Scientif-
ic management provided the trappings of efficiency and efficacy that were 
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alluring to the elites of these new post- colonial nations. In its incarnation 
within Indonesia, the ideas of efficiency would be implemented at many levels 
across the state and its economy.
The rise of administration science would result in the formation of a series 
of institutions within the universities and the creation of specialized learning 
institutions to provide education and research and to develop a specifically In-
donesian type of public administration. Within the Indonesian economy there 
were two major drives in the 1950s. The first was the development of business 
administration science, which was to provide the managerial manpower needs 
of business offices. Public and business management were two sides of the 
same coin. However, despite this similarity, both developed separately in In-
donesia within differing institutional environments. Public administration sci-
ence developed in the corridors of social and political science faculties, while 
business administration was developed as part of the economics faculty. The 
development of scientific management deeply affected the decolonization 
process for two reasons. First, it entailed Americanization, which provided the 
means to leave behind Dutch, that is, liberal, ways of doing things. Second, and 
related to this, was the relationship between managerial science and the legiti-
macy of the Guided Democracy. It would not be too wrong to say that the idea 
of efficiency contributed to the end of parliamentary democracy in Indonesia.
1 Development of Management
Public administration developed from the confines of political science, while 
scientific management developed from that of engineering. Both were predi-
cated on the idea of producing professional, white- collar experts for the gov-
ernment office and the factory floor. Administrative experts were seen as the 
implementers of efficiency, which was central to the most important goal of the 
twentieth- century state: development. In the words of public administration 
expert Donald C. Stone: ‘The primary obstacle to development is administra-
tive rather than economic […] Countries generally lack the administrative ca-
pability for implementing plans and programmes. Countries share in common 
most of the same administrative problems and obstacles.’1 Although modern 
business management had developed rapidly before the Second World War, 
the science of what came to be known as public administration was still in 
 1 Donald C. Stone, ‘Government Machinery Necessary for Development’, quoted in William 
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its gestation period. It was one of the primary exports of American scientific 
achievement that was channelled through the Marshall Plan and the various 
American aid programmes. In 1955, Americans started exporting the nascent 
science around the world. It was a science still under development, as William 
J. Siffin explains: ‘Defining the subject was less an issue than doing it, studying 
it and exporting it, whatever it might be.’2 From 1955 to 1963, American aid to 
assist with public administration totalled $187 million and between 1952 and 
1963, around six thousand people from all over the world were sent to the US 
for training, courtesy of the ica. The UN, the Ford Foundation, and the US 
government helped to establish some seventy public administration training 
institutions in various developing countries.3
In East Asia, the interest in promoting public administration was clear early 
on. The report of the Economic Survey Mission to Southeast Asia (the Griffin 
Mission) in 1950 had concluded that there was a need to support public admin-
istration in Indonesia. Formal recognition of this came with the Bell Mission 
to the Philippines.4 US economic assistance to the region in the period 1948– 
1967 totalled $7.6 billion. Technical cooperation amounted to $522.2 million, or 
roughly 7.3 per cent of the total. Of that, only $33.7 million, or half a per cent, 
was spent on public administration. In Indonesia, that amounted to $6.1 mil-
lion. The countries of Indonesia, Thailand, Korea, and the Philippines received 
88 per cent of the total aid spent on public administration in East Asia.5
From 1952 to 1965, the eca sent 502 Indonesian trainees to the US to study 
public administration. The eca helped to establish a series of public admin-
istration organizations, including the Public Service Centre (Balai Pelatihan 
Administrasi) at Gadjah Mada University, the Local Government Training 
Academy (Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri), and the National Institute 
of Administration (Lembaga Administrasi Negara). In the period 1957– 1965, 
usaid ran seven projects in public administration – four focused on training 
and three others on fiscal management, central- government administration, 
and local government.6 The United States would help to create twelve public 
administration institutions in East Asia, ten of which were assisted through 
direct contracts with American universities.7
 2 Siffin, ‘Two Decades of Public Administration’, 61.
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2 Problems of Efficiency
The push to implement scientific management was the result of the failure of 
a series of state- based industrialization efforts within the Economic Urgency 
Plan (Rentjana Urgensi Perekonomian) and the Benteng Programme. The plan 
started in 1951. The Urgency or Sumitro Plan outlined the need to improve and 
expand the research and training institutes of the Department of Industries 
(Departmen Perindustrian); to extend loans and credit to cottage and small- 
scale industries; to establish, through direct government sponsorship, central 
production and processing units (induk perusahaan) in industrial centres; and 
to establish government- sponsored, large- scale industrial plants in sectors of 
vital importance. In 1954, under orders from the National Planning Bureau 
(bpn) and the Department of Industry of the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(Departemen Perindustrian Kementerian Urusan Perekonomian), Sumitro 
Djojohadikusumo appointed the lpem, the research arm of the Faculty of Eco-
nomics, Universitas Indonesia, to conduct research into the industrialization 
efforts in the country. The findings emphasized the need to build up both the 
public and the business administration in the country, if a state- based indus-
trialization programme was to be developed.8
The Sumitro Plan made little progress after its inception in 1951. Projects 
that were supposed to have been ready by the end of 1952 were, for the greater 
part, still not completed by the middle of 1954. This was due to poor organiza-
tion as a result of incompetent management and a lack of experience, a short-
age of expert and experienced labour, and unattractive wages for technicians 
and management. From the government side, bureaucracy hindered instead 
of helped as a result of various administrative and financial regulations. There 
was a lack of coordination between the government departments and, at a 
lower level, between the departments and the project managers. This illustrat-
ed the sad state of the public administration. Lastly, there was a general lack of 
technical experts in the government.9
The Induk Perusahaan programme met with similar problems. The induk 
were local associations created to improve the quality of output and the pro-
duction techniques of small industries; to standardize production; to introduce 
efficient forms of organization; to instil cooperation; and to organize joint and 
cooperative sales of finished products. The crafts that the induk were formed 
around included woodwork, ceramics, textiles, ironwork, and leather goods, 
 8 Djojohadikuumo (ed.), The Government’s Program on Industries, 3.
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with production occurring in various places in Java and Madura. The problems 
that plagued the production of these crafts pointed to a lack of managerial 
capabilities. However, the Department of Industries’ programme focused ex-
clusively on quality improvement and techniques of production. As a result, 
the induk still had difficulty in finding markets, getting the best possible price 
for their products, and securing raw materials. Related to this was the lack of 
an organized distribution apparatus and rational business organization due to 
inadequate knowledge of the most elementary principles of business admin-
istration.10
There was a wider problem concerning public administration. As Sumitro 
explained:
Until recently, the internal conditions of administration at the depart-
ment were more or less chaotic. Even documentation and filing were not 
well taken care of. Preliminary reports and surveys frequently went miss-
ing. Basic reports were scattered all through sections and subsections. 
There was no concentration of master files. There was a lack of an ade-
quate number of trained administrative personnel to disseminate and to 
follow up on reports coming in from regional branches. Control by the 
Department of Industries and its extended services of induks have been 
inefficiently executed. A good deal of overlapping and cross wiring could 
be observed in the course of our research. One of the fundamental rea-
sons was probably the frequent transfer of people who were in charge of 
the supervision and control of induks. There was also a lack of delinea-
tion of responsibilities. Sometimes there was confusion concerning the 
agency responsible for the implementation of the induks. Was it the cen-
tral Department of Industries or was it the regional branch (inspector) of 
the Department of Industries?’11
The lack of entrepreneurial skill amongst the indigenous population was 
well known, due to them being, as Boeke put it, on the non- productive side 
of the colonial dual economy.12 Sumitro’s efforts to increase entrepreneurial 
capabilities by implementing government policies such as the Benteng Pro-
gramme were seen to be a failure. The government found that 90 per cent of 
 10 Djojohadikusumo (ed.), The Government’s Program on Industries, 15– 16.
 11 Djojohadikusumo (ed.), The Government’s Program on Industries, 16– 19.
 12 J.H. Boeke, Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies. As Exemplified by Indonesia 








the Indonesians receiving help lacked business experience and their business-
es often became fronts for Chinese– Indonesian businessmen.13
The failure of the Benteng Programme was a major setback to the idea 
that the Indonesian government could instantly develop an indigenous, en-
trepreneurial class through the application of government policies. Sumitro 
 reiterated:
Lack of equipment was not the most serious bottleneck. Equally serious, 
if not more so, was the lack of skills in general, and the critical conditions 
of public administration in particular […] Immediate improvement of 
our public administration is a precondition for satisfactory implemen-
tation of future economic and financial policies. We refer not only to the 
government but also to government controlled or government sponsored 
enterprises, banks, credit agencies, etc.14
It pointed to the need for Indonesia to create not only a class of entrepreneurs 
but a whole range of administrative capabilities and administrative scaffolding 
for growth. This was why the introduction of the concept of business admin-
istration seemed to be the perfect answer to the lack of Indonesian entrepre-
neurial spirit:
We have experienced to our bitter disappointment, however, that capital 
equipment purchased resulted in actual capital loss just because no ac-
count was taken of the organizational preparation and skills required to 
turn capital expenditures into really productive results. I would consider 
for the next five years the problems of human investment to be equally, if 
not more important than capital investments.15
3 From Dutch to American Concepts of Management
The government’s initial effort to grapple with administrative management 
was through the Committee to Investigate Ministerial Organizations (Panitya 
 13 For more on the Benteng Programme, consult Thomas Lindblad, Bridges to New Business. 
The Economic Decolonization of Indonesia (Leiden: kitlv Press, 2008), 125– 47.
 14 Quoted in Douglas Paauw, Financing Development. The Indonesian Case (Glencoe:  The 
Free Press, 1959), 75.
 15 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, ‘Budget and Its Implications’, in Ekonomi dan Keuangan 
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Negara untuk Menjelidiki Organisasi Kementerian- kementerian, or Panok), 
set up in 1952. The committee was tasked with halting the expansion of organ-
izations and civil servants and creating uniform ministerial structures. Head-
ed by legal specialist Abdul Karim Pringgodigdo, the report was published in 
1954.16 The committee found formal legal and organizational differences: there 
was a highly differentiated organizational structure, with overlapping and re-
dundant functions.17 They proposed reordering and regrouping the current 
structure into several ministerial sub- organizations. There was hostility to the 
changes. A division that was ‘demoted’ to a section felt slighted. The integra-
tion of redundant offices made many people anxious about the security of 
their positions. The transfer of an office, section, or division from one ministry 
to another was met with hostility, as that meant a loss of workers and prestige. 
There were other problems, too. One critic from the lan wrote:
Perhaps it was the result of the inaccurate calculation of the committee, 
perhaps it could also be the result of stress among the implementers, es-
pecially the legal specialists […] Within Panok there were five jurists, one 
legal expert, and one candidate jurist, and as a result the plan was created 
in a ‘rigid’ fashion with no escape clauses.18
He blamed the problems of Panok on the lack of public administration spe-
cialists. The failure of the so- called ‘legal specialist’ from the perspective of this 
public administration specialist pointed to the need for a change of mindset 
regarding organization.
There was an almost fanatical need to pry Indonesian practices away from 
Dutch practices. Sumitro Djojohadisukumo, in an inaugural lecture at the 
School for Business and Public Management (Perguruan Tinggi Ketataniagaan 
dan Ketatapradjaan) on 14 January 1957, said:  ‘I should stress that the term 
“administration” must not be confused with the term “administrasi” which is 
 16 Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, ‘Perkembangan Ilmu Administrasi Negara di Indonesia’, in 
M. Makagiansar and Widjojo Nitisastro, Research di Indonesia, 1945– 1965, Vol. iv: Bidang 
Sosial, Ekonomi dan Kebudajaan (Jakarta: Departemen Urusan Research Nasional, 1965), 
22– 3.
 17 Mohammad Sidik Moeljono, ‘Rantjangan Panok’, in Pantjawarsa LAN (Jakarta: Lembaga 
Administrasi Negara, 1963), 86– 7.
 18 Moeljono, ‘Rantjangan Panok’, 90– 1. ‘Mungkin a.l. karena perhitungan2 Panok kurang 
sempurna, mungkin djuga karena Panok terdiri dari orang- orang praktek dengan titik 
berat ahli hukum […] Dalam Panok terdapat 5 juris, 1 ahli hukum, 1 tjalon juris, maka 








usually used in Indonesia as an extension of the Dutch usage of the word.’19 
This disinterest in the colonial heritage was supported by a compelling argu-
ment: the bureaucratic tradition of the colonial state was too complicated to 
be able to be implemented effectively. In Sumitro’s words:
We have taken over from the colonial government a bureaucratic body 
that is in itself very difficult to understand. The bureaucracy used difficult 
and complicated working methods. This difficult bureaucratic body was, 
during the colonial period, run by people who were acclimatized to work-
ing within such structures. At present, the same bureaucratic system is 
being filled with new employees whose technical capabilities and expe-
rience are not in line with the needs of the system. The procedures used 
in the colonial bureaucratic system (which are still being used today) are, 
according to the experience of the writer, very hard to understand and 
control. Often people working within the environment of these bureau-
cracies have a hard time understanding the regulations. As a result, deci-
sions are often based on whims (or often people decide not to make any 
decision at all).20
Such a legal approach was considered anathema to economic development 
and represented what Sumitro called the regulation economy, in which regu-
lations grew haphazardly and in contradictory ways, thus reducing economic 
efficiency.21 During the colonial period, a legal education was often the only 
 19 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Management dan Mismanagement dalam Perusahaan dan 
Masjarakat (Jakarta:  Pembangunan, 1957), 3.  ‘Hendaklah saja tekankan, bahwa kata 
“administration” djangan ditjampur- adukkan dengan “administrasi” dalam arti jang lazim 
masih dipakai di Indonesia sebagai kelangsungan rangka pengertian bahasa Belanda.’
 20 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Bunga Rampai Ekonomi (Jakarta: Indira, 1951), 266. ‘Kita telah 
mengambil over dari pemerintahan kolonial, suatu badan birokrasi jang pada dirinja 
sudah sangat sukar difahami. Birokrasi tersebut mempergunakan tjara bekerdja jang 
sulit dan gecompliceerd. Badan birokrasi jang serba sulit itu, dizaman colonial didjalan-
kan oleh tenaga2 jang sudah biasa bekerdja dalam susunan demikian. Dalam keadaan 
sekarang, system birokrasi tersebut diisi oleh tenaga2 baru jang baik mengenai pengala-
man maupun ketjakapan technis, tidak menerima didikan jang sepadan. Procedure jang 
dipakai dalam susunan birokrasi bekas kolonial (jang dilandjutkan hingga sekarang), 
memang menurut pengalaman pengarang sendiri, adalah sangat sukar dimengerti dan 
dikendalikan. Seringkali orang2 jang harus kerdja dalam lingkungan badan birokrasi ini, 
tidak mengerti sendiri peraturan2 jang berlaku. Akibatnja ialah, tindakan2 jang diambil 
mempunjai sifat jang tidak karuan (ataupun sama sekali tiada diambil tindakan dan/ atau 
keputusan).’
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training given to candidate administrators at schools such as the mosvia/ 
osvia, the Law School (Rechtshoogeschool) and the Public Administration 
College (Bestuursacademie). The feeling of ambivalence towards the Dutch 
influence grew as the transgenerational shift occurred. The older generation 
clung to Dutch methods and the policymakers in government continued to 
send civil servants to study in the Netherlands. The shift was pushed through 
by the newly educated and the receipt of American aid assistance. It can be 
argued that the shift from the ‘legal’ to the ‘practical’ approach involved a shift 
from Dutch to American ideas.22
After the war, the Dutch development of public administration started to 
have an impact in Indonesia, as Gerrit van Poelje’s 1942 book Bestuurskunde 
(Public administration) was translated in 1953, the same year as the publica-
tion of A. M. Donner’s Nederlandsch bestuursrecht (Dutch administrative law). 
The bpn published ‘Administrative Requirements for Social and Economic De-
velopment’ in August 1954.23 Ernst Utrecht’s Pengantar Hukum Administrasi 
Negara (Introduction to public administration law) was published in 1955, a 
year after the Panok committee had conducted their study and published their 
plans. According to the communist economist Carmel Budiardjo,
The experts in England and the United States in general say that political 
science is about the study of power in society. Power is analysed on the 
basis of its properties, principles, development, framework, and conse-
quences. In comparison, experts from countries under German influence 
maintain that political science studies the state as a legal phenomenon, in 
terms of juridical- constitutional interpretation and administrative law.24
The Anglo- Saxon approach was to see the administration of the state as similar 
to the administration of the company. The main ideas of business adminis-
tration, such as ‘organization’ and ‘management’, were imported and geared 
 22 There was a growing interest in economics and the other social sciences that had begun to 
rival law as a potential subject of study, for instance. Glassburner, ‘High- Level Manpower 
for Economic Development’, 180.
 23 Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, ‘Perkembangan Ilmu Administrasi Negara di Indonesia’, 27– 8.
 24 Ernst Utrecht, ‘Beberapa Tjatatan tentang “Public Administration” berhubungan den-
gan Pidato- pidato Prajudi dan Tjia Kok Tjiang’, Padjadjaran, 1/ 2 (November 1958), 52. 
‘Para sardjana di Inggris dan Amerika Serikat umumnja mengatakan bahwa ilmu politik 
mempeladjari soal kekuasaan dalam masjarakat. Kekuasaan ini diperlihatkan sifatnja, 
asasnja, perkembangannja, rangka dan akibatnja. Sebaliknja ahli- ahli dari Negara jang 
terpengaruh oleh Djerman mempertahankan bahwa ilmu politik terutama mempeladjari 








towards the practical and the pragmatic. The resultant system was supposed 
to be efficient and flexible, and geared towards problem- solving rather than 
merely the implementation of regulations and the law. Ernst Utrecht warned 
that such alacrity in accepting American ideas was dangerous and that ‘there 
is nothing wrong with us directing our interest to the problem- solving system 
of progressive countries like the People’s Republic of China’.25 One important 
development in this shift was the American- funded visit to Indonesia of two 
Cornell professors in the early 1950s.
4 Lichtfeld and Rankin’s Visit
In 1954, the Indonesian government invited Dr Edward H. Lichtfeld and Dr Alan 
C. Rankin, then respectively dean and assistant professor of Cornell’s School of 
Business and Public Administration, to conduct a three- month survey of Indo-
nesia’s administrative problems. The two men met with important Indonesian 
leaders, including Vice President Mohammad Hatta; the head of the National 
Planning Bureau, Ir. Djuanda Kartawidjaja;26 and prominent intellectuals such 
as Dr Muhammad Yamin, Dr Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, and Dr Raden Supo-
mo, president of the University of Indonesia. Lichtfeld and Rankin interviewed 
various Indonesians in top- , middle- and low- level positions in government.
The report they published pointed to a grave lack of knowledge of the basic 
concepts of public administration everywhere they went:  government offic-
es, hospitals, schools, and so forth. ‘Generally speaking, we would say that the 
field of administrative science is largely unknown in contemporary Indonesia’, 
Lichtfeld and Rankin concluded.27 They suggested the creation of university- 
based, Indonesian administrative courses, as well as the establishment of 
libraries and the training of librarians. They encouraged the development 
of relevant literature in administration science, including the acquisition of 
foreign materials, the translation of standard materials, and the development 
of Indonesian- based literature. Dwight Waldo’s The Study of Public Admin-
istration was published in Indonesian in 1955.28 There were only a couple of 
 25 Utrecht, ‘Beberapa Tjatatan tentang “Public Administration”’, 72.
 26 ‘Ir.’ is short for ingenieur (Dutch) or insinyur (Indonesian); it is the title used to refer to 
someone holding an engineer’s degree in the Netherlands and Indonesia, among others.
 27 Edward H.  Lichtfeld and Alan C.  Rankin, Training for Administration in Indonesia 
(Ithaca: Cornell University, 1954), 11.
 28 It was translated by Slamet W. Atmosoedarmo and published in 1955 as Pengantar Studi 
Public Administration. The term ‘public administration’ was left in its English original, 
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hundred books available for the entire university system in Indonesia, many of 
which were imported and only relevant to Indonesia tangentially. Many uni-
versities did not have a library. The available books on Indonesia were confined 
mostly to those written in the Law Department and a few on the economy, 
with practically no supporting literature on political science and psychology.29
The next step was to develop university faculties in administrative science. 
The temporary importation of foreign teachers and the active training for a per-
manent, Indonesian faculty would be required. They suggested a programme 
of graduate work involving three years of study in residence and a fourth year 
in the field leading to a PhD. They calculated that if only one person were to 
be trained each year for each of the ministries, provinces, regencies, and very 
large cities, then over two hundred graduates a year would be needed. Thus a 
four- year undergraduate training programme for one thousand students would 
be needed. In fact, it would need to be larger, considering the rate of attrition, 
which they calculated conservatively to be around 25 per cent.30
5 Effect and Criticism of the Public Administration
A committee was formed to follow up on the report. It was led by Vice Presi-
dent Mohammad Hatta, with Djuanda Kartawidjaja of the bpn, M. Hutasoit 
from the Ministry of Culture and Education, and Sumarman as members. 
The committee agreed on the development of a specifically Indonesian pro-
gramme that would unite both public and business administration within a 
single educational centre. In 1956, the ica created a public administration divi-
sion in Jakarta, appointing Harry W. Marsh and John A. Ulinski as officers. The 
ica programme focused on importing books on administration and sending 
Indonesians to study scientific administration abroad.31 The interest in public 
administration resulted in the swift expansion of state- sponsored institution-
al development pertaining to education and research, including, for instance, 
the creation of the Domestic Government Academy (Akademi Pemerintahan 
Dalam Negeri, or apdn) by the Ministry of the Interior in March 1956. Pupils 
at the apdn were taught the latest findings in public administration, to the 
detriment of administrative law. American public administration specialists 
Dwight Waldo, The Administrative State. A Study of the Political Theory of American Public 
Administration (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1948).
 29 Lichtfeld and Rankin, Training for Administration in Indonesia, 13– 14.
 30 Lichtfeld and Rankin, Training for Administration in Indonesia, 19– 20.









Garth C. Jones and Henry W. Bush taught at the school.32 Indonesia thus had 
cutting- edge specialists, books, and knowledge on this matter.
On 20 September 1956, Prajudi Atmosudirdjo gave the inaugural lecture on 
public administration at the Faculty of Administration at the private Universi-
ty Krisnadwipajana in Jakarta. In December of the same year, Tjia Kok Tjiang 
also opened a Faculty of Public Administration at the Universitas Indonesia in 
Makassar. Ernst Utrecht’s criticism of these lectures accused both men of be-
ing dilettantes and intellectually dishonest. On Prajudi’s lecture, he said: ‘I’ve 
never encountered from the mouth of an Indonesian intellectual such a series 
of nonsense and lies, as has been spoken (in said lecture).’33 Utrecht’s main 
criticism was of the danger of overestimating the abilities of public adminis-
tration and the consequent loss of interest in understanding the importance of 
administrative law (hukum tata- negara).
Public administration and scientific management had become modern 
mantras that promised the arrival of efficiency and order as if by magic. Utre-
cht called them mode- woorden and even toverwoorden, magical words.34 ‘Has 
the result of public administration matched the enormous interest we have in 
it?’, he asked, answering in the negative.35 A usaid report said in 1964: ‘One of 
the current fetishes in most developing countries is the field of “management”. 
Everyone seems to look on it as a panacea to all problems.’36 American support 
for its expansion also meant that it not only conformed to the intellectual fash-
ion of the day, but that authorities saw it as an opportunity to obtain the funds 
and aid that the US had made available.
American books were seldom contextualized for the Indonesian situation.37 
The case studies compiled and used as the foundation for the contextualized 
Indonesian science of public and private management lacked a deep under-
standing of the ‘ecology’ of the power relationships and institutions that were 
needed.38 This lack of development in Indonesian political science made it 
 32 Tjokroamidjojo, ‘Perkembangan Ilmu Administrasi Negara di Indonesia’, 33– 4.
 33 Utrecht, ‘Beberapa Tjatatan tentang “Public Administration”’, 47. ‘Belum pernah saja 
mendengar dari mulut seorang tjendikiawan bangsa Indonesia suatu rentetan omong- 
kosong dan bohong, seperti tertera dalam kutipan diatas.’
 34 Utrecht, ‘Beberapa Tjatatan tentang “Public Administration”’, 69– 70.
 35 Utrecht, ‘Beberapa Tjatatan tentang “Public Administration”’, 68.
 36 usaid, Human Resource Development. Problems, Policies, Programs (Jakarta:  usaid, 
1964), 11.
 37 Often, the books were rehashed versions of American books with little effort to apply the 
knowledge to an Indonesian context or situation.
 38 J. Rossall, Dale McKeen and Leon A. Mears, Indonesian Cases in Business Administration 
(Jakarta:  lpem, 1961); see also Everett Hawkins, Cases in Business Administration 
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difficult to fully analyse the ‘ecological’ context of the manager. The problem 
was twofold. First, if such legal changes in the state system gave greater author-
ity to managers, they required the redistribution of the power of the political 
elites in favour of their ‘expert’- based elite, and this did not happen. Second, 
‘scientific management’ was a ‘magic word’ for the political elite that was si-
multaneously supported by US aid, and this effectively blocked the need to 
deal with the ‘real’ problem, which was a political one.
6 The Development of Business Management
Business administration grew rapidly in the 1950s and exhibited the same shift 
from the Dutch/ Continental style to an American/ Anglo- Saxon one. Barli Hal-
im divided the period into three: 1945– 1957 as a Continental period, 1958– 1959 
as an Anglo- Saxon one, and 1960– 1965 as a period of business management sci-
ence based on Indonesian socialism.39 Although he saw the Americanization 
as a brief and almost insignificant one- year period of development, it would 
be foolish to underestimate the strength of its message and ideology. Reading 
through works on business administration from the 1960s easily shows how 
replete ideas of scientific management were within the pages of supposedly 
socialist Indonesian tracts on management.
The ‘Indonesianization’ of business administration lagged behind public 
administration for several reasons. First, business administration was a lot less 
politically sensitive than public administration. Second, Dutch perspectives 
continued to pervade business administration as a result of the continued 
presence of the Dutch in Indonesian universities. Third, the continuing and 
large presence of Dutch- owned enterprises meant that there was a likelihood 
of Indonesian graduates entering into employment with these enterprises and 
thus the relevance of a Dutch perspective on business administration contin-
ued. All of this ended with the nationalization of Dutch- owned enterprises 
and the forced repatriation of Dutch citizens in 1957.
There were basically three main paths to obtaining a business manage-
ment education in the country: university courses, corporate business cours-
es, and state- sponsored courses. Business administration was not taught in 
higher- education institutions during the colonial period. The only faculty 
detached and focused on a purely economic approach, instead of understanding the 
wider societal and political implications of inefficiency.






that offered some economics teaching was the Law Faculty. Only fifteen Indo-
nesian economists were available on independence; they had graduated from 
Dutch universities, mostly the Erasmus University in Rotterdam. After inde-
pendence, three universities developed relatively strong economics facul-
ties: the University of Indonesia, Gadjah Mada University, and the Protestant 
Nommensen University in Medan. A college of business management was set 
up in the early 1950s by Dutch commercial organizations and chambers of 
commerce, representing a private- sector response to the need for commercial 
managers.40
The Dutch approach to business economics focused on the study of the firm. 
This liberal approach contrasted with the study of the state, that is, its role in 
economic development, in the nascent science of developmental economics. 
The study of business management was divided into four sciences: cost theory 
(ilmu biaya), expenditure theory (ilmu belandja), external organization theory, 
and internal organization theory. The books were also in Dutch – for example, 
Jan C.  Rietveld’s Inleidend leerboek der bedrijfseconomie (Introductory Text-
book of Business Economics), B.  van der Meer’s Schets der bedrijfseconomie 
(Sketch of business economics), and P. J. Potgieter’s Inleiding tot de bedrijfsec-
onomie (Introduction to business economics).41
In 1955, the feui discussed the possibility of linking up with an American 
university to support the improvement of the Indonesian teaching staff. Since 
the early 1950s, Sumitro had succeeded in recruiting Dutch teachers through 
his connections with the Rotterdam School of Economics.42 In 1956, an agree-
ment was signed with the University of California at Berkeley for education 
that was to be funded by the Ford Foundation. As well as sending young In-
donesian lecturers to pursue post- graduate studies there, uc Berkeley would 
also send professors to teach at ui. In 1957, six ui staff members were sent to 
California while Berkeley sent three of their staff members to the institute. 
In 1955, Universitas Gadjah Mada had taken the subject of economics out of 
the Law, Economics and Social Science Faculty and created a standalone Eco-
nomics Faculty, appointing lecturers Dr J. B. Stock; Prof Stanislaw Swianiew-
icz, a Polish economist; and Prof C. de Heer,43 the former professor of busi-
ness enterprise at Makassar.44 In 1957, ugm signed an agreement with the 
 40 Antara, 29 November 1953.
 41 Halim, ‘Ilmu Ekonomi Perusahaan’, 213– 14.
 42 Thee Kian Wie, ‘Economics’, in Koentjaraningrat (ed.), The Social Sciences in Indonesia 
(Jakarta: lipi, 1979), 229.
 43 Sardjito, Laporan Tahunan Universitas Gadjah Mada 1955/ 1956, 4.
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Ford Foundation and Wisconsin University, which led to the arrival of eight 
foreign lecturers, six of which came from Wisconsin University, including Ev-
erett Hawkins.45
The first change that they made was to replace the theories that were be-
ing taught in classes. The theories of the American Frederick Taylor and the 
French Henri Fayol now started to make their appearance. Fayol divided 
business administration into six parts: management, production, marketing, 
financing, accountancy, and personnel. American textbooks appeared in Indo-
nesia for the first time: Prentice Hall, McGraw and Hill, and Macmillan, among 
others, provided more pragmatic books, designed for the uninitiated.46 A shift 
was also observable in the method of teaching. The introduction of discussion 
groups and seminars was seen as a refreshing change from the lecture formats 
of the Dutch professors. The introduction of Indonesian case study methods 
was empirical and contextual. The business administration curriculum was an 
import from the usa.47 The curriculum consisted of an introduction to Tay-
lorist scientific management and a collection of case studies of companies and 
their problems. Leon A. Mears and Rossall J. Johnson were among the first to 
collect business case studies in Indonesia.48
7 The Caldwell and Timms Report
The rise of interest in business administration was portrayed succinctly in the 
Caldwell and Timms report. The report was published on 1 November 1958, 
having been commissioned by the bpn, and was the result of a survey of In-
donesia by Linton K. Caldwell, professor of government and director of public 
service training, and Howard L.  Timms, professor of business management, 
from Indiana University,49 between the months of July and August of the same 
year. They interviewed around 300– 350 leaders in public administration, busi-
ness management, and education, half of them in Jakarta and the rest in oth-
er cities including Bogor, Bandung, Pekalongan, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Sura-
baya, Malang, Medan, and Palembang. Because of the short, two- month stay 
of the consultants and their general prior ignorance of Indonesia, the report 
 45 Sardjito, Laporan Tahunan Universitas Gadjah Mada 1955/ 1956, 13– 14.
 46 Halim, ‘Ilmu Ekonomi Perusahaan’, 216.
 47 Caldwell and Timms, Developing the Managerial Resources of Indonesia, 40– 1.
 48 Johnson, McKeen and Mears, Indonesian Cases in Business Administration.
 49 J. Panglaykim (1968). Managerial Development:  An Indonesian Experience,  Australian 













functioned more as an instrument through which Indonesians working in the 
field could express their general ideas.50
The report was important exactly because it recorded the sentiments of 
general Indonesian managers at the beginning of the Guided Democracy. 
There was a degree of apprehension amongst those interviewed that the grad-
ual retirement of most Dutch- trained administrators would reduce the efficacy 
and efficiency of the administration.51
The report highlighted several issues that needed to be addressed to develop 
business administration. As an immediate goal, it called for the creation of a 
management development programme, modelled after the Advanced Manage-
ment Programme of the Far East in the Philippines. This was an extension of 
the Advanced Management Program set up by the Harvard School of Business 
Management. It also called for the establishment of evening courses in busi-
ness administration at business and government centres throughout Indone-
sia and within the Indonesian universities. As a long- term goal, it emphasized 
the need to speed upthe graduation of students by supporting the doctorandus 
programme in business administration at the University of Indonesia, which 
was at the time the most advanced programme in business administration 
in the country. Lastly, it called for the development of a first- rate institution 
of higher education, similar to the Harvard School of Business Management. 
This, it argued, should be located within the feui.52
As a follow- up to the Caldwell and Timms report, a committee headed by 
the economists Subroto, Mohammad Sadli, Panglaykim, and Arifin Abdulrach-
man was created. Many of the experts were from the feui. The focus on busi-
ness management resulted in the formation of a series of managerial courses 
that were meant to upgrade the capabilities of business managers, especially 
those at state- owned companies. With the help of the Ford Foundation and 
the University of California, a Management Development (Pembangunan Ket-
atalaksanaan) course was set up.
In 1957, the law professor Djokosoetono took on the role of acting dean of 
the Economics Faculty of the Universitas Indonesia after Sumitro Djojohadik-
usumo joined the prri rebellion in Sumatra. As part of the shift to the Guided 
Democracy, the curriculum of the faculty was also revamped. Djokosoetono 
felt that the curriculum should be geared towards the specific needs of the 
 50 Linton K.  Caldwell and Howard L.  Timms, Developing the Managerial Resources of 
Indonesia. A Report to the Biro Perantjang Negara (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1958), 
8. anri, Mohammad Bondan, inv. no. 699.
 51 Caldwell and Timms, Developing the Managerial Resources of Indonesia, 9.
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developing country. ‘Luxury’ and ‘liberal’ courses were eliminated, and the 
dabbling in ‘abstract analyses’ was discontinued.53 The Dutch curriculum had 
included a large proportion of law education, including courses on private law, 
fiscal law, Islamic law, and commercial law at the undergraduate level. After 
the changes, many of the economics courses focused less on the different as-
pect of law.54
The shift towards an American curriculum, alongside the introduction of 
American- influenced sciences such as public and business administration, 
was significant and widespread. Before 1955, economics was taught within 
a single Social Science Faculty and was heavily based on the Dutch curricu-
lum. All the books and articles used in the courses were Dutch in origin.55 The 
overall result of the changes led to a more pragmatic focus, that is, a heavier 
emphasis on applied economics. The economics courses offered three fields 
of specialization:  general economics, business economics, and accountancy. 
In 1964, governmental economics was introduced. These changes occurred 
throughout the university system.
Another important reason for the Americanization of the curriculum lay in 
a shift in language ability. Thee Kian Wie argued that since the mid 1950s, there 
had been an influx of students with little ability to command the Dutch lan-
guage because their primary education had started after the Japanese invasion 
in 1942. This change in language proficiency necessitated the move towards 
English- based reading materials.56
In a report submitted by the labour division of usaid in February 1964, the 
root of the problem with implementing Indonesian management science was 
spelled out. The report outlined several issues:
First, the approach has been substantially one of taking Western manage-
ment concepts and methods and attempting to overlay them on a culture 
and economy not yet attuned to them. The result is that the trainees can, 
at the conclusion of their course, glibly repeat the management jargon, 
but the basic cultural barriers have not been broken through. Processes of 
thinking and acting have not fundamentally changed. Second, the cours-
es tend to be academic and abstract; there is little emphasis on or use of 
the case methods or the problem- solving technique. As a result, there 
 53 Ali Wardhana, Pidato Dekan Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Indonesia pada Peringatan 
Dwi- Dasawarsa dan Reuni Alumni Ke ii, Jakarta, 1970 (Jakarta: feui, 1970).
 54 Thee, ‘Economics’, 230– 4.
 55 Thee, ‘Economics’, 230– 4.










is no effective transition from principle to practice. Third, the teaching 
process consists almost entirely of ‘lectures’, which, in this case, usually 
consist of transferring the notes from the book of the lecturer to that of 
the student without necessarily passing through the minds of either.57
The report laid out two suggestions for the development of public adminis-
tration. First, an approach geared towards the social mores of the Indonesians 
rather than an attempt to transplant Western management ideology was nec-
essary. Second, the introduction of an in- depth programme, which would at-
tend to the specific skills and practices of management and supervision and 
would not merely focus on the academic side of things.58
Garth N. Jones saw that the problem with Indonesian public administration 
was its decontextualized character: ‘Unfortunately, there is a dearth of schol-
arly studies concerning the social milieu of Indonesia. Public administrators 
even if they understand the importance of the relationship of social science 
to their work, must operate almost in a void of knowledge about their social 
setting.’59 As a result, in the early 1960s, he advocated that any technical assis-
tance programme must be focused on a scholarly study of the social milieu, 
governmental structures, and processes, meaning that a considerable effort 
would have to be made to obtain solid and basic information on the Indone-
sian government and society.60 He summed this up by saying, ‘Fundamentally, 
the management process must be brought down out of the sky and back to 
earth.’61 It was stressed that the pouring of capital investment into an economy 
or a society not yet ready to expand its productive capacity represented a waste 
of money.
8 Production of a Managerial Class
The expansion of schooling in public and business management was proof of 
the Indonesian government’s commitment to expanding the nation’s manage-
rial class. The less than satisfying result of the putaba scheme may have been 
one of the reasons, but it was always expected that the Indonesian state and 
 57 usaid, Human Resource Development, 8.
 58 usaid, Human Resource Development, 11.
 59 Garth N.  Jones, ‘Some Critical Areas concerning Technical Assistance in Public 
Administration in Indonesia’, Bulletin Lembaga Administrasi Negara, 1 (1961), 10– 11.
 60 Jones, ‘Some Critical Areas’, 13.












Scientific Administration and the Question of Efficiency 149
society would be managed by Indonesians. For instance, the Eight- Year Devel-
opment Plan published in the early 1960s stated that each state university was 
to be equipped with a Faculty of Public Administration.62
There was a strong connection between civilian and military managers. For 
instance, the Manager magazine produced special editions in which military 
management was discussed. Generals including Nasution, Ibrahim Adjie, and 
Ahmad Yani graced these editions with their opinions, including an article 
by Nasution on the Paran and one by Ibrahim Adjie on the Civic Action pro-
gramme.63 Aside from the military elites, most other contributors came from 
the civilian expert elite, including First Minister Djuanda. A coterie of military 
and civilian experts, most with ties to or sympathy for the psi, represented the 
core managerial class of the country. This was the same group of people that 
would eventually come to power under the banner of the New Order.
The significant feelings of inadequacy that are apparent in the grumblings 
about the ‘cultural’ weaknesses of the Indonesian managers and the almost 
triumphant exclamation of the managerial revolution by those same managers 
offers an interesting juxtaposition. In magazines such as Fortuna, Manager, and 
Perusahaan Negara, references to managers as the future leaders of the coun-
try abound. The confinement of managerial production to the social sciences 
was a unique and modern perspective. ‘It is now prevalent in the United States 
to leave behind the old tradition that assumes potential managers require 
them to be educated in engineering. The large industries in today’s America, 
with their various kinds of societal activities, are a modern social group’. What 
was desirable in a person was their flexibility. Many American companies in 
fact claimed that humanities and social science students were preferred over 
more technical types.64
On the other side of management, the expansion of the doctorandus degree 
in business management continued apace and, in fact, the intake of business 
management students climbed rapidly after the takeover of Dutch- owned 
businesses in Indonesia. The table below shows the number of feui graduates 
during the period 1952– 1963 and illustrates that business management trailed 
behind general economics in terms of numbers of graduates. Yet, even more 
significant was the expansion of the student intake in business management 
 62 Rantjangan Dasar UU Pembangunan Nasional- Semesta Berentjana Delapan Tahun: 1961– 
1969. Bidang Mental/ Ruhani dan Penelitian, Buku Ke iii, Djilik Ke vi:  Pola Pendjelasan 
Bidang Pendidikan Tenaga Pembangunan (Jakarta:  Dewan Perentjanaan Negara, 1960), 
1751.
 63 Nasution, ‘Kata Sambutan’, 4– 9; Adjie, ‘tni dan “Civic Mission”’, 10– 15.








science. The most significant rises occurred in 1959– 1960, when 146 economics 
majors graduated, and in 1960– 1961, when thirty- seven business management 
majors graduated.
The feui produced its first business administration graduates as early as 
1952. Yet, until 1957, enrolment in the subject remained fairly limited. Enrol-
ment numbers increased from 1958. However, these figures were dwarfed by 
the expansion of the Economics Department, which enrolled more than one 
hundred students in 1959 in anticipation of the Guided Economy. By 1963, a 
total of 210 business administrators had been educated by feui, about half 
the number of the 429 graduates in economics. Yet, if we look at enrolment for 
1963– 1964, there were around 101 first- year and 280 second- year undergraduate 
students in business administration at feui, in comparison to just 26 first- year 
and 104 second- year students in general economics. The unmistakable trend 
was of an increasing interest in business administration in comparison to gen-
eral economics as the 1960s wore on.65
table 11 Graduates in the three departments of the Faculty of Economics at the University 
of Indonesia
Economics Business management Accountancy
1952– 1953 0 2 2
1953– 1954 0 1 1
1954– 1955 4 1 5
1955– 1956 14 9 23
1956– 1967 17 9 30
1957– 1958 11 9 21
1958– 1959 45 22 69
1959– 1960 146 37 203
1960– 1961 76 34 138
1961– 1962 58 36 103
1962– 1963 58 50 128
Total 426 210 723
source:  taken from j.  panglaykim, ‘some notes on the development of eco-
nomic and business administration education in indonesia’, de economist, 113/ 
4 (1965), 281
 65 Panglaykim, ‘Development of Economic and Business Administration Education’, 277– 91. 
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The interest in public and business management thus peaked during the 
early part of the Guided Democracy, between the years 1957 and 1962. This 
expansion could be seen in both the rising interest in business management 
courses and the increasing production of books, especially on public adminis-
tration. In a survey of the production of books on various subjects labelled as 
administration, The Liang Gie found a peak in 1960– 1961,66 at the time when 
Law 19/ 1960 was passed, which effectively transferred the coordination of the 
entire economy, including the private economy, into the hands of the govern-
ment. The number of articles produced reached a peak in 1960 with eighty- six 
articles and in 1961 with eighty- nine articles, as the chart below indicates. Of 
the 289 published books on administration, ninety- one, or a third of the total, 
were translations.67 After this year, the production of both articles and books 
fell. This was then followed by the closure of the journal Madjalah Manager 
in 1965.
The Executive Development Programme (Program Pembangunan Ketat-
alaksanaan), which was supported by the Ford Foundation, was launched 
at feui in 1960 and taught a curriculum that was in line with the one at 
the lan, one mostly associated with the problems of authority, decision- 
making, and leadership.68 At Universitas Gadjah Mada, the success of the 
 66 The Liang Gie, Bibliografi Ilmu Administrasi (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Karya, 1970), 184– 5.
 67 The, Bibliografi Ilmu Administrasi, 183 and 209– 10.
 68 Aminin Honggodjojo, ‘Curricula Implications in Management Education for Present 
and Future Needs’, in Yip Yat Hoong (ed.), Role of Universities in Management Education 
 figure 5  Production of books and articles on managerial science between 1950 and 1968, 
with a peak in 1961
  source: taken from the liang gie, bibliografi ilmu administrasi 









Administration Development Center (Balai Pembinaan Administrasi, bpa), 
peaked with its involvement in the Congress of the Science of Public and 
Business Administration held in 1961 in collaboration with the lan.69 The 
lan produced over twenty- five publications between 1958 and 1963.70 A se-
ries of managerial courses were introduced by a variety of organizations. The 
Ministry of Industry, for instance, set up a Academy of Industrial Manage-
ment (Akademi Pemimpin Perusahaan) in 1958, copying the principles and 
curriculum of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s School of Indus-
trial Technology.71
Within the field of agricultural estates, the nationalization of Dutch- owned 
companies resulted in the Indonesianization of 2,300 managerial positions 
across four hundred estates.72 The creation of professional, that is, university- 
trained, managers could not keep up with this expansion. Atmosudirdjo reck-
oned that if Universitas Gadjah Mada produced approximately one hundred 
graduates, Padjadjaran thirty graduates, lan fifty graduates and Hassanudin 
twenty graduates, this would only total two hundred managers, which was not 
enough.73 In its eight- year history, by 1959 the feui had produced just sixty 
economists: fifty- five business administrators and five accountants.74 The lim-
ited ability of the education system to produce professional managers meant 
that a large percentage of managerial personnel came from other parts of so-
ciety. Panglaykim pared these down to six categories, including civil servants, 
military personnel, and university graduates.75 The majority of managers had 
studied at general schools during the colonial period. Some were former teach-
ers, civil servants, or army personnel.76
for National Development in Southeast Asia (Singapore:  Regional Institute of Higher 
Education and Development, 1972), 213– 25.
 69 The, Bibliografi Ilmu Administrasi, 188.
 70 Imam Buchari, Buku Peringatan Pantjawarsa Lembaga Administrasi Negara, 1958– 1963 
(Jakarta: Lembaga Administrasi Negara, 1963), 40– 1.
 71 Program Akademi Pemimpin Perusahaan, 1958– 1959 (Jakarta: Kementerian Perindustrian, 
n.a.), 3– 15.
 72 Everett D. Hawkins, ‘Indonesia’, in Walter Galenson (ed.), Labor in Developing Economies 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), 117.
 73 Atmosudirdjo, ‘Masalah Pendidikan Ilmu Administrasi’, 34.
 74 Mohammad Sadli, The Structural and Operational Aspects of Public (Especially Industrial) 
Enterprises in Indonesia (Jakarta: n.n., 1959), 249.
 75 Panglaykim, State Trading Corporations in Indonesia. First Year’s Performance, 1961 
(Jakarta: Jajasan Badan Penerbit feui, 1965), 7– 8.
 76 Achmad Sanusi, Manager:  Insentif dan Motif Putusannja. Satu Perbandingan Umum 
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Who was the Indonesian manager? Achmad Sanusi put it this way:
Sometimes he is depicted as an ideologist, a carrier of the people’s wish-
es, and a father faithful to his children. He does not have a university 
education, but has had plenty of experience and knows deeply the bitter 
laws of life. At other times, he is shown as a young person, a student, who 
is trying and experimenting, behaving in a formalist fashion, still lacking 
skill in translating policy from theory and not clever enough to play the 
games according to the real rules. Sometimes, the manager takes on the 
image of a leader of society, who is constantly managing his relationship 
with government leaders and heads of departments, who cooperates 
with and for businessmen, lending them his name and service.77
Jamie Mackie’s survey of agricultural estate companies in 1960– 1961 showed 
the extent to which the rise of the new managerial elite had resulted in the 
formation of new regional power structures:
Relatively powerless in central politics, the new managers appear to be 
an influential group in the daerahs (districts), particularly in those where 
there are close bonds of interest and affinity between them and the ex-
isting regional authorities, pamongpradja and Army officers. Thus, the 
divorce between political power and responsibility for production, which 
characterized the years 1950– 57, has been remedied (in a uniquely Indo-
nesian fashion) at the regional level.78
 77 Sanusi, Manager:  Insentif dan Motif Putusannja, 67. ‘Kadang2 ia tergambarlah sebagai 
seorang karyawan ideologist, pengemban amanat penderitaan rakjat, dan sebagai bapak 
jang setia kepada anak2nja. Ia tak berpendidikan universiter, tapi telah tjukup banjak 
makan garam, dan tahu betul kenjataan hukum2 hidup jang pahit- getir sekalipun. Lain 
kali manager Indonesia tergambar sebagai tokoh muda, sardjana, jang sedang membuat 
eksperimen2, masih banjak formalism, belum handig lagi membuat satu policy dari 
satu teori, dan belum lagi pandai main “the games according to the real ground- rules”. 
Kadang2 manager kita tergambar lagi sebagai symbol tokoh masjarakat, jang pernah dan 
terus memperhatikan banjak relasinja dengan pimpinan pemerintahan, djawatan2, jang 
bekerdja- sama dengan, atau untuk, pengusaha2 jang memindjam nama dan djasa2nja 
itu. Betapapun sifat2 itu jang lebih sesuai, manager di Indonesia pun dipandang umum 
sebagai satu golongan elite jang kedudukan ekonomisnja lebih tinggi, dan hidupnja jauh 
lebih mewah daripada rata2 penduduk biasa, bahkan djuga dapat mempengaruhi djalan 
pelaksanaan politik pemerintah atau djawatan2.’
 78 J. A. C. Mackie, ‘Indonesia’s Government Estate’s and Their Masters’, Pacific Affairs, 34/ 4 






This ‘federalization’ of the regions under military rule resulted in a significant 
restructuring of the state. As Daniel Lev phrases it:  ‘Already identified with 
their provinces, army commands hyperactively and over- optimistically un-
dertook to fulfil local demands for the economic development which civilian 
government had been unable to accomplish.’79 The development of a military- 
cum- expert planning structure, within what was to become the Bappenas 
planning structure, provided the solution to the problem of decentralization.
9 Public Administration, the Welfare State and Guided Democracy
The pro- Sukarnoist legal specialist and pni member Ernst Utrecht viewed the 
move to the Guided Democracy as a shift from the Continental Rechtsstaat 
to the Anglo- Saxon welfare state or Wohlfahrtstaat.80 The German Rechtsstaat 
attempted to impose a legal order in which all government decisions could be 
regulated within the law; however, problems appeared when the state began 
to expand its function as part of the development of social services and as a 
purveyor of public goods.81 ‘This narrow view strait- jacketed the government’s 
activity within legal boundaries. As a result, when government activity was ex-
panded because of the acceptance of the Wolhfahrtstaat, a ‘web of administra-
tive prescriptions’ (net van administratieve voorschiften) that was increasingly 
complicated and in contradiction with itself was created. This was because of 
the wish that nothing be left to its own devices and that positive legal supervi-
sion be maintained. As a result, there appeared a bureaucracy that preferred 
to obstruct instead of support the government’s activity in promoting general 
welfare and individual interests!’82 Quoting Yugoslavian legal specialist Eugen 
 79 Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 63.
 80 He hated the psi and called it the party of champagne socialists (salonsocialist). See 
Eileen Utrecht, Twee zijden van een waterscheiding. Herrineringen aan Indonesië voor en 
na de onafhankelijkheid (Amsterdam: Sua, 1991), 87– 90, 138 and 152– 62.
 81 For more on the liberal character of the Rechtsstaat, see Rachel S.  Turner, Neo- Liberal 
Ideology. History, Concepts and Policies (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2008), 
27– 31.
 82 Utrecht, ‘Beberapa Tjatatan tentang “Public Administration” ’, 62. ‘Pendapat sempit ini 
hendak mengikat aktivitet pemerintah pada hukum. Akibatnja: ketika kemudian aktivitet 
pemerintah sangat diperluas karena diterimanja ‘Wohlfahrtstaat’, maka dilahirkan suatu 
‘net van administratieve voorschiften’ luas jang sangat berbelit2 dan makin luas makin 
bertentangan (!), sebab keinginan supaja tiada sesuatupun jang dilepaskan dari pengawa-
san hukum positif tetap dipertahankan. Dengan demikian dilahirkan suatu birokrasi jang 
lebih menghalangi daripada memadjukan aktivitet pemerintah guna kepentingan umum 
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Pusic, Utrecht wrote that ‘administrative inefficiency, caused by legal guaran-
tees, can finally reduce these guarantees to nil’.83
Sukarno, in a speech to the Indonesian Master of Law Association (Per-
himpunan Sardjana Hukum Indonesia, Persahi) in 1961, said this of legal- 
mindedness: ‘Wilhelm Liebknecht has said – in Dutch – “you can’t make revo-
lutions with lawyers”.84 What Liebknecht said was that most legal specialists, 
jurists, are very legalistic; they cling to the prevailing laws so strongly that if 
they were to be asked to join the revolution, which requires throwing away 
the current situation […] these legalistic jurists, would find it very difficult 
to do so.’85 Sukarno equated legalistic thinking with being almost contra- 
revolutionary. In 1958, Sukarno established the Institute for the Development 
of National Law (Lembaga Pembinaan Hukum Nasional, lphn), whose goal 
was to change the colonial roots of Indonesian law.86 In 1960, Sukarno gave 
ministerial status to the head of the Supreme Court (Kejaksaan Agung), thus 
suspending Indonesia’s law- based state.87
During the inaugural address of the lan, its head, Prajudi Atmosudirdjo, 
stated:
The formation of this LAN by the government signals the wish to speed 
up the changes in the spirit (djiwa) of our civil servant, who is currently 
a laughing stock of society. This is the change from a civil servant who 
 83 Utrecht, ‘Beberapa Tjatatan tentang “Public Administration”’, 62.
 84 ‘Met juristen kun je geen revolutie maken.’
 85 Sukarno, Sosialisme dalam Kepribadian Indonesia. Pidato Presiden Sukarno pada 
Pembukaan Kongress Persahi di Jogjakarta, 26 Nopember 1961 (Jakarta:  Departemen 
Penerangan, 1961), 4.  ‘Wilhelm Liebknecht telah berkata  – salinannja dalam bahasa 
Belanda – “Met juristen kun je geen revolutie maken.” Jang dimaksudkan oleh Liebknecht 
ialah bahwa ahli hukum, juristen, kebanjakan – demikianlah maksud Liebknecht – sangat 
legalistis, sangat memegang kepada hukum- hukum jang “prevaleren”, sangat memegang 
kepada hukum- hukum jang ada, sehingga djikalau diadjak ber- revolusi  – revolusi jang 
berarti melemparkan hukum jang ada, “a revolution rejects yesterday” kata seorang pem-
impin revolusi jang lain, “a revolution rejects yesterday” – sehingga djikalau jurist- jurist 
jang legalistis ini diadjak ber- revolusi, katanja, amat sulitlah hal jang demikian itu.’
 86 Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 107 tahun 1958 tentang Lembaga Pembinaan 
Hukum Nasional (lphn), anri, Jakarta, Mohammad Yamin, inv. no. 360. The lphn was 
composed of lawyers and other elements of society in order to create a legal system that 
was not merely based on a legal approach, but also able to accommodate other elements, 
at least this was the case stated by the minister of education and culture to the ministerial 
board in charge of creating the body. anri, Jakarta, Kabinet Perdana Menteri Republik 
Indonesia, inv. no. 1651.
 87 A. M. Reksohadiprodjo, ‘The Relations of Law and Economic Development. With Special 












‘merely follows the rules’ to a new Indonesian civil servant, one who has 
an entrepreneurial spirit which embodies the spirit of the ‘managers of 
the state’ or ‘public managers’, is full of personal initiative, and has a dy-
namic mindset in their efforts to increase their productivity and the na-
tional capital productivity in order to achieve the highest level of welfare 
for the people and the state, in as little time as possible.88
Even more significantly, the change in the spirit of the civil service was part 
of the underlying spirit of the Guided Democracy and that of the New Order 
state itself:
[T] he duty of this organization is to implement a government decision 
that is revolutionary in character. The decision of the government to cre-
ate the LAN shows that the government is serious about creating a ‘public 
administration’ in Indonesia and represents an important caesura in the 
history of our government. With this decision, we leave behind the ‘law- 
based state’ doctrine that we have inherited from the Dutch, and, with-
out forgetting the law, we are on our way to becoming an ‘administrative 
state’, which is the most modern governmental idea, whereby the state is 
seen to form a sort of corporation (ondernemingsvorm). In comparison, 
the law- based state saw the state as merely a juridical- formal body. In a 
law- based state the main purpose of the government is to keep ‘peace 
and order’, while in an administrative state, the government actively con-
ducts efforts to increase the welfare of the people and the state. In other 
words, with this government decision, we decidedly move from a ‘legal 
state’ towards an ‘administrative state on a legal basis’.89
 88 Pantjawarsa Lembaga Administrasi Negara (Jakarta: Lembaga Administrasi Negara, 1963), 
10. ‘Dengan mendirikannja Lembaga Administrasi Negara ini Pemerintah ingin mempert-
jepat proses perubahan djiwa pegawai2 negeri kita, jang pada masa ini masih selalu mend-
jadi edjekan masjarakat, jaitu perubahan dari pegawai negeri jang “hanja mendjalankan 
peraturan” sadja ke pegawai negeri Indonesia Baru, jang mempunjai entrepreneurship 
dan leadership, jang berdjiwa sebagai “managers of the state” atau “public managers” jang 
penuh inisiatif sendiri serta berdjiwa dinamis dan jang selalu berusaha untuk mempert-
inggi produktivitet kerdja, produktivitet mode nasional dan sebagainja, guna mentjapai 
kemakmuran Bangsa dan Negara jang se- tinggi2nja dalam waktu jang sesingkat2nja.’
 89 Pantjawarsa Lembaga Administrasi Negara, 10. ‘[T] ugas Lembaga ini merupakan pelaksa-
naan dari suatu Keputusan Pemerintah jang bersifat revolusioner. Keputusan Pemerintah 
untuk mendirikan Lembaga Administrasi Negara jang berarti, bahwa Pemerintah setjara 
tegas hendak membangun “Public Administration” in Indonesia, adalah suatu titik- 
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There was thus a deep contradiction between the rise of the welfare state or, in 
Atmosudirdjo’s words, the administrative state, and the traditional and ‘liberal’ 
forms of political democracy. In fact, the shift towards an administrative state 
was seen as leaving behind the trias politica and the separation of powers that 
had been the prime model of Western democracy since the French and Amer-
ican revolutions, and which had been reflected in the 1950 Indonesian ‘liberal’ 
constitution. The ‘liberal’ trias politica state was thus considered a night- watch 
state, which focused on the application of the law. In fact, Montesquieu’s idea 
was based on the aim of denying the possibility of state tyranny and ensuring 
the liberty of the individual citizen. Thus, individual liberty was traded for the 
completion of revolution and development.
This constitutional reordering highlights several ideas related to the Guided 
Democracy state. The root of the failure of 1950s’ development was pointed 
out, quite correctly, as being a problem of planning and coordination. Sukar-
no attributed this to the inherent chaos that liberalism had induced. The fact 
that seven governments had existed between 1950 and 1957 certainly strength-
ened this accusation. According to Sukarno, the only way to solve this problem 
was to complete the Indonesian revolution. There were several obstacles to be 
overcome, if this were to be accomplished. First, Indonesia needed to elimi-
nate the dualism between the ‘government’ and the ‘revolutionary leaders’ that 
had coloured governance in the 1950s. Sukarno pointed out that, as a result of 
the compromise made in 1950 at the Round Table Conference and under the 
rule of the social democrats, ‘[o] ur earth became fertile for the growth of all 
types of conventional, conservative, reactionary, and contra- revolutionary and 
liberal ideas’.90
These ‘contra- revolutionary reactionaries’, that is, the social democrats, 
the psi, and economists such as Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, had taken over 
meninggalkan azas “Negara Hukum” jang kita peladjari dari Belanda, dan dengan tidak 
meninggalkan hukum itu kita sekarang sedang menudju kesuatu “Negara Administratif”, 
jaitu pandangan kenegaraan jang paling modern, dalam mana negara itu dipandang 
sebagai salah satu bentuk pengusahaan (Ondernemingsvorm), sedang didalam rangka 
pandangan “Negara Hukum” kewadjiban pokok dari Pemerintah hanjalah memelihara 
“keamanan dan ketertiban”, sedang didalam “Negara Administratif” Pemerintah ikut aktif 
menjelenggarakan usaha2 untuk memperbesar kemakmuran masjarakat dan Negara. 
Dengan perkataan lain, dengan keputusan Pemerintah itu kita lebih tegas lagi menudju 
dari “Legal State” ke “Administrative State on Legal Basis” […].’
 90 Sukarno, ‘Manifesto Politik Republik Indonesia’, in Tudjuh Bahan Pokok Indoktrinasi 
(Jakarta: Panitia Pembina Djiwa Revolusi, 1963), 19. ‘Bumi mendjadi subur untuk ber-





the country and divided the government from its leadership. In the words of 
Sukarno:
The head of the revolution is separated from the head of government. 
The head of the government in fact weakens the head of the revolution. 
He becomes nothing more than a ‘stamp machine’. He often clashes with 
the ideology of the head of government. He has been ‘trias- politica- ized’, 
and not only within the executive. He has become Togog.91 This, accord-
ing to supporters of the system, is said to be the highest of wisdom within 
democracy. Yes! Liberal democracy! Dutch democracy! The democracy of 
the Western states, whose democracy was born to the mother of middle- 
class capitalism (burgerlijk kapitalisme).92
This was an unconventional revolution and as a result, required unconvention-
al means: ‘It cannot be solved with means taken from the decrepit warehouse 
of liberalism. It cannot be solved with the means written in the textbooks of 
yore.’93
Sukarno was adamant that his revolution was ‘modern’ and, in this regard, 
he considered the changes brought about by the revolution to be both mod-
ern and anti- liberal. The cleansing of the contra- revolutionary was to happen 
through what was called retooling, a managerial strategy in which people were 
evaluated on the basis of their position in the revolution and replaced accord-
ingly. Only those who were pro- revolutionary were allowed to participate. 
A whole slew of institutions would be created in order to achieve the goals of 
retooling.
 91 A character in a wayang shadow play, the son of Semar, who had failed to be born, that is, 
his power was denied to him.
 92 Sukarno, Djalannja Revolusi Kita (Djarek), 38– 9. ‘Pimpinan revolusi dipisahkan daripada 
pimpinan pemerintahan. Pimpinan Revolusi malahan dilumpuhkan (diverlamd- kan) 
oleh pimpinan Pemerintahan. Ia kadang- kadang didjadikan sekedar “tukang stempel”. 
Ia sering sekali tabrakan faham dengan pimpinan Pemerintahan. Ia di- ‘triaspolitica’- kan 
bukan sadja, tetapi dalam bagian eksekutif daripada triaspolitica itupun ia sekedar did-
jadikan sematjam togog. Ini, menurut pentolan- pentolan sistim itu, dinamakan “hoog-
stewijsheid” dalam alam demokrasi. Ja! Demokrasi liberalisme! Demokrasinja Belanda! 
Demokrasinja negara- negara Barat, jang an sich demokrasi disana itu adalah anak- 
kandung dan ibu kandung daripada burgerlijk kapitalisme.’
 93 Sukarno, ‘Penemuan Kembali Revolusi Kita’, Pidato Presiden Republik Indonesia pada 
Hari Proklamasi 17 Agustus, 1959, 73. ‘Ta’ dapat ia diselesaikan dengan tjara- tjara jang 
keluar dari gudang- apeknja liberalisme. Ta dapat ia diselesaikan dengan tjara- tjara jang 







Scientific Administration and the Question of Efficiency 159
Second, the Indonesian revolutionary leadership needed to pool togeth-
er the ‘funds and forces of the people’. Sukarno understood that, as a result 
of modern technological changes, the nature of participation had changed 
profoundly: ‘In this twentieth century, with its sophisticated communication 
technology, every revolution is a people’s revolution, a mass revolution, not 
like those of the previous centuries, when the revolution was often limited to 
the upper classes, the revolution of the ruling few.’94 Thus, the revolution in 
question had a historical inevitability to it and an almost scientific and natural 
character. It was a revolution that involved three- quarters of humanity. ‘Look 
and observe! A state that does not mature in a revolutionary fashion will not 
only be crushed by its own people, it will be swept clean by the universal rev-
olutionary typhoon that is the most significant phenomenon of the present 
age.’95 The revolution was thus not only modern, but also in tune with global 
changes.
The importance of the participation of the masses was described succinctly 
as being part of the participative development that Guided Democracy prom-
ised. ‘Universal development cannot succeed without mobilizing universal 
work. The revolution cannot work without the participation of the people in 
it.’96 In order for the revolution to succeed, therefore, the relationship between 
the administrator and the masses had to change profoundly:
I stressed this in my Political Manifesto speech about the summoning of 
the energy and passion of the people because many of the people within 
the state apparatuses – the people with noble qualities – do not under-
stand the meaning of mass energy and mass passion, and in fact suffer 
from a phobia of the masses and the people. The spirit of these noblemen 
and noble women must be cleansed and destroyed, so that the revolution 
 94 Sukarno, ‘Penemuan Kembali Revolusi Kita’, Pidato Presiden Republik Indonesia, 72. 
‘Dalam abad ke- xx ini, dengan ia punja teknik- perhubungan jang tinggi, tiap revolusi ada-
lah revolusi Rakjat, revolusi Massa, bukan sebagai diabad- abad jang lalu, jang revolusi- 
revolusinja adalah sering sekali revolusinja segundukan manusia- atasan sadja  – “the 
revolution of the ruling few”.’
 95 Sukarno, ‘Djalannja Revolusi kita (Djarek). Amanat Presiden Republik Indonesia pada 
Hari Proklamasi 17 Agustus, 1960’, 38. ‘Lihat dan perhatikan! Suatu Negara jang tidak ber-
tumbuh setjara revolusioner, tidak sadja akan digilas oleh Rakjatnja sendiri, tetapi djuga 
nanti akan disapu oleh Taufan Revolusi Universil jang merupakan phenomenon terpent-
ing daripada dunia dewasa ini.’
 96 Sukarno, ‘Djalannja Revolusi kita (Djarek). Amanat Presiden Republik Indonesia pada 
Hari Proklamasi 17 Agustus, 1960’, 72. ‘sebab pembangunan semesta ta’ mungkin berd-








can continue as a People’s Revolution and thus reach an optimal level of 
efficiency!97
Sukarno’s visit to China in 1956 must have had an important influence on this 
image of a united people working together under the guidance of revolution-
ary leadership.98 According to Sukarno, China had implemented a develop-
mental programme that was contextualized within the history, culture, and 
character of the nation. China’s industrialization programme had mesmerized 
him during his visit to the country. Chinese industrialization was driven not 
through foreign investment but through a revolutionary reordering of the pro-
ductive powers of society, which appealed to him immensely. It was perhaps 
no coincidence that Mao’s Great Leap Forward occurred at just about the same 
time as the introduction of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy.99
Third, it was a planned and coordinated revolution. The planned nature 
of the revolution was essential. ‘Planning is an absolute requirement for 
the implementation of socialism! Thus the implementation can then be di-
vided between Guided Economy and Guided Democracy.’100 The revolution 
was a planned political, economic, social, cultural, and mental activity. The 
people, through organizations such as Depernas, created the plans, but their 
 97 Sukarno, ‘Djalannja Revolusi kita (Djarek). Amanat Presiden Republik Indonesia pada 
hari Proklamasi 17 Agustus, 1960’, 72– 3. ‘Saja mengulangi bagian pidato Manifesto Politik 
jang mengenai penggalangan tenaga dan semangat massa Rakjat ini in extensor (den-
gan lengkap), oleh karena masih banjak orang- orang dalam kalangan aparatur Negara – 
orang- orang dengan kwalit eit ndoro- ndoro dan djuragan- djuragan, wanita- wanita 
dengan kwaliteit den- adjeng den- adjeng dan den- aju- den- aju  – jang tidak mengerti 
artinja tenaga massa dan semangat massa, bahkan menderita penjakit massa- phobi 
dan Rakjat phobi, jaitu takut kepada massa dan takut kepada Rakjat. Djiwa ndoro dan 
djiwa den- aju itu harus kita tjutji sama sekali dan harus kita kikis sama sekali, agar supaja 
Revolusi dapat berdjalan benar- benar sebagai Revolusi Rakjat, dan oleh sebabnja berd-
jalan seeffisien- effisiennja pula!’
 98 Sukarno, ‘Amanat Pembangunan Presiden, 28 Agustus 1959’, in Tudjuh Bahan Pokok 
Indoktrinasi (Jakarta: Panitia Pembina Djiwa Revolusi, 1963).
 99 In comparison to the failure of Guided Democracy, the Great Leap Forward was suc-
cessful at least in terms of the ability of the Chinese Communist Party to mobilize the 
people. This, of course, resulted in a massive tragedy as the indigenous industrialization 
process resulted in the loss of millions of lives. It may perhaps have been a lucky thing 
for Indonesia to have had such a weak bureaucracy, for the state could not, even if it had 
wanted to, have implemented such massive programmes that would have been prone to 
violence.
 100 Sukarno, ‘Djalannja Revolusi kita (Djarek). Amanat Presiden Republik Indonesia pada 
hari Proklamasi 17 Agustus, 1960’, 59. ‘Perentjanaan Pola, atau Planning, adalah satu sjarat 
mutlak bagi pelaksanaan Sosialisme! Planning itu nanti dalam pengkarjaannja mend-
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implementation was to be guided by the revolutionary leadership. This was 
the last but perhaps one of the most important components of the revolution, 
for, in order for it to succeed, it had to be guided by the leadership. ‘In the ab-
sence of leadership, without the provision of planning in each of the complex 
parts of the revolution, we would reach, as I have said before, a multi- complex 
chaos.’101
The revolution was rooted in the changing nature of the relationship be-
tween the people/ masses and its leadership. The revolution thus shared its 
roots with the democratic expansion of participation. ‘The foundation and 
goal of the Indonesian revolution is congruent to the Social Conscience of 
Man!.102 Social justice, individual freedom and national freedom were the goal 
that was espoused by Sukarno during the formation of Indonesia’s national 
ideology and principles, the Pancasila, in 1945. ‘It is not a Western democra-
cy, but a political- economic democracy, a political democracy with social jus-
tice (sociale rechtvaardigheid), a democracy with welfare; those two notions 
I squeeze into one. This is what I have always called a socio- democracy.’103
This focus on social justice and welfare promoted by the state was contrast-
ed with a liberal notion of statehood. For the state to actually act in ways that 
would promote social justice and welfare, the executive was required to have 
the ability to act outside the boundaries that had been set up as part of the 
separation of powers. In the words of Utrecht:
The granting of ‘Freies Ermessen’104 to the state administration meant 
that some of the power held by the Parliament, by the legislative body, 
has been transferred to the hands of the government, the administration, 
as the executive body. This is something that occurs in all ‘welfare states’ 
 101 Sukarno, ‘Amanat Presiden tentang Pembangunan Semesta Berentjana. Sidang Pleno 
Depernas, 28 Agustus 1959’, 60. ‘Djikalau tidak diberi pimpinan, tidak diberi planning 
dimasing- masing bidang dari kompleksiteit daripada revolusi ini, maka kita achirnja 
sebagai tadi sudah saja katakan, datang kepada kompleksiteit kekatjauan.’
 102 Sukarno, ‘Penemuan Kembali Revolusi Kita’, Pidato Presiden Republik Indonesia, 41. 
‘Dasar dan tudjuan Revolusi Indonesia adalah congruen dengan Social Conscience of 
Man itu! Keadilan sosial, kemerdekaan individu, kemerdekaan bangsa dan lain sebagainja 
itu adalah pengedja- wantahan daripada Social Conscience of Man itu’.
 103 Sukarno, ‘Lahirnja Pantjasila, 1947’ in Tudjuh Bahan Pokok Indoktrinasi (Jakarta: Panitia 
Pembina Djiwa Revolusi, 1963), 29. ‘Dan Demokrasi jang bukan demokrasi Barat, tetapi 
politiek- economische democratie, jaitu politieke democratie dengans sociale rechtvaar-
digheid, demokrasi dengan kesedjahteraan, saja peraskan pula mendjadi satu. Inilah jang 
dahulu saja namakan socio- democratie.’
 104 Discretionary power or pouvoir discretionaire or beoordelingsvrijheid. It has become an 










as a logical consequence of the implementation of said ‘welfare state’. By 
expanding the power of the executive, the concept of the guided democ-
racy is born as the system of government of the welfare state.105
This executive expansion was a worrying aspect of the administrative state in 
relation to democracy and it was something that had been bothering people 
both in the West and in Indonesia. ‘Differing from the narrow definition of the 
legal state (Kant, Fichte), the ‘idea of the modern legal state does not empha-
size the law (positive law), but the goal of social justice (sociale gerechtigheid) 
to all citizens. If necessary, the state can act outside of the law in order to reach 
that social justice.’106 The ‘welfare state’ thus expanded the discretionary pow-
er of the executive.107
In fact, leaving behind the trias politica was a phenomenon that transcend-
ed the ideological divide of the Cold War. In his discussion on public adminis-
tration, Utrecht considered the various new ideas surrounding the shift from 
a separation of powers to a separation of functions: ‘The separation was pres-
ent in the discussions of three famous American experts who have studied 
“Government” and “Public Administration”, namely Woodrow Wilson, Frank 
Goodnow, and Herman Finer.’108 Obviously the rise of the welfare state in the 
West had not resulted in the rise of military dictatorships. Sukarno was ada-
mant that the revolution was essentially democratic; he saw its genesis to be 
 105 Ernst Utrecht, Pengantar dalam Hukum Administrasi Negara Indonesia (Jakarta: Ichtiar, 
1963), 23. ‘Diberinja “freies Ermessen” kepada administrasi negara itu sebenarnja berarti 
bahwa sebagian kekuasaan jang dipegang oleh dewan perwakilan rakjat, sebagai badan 
legislatif, dipindahkan kedalam tangan pemerintah, administrasi negara, sebagai badan 
eksekutif. Hal ini mendjadi kenjataan ditiap- tiap “welfare State” sebagai suatu konsek-
wensi logis dari diadakannja “welfare State” itu: supremasi badan legislatif diganti oleh 
supremasi badan eksekutif! Ekonomi terpimpin, sebagai sistim perekonomian “welfare 
State”, – sebagai suatu konsekwensi logis – memperbesar kekuasaan eksekutif, melahir-
kan demokrasi terpimpin sebagai sistim pemerintahan “welfare State”.’
 106 Utrecht, Administrasi Negara Indonesia, 35. ‘Berlainan dengan “idee” negara hukum dalam 
arti kata sempit (Kant, Fichte), maka dalam “idee” negara hukum modern titik- berat pada 
pokoknja tidak terletak pada “hukum” (hukum positif), tetapi pada tudjuan mentjapai 
keadilan sosial (sociale gerechtigheid) bagi semua warga negara. Apabila perlu, negara 
djuga boleh bertindak diluar hukum untuk dapat mentjapai keadilan sosial bagi semua 
warga negara itu.’
 107 Some legal experts considered it the end of the law- based state when Sukarno gave minis-
terial status to the head of the Supreme Court in 1961. Reksohadiprodjo, ‘The Relations of 
Law and Economic Development’, 33.
 108 Utrecht, Administrasi Negara Indonesia, 34. ‘Pembagian tersebut terdapat dalam tiga 
ahli terkemuka bangsa Amerika Serikat jang mempeladjari “Government” dan “Public 
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Western but more perfect, claiming as antecedents both the French and Amer-
ican bourgeois revolutions and the Marxist Russian revolution. Leaving behind 
the separation of powers, alongside the decimation of the legislative body and 
its party elements, the revolution also signalled a significant lurch towards the 
creation of a military dictatorship. Even if the Guided Democracy never be-
came an outright dictatorship, it did provide the principles and groundwork 
for one.
It is also important to understand that the foundation of the Guided De-
mocracy and Guided Economy state, Indonesia’s constitutional ideology, did 
not particularly conflict with ideas surrounding the rise of the administrative 
state. The Presidential Decree of 1959 (Dekrit Presiden 1959) was issued out-
side the bounds of the constitution but was justified as a ‘logical consequence 
of the implementation of a welfare state (guided democracy)’109 in order to 
create executive supremacy over the legislative body. Sukarno used Article 22 
of the 1945 Constitution (or Article 96 of the 1950 Constitution), which allowed 
for the creation of a government regulation in lieu of the constitution (peratur-
an Pemerintah pengganti undang- undang, or p.P.p.u.u.), which was justified in 
a ‘situation of forced emergency’.110 Rather than using it for its intended pur-
pose, however, he used it to justify the ending of parliamentary democracy by 
attacking the liberal straw man. Guided Democracy was depicted as a social 
philosophy that went with the times, whereas liberalism was painted as some-
thing that was conservative and unmodern. The only difference was that it was 
to be a managerial state that was at the same time revolutionary. The argument 
shown above was congruent with the arguments discussed in Chapter 1:  the 
1928 generation was now being garbed as the ‘revolutionary leadership’.
As a result, the rise of the Guided Democracy state was not incompatible 
with the developments in public administration that had occurred during the 
1950s. The lan was to occupy a relatively important position during the peri-
od, although it failed to take over leadership of the development of Indonesian 
public and business administration education.111 The Guided Democracy’s rise 
was not predicated on any form of East– West divide but, rather, on an almost 
mythical divide between liberalism and socialism. As Utrecht’s discussion of 
the rise of the public administration in Indonesia shows, its roots were entirely 
Western, that is, American. That said, Utrecht did also discuss the German and 
Dutch cases and their own ‘Americanization’ during the period, especially the 
 109 Utrecht, Administrasi Negara Indonesia, 26.
 110 Utrecht, Administrasi Negara Indonesia, 23.
 111 Djuna Hadisumarto, ‘The Indonesian Civil Service and its Reform Movement’, PhD disser-









thoughts of Dutch legal specialist O. M. Donner and management specialist 
Gerrit van Poelje.112
10 Legal Culture and Democracy
The conflict between democracy and efficiency was the main divider be-
tween what Waldo, writing in the 1940s, termed ‘progressives’, who advocat-
ed planning, and the ‘old- liberals’, who believed that efficiency could only be 
achieved if more democracy were introduced. In Waldo’s words: ‘They knew 
that the Future must well up from below. In opposition were those whose pa-
tience was exhausted waiting for the Promise of American Life to realize it-
self by natural and inevitable means, whose view of human nature was not so 
charitable and who had no faith in the devices of primitive democracy, who 
had begun to think of planning and who realized that builders need tools.’113 
The ambivalence towards democracy was partially based on the disdain that 
the manager had for the legal process. ‘The anti- legal temper of public ad-
ministration is obvious and its import clear. In fact, one does not need to go 
far in the literature of public administration to find that if any person is to 
count for less than one in the New Order it is the lawyer! The lawyer suffers 
from a meager social outlook, the spirit of the New Management does not 
abide with him.’114
Yet, the image of the welfare state was exemplified by the success stories 
of the Western European and North American democracies. The welfare state 
became a symbol of the success of the West. There was no doubt that people 
like Waldo, Burnham,115 and Redford,116 who had ruminated on the potentially 
autocratic nature of the state in question, saw the inherent problem in find-
ing the balance between individualism and democracy and the welfare state. 
In fact, many of the analyses of public administration in the United States 
 112 Donner’s idea, understood in Indonesia as dwipradja, divided the government along func-
tional lines between those who determine the function of government duties (taakstel-
ling), that is, policymakers, and those who implement the duties (verwezenlijking van de 
taak). This was in line with Woodrow Wilson’s division into Government, as the political 
arm that determines policies, and Public Administration, which implements the policies 
in question.
 113 Waldo, The Administrative State, 18.
 114 Waldo, The Administrative State, 79.
 115 Burnham, The Managerial Revolution.
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focused on reconciling the problem between the ideals of individualism and 
democracy and the expansion of an efficient state.117
The strength of the commitment to the rule of law was related to the 
state– society ideology that the nation prescribed for itself. In this case, it 
could be argued that the American value of individualism, rooted in a tra-
dition of economic independence, allowed for critical opposition that func-
tioned as a check on the expansion of the administrative state. This ‘liberal’ 
opposition was practically non- existent in Indonesia. Rule of law was con-
sidered a bourgeois belief that masked the class roots of the law under ob-
jective and neutralist notions. As Suprapto phrased it, ‘The theory of the 
law and the state, which is a formalistic, logical- formal abstract, instructs 
the creation of the law for the “vested interests”, to maintain a state without 
justice (Staat ohne Recht).’118 Even a legal specialist like Ernst Utrecht, who 
tried to argue for the relevancy and importance of at least administrative 
law, did not particularly posit the rule of law as an inherently central com-
ponent of democracy. Similar to the communists’ attack on the economic 
science taught by ‘Sumitro- followers’, the Marxist legal approach was to see 
the law as inherently bound up with the class struggle.119 Jusuf Adjitorop, a 
member of the politbureau and secretary of the pki, said that the main issue 
for national law was ‘how to integrate the work of the legal specialist with 
that of the masses’.120
It was important that the law was revolutionized in order to reflect the 
changing values of the new ruling class. The role of national law was to raise 
awareness of Indonesian socialism and gotong rojong values, and to push for 
more equitable production methods for a just society.121 Utrecht was a mem-
ber of the National Law Development Institute (Lembaga Pembinaan Hukum 
Nasional), created in 1958 as part of the Guided Democracy revolution. In a 
seminar on national law held in 1963 by the institute, Suprapto, a legal spe-
cialist, explained the idea of the law as understood under Guided Democracy:
 117 For instance, Redford, Democracy in the Administrative State and F. C. Mosher, Democracy 
and the Public Service (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).
 118 Suprapto, Dasar Pokok, Fungsi, Sifat2 dan Bentuk Hukum Nasional (Jakarta:  Lembaga 
Pembinaan Hukum Nasional, 1963), 8. ‘[…] teori tentang hukum dan negara jang formalis-
tis, logis- formil- abstrak, itu mengadjarkan untuk menegakkan hukum bagi kaum “vested 
interest”, untuk mempertahankan negara tanpa keadilan (Staat ohne Recht).’
 119 Ernst Utrecht, Pengantar dalam Hukum Indonesia (Jakarta: Ichtiar, 1964), 230 and 306.
 120 Jusuf Adjitorop, Peranan dan Tugas2 Hukum Nasional dalam Alam Manipol (Jakarta: 
Jajasan Pembaruan, 1963), 6.












Until now the influence of formalism on a theory of law based on a static, 
abstract way of thinking, with narrow formal logics, known as ‘besliss-
ing leer’, ‘theorie van stelligstaatsrecht’ and so forth, has not been able to 
be fully removed from the science of Dutch legal knowledge. Basically, 
these theories intend to separate the law from its relationship with the 
entirety of social and individual life in all its myriad forms, which affect 
and are affected by one another, always moving and contradicting, with 
their own dynamics of change through the process of evolution and rev-
olution and creating qualitative and quantitative exchanges. The theory 
of law that says that the law is the result of the abstraction of a decision 
made by officials appointed by the state, and that the state is merely an 
organization composed of a series of functions, a formalism needed by 
the colonialist to protect the vested interests of the monopolist and feu-
dalist, of the landlords and other bloodsuckers.122
Individualism was seen as anathema to the ideals of Indonesian society. Dur-
ing the constitutional discussions in 1945, which gave birth to the national 
ideology, the conservative nationalist leadership chose to use the indigenous 
legal code (Herziene Inlandsche/ Indonesische Reglement, hir) as opposed 
to the European legal code. The hir had fewer provisions in place to protect 
the legal subjects. According to Lev, the logic of colonial law ‘had mainly to 
do with maintaining a manageable mass of Indonesians in place’.123 During 
the Japanese occupation, many of Indonesia’s nationalist leaders had worked 
in the administration. In a meeting with Sukarno, the head of the military in 
 122 Suprapto, Dasar Pokok, Fungsi, Sifat2 dan Bentuk Hukum Nasional, 7. ‘Sampai pada saat ini 
masih belum dapat dihapuskan seluruhnja pengaruh formalisme daripada teori hukum 
jang didasarkan pada tjara berfikir abstrak jang statis, logika formil jang sempit, sebagai 
jang terkenal dengan nama “beslissingen leer”, “theorie van stellig staatsrecht” dsb. Dari 
dunia ilmu pengetahuan hukum Belanda. Dalam hakekatnja teori- teori tadi hendaknja 
melepaskan hukum dari hubungannja dengan keseluruhan kehidupan masjarakat dan 
individu dalam berbagai- bagai seginja, jang saling berhubungan dan saling mempen-
garuhi, jang senantiasa bergerak dan saling berkontradiksi dan jang dengan dinamikanja 
sendiri berobah melalui evolusi dan revolusi, dengan menimbulkan pertukaran kwalitas 
dan kwantitas. Teori hukum jang mengadjarkan, bahwa hukum adalah hasil pengabstra-
kan dengan pikiran dari keputusan- keputusan jang dibuat oleh pedjabat- pedjabat jang 
ditundjuk oleh negara dan negara tak lain hanjalah suatu organisasi jang terdiri daripada 
rangkaian fungsi- fungsi adalah suatu bentuk formalisme jang diperlukan oleh kaum pen-
djadjah untuk mempertahankan “vested interest” kaum modal monopoli dan golongan 
feodal, golongan tuan tanah dan kaum penghisap lainnja.’
 123 Daniel Lev, Legal Evolution and Political Authority in Indonesia. Selected Essays (The 
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Java, General Imamura, had personally stated his support for the employment 
of as many Indonesians within the government as possible.124 Perhaps one of 
the most significant effects of the Japanese occupation was the promotion of 
a world view based on a deep and inherent suspicion and dislike of Western 
imperialism and its replacement with a corporatist economic order, one called 
Hakko Ichiu, which positioned the ‘Eastern’ concept of the family as the gov-
erning principle in understanding state– society relations.125
11 Conclusion
Understanding the ideological developments of the 1950s is essential to un-
derstanding the changes that occurred from the late 1950s as the Guided De-
mocracy emerged. The process of Americanization inadvertently led to the im-
portation of scientific management, whose Indonesian incarnation prompted 
an ideological shift. This allowed the rise of a pre- independence corporatist 
notion, which had been written into the earlier 1945 Constitution, to join forc-
es with the efficiency mantra that drove the interest in scientific management. 
This resulted in a reordering of state– society relations that was congruent with 
corporatism and the idea of the welfare state.
The rise of a new Indonesian managerial class was a component in the 
structural changes that occurred with the creation of national planning. The 
expansion of the roles played by these new managers – graduates of the man-
agement education provided during the decade, as well as military officers 
who had obtained managerial posts within the government and the econo-
my – required the reordering of the economy and wider society. In order to 
achieve this, a national planning scheme was created as part of the Indonesian 
revolution. It is on this national planning and structural transformation that 
the next chapter focuses its attention. These were essential components that 
complemented the shift in ideas that was inadvertently introduced as a result 
of the expansion of scientific management.
 124 Mitsuo Nakamura, ‘General Imamura and the Early Period of Japanese Occupation’, 
Indonesia, 10 (October 1979), 1– 26.
 125 On the basic objectives of establishing a New Economic Order for the people of Java 
(Jawa jumin keizai shintai seiken setsu no kompon shushini tsuite), see Harry J.  Benda, 
James K. Irikura and Koichi Kishi, Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia: Selected 
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 chapter 5
Economic Planning during the Guided Democracy
 Abstract
This chapter discusses the development of institutions of national planning during the 
Guided Democracy and how it increasingly integrated the state within this structure. 
Sukarno’s Guided Democracy state wanted to reform the relationship between the old 
political elite, the new managerial elite and the wider Indonesian society. It wanted 
to do away with the centralization of power and authority within expert bodies and 
expand on the participation of both the old political elites and the wider Indonesian 
society in national, regional and local planning. The problems inherent in such a cor-
porative planning structure came to a head with the failure of the Eight Year Plan of 
the Guided Democracy. This failure resulted in the recentralization of planning au-
thority within the community of experts in a new planning body that would become 
central to New Order policy making in the future, the Bappenas. The integration of 
national, regional and local government into the institution of planning had resulted 
in the formation of new power relations that placed the military and expert planners 
in the center of state making policies. These forms of power relations had expanded 
the managerial state into the lower parts of the Indonesian state and thus opening the 
way for a more integrated managerial state that wield the ability to coordinate on a 
deeper level of society. The rise of regional planning coincided with the expansion of 
the army’s role in regional power politics and administration.
 Keywords
Depernas – Bappenas – eight year overall national planning – regional planning
This chapter discusses the development of the institution of national planning 
during the Guided Democracy. The question that the chapter aims to answer 
is: who was leading society? Was it the experts, whom Sukarno considered to 
have failed the nation in the 1950s? Or did another, more democratic form of 
leadership emerge? The bpn was changed into the Depernas. This chapter 
studies the experiment of ‘social control’ or ‘social participation’ and looks at 
why this experiment, in the form of the Depernas, failed, and how develop-
ments in the latter part of the Guided Democracy strengthened the role of the 
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experts by giving them key positions in a new body, the Bappenas, which was 
central to economic policymaking during the New Order.
The Depernas was a forum that bypassed Parliament and combined the old-
er planning board and political representation in one body, a form of social 
control through incorporation. The function of the ‘democratic’ Depernas was 
to represent the people in national planning. Thus, its decisions and consen-
sus were to be acknowledged and the authority of the planning body would 
be self- evident. The introduction of the idea of social control, as exemplified 
by the Depernas, by the introduction of new institutions such as the compa-
ny board (dewan perusahaan), and by ideas such as open management, rep-
resented a genuine attempt to implement changes. But it was one that would 
ultimately fail.
After the failure of the Depernas, the National Planning Body (Badan Per-
antjang Nasional, Bappenas) was created in 1963. This represented a correc-
tion to the corporatist experiment, allowing the ‘experts’ greater participation 
within the planning agency. It also included a political wing, the National Plan-
ning Consensus (Musjawarah Perentjanaan Nasional, Muppenas), which acted 
as the parliamentary wing of the Depernas. The Bappenas– Muppenas enabled 
the gradual re- infiltration of the ‘expert’ managerial class into planning. It cre-
ated a planning structure that united the central and the regional executives. 
In this way, the answer to the problem that had plagued the 1950s – how to cre-
ate coordination among the national executive in lieu of the Pamong Praja – 
had seemingly emerged. The inherent tension between societal participation 
and expert leadership was to play out more forcefully in the economic poli-
cymaking of the period. The institutional development of planning, however, 
illustrated the rise of an executive class that owed its position to the efforts to 
implement national planning.
1 Transition from the bpn
The bpn drew up Indonesia’s first Five- Year Development Plan (1956– 1960) in 
1956. It was then submitted to Parliament but was not approved until 1958. In 
the meantime, many of the economic assumptions contained within it had 
changed. Aside from the enactment of a foreign investment bill,1 the plan failed 
to materialize. In 1958, the role of the bpn in national planning was replaced by 
 1 Submitted to parliament during the second Ali Cabinet in 1956, it was finally passed in 1959. 






the newly created Depernas. The bpn had been a psi- dominated bureau and 
when the social democrats lost political influence, the pki succeeded in clos-
ing it down on charges of it being too ‘capitalist’.2 The communists were very 
critical of the bpn’s large- scale manufacturing projects, such as the Asahan 
Aluminium Mill. Ir. Djuanda Kartawidjaja, as prime minister, presided over 
the dissolution of his bpn power base, but he recovered his power by creating 
the Economic and Finance Bureau (Finek or sometimes called bureau number 
two), a prime- ministerial office with the task of assisting in economic mat-
ters. He appointed former bpn staff member Muljatno Sindhudarmoko as bu-
reau chief, and Ali Budiardjo and Saubari as staff.3 This bureau, coupled with 
Djuanda’s control of the feui, the Ministry of National Research (Kementeri-
an Urusan Research Nasional) under Minister Sudjono Djuned Pusponegoro,4 
and the Leknas, provided adequate protection for the core social scientists, 
enabling them to flourish both in research and in developing power relations.
The role of Djuanda during the early Guided Democracy period, from 
around 1957 to 1962/ 1963, was perhaps as central as that of General Nasution. 
Although people like Sumitro Djojohadikusumo had left, the ‘technocratic el-
ement’ still existed at the core of both the government and the military. Taufik 
Abdullah recalled a conversation in which a famous Indonesianist said that 
‘people will realize later on how crucial Djuanda’s role was in these critical 
years, and how much of a loss to the nation the sudden death of Djuanda was’.5 
Djuanda died in 1963. Born on 14 January 1922 to Raden Kartawidjaja, a school-
teacher from the lower Sundanese nobility, Djuanda obtained a scholarship 
to study at the Bandung Technical College (Technische Hogeschool Bando-
eng) in 1929, graduating as a civil engineer in 1933. He became a director of 
the Muhammadiyah teaching school in Batavia before getting a job as a civil 
servant with the Department of Water Control (waterstaat) in the province of 
West Java in 1939. Unlike Hatta or Sumitro, Djuanda thus never lived in Hol-
land nor was he particularly active within the nationalist movement.6 With no 
affiliation to any particular party or ideology, Djuanda was a neutral option for 
Sukarno’s right- hand man.
 2 Robinson Pangaribuan, The Indonesian State Secretariat, 1945– 1993 (Perth: Murdoch Universi-
ty, 1995), 15.
 3 Pangaribuan, The Indonesian State Secretariat, 16. Budiardjo was sympathetic to the psi. Hig-
gins and Higgins, Crisis of the Millstone, 87.
 4 Prior to his appointment as a minister, Pusponegoro was the rector of the Universitas Indo-
nesia and dean of the Faculty of Medicine there.
 5 Taufik Abdullah, ‘Kata Pengantar’, in Awaloeddin Djamin (ed.), Pahlawan Nasional. Ir. 
H. Djuanda. Negarawan, Administrator dan Teknokrat Utama (Jakarta: Kompas, 2001), xx.
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Rosihan Anwar called Djuanda a pioneer in the Indonesian technocracy, in 
that people like him ‘have no specific ideological commitment, in fact they act 
and are apolitical. Their main function is to be a helper and to aid their politi-
cal master’.7 This was certainly not entirely true of the New Order technocrats, 
whose relationship with the military state was determined by their desire to 
promote a certain vision of the Indonesian economy. Quoting Hanna, Higgins 
stated that Sukarno’s entourage was composed of sycophants, rogues, and hou-
ris.8 And although he wasn’t ‘political’ in the usual sense, Djuanda was pro- 
heavy industry, supporting large projects such as the Jatiluhur electric plant, 
the Gresik cement plant, and the Krakatau steel mill.9
One of the most important components of the Guided Democracy state was 
the belief in the importance of centralizing the executive. The Pamong Praja 
corps, which had been slated to disappear under the decentralized regional 
governments, was revived by Sukarno in his presidential edict of 1959,10 and 
this had the effect of recentralizing the executive.11 The Pamong Praja was to 
work alongside a territorial military structure that had also been expanded 
during the period. With the creation of a national planning body composed of 
representatives of working bodies (Karya groups), the fractious, decentralized, 
party- based society of Indonesian liberalism was replaced by an incorporated 
structure in which society would participate in national planning and in the 
greater economy through the application of open management systems. The 
structure of power would be centralized, allowing society and state to function 
as one organic whole.
2 Institutional Development during the Guided Democracy
On a general level, we can divide the Guided Democracy into two periods. The 
first covered 1957– 1962 and represented an experimental period, in which vari-
ous new institutions were set up within an environment that held an optimistic 
 7 Rosihan Anwar, ‘Pelopor Teknokrat. Non- Stop Jadi Menteri’, in Awaloeddin Djamin (ed.), 
Pahlawan Nasional. Ir. H. Djuanda Kartawidjaja. Negarawan, Administrator dan Teknokrat 
Utama (Jakarta: Kompas, 2001), 217– 18.
 8 Higgins and Higgins, Crisis of the Millstone, 122.
 9 Mohammad Sadli, ‘Pelopor Perencanaan Pembangunan Ekonomi’, in Awaloeddin Djamin 
(ed.), Pahlawan Nasional. Ir. H. Djuanda Kartawidjaja. Negarawan, Administrator dan Tek-
nokrat Utama (Jakarta: Kompas, 2001), 258– 9.
 10 J. D.  Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia:  A Study of Local 
Administration, 1950– 1960 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), 21.













view of the future. It was a corporatist period in which participation in the 
planning body through Karya organizations was heralded as the foundation 
for a stable and efficient Indonesia. During this period, Sukarno’s anti- expert 
feelings were at their height. The second period, 1962– 1965, was the period af-
ter the experiments had been conducted, when the mood shifted towards one 
of apathy and pessimism. The changes also saw Sukarno wielding increasing 
authority as well as a loss of power for Nasution. Interestingly, the latter period 
also saw the rise of Western- educated social scientists and communists in the 
executive and their increasing prominence in the discourse on the economy. 
There was also growing economic distress and a loss of control of the state, 
while simultaneously a series of new, executive institutions were established 
that were to become the institutional bedrock of the future New Order state. 
In short, it was a period rife with contradiction and conflict that witnessed the 
rise of a new generation of experts that was to exercise an increasing influence 
on the executive.
As Herbert Feith describes, Guided Democracy was both an initiative of 
the military and Sukarno, ‘and they did so not as leaders and followers or 
as part of a single power group, but as two partners and followers, or as a 
part of a single power group, as two partners between whom relations were 
competitive as well as cooperative’.12 In the early phase, starting around 1957, 
Nasution used the martial law that was proclaimed after the dissolution of Ali 
Sastroamidjojo’s Cabinet to push forward his institutional ideas. His author-
ity as chief of staff of the army resulted in his command of the Central War 
Authority (Penguasa Perang Pusat, Peperpu), which controlled the Region-
al War Authority (Penguasa Perang Daerah, Peperda). Sukarno successfully 
wrested control of this double administration away from Nasution when he 
dissolved the Peperpu and established the Supreme War Authority (Penguasa 
Perang Tertinggi, Peperti), positioning himself as the head of both the civil-
ian and the military administration.13 In December 1961, the Supreme Com-
mand for the Liberation of West Irian (Komando Tertinggi Pembebasan Irian 
Barat, koti) was created under Sukarno; this became the most important 
government agency, acting like a cabinet.14 The competitive atmosphere had 
resulted in the formation of institutions along similar lines by both the mil-
itary and Sukarno. In many cases, the initiative was taken by Nasution and 
 12 Herbert Feith, ‘The Dynamics of Guided Democracy’, in Ruth McVey (ed.), Indonesia 
(New Haven: Hraf Press, 1964), 327.
 13 Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, 47.
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then followed by Sukarno. It was not until 1962, when Sukarno succeeded in 
undermining Nasution’s position, that an expansion of executive authority 
took place under the presidential office, putting institutional authority in the 
hands of the president.
According to Daniel Lev, ‘The striking aspect of Guided Democracy as it de-
veloped after the restoration of the 1945 Constitution was that it contained 
many political but few institutional controls. For institutions were pulled apart 
and broken down but poorly reassembled.’15 While there was an institutional 
breakdown, new organizations and institutions were created. While Sukarno’s 
preoccupation with politics and the shoring up of his support base reduced 
the efficacy of these new institutional arrangements, it is important to realize 
that significant path- dependent changes were being wrought. The importance 
of the Guided Democracy experiment was in its impact on the establishment 
of Indonesia’s state– society relations. The problems of perceived government 
inefficiency resulted in the creation of an ‘experimental’ state. In the words of 
Sukarno: ‘If we admit that the Indonesian revolution is not yet over, we have 
to understand that we will have to confront continued renewal. Try this, if it 
doesn’t work, try something else […] if that doesn’t work, then try again […]. 
Revolution is a dynamic process.’16 This experimental approach showed a be-
lief in historical materialism and the dialectic of nature itself. As Engels said, 
‘the whole of nature has its existence in eternal coming into being and passing 
away, in ceaseless flux, unresting motion and change’.17
Two important events heralded the rise of the Guided Democracy. The first 
was the expropriation of Dutch- owned enterprises and the subsequent forced 
repatriation of Dutch citizens from Indonesia. This resulted in the opening up 
of positions in newly nationalized corporations and, subsequently, the hasty 
expansion of management science to fill the void left by the departing Dutch-
men. The second was the further implementation of the dual function of the 
military, which enabled greater participation by the military in both civilian 
and business management.
The figure above represents a simplified model of institutional develop-
ment within the government during this period. The strategy can be divided 
into two: a macro strategy for state coordination and a micro strategy for the 
 15 Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 286.
 16 Sukarno, ‘Don’t Built a Façade on Sand’, in Dewan Nasional (n.p.: Kementerian Penerangan 
RI, n.y.), 62.
 17 Friedrich Engels, The Dialectics of Nature, quoted by Roeslan Abdoelgani; see Abdoelgani, 
‘Tentang Ketegasan Sosialisme Indonesia I.  Landjutan Kuliah Umum di Universitas 








transformation of the individual civil servants. The macro strategy tried to 
resolve the 1950s’ problem regarding the inability of the state to implement 
concrete national coordination and planning. The micro strategy looked 
more deeply at the implementation of management science and the ideo-
logical efforts made to create a ‘new Indonesian man’ through the establish-
ment of both state effectiveness and nation- building. State capability and 
nation- building became intertwined within an ideology that promoted the 
state’s control as the end goal of the nation. This development was impor-
tant because, although the Guided Democracy was a failure, it also cemented 
in place the kind of military- technocratic state that the New Order would 
 become.
The Indonesian economy was restructured along corporatist lines when the 
government issued the Law on State Enterprise (Peraturan Pemerintah No. 16/ 
1960) in April 1960. The law stipulated the creation of general management 
boards (badan pimpinan umum, or bpus), which were given authority over 
the general management of, and staff functions for, particular industries: trad-
ing, mining and industry, sugar, rubber, agricultural products, and so on. The 
general management boards were created to replace the Nationalization Board 
(Badan Nasionalisasi, Banas) that was headed by Prime Minister Djuanda, the 
governor of the central bank, and eleven other ministers, who had managed 
 figure 6  Institutional development under Guided Democracy
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the nationalization of the Dutch- owned companies.18 These bpus were placed 
under the authority of the relevant ministries. Together they acted as a ‘super 
management’ board with the authority to intervene in day- to- day operations.
Back in 1957, the takeover of Dutch corporations had resulted in a group of 
military and civilian officers into the management rooms of corporations. On 
10 December 1957, Central Military Ruler (Penguasa Militer Pusat) Nasution 
instructed all Regional War Authority (Penguasa Perang Daerah, Peperda) to 
take charge of Dutch corporations, many of which had already ended up in the 
hands of leftist trade unions. The creation of the Banas was a significant event 
as it brought policymaking for all types of nationalized enterprises under the 
central control of Prime Minister Djuanda, eleven other ministers, and the gov-
ernor of Bank Indonesia. When a more permanent control machinery replaced 
the Banas, its staff was incorporated as a coordination board, ensuring conti-
nuity.19 Two important factors should be noted here. First, the appointment of 
Colonel Suprajogi as the head of the Banas and as minister of production co-
ordination meant that the military gained a significant say in the organization. 
This included hiring people such as Colonel Soehardiman and other military 
managers to work at the Banas. Second, retaining the Banas under the Office of 
the Prime Minister ensured the continuity of significant parts of its policymak-
ing, which was led by the expert elites of the planning body. As in economic 
planning, much of the policymaking was thus successfully retained under the 
authority of Prime Minister Djuanda.
Several months later, in March 1958, Nasution ordered the creation of 
the Central Body for the Management of Industrial and Mining Companies 
(Badan Pusat Penjelenggaraan Perusahaan- perusahaan Industri dan Tambang, 
or Bappit). The biggest shift in the management of state- owned companies 
took place in 1960 with the issuing of a Government Regulation in Lieu of law 
(Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang- undang or Perpu).
Despite these manoeuvres, the presence of the military within these cor-
porations, in the Bappit, and within the newly created bpus remained, and, 
in fact, army men were present in practically all- important state institutions. 
Within the Bappit, three bpus were created.20 The Depernas’s discussion on 
the Corporatist Body of Private Business Owners (Badan Musyawarah Nasion-
al, Bamunas) finally solved the issues surrounding the position of government- 
owned corporations within the framework of socialism à la Indonesia. As in 
the area of national planning, experts like Mr Ali Budiardjo and managers such 
 18 Mackie, ‘Indonesia’s Government Estates’, 341– 2.
 19 Mackie, ‘Indonesia’s Government Estates’, 328.








as Lieutenant Colonel Soekamto Sajidiman, who was the bpu director of the 
State Trading Corporation Juda Bhakti, visited countries including Yugoslavia 
and Czechoslovakia to study the role of the state, the market, and organiza-
tions like the Chamber of Commerce within the economies of these socialist 
states.21 There was interest in Yugoslavia’s ‘socialized enterprises’ system, in 
which companies were not centrally nationalized but controlled by the work-
ers through the formation of collectives. As with the regionalization of nation-
al planning, which the Depernas envisaged for later on, many experts also saw 
the need to decentralize ownership.22
Another important innovation in corporate management was the Company 
Council (Dewan Perusahaan). It was created on the assumption that workers 
having control over the management might result in a system of checks and 
balances that would reduce corruption.23 As Suprapto phrased it,
The capitalist oppression conducted through the hierarchical system, 
from the opperdirecteur in the Netherlands, via the directors, manag-
ers, representatives, and zetbaas in Indonesia must be revamped and 
changed into a democratic system that allows for the participation of 
workers in the management of the company, the planning of work, and 
planning itself.24
There were two levels of council: the Management Board level and the com-
pany level. At the Management Board level, the council was composed of a 
representative from management, who served as the chairman, and a repre-
sentative from a union or peasant organization connected to the company. If 
 21 Lieutenant Colonel Sajidiman specifically met with the Chamber of Commerce of 
Czechoslovakia in September 1961 to understand its role in the socialized economy, 
something which he envisaged the BPUs mimicking. Sajidiman, ‘Perdjalanan ke Negeri 
Tjekoslowakia dalam rangka Tugas Pemerintah’, Madjallah Perusahaan Negara, 1/ 11 
(November 1961).
 22 Mohammad Sadli, ‘Masalah Perusahaan Negara di Indonesia. Laporan Symposium pada 
Latihan Pembangunan Ketatalaksanaan’, Madjallah Perusahaan Negara, 2/ 18 (June 
1962), 4.
 23 Mochammad Natzir, Dewan Perusahaan sesuai dengan UU No. 45 Prp. thn. 1960 (Makassar: 
Sedjahtera, 1963), 7.
 24 Suprapto, Dasar Pokok, Fungsi, Sifat2, 17. ‘Sistim penindasan kapitalisme jang didjalan-
kan dengan melalui hierarchie dari atas ke bawah, mulai dari opperdirectur di Negeri 
Belanda, direktur- direktur/ manager- manager/ vertegenwoordiger- vertegenwoordiger/ 
zetbaas- zetbaas di Indonesia harus dirombak dan diganti dengan sistim jang demokratis, 
jang memungkinkan kaum pekerdja turut serta dalam pimpinan perusahaan, turut mer-
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the company was not in the agricultural sector, union representatives could 
replace peasant representatives. A  union’s membership had to equal 30 per 
cent of the total workforce of the company for it to be represented. An expert 
was appointed to be part of the council. At the company level, the ministers 
also had the right to appoint community leaders suggested by the local gover-
nor. The company board (dewan perusahaan) was a consultative body, offering 
recommendations for improving the environment of the companies in order 
to increase productivity. By the middle of 1964, there were twenty- one workers- 
management councils at the bpu level and 636 at the enterprise level; 60.5 per 
cent of the representatives were from labour unions, 13.5 per cent from the 
farmers’ union, 24 per cent came from the management, and 2 per cent were 
experts.25
Studies by Everett Hawkins have shown that there was a decrease in the 
number of labour disputes from 4,131, involving over five million workers, in 
1957, to 807, involving over seven hundred thousand workers, in 1963. This was 
not because of a decrease in the number of grievances, but because labour dis-
putes were transferred from the labour dispute bureau to the military’s labour 
relations group (Badan Kerdja Sama Buruh- Militer, bks- Bumil).26 Again, in ac-
cordance with Indonesian corporatist ideas, disputes and forms of decentral-
ized decision- making were replaced by consensus within familial structures 
dominated by the executive, the military, or a combination of the two. The 
expansion of participation was met with hostility by some parts of the man-
agement, which often had a difficult relationship with aggressive unions.27
3 Depernas
The Depernas was entrusted to create not just an industrial or development 
plan, but an overall national plan ‘to be built in accordance with Indonesian 
ideals’.28 It was an official, high government body, on the same level as Parlia-
ment and the Supreme Court. Sukarno wanted the Depernas to stand outside 
 25 Panglaykim, ‘Indonesian State Enterprise and Worker- Management Councils (Dewan 
Perusahaan)’, Asian Survey, 3/ 6 (June 1963), 285– 8.
 26 Everett Hawkins, ‘Labor in Transition’, in Ruth T. McVey, Indonesia (New Haven: Southeast 
Asia Studies, 1963), 248– 71; Panglaykim, ‘Worker- Management Councils in Indonesia’, 
World Politics, 17/ 2 (Jan. 1965), 243– 55.
 27 Panglaykim, ‘Worker- Management Councils in Indonesia’, 252.
 28 Roeslan Abdulgani, ‘The Lessons of Indonesia’s Experience in Planning’, in Politik dan 











and above the authority of the cabinet, although Djuanda was legitimately 
worried that this would make coordination difficult. Although he insisted in 
Parliament that the body should be under the authority of the cabinet, Sukar-
no’s corporatist idea held sway.29 This decision was made through the National 
Council (Dewan Nasional). The council appointed the engineer Prof Herman 
C. Johannes of Gadjah Mada University to lead a nineteen- man commission 
to form the Depernas. The commission was composed of several intellectuals, 
including Gerrit Augustinus Siwabessy, an engineer; Tjan Tjoen Som, a Sinolo-
gist; and Raden Djokosoetono, a legal expert. On 8 October 1957, Johannes gave 
an exposition of the Depernas to the National Council, which approved it the 
following day.
Further discussion of the Depernas was deferred to the National Develop-
ment Congress (Musyawarah Pembangunan Nasional, Munap), held on 25– 
27 November 1957. The Munap was organized by the bpn. The bpn produced 
working papers, which were distributed and discussed by the various panels. 
Around four hundred delegates attended the congress from the government 
and the private sector. Regional civilian and military governors came with their 
advisers, along with members of the central government, Parliament, the Con-
stituent Assembly (Dewan Nasional), and the National Council, and represent-
atives of traders, industrialists, the banking sector, labourers, farmers, young 
people, women, reporters, veterans, artists, and religious leaders, all of whom 
were represented by their contemporary organizations.30
The corporatist nature of the congress was to be replicated in the Deper-
nas, a prototype of which was first displayed by the National Council. This 
was part of the effort to create social control through social participation.31 
These organizations traditionally had vertical ties to various parties, simi-
lar, according to Nasution, to the Dutch verzuiling structure.32 Djokosoetono 
 29 Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 180.
 30 Keng Po, 26 November 1957. Those attending included the sobsi, the kbki, and the rks 
representing the labour organizations, while Majelis Perniagaan dan Perindustrian, the 
deip, the mii, the kensi, and Perbana represented the economic sector. The bti, the 
stii, and Petanu represented the agricultural sector, and the pwi, the ippkn, and Ikatan 
Wartawan Ekonomi represented the reporters. Finally, Wakil Legiun Veteran and the 
muvi stood for the veterans and the lekra and the bkmn for the artists.
 31 Even at the end of the Guided Democracy, the creation of the Bamunas in 1965 was part of 
the effort to ensure ‘social participation and social control’. Musjawarah Pusat Bamunas 
Ke- I. 19– 20 Pebruari 1965 (Jakarta: Bamunas, 1965), 2.
 32 A. H.  Nasution, ‘Mengabdi Bangsa Bersama Pak Djuanda’, in Awaoeddin Djamin (ed.), 
Pahlawan Nasional. Ir. H. Djuanda Kartawidjaja. Negarawan, Administrator dan Teknokrat 
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warned that corporatist states only existed in fascist and communist 
countries.33
The plan stressed the ‘indigenous’ nature of its creation, in comparison to 
the 1950s’ dependency on foreign experts. The Depernas was to be a testament 
to the capabilities of the non- professional. Roeslan reiterated this again in his 
speech in Malang: ‘The results of the Depernas in its basic principles are full 
of quality and value, in line with our revolution and the wishes of the people. 
This is not surprising. The character of its members determines the character 
of its results.’34 He added:
It is not too much to say that the members of the Depernas are the sons 
of revolution and the sons of the people. They are different from the pre-
vious planning and development boards, whch emphasized their mem-
bers’ intellectual expertise. Instead of these theorists, who had little con-
tact with the common people, the Depernas focuses its membership on 
groups or Karya that have deep roots within and amidst society, without 
dispensing with the advice and opinion of experts. No less than 270 In-
donesian experts in 12 fields of development, who have excellent qualifi-
cations and capabilities have been deployed and have had their opinions 
heard by the Depernas in order to perfect their work.35
On 16 July 1958, the Ministerial Council appointed Muhammad Yamin and 
Hanafi to formulate the Depernas bill. The Depernas was to devise, supervise, 
 33 Nasution, ‘Mengabdi Bangsa Bersama Pak Djuanda’, 297.
 34 Abdulgani, ‘Tentang Ketegasan Sosialisme Indonesia II. Landjutan Kuliah Umum di 
Universitas Malang pada Tanggal 13 Februari 1961’, 68, in anri, Roeslan Abdulgani, inv. 
no. 641. ‘Hasil- karya Depernas dibidang pengertian- pengertian jang pokok- pokok ini ada-
lah hasil jang bermutu dan bernilai, tjotjok dengan tuntutan Revolusi kita dan Amanat 
Pederitaan Rakjat. Hal ini tidak mengherankan. Watak keangautaannja menentukkan 
watak- hasilnja.’
 35 Abdulgani, ‘Tentang Ketegasan Sosialisme Indonesia II’, 68, anri, Roeslan Abdulgani, inv. 
no. 641. ‘Karena itu tak berlebih- lebihan kiranja kalau dikatakan disini bahwa anggauta- 
anggauta Depernas adalah putra- putra Revolusi dan putra- putra Rakjat. Berbeda den-
gan dewan- dewan perantjang dan pembangunan jang dulu- dulu, jang menitik- beratkan 
keangautaannja kepada para intelek- ahli dan intelek- expert, dan kepada ahli- ahli teori 
jang kurang berkontak dengan kehidupan Rakjat dan masjarakat, maka Depernas men-
gutamakan keanggautaannja untuk golongan- golongan karya jang berakar dimasjarakat 
dan ditengah- tengah rakjat, tanpa mengabaikan nasehat dan pendapat para ahli dan para 
expert. Tidak kurang dari 270 orang tenaga ahli Indonesia dalam 12 bidang pembangu-
nan, jang bermutu tinggi dan berkapasiteit besar telah dikerahkan dan didengar pendap-








and evaluate an overall national plan. Its first duty was to create an Eight- Year 
Overall Development Plan. This was later expanded when, in January 1961, the 
president formed a working body to create an annual plan based on the Eight- 
Year Plan. On 30 June 1959, the Depernas decided to name Muhammad Yamin 
the minister- chairman of the Depernas. Within the Depernas, prominent in-
dividuals represented each province, usually the governor. The armed forces, 
as well as national businessmen and minority groups, were given seats in the 
body. This disparate collection of interests was convened over a period of ten 
months in order to create the Eight- Year Plan. Four plenary sessions were held 
based on the themes of basic necessities (sandang pangan), state constitution 
(kenegaraan), economy/ finance, and society.
The master plan for Indonesia’s first and only Eight- Year Plan was met with 
much scepticism. The plan was presented in the form of eight books, seven-
teen volumes, and 1,945 paragraphs. The symbolic nature of the arrangement 
of the plan was that it mirrored the date of 17 August 1945, Indonesian Inde-
pendence Day. The Depernas was not clear on how its plans were to be su-
perintended and reviewed.36 There was a struggle among the leadership over 
who was to carry out the plan, with Djuanda trying to entrust its control to 
a small, expert group of ministers and Chaerul Saleh trying to move it to his 
ministry.37 However, the Depernas lacked the institutional capability to carry 
out a national plan and became merely a council that collected departmental 
plans. It lacked coordinating and supervising capabilities. The plan also only 
included those projects that were to be financed by the central government. 
Regional- government and private- sector finance were not included.38 The 
plans themselves would eventually be given back to their respective ministries 
and departments and the problems inherent in them would result in their fail-
ure. The Eight- Year Plan was merely a collection of various projects without a 
unifying framework.
The plan was criticized externally, too. On a visit to Washington, DC in April 
1961, Sukarno gave President Kennedy a copy of Indonesia’s economic plan. 
Kennedy sent the plan to a team of experts from Yale University, who went on a 
twenty- four- day mission to Indonesia in August of the same year. The mission 
found deep flaws in the development programme. An expanded programme 
 36 Hasil Konferensi Kerdja Bappenas– Baperdep (Jakarta: Bappenas, 1964), 4.
 37 J. A.  C. Mackie, Problems of Indonesian Inflation (Ithaca:  Modern Indonesia Project, 
1967), 28.
 38 Sutikno Slamet, ‘Uraian Mengenai Pembiajaan Pembangunan Nasional, Pengawasan dan 
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of development was considered impossible ‘until Indonesia makes greater pro-
gress in putting its house in order’.39 One of the main conclusions was that 
American help should focus on the education and training of Indonesian man-
agers and technicians, and proposed aid to the tune of $325– 390  million.40 
Without adequately skilled personnel, that money would not be spent but 
would only add to the rate of inflation. The investment required Rp 30 billion, 
or 13 per cent of Indonesian gdp in 1961 alone; for the entire eight years, it 
would have required Rp 240 billion, 50 per cent of which (that is, $270 million) 
would have had to be paid in dollars.41 The Indonesian government ignored 
the report.42
In a report to the president, the minister of public works, engineer Sardjono 
Dipokusumo, reiterated that the plan made weak assumptions about project 
financing. The plan divided the projects into two: A projects and B projects. 
The A projects were ‘proper’ development projects, including those to achieve 
rice self- sufficiency and textile self- sufficiency, and to lay the foundations for 
heavy industry, such as the creation of steel and aluminium mills and petro-
chemical plants. All of this was to be financed by the B projects, which consti-
tuted ‘low- hanging fruit’, as they utilized Indonesia’s rich resources. The Deper-
nas mapped eight areas of Indonesian low- hanging fruit: petroleum, timber, 
fisheries, copra, rubber, tin, alumina, and tourism. While Indonesia had these 
resources in abundance, the Depernas failed to assess the capital and exper-
tise needed to increase production in these sectors. For instance, the plan for 
Kalimantan timber was to export 37 million cubic metres of wood per year. 
However, the wood export volume of the entire world was only 40 million cu-
bic metres. Such production would not only swamp the world’s markets but 
would have required roads whose capital investment would have needed up to 
Rp 90 billion, twice the size of the 1961 national budget.43 Similar issues can be 
seen in the fisheries project, where calculations required Indonesia to invest 
in a fleet three times as large as the fleet belonging to the top fishing nation, 
Japan. As Dipokusumo reiterated in his conclusion: ‘none of the plans above 
considers reality. None of them can be successfully conducted, perhaps some 
 39 Donald Humphrey et al., Indonesia. Perspectives and Proposals for United States Economic 
Aid (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), 160.
 40 Mahajani, Soviet and American Aid to Indonesia, 19.
 41 Abdulgani, ‘Tentang Ketegasan Sosialisme Indonesia II’, 54, anri, Roeslan Abdulgani, inv. 
no. 641.
 42 Anwar, Sukarno, Tentara, pki, 189. That $30 billion would have had to be paid for through 
the national budget. Exports, in fact, decreased during the period. anri, Jakarta, Roeslan 
Abdulgani, inv. no. 880.












may be conducted on a small scale, but such a scale would never be justifiable 
as a source of meaningful development.’44 Unfortunately, Yamin totally disre-
garded cabinet criticisms of the plans.45
Lack of data was cited as one of the main problems with the Eight- Year 
Plan.46 ‘More often than not, the numbers do not match other data, or are not 
in accordance with reality. This situation had forced the Depernas to calculate 
its own numbers in important fields through the creation of special commit-
tees, such as the Population Committee (Komisi Populasi) and the National 
Income Committee (Komisi Pendapatan Nasional).’47 They thus ignored the 
vital fact that the plan had no supporting organization to provide them with 
data. As a result, there were a lot of guesstimates. For instance, gross domestic 
product was calculated to be between Rp 163 billion and Rp 267 billion, de-
pending on which of the seventeen volumes of the master plan was consulted; 
at the same time, per capita growth was assumed to be between 0.1 and 5.6 
per cent per year until 1969, depending on the population growth rate, which 
varied from 1 per cent to 3.6 percent per year in the various volumes.48 These 
figures were significantly different and thus provided different estimations of 
the developments in question.49
By 1962, the plan had essentially unravelled. Government investment in the 
plan had reached Rp 67.7 billion, or 41 per cent of Indonesia’s gdp in 1960, 
using the Depernas’s lower estimate. By the end of 1961, government revenue 
from these development projects had yielded just Rp 10.4 billion instead of the 
planned Rp 19 billion. In 1962, most of the Rp 40 billion needed to finance the 
plan had to come from the national budget because the projects had yielded 
a measly Rp 4.2 billion. The B projects yielded $5 million, or Rp 225 million, 
from the Pan- American Oil Company, and Rp 20  million from tourism, out 
of a projected annual revenue of Rp 225  million. The projected yields from 
forestry of Rp 295 million, fisheries of Rp 70 million, copra of Rp 427 million, 
and rubber of around Rp 1.8 billion did not materialize due to either lack of 
 44 S. Dipokusumo, ‘Masalah Pembiajaan Pembangunan Semesta, Rentjana Depernas’, 2 
September 1960, S.1417/ 9/ 60, in anri, bapekan, inv. no. 5.
 45 Guy Pauker, ‘Indonesia’s Eight Year Development Plan’, Pacific Affairs, 34/ 2 (1961), 115.
 46 Badan Perentjanaan Pembangunan Nasional (bappenas). Peraturan- peraturan (Jakarta: 
Bappenas, 1964a), 8– 9.
 47 Badan Perentjanaan Pembangunan Nasional (bappenas). Peraturan- peraturan (Jakarta: 
Bappenas, 1964a), 8– 9.
 48 Soerjadi, ‘Sistim Ekonomi Terpimpin dibidang Moneter’, speech given at the hsi 
Economic Seminar, 20 July 1963, 14– 16.
 49 For more on the history of national- income accounting, see W.H. Arndt and C. Ross, ‘The 
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investment or the inability to control the export market. Tin exports actually 
went down.50
4 The 1962 Regrouping
There was a significant regrouping in 1962. This resulted in national planning 
and many other institutes being placed under the office of the president, in a 
way similar to the centralized structure that existed during the parliamenta-
ry democracy.51 Economic deterioration and the failure of the Eight- Year Plan 
forced these changes and gave rise to a more significant role for experts within 
the government. Nasution, Sukarno’s biggest rival, was effectively demoted by 
‘kicking him upward’ to a technically higher post, but one with less authority.52 
In the eyes of many, the appointment of Ahmad Yani as head of the army put 
the army more fully under the president’s control. Roeslan Abdulgani was re-
moved from the cabinet, which was a surprise to many. Djuanda kept his post, 
but by this time he was somewhat incapacitated by illness, having been diag-
nosed with heart problems in August 1961. Sukarno had also banished Sjahrir 
and his inner circle to East Java.53 On 17 October 1962, Muhammad Yamin died 
and was buried in West Sumatra. On 7 November 1963, Djuanda passed away.
A speech Roeslan Abdulgani gave in 1967, titled ‘The Death of Djuanda: The 
Turning Point’, emphasized the changes to the government after this period. 
According to Awaloeddin Djamin, the failure of the economic recovery (De-
kon) was attributed to the absence of Djuanda, as influence passed to Soe-
bandrio.54 This may be too simplistic an interpretation, as Soebandrio was 
instrumental in getting the nascent technocrats on board with the rehabilita-
tion programme. It is also uncertain whether Sukarno would have listened to 
Djuanda’s counsel and stopped the move towards foreign adventures in 1963. 
In any case, Sukarno took up the reins of power. In the meantime, Nasution 
vied for greater control and authority for his Ministry of Defence and thought 
that it would be good to imitate the Soviet system. He had collected papers 
 50 Soerjadi, ‘Sistim Ekonomi Terpimpin’, 19– 23.
 51 By the end of the Guided Democracy, institutions under the presidential office would 
number 132, including sixty- eight departmental committees.
 52 Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Jilid V, 26; Penders and Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris 
Nasution, 140.
 53 Anwar, Sukarno, Tentara, pki, 123– 7 and 128– 30.
 54 Awaloeddin Djamin (ed.), Pahlawan Nasional. Ir. H. Djuanda. Negarawan, Administrator 













on Soviet defence integration and given them to Djuanda’s Committee of Six 
(Komite Enam).55 Instead, the result of the reorganization was greater control 
for the president through the koti, eliminating the authority of the Ministry 
of Defence. Sukarno also placed the intelligence agency (Badan Pusat Inteli-
jen, bpi) within his office, under the authority of Soebandrio’s Ministry of For-
eign Affairs.56
The centralization of power under the presidential office led to a restructur-
ing of national planning that opened the door for greater expert participation. 
This included continued involvement from foreign experts. Even during the 
reign of the Depernas, experts had been consulted regarding the creation of 
the Eight- Year Plan. In April 1960, in line with the government’s request for 
technical assistance, the Americans had provided the expertise of the private 
economic consultants Bernard Bell and Oscar A.  Ornati.57 A  contingent of 
experts, including economists, tried to help with the plan’s development by 
offering opinions to the members. For instance, in the case of agriculture, the 
Depernas relied on the reports of the feui’s Research Institute for the Econ-
omy and Society (Lembaga Penjelidikan Ekonomi dan Masjarakat).58 From 
early 1960 to 1964, the Indonesian government took on board the recommen-
dations of the American consultancy company Griffenhagen– Kroeger, Inc. on 
the reorganization of the budgetary system; these followed on from the reports 
made by Karakachev, Kirkor, and other Indonesian experts.59 As part of the 
retooling, budgetary responsibility was moved from the Ministry of Finance to 
the presidential office, where it was placed under the authority of Prime Minis-
ter Djuanda. A major reason for placing it under the prime minister’s authority 
was the concentration of experts at the Finek. This allowed effective fiscal con-
trol to be in the hands of the prime minister. The report from Griffenhagen– 
Kroeger concluded that the placement of the budget office under the authority 
of the prime minister would enable greater cooperation among the various 
government agencies and the executive in the presidential office.60
The period 1962– 1965 saw even greater expansion of executive authority 
through the establishment of various new state bodies. Sukarno was also able 
 55 Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Jilid V, 218– 21.
 56 Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Jilid V, 218– 21.
 57 Pauker, ‘Indonesia’s Eight- Year Development Plan’, 116.
 58 Rantjangan Dasar UU Pembangunan Nasional- Semesta Berentjana Delapan Tahun: 1961– 
1969. Bidang Mental/ Ruhani dan Penelitian, Buku ke iii, Djilid vi: Pola Pendjelasan Bidang 
Pendidikan Tenaga Pembangunan (Jakarta: Dewan Perentjanaan Negara, 1960), 1689.
 59 Tjokroamidjojo, ‘Perkembangan Ilmu Administrasi Negara di Indonesia’, 38.
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to take over the running of institutions that Nasution had created during his 
position as head of the army. By 1965, various bodies and institutions report-
ed directly to the president. As head of state, he commanded seven institu-
tions, including the State Secretariat and the cabinet. As the Great Leader of 
the Revolution (Pemimpin Besar Revolusi) he headed thirteen bodies.61 As the 
mandate holder of Parliament (Mandataris mprs) he headed another twenty- 
three agencies.62 Other state bodies directly under the authority of the presi-
dent included the State Administrative Academy, the Central Statistical Board, 
the Office of Government Employees, and the Intelligence Office. Semi- private 
government bodies such as the Bamunas and the Indonesian Science Council 
(Madjelis Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, mipi) also reported to the president, 
as did international organizations headquartered in Indonesia such as the 
Ganefo (Games of the New Emerging Forces) Secretariat. Lastly, the president 
chaired sixty- eight bodies and inter- departmental committees, including the 
Economic and Development Council (Dewan Ekonomi Pembangunan, dep) 
and the Council for Economy and Finance (Badan Ekonomi dan Keuangan, 
bek). In total, there were around 132 higher executive bodies by the end of the 
Guided Democracy.63
5 The Rise of a New Generation
The creation of the Indonesian Science Council (mipi) in 1956 provided a sanc-
tuary for experts from the hostile political environment of the day. Research 
was alleged to be important to the Depernas, at least within its official publica-
tions,64 but it was not until 1962 that the government created the Department 
for National Research Affairs (Departemen Urusan Research Nasional), whose 
duty was ‘to coordinate, stimulate and conduct research for the purpose of 
 61 Including the Front National, the Kotrar, the kotari (Komando Operasi Berdikasi), 
the kogam (Komando Ganjang Malaysia), the Kopedasan (Komando Pembangunan 
Daerah2 Perbatasan), the Lembaga Pembina Kesatuan Bangsa, the Komite Nasional 
Ganefo, the Lemhanas, et cetera.
 62 Including the Conefo, the Committee for National Monuments and Istiqlal Mosque, the 
national television corporation, and the Jagorawi Highway Authority, among others.
 63 Bintoro Tjokramidjojo, ‘Masaalah jang Perlu Dipikirkan tentang Herordening Aparatur 
Negara Ditingkat Pusat’, in Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, Tulisan- tulisan Administrasi 
Pembangunan, 1966– 1968 (Jakarta: Bappenas, 1971), 1– 17.
 64 M. Makagiansar and Widjojo Nitisastro (eds), Research di Indonesia, 1945– 1965, Vol. iv: 












national development’.65 The institutional environment for researchers and 
experts thus expanded significantly. As well as the Leknas and universities, 
other large economic organizations, such as the Bank of Indonesia, Bank Ne-
gara Indonesia, and the general management boards, also began to conduct 
their own research.66
The university was another important institution that expanded the influ-
ence of the expert. Higher education received significant attention from both 
Depernas’s Eight- Year Plan and the government in general. The plan required 
the establishment of a Higher Education Ministry (Kementerian Pendidikan 
Tinggi) that was separate from the more general Ministry of Education and 
Culture, and this was achieved in 1961. The creation of the Department of 
Higher Education and Science in April 1961 and the regulation on universities 
aimed to integrate the universities into the development and revolution of the 
Guided Democracy. The universities formulated an ethical oath called the Tri 
Dharma, or three purposes (of higher education), whose third purpose spe-
cifically endorsed the role of higher education in societal development. This 
was interpreted as meaning that there would be greater state intervention, es-
pecially in such matters as the curriculum. A Conference of Similar Faculties 
(Pertemuan Antar Fakultas) took place, at which twelve types of faculties that 
taught across the country came together, resulting in the formation of the Ex-
pert Committee of Similar Faculties. This committee helped the department 
to evaluate the results of the conference in order to streamline the curricula of 
faculties throughout the nation.67
The government was committed to the formation of a higher- education 
institute for each province and the strengthening of the science and technol-
ogy sector in the quest to industrialize.68 In 1962, a series of inter- university 
and inter- faculty meetings was conducted in order to discuss the creation of a 
uniform national curriculum and standardized teaching methods. The Expert 
Committee on Uniform Faculties, which met from 20 to 22 December 1963, 
 65 Makagiansar and Nitisastro (eds), Research di Indonesia, 14. ‘untuk mengkoordinir, men-
stimulir dan mengadakan research untuk kepentingan dan pembangunan Negara, baik 
dibidang ilmu- ilmu pengetahuan semesta alam, maupun dibidang ilmu- ilmu pengeta-
huan social dan kemanusiaan dengan memberikan prioritas kepada research dibidang 
produksi.’
 66 Mohammad Sadli, ‘20 Tahun Perkembangan Ilmu Ekonomi di Indonesia’, in Makagiansar 
and Nitisastro (eds), Research di Indonesia, 1945– 1965, Vol. iv: Bidang Sosial, Ekonomi dan 
Kebudajaan (Jakarta: Departemen Urusan Research Nasional, 1965), 188.
 67 Barli Halim, ‘Ilmu Ekonomi Perusahaan’, in Makagiansar and Nitisastro (eds), Research di 
Indonesia, 220– 2.
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created a Ministry Ruling Concept for the curricula for all science faculties, 
which was to be confirmed in a government regulation at a later date. Many 
facets of the student’s university learning experience were regulated by gov-
ernment decisions: the number of hours per semester, the percentage of time 
devoted to laboratory work (praktikum), the number of classes per semester, 
and so forth.69
The designation of feeder universities, whose duty was to provide teach-
ing staff or training for faculty members of other universities, aimed to ensure 
uniformity. All feeder faculties were at either the University of Indonesia or 
Gadjah Mada University.70 All feeder faculties had affiliations with American 
universities. What is significant here is the fact that these American affiliations 
continued into the Guided Democracy period. The continuing elitist nature of 
this development was illustrated by a survey of Gadjah Mada University stu-
dents in 1960, which showed that 84 per cent of students came from urban 
high schools and 60 per cent from just three major cities.71
In November 1962, an Inter- Economic Faculties Conference (Konperensi 
Antar Fakultas Ekonomi) was held to develop the economics curriculum with 
regard to Indonesian socialism. In order to determine exactly what counted as 
part of Indonesian socialist economics, especially in relation to the content of 
the curriculum, a series of conferences was held. The Third Congress of the In-
donesian Economic Scholars Community (Ikatan Sardjana Ekonomi Indone-
sia) took place at Cipayung in December 1960, followed by the First Seminar on 
Agricultural Marketing in Bogor in December 1962, the Second mipi Congress 
in Jakarta in October 1962, and the Grand Congress (Musjawarah Besar) of Eco-
nomic Scholars and Experts in Jakarta in April 1964.72 There was an effort to in-
troduce new economics literature from socialist countries; for instance, books 
written by Polish planning specialist Oscar Lange or socialist economists from 
the West, such as Paul Baran.
This literature formed the core of the new, ‘Indonesianized’ economics cur-
riculum, and taxes on academic books were waived. There was thus an effort to 
develop an Indonesian science as opposed to merely importing American and 
 69 Rifai, Perkembangan Perguruan Tinggi, 64.
 70 The Faculty of Medicine, University of Indonesia; the Institute of Agriculture Bogor, the 
Institute of Technology Bandung, and the Faculty of Agriculture and Forestry, Gadjah 
Mada University; the Faculty of Social and Political Science, Gadjah Mada University; the 
Faculty of Law, Gadjah Mada University; and, lastly, the Faculty of Economics, University 
of Indonesia. Rifai, Perkembangan Perguruan Tinggi, 68.
 71 Joseph Fischer, ‘Indonesia’, in James S.  Coleman, Education and Political Development 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 95.










socialist books and ideas. This underscored both the increasingly pervasive na-
ture of state intervention and the support that existed for the development of 
Indonesianized economics and other social sciences.
In 1960, mipi had decided to expand its research through the creation of seven 
research institutes, among them the National Economic and Social Research In-
stitute (Lembaga Ekonomi dan Sosial Nasional, Leknas). In March 1962, mipi ap-
pointed an advisory committee headed by law expert Soediman Kartohadiprodjo, 
and composed of anthropologist Koentjaraningrat, economist Mohammad Sadli, 
sociologist Selo Soemardjan, international- politics and law expert M. Makagian-
sar, and agricultural specialist Kampto Utomo in order to establish Leknas.73 In 
March 1963, the Leknas was created. Immediately, the Ford Foundation provided 
Harvard advisers for the Leknas.74 Another important research organization, di-
rectly under the authority of the Faculty of Economics of UI, was the Economic 
and Social Research Institute. Prior to the formation of the Leknas, this institute 
played a greater role in economic research. The planning authorities were thus 
exposed to the ideas of both foreign and Indonesian economists. For instance, in 
October 1964, foreign experts from ecafe in Bangkok were invited to teach at an 
advancement course in the field of planning engineering and methods.75
As older, Dutch- trained experts left their positions, were made redundant, 
or died, the field opened up to greater participation by American- trained ex-
perts. Older economists or managers, such as Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Mo-
hammad Hatta, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, and Jusuf Wibisono, had, by now, 
been effectively sidelined. Some, like Djuanda Kartawidjaja and Muhammad 
Yamin, passed away in the early 1960s.76 The communists’ attack on Western- 
trained experts and followers of Sumitro delineated the significant position 
these economists had held within the government. They had initially sought 
political protection from Prime Minister Djuanda and elites including Mo-
hammad Hatta and Sjahrir.77 Later on, their position became more entrenched 
within the bureaucracy. In Mohammad Sadli’s words:
 73 Sadarjoen Siswomartojo, A Tentative Statement about the Set- Up, Nature and Purpose 
of the National Institute for Economic and Social Research of the Council for Sciences of 
Indonesia (Jakarta: Leknas, 1963), 4.
 74 Joseph J.  Stern, ‘Indonesia– Harvard University:  Lessons from a Long- Term Technical 
Assistance Project’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 36/ 3 (December 2000), 
113– 25.
 75 Suharto, ‘Pidato Penutup’, in Hasil Konferensi Kerjda Bappenas/ Baperdep– Bakopda (Jakarta: 
Bappenas, 1964), 147.
 76 Djuanda died in November 1963 and Muhammad Yamin in October 1962.












Economic Planning During the Guided Democracy 189
Because most economics graduates were still relatively young, by 1963 
some of them had reached strategic, influential, or honourable posi-
tions, for instance, as aides to ministers, heads of directorates or offices, 
presidential directors or members of corporate organizations, heads of 
mass organizations or private organizations, or as professors, deans, or 
vice rectors at universities. The elevation of economists to the position of 
ministers or university rectors only became a phenomenon in 1964 and 
1965. In general, these latter years began to see the start of the rise of 
economists to higher levels in society and the bureaucracy.78
Even so, competent experts and technocrats were ‘dispersed throughout sever-
al departments and isolated from any central point of authority’.79
The rise of this technically competent generation was, according to Feith, 
significant in understanding the continued promotion of revolution by the 
older generation. ‘If the government were to speak less and less of the need 
for revolution and instead to declare economic development as the principle 
challenge of the present period’, the top political leaders and heads of govern-
ment enterprises ‘would soon have their positions contested in the name of 
the government’s ideology by others who could claim greater technical com-
petence’.80 The contenders for these posts were either old administrators who 
had lost their jobs or up- and- coming university graduates with their formal 
education and bitter experience of having their career paths blocked by the 
current elite.81 In turn, the communists attacked the economists by using rev-
olutionary rhetoric. According to Aidit, these experts were not showing their 
true colours but were secretly undermining the revolution: ‘These cynics ap-
parently obtain their energy and inspiration from the poisonous materials 
in the bulletins and periodical pamphlets spread by Sumitro and his agents 
within government offices and other parts of our government and economic 
 78 Sadli, ‘20 Tahun Perkembangan Ilmu Ekonomi di Indonesia’, 184. ‘oleh karena kebanjakan 
sardjana ekonomi relatip masih muda maka baru sedjak tahun 1963 beberapa diantara 
mereka mulai menduduki fungsi2 jang strategis, berpengaruh atau jang terhormat, sep-
erti misalnja pembantu2 menteri, kepala2 direktorat atau djawatan, presiden direktur 
atau anggauta direksi perusahaan besar, anggauta pimpinan ormas2, organisasi swasta, 
guru besar, dekan dan pembantu2 rektor universitas. Dipegangnja beberapa kedudukan 
menteri dan rector universitas oleh sardjana ekonomi baru mendjadi gedjala tahun 1964 
dan 1965. Pada umumnja, tahun2 jang achir ini baru menundjukkan permulaan dari 
muntjulnja kaum sardjana ekonomi ditingkat2 atas masjarakat dan birokrasi.’
 79 usaid, Human Resource Development, 13.
 80 Quoted in Mackie, Problems of Indonesian Inflation, 52.










apparatuses.’82 The absence of communists within this structure was a signif-
icant factor. The party had its own educational system based on the People’s 
University (Universitas Rakjat) and the Ali Archam institute, but ‘the paucity 
of Marxist knowledge and of the scholarly output of its leaders’83 further mar-
ginalized their position as outsiders regarding this institutional development.
The most serious attack on the entrenched position of the ‘Sumitro follow-
ers’ occurred in 1961, when Sukarno appointed Iwa Kusumasumantri, a radical 
nationalist with close ties to the Murba and the pki, as minister of higher edu-
cation and science (Menteri Pendidikan Tinggi dan Ilmu Pengetahuan, ptip). 
Previously, higher education had been under the authority of the Ministry of 
Education and Culture, which assumed responsibility for all education in the 
country. It was headed by Minister Prijono, a Murba member who had received 
the Soviet peace prize.84 Iwa Kusumasumantri made several important chang-
es to the curriculum and textbooks, especially in the field of the social sciences. 
His approval was necessary for students wishing to study abroad, which result-
ed in the end of Indonesian students being sent to the United States to study, 
and he asked students to report on signs of the teaching of liberalism in the 
universities.85 His high- handed dealings with faculties and members and his 
effort to introduce political goals created many enemies, both within and with-
out the universities. In the cabinet reorganization of March 1962, Tojib Hadi-
widjaja, a non- party, army- approved candidate, replaced him, which signalled 
the beginning of the long- term army control of the universities and campuses 
in much of twentieth- century Indonesia. As was the case with the creation of 
technocrats or army specialists, the left was never able to gain control of higher 
education.86
Research organizations such as the Leknas were institutionally connected 
with the leading universities, in particular the University of Indonesia. The 
 82 D. N.  Aidit, Dekon dalam Udjian (Jakarta:  Jajasan Pembaruan, 1963), 7.  ‘Kaum sinis ini 
ternjata pula mendapat angin dan inspirasi dari bahan- bahan ratjun berbentuk buletin- 
buletin atau stensilan- stensilan periodic jang pada saat ini diedarkan oleh pengchianat 
Sumitro dan agen- agennja dikalangan- kalangan pegawai perusahaan- perusahaan negara, 
kantor- kantor pemerintahan dan lain- lain bagian daripada aparatur pemerintahan dan 
ekonomi negeri kita.’
 83 M. A. Jaspan, Aspects of Indonesian Political Sociology in the Late Sukarno Era (Nedlands: 
Centre for Asian Studies, 1967), 20– 1.
 84 Bresnan, At Home Abroad, 42.
 85 Feith, Sukarno- Militer dalam Demokrasi Terpimpin, 84.
 86 For more on the army– communist struggle over higher education, see Thomas R. Murray, 
‘Indonesian Education:  Communist Strategies (1950– 1965) and Government Counter- 
Strategies (1966– 1980)’, Asian Survey, 21/ 3 (March 1981), 369– 92. Also Suwignyo, ‘The 
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Leknas was not able to send its staff to the United States until 1963 and so 
had to rely on graduates from the feui for much of its research. A look at the 
activities of the Leknas in 1963 gives a glimpse of the kind of community and 
relations in existence in the middle of the Guided Democracy period. The Le-
knas did not have a ready expert staff of its own in its early years. In fact, its 
managing committee consisted of some of Indonesia’s newest and brightest 
social scientists, fresh from postgraduate education in the United States; these 
included the economists Widjojo Nitisastro and Sarbini Sumawinata, the an-
thropologist Koentjaraningrat, and the sociologist Selo Soemardjan. They 
represented the ‘Indonesian godfathers’ of their respective sciences. The Le-
knas also employed consultants such as economists Mohammad Sadli, Everett 
Hawkins, and Kurt Martin, among others, and counterpart consultants includ-
ing Ali Wardhana and Harun Zain. In June 1963, the Leknas signed a consultan-
cy agreement with the Harvard Development Advisory Service.
The Leknas began sending its employees abroad to pursue postgraduate 
studies in the same year. Thee Kian Wie, Julian Luthan, and Lukman Siahaan 
were sent to study for master’s degrees in economics at Wisconsin and Indiana 
Universities; T. S. S. Sutanto studied administration science at Pittsburgh; Tan 
Giok Lan and Harsja Bachtiar studied sociology at the University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley and Harvard, respectively; and D. M. Wattimena studied social 
psychology, also at the University of California, Berkeley. From October 1963, 
a regular weekly seminar was held at the Leknas, which was also attended by 
representatives from the Indonesian Science Council and the Department of 
National Research. Initially, the senior researchers, consultants, and counter-
part consultants would give talks on actual and theoretical issues. The junior 
researchers would later contribute to the talks as well. The first workshop, 
held in April 1963, was on the issue of taxation and led by Sarbini Sumawinata. 
A second seminar, on the issue of managerial deconcentration in government- 
owned enterprises, was led by Mohammad Sadli in July 1963. Both these 
themes supported the Dekon programme that had been announced in March 
of the same year. In September 1963, Kurt Martin led a seminar titled ‘Inflation 
and Economic Growth’.
The relationship with Universitas Indonesia was certainly intimate, but the 
Leknas also reached out to other institutions. Everett Hawkins and Harun Zain 
conducted discussions and concluded agreements with Universitas Gadjah 
Mada and Universitas Padjadjaran, as well as cooperating with government 
departments, including the Department of Basic Industry and Mining (Depar-
temen Industri Dasar dan Pertambangan). Many of the foreign relationships 
were with American or UN institutions, such as the Harvard Development Ad-
visory Service, the Center for Research on Economic Development at Michigan 
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University, unesco’s Research Centre on Social and Economic Development 
in Southern Asia in New Delhi, and the Economic Commission for Asia and 
the Far East in Bangkok. However, in accordance with the shift in emphasis of 
the curriculum to better reflect Indonesia’s socialist economy, there also were 
efforts to contact socialist social scientists, including two Russian economists, 
to discuss the problems of Indonesian economic growth in August 1963.
6 Bappenas
Efforts to recentralize planning resulted in the formation of the dichotomous 
Bappenas– Muppenas structure, which was inaugurated in December 1963. 
The Bappenas was created in December 1963 by a presidential decision that 
integrated the Depernas with the Bappenas, while at the same time reducing it 
to a body under the authority of the president, giving him yet further titles as 
coordinator of the Ministry for the Coordination of Development and day- to- 
day supervisor of the Ministry for Matters of National Development Planning 
(Urusan Perentjanaan Pembangunan Nasional, uppenas).87 This reintegra-
tion under the executive was reiterated in Sukarno’s May 1963 Ambeg Parama 
Arta speech, in which he outlined the country’s economic policy (deklarasi 
ekonomi, Dekon), a terminology that, according to Lance Castles,88 was influ-
enced by management science. Thus, the planning body was downgraded from 
a high government body to an adjunct of the presidential office, similar to the 
position of the bpn within the prime minister’s office. The cabinet was also 
reorganized within a New Style Work Cabinet (Kabinet Kerdja Gaja Baru).89
In accordance with Presidential Decision No. 12/ 1963, the body wielded 
wide- ranging authority:
For the purpose of perfecting the National Overall Development Plan and 
the need to create detailed and derivative continuation, and in an effort 
to strengthen the integration of all government apparatuses, the Deper-
nas in its former form and position has been integrated into the executive 
government apparatus or body, changing its structure and composition 
 87 For more on the structure of the Bappenas, see Hamzah Nasution, ‘The Organization of 
the Planning Agency’, Bappenas News Bulletin, 1/ 1 (1964), 30– 5.
 88 Lance Castles, ‘Bureaucracy and Society in Indonesia: Paper for Discussion’ (n.p.: n.n., n.y.).
 89 Sukarno, Amanat pjm Presiden Republik Indonesia pada Sidang Pleno Terachir Depernas’, 
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in accordance with present development needs. After the Depernas com-
pletes its duties to create a Development Conception in accordance with 
our development principles as laid down within the Presidential Devel-
opment Address in written and oral forms, we then need a more techni-
cal Development Planning and Supervision Apparatus to suit the level of 
growth of our Revolutionary Development. For this reason, the reforms 
and changes of the Depernas are focused on the creation of the National 
Development Planning Body or Bappenas, which will perfectly support 
the Executive Body in executing the planning and supervision of devel-
opment throughout the country under the leadership of the Prime Min-
ister assisted by a technical Minister. The Staff of the Bappenas will be 
composed of TECHNicaL EXPERTS in planning and development whose 
duty is to create detailed plans, in the form of yearly and long- term plans, 
as the perfect and continued implementation of our Development Con-
ception.90
If the Depernas was the political organization that created the concept of na-
tional planning, the Bappenas– Muppenas acknowledged expert participation 
within the Bappenas, while giving a voice to political and social organizations. 
‘Our development planning apparatus has recently made significant strides. 
This is the culmination of historical development and experience over the last 
ten years, from the bpn to the Depernas and now to the Bappenas.’91 The reali-
zation of the need for a good apparatus was apparent in many of the reports of 
the Muppenas/ Bappenas. ‘We know with clarity that our economic difficulties 
cannot be handled purely through formulating economic plans. As the gist of 
the recent Presidential political address (Amanat Politik) noted, however well 
formulated an economic plan is, its success is determined by the conditions of 
its apparatus.’92
 90 Quoted in Soerjadi, ‘Sistim Ekonomi Terpimpin’, speech given at the hsi Economic 
Seminar, 20 July 1963, 31– 2. anri, Roeslan Abdulgani, inv. no. 1082. Capitalization accord-
ing to the original.
 91 Soeharto, ‘Pidato Pembukaan oleh J.  M. Menko Urusan Perentjanaan Pembangunan 
Nasional’, in Hasil Konferensi Kerjda Bappenas/ Baperdep– Bakopda (Jakarta:  Bappenas, 
1964), 3.  ‘Aparatur perentjanaan pembangunan kita telah mengalami kemadjuan jang 
pesat pada waktu achir2 ini. Hal ini adalah hasil perkembangan sedjarah dan pengala-
man dalam pembangunan selama 10 tahun, dari Biro Perantjang Negara ke Depernas dan 
kini ke Bappenas.’
 92 Kesimpulan- kesimpulan dan Kertas Kedja. Musjawarah Muppenas Ke iii, 6, ‘Kita mengeta-
hui dengan djelas bahwa kesulitan2 ekonomi tidak bisa kita atasi hanja dengan perumu-








Although at the time the Bappenas was not fully under the control of the 
technocrats, as it was latterly in its role as the technocratic body par excellence 
for the New Order state, it assisted the rise of these new technocratic elites 
into various policymaking and expert- producing positions and represented an 
iconic change that signified the possible transition to a technocracy. The duties 
of the Bappenas included not only the creation of a national plan but also its 
supervision and implementation. There is no doubt that the Bappenas opened 
the doors to greater technocratic participation, as evidenced by the content of 
Sukarno’s speech: ‘The staff of the National Development Planning Board will 
be composed of technical experts in planning and development, whose duty is 
to write up detailed plans, on an annual and long- term basis…’93
Three lessons had been learned from the failure of the Depernas. First, the 
lack of reliable data on the economy underscored the need to have credible 
research centres focused on collecting economic data, specifically statistical 
data concerning population growth, gross domestic product, and the domestic 
capital available for investment.94 Second, the failure spelt out the need to put 
the available expertise to better use. Third, it highlighted the failure of corpo-
ratist planning and stressed the need to ‘recentralize’ economic policymaking 
within a highly competent environment. The lack of oversight and implemen-
tation was also a major problem, which the Bappenas– Baperdep– Bakopda95 
structure was intended to solve.96 The number of economic research bodies 
was expanded during the late Guided Democracy period. One of the most per-
tinent was the Central Statistical Board (bps), a former colonial body, which, 
by the mid- 1950s, lacked the capability to generate economic data, including 
the national income index. Since 1955, the economist Sarbini Sumawinata, who 
had been trained by Nathan Keyfitz, had headed the bps.97 However, despite 
this deficiency, economic research on Indonesia was forthcoming through the 
P. J. M. Presiden dalam Amanat Politik beliau jang baru lalu maka bagaimanapun baiknja 
suatu rentjana ekonomi pelaksanaannja tergantung pada keadaan aparatur.’
 93 Sukarno, Ambeg Parama Arta, 30. ‘Staf Badan Perentjanaan Pembangunan Nasional 
itu akan terdiri atas AHLI- AHLI TEHNIS perentjanaan dan pembangunan, jang bertu-
gas membuat rentjana- rentjana terperintji, baik rentjana- tahunan maupun rentjana- 
djangka- pandjang, sebagai penjempurnaan dan pelaksanaan lebih landjut daripada 
Konsepsi Pembangunan kita.’
 94 Slamet, ‘Uraian Mengenai Pembiajaan Pembangunan Nasional’, 97.
 95 Baperda stands for Badan Perantjang Departemen, or Body for Departmental Planning; 
Bakopda means Badan Koordinasi Pembangunan Daerah, or Body for Regional Planning 
Coordination.
 96 Hasil Konferensi Bappenas– Baperdep, 19– 20.
 97 Webster, Fire and the Full Moon, 88; Sumawinata, ‘Recollections of My Career’, 45– 8. 
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feui. Moreover, steady cooperation with American universities and support 
from the Ford Foundation was allowing more Indonesians to study at US uni-
versities.
The main thrust of the Bappenas plan was to integrate the regions and the 
centre within one organizational authority. This was made possible in the early 
1960s as the regional rebellions had been suppressed.98 By 1962, Sumatra was 
back under the control of the central government. The rehabilitation process 
became part of the discussion on the application of socialist models for insti-
tutionalized development. For instance, surveys of the various planning agen-
cies in communist countries were made by Panglaykim and Hazil.99 Special 
interest was shown in the Soviet Planning model that had been introduced by 
Premier Khrushchev in the ussr’s sixth Five- Year Plan (1956– 1960) because 
of its decentralized and regional character. The Soviet’s central- regional or 
Gosplan- Sovnarkhoze planning caught the fancy of the Indonesian govern-
ment. The Gosplan or the Soviet state planning commission was quite simi-
lar in structure to the Depernas/ Bappenas, while the 107 Sovnarkhozies were 
regional economic councils that had been introduced in the sixth Five- Year 
Plan as part of Khrushchev’s decentralization plan. Khrushchev had called for 
a comprehensive plan that focused on creating greater efficiency and manage-
rial leadership in order to give the republics, the ministries, and the adminis-
trators of productive enterprises greater responsibility.
Ideas regarding the development of a central- regional planning body that 
could function independently and serve to fine- tune the planning process 
were increasingly accepted. Earlier plans for regional planning bodies had 
been seen as contradicting the corporatist format that organized everyone 
within a unified and centralized body. It was argued that the regions were giv-
en plenty of representation within the Depernas and so regional planning bod-
ies were not deemed necessary: ‘The government is of the opinion that there 
are already enough members sitting in the National Planning Council in the 
capital of Jakarta who are able to bring forward the development problems 
of first level regions of local autonomy.’100 It is possible that the government 
was now more assured of the docility of the regions after Jakarta’s successful 
clampdown, and was thus more willing to provide the regions with institutions 
that had previously been seen as increasing the degree of independence from 
the centre.
 98 Pauker, The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare, vi.
 99 Panglaykim and Hazil, Struktur Management dan Organisasi.
 100 J. E. Ismael, ‘Some Institutional Aspects in National and Regional Development’, Ekonomi 








An Economic and Social Research Institute survey conducted between Octo-
ber 1961 and February 1962 affirmed major problems of coordination. J. E. Ismael 
wrote, ‘[F] or instance, the Public Works and Power Service of some regions does 
not know whether the road repairs executed are part of the routine plan of their 
department or whether they are now included as one of the projects of the Plan. 
Thus, it becomes obvious that there is no coordination and communication both 
between the Departments and Local Governments and between the Departments 
at the Centre and the Services in the region.’101 He implied that few of the coor-
dination issues that had haunted the 1950s had ever been resolved. It was within 
this spirit of creating true coordination that the need for a regional approach was 
seen as essential. What was envisaged was an integrated regional development 
plan, as a more perfect alternative to the national overall development plan. Its 
implementation was to realize the old dream of integrating Indonesia’s central 
and regional governments into one organization for the purpose of development.
7 Structure and Organization
The Bappenas was controlled by a secretariat composed of deputies (wak-
il menteri) from the Ministries of General Affairs (Urusan Umum), Planning 
(Urusan Perentjanaan), and Evaluation (Urusan Penilaian). At a lower level, 
eight bureaux were assigned to plan, supervise, and evaluate projects in their 
respective fields.102 These bureaux had functions that were similar to those of 
both the bpn and the Finek. The reports of the bureaux would then be used 
by the president as progress reports for Parliament (Majelis Permusjawaratan 
Rakjat Sementara, mprs). As well as the Bappenas, there were also six per-
manent committees (komisi tetap) on rules and regulations,103 statistics,104 de-
velopment surveillance and evaluation,105 natural resources,106 development 
 101 Ismael, ‘Some Institutional Aspects’, 25.
 102 The bureaux were: management of the revolutionary soul, finance, development, distri-
bution, domestic and legal affairs, defence and security, welfare, and international organ-
izations and relations.
 103 Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 6 tahun 1964 tentang Panitia Negara Bappenas 
Urusan Tatatjara dan Peraturan.
 104 Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 7 tahun 1964 tentang Panitia Negara Bappenas 
Urusan Statistik.
 105 Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 8 tahun 1964 tentang Pengawasan dan 
Penilaian Pembangunan.
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funding,107 manpower planning,108 and standardization and normalization.109 
These committees were composed of experts from within and without the Bap-
penas and from the government and private sectors. They provided memoran-
da, consultation, and ideas to the uppenas, which oversaw the Bappenas. The 
last organization was the Muppenas, run by the deputy head of the Bappenas 
and head (pimpinan harian) of the Bappenas. It was composed of members 
of the Parliamentary Leadership Board (Badan Pembantu Pimpinan, mprs) 
and provincial governors. The Muppenas was an advisory body, meant to pro-
vide advice and ideas for planning and development. What was thus envisaged 
was that the Bappenas would be an executive body with expertise committees 
forming permanent committees, with parliamentary and regional oversight 
provided by the Muppenas. This represented the central planning structure of 
the Republic. This central body had links with both regional and departmental 
planning.110
The planning process of the Bappenas was to be as follows: it would design 
a development policy, which would then be given a hearing by the Muppenas. 
After consulting the Muppenas, the plan would then be proposed to the pres-
ident. The formulation of the plan required the help of two organizations: the 
Baperdep and Bamunas. The Baperdep would collect ideas and proposals from 
various departments and, through their respective ministers, convey them to 
the Bappenas. The Bamunas would conduct a similar process in the private 
sector. With regard to budgetary matters, a team comprising the Indonesian 
Development Bank (Bank Pembangunan Indonesia, Bapindo), the Depart-
ment of Budgetary Affairs (Departemen P3 Urusan Anggaran), and the Bank 
of Indonesia would provide assistance with creating the budget. The Bappenas 
and the Bapindo would then be assigned to oversee budget implementation. 
The Bappenas would also evaluate the implementation of projects and write 
a development overview (ichtisar pelaksanaan pembangunan). The Baperdep 
and the Bakopda were obligated to provide their annual plans to the Bappenas. 
In order to create a better working environment and coordination, various 
conferences were held between the Bappenas and the other bodies in order 
 107 Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 10 tahun 1964 tentang Panitia Negara 
Bappenas Urusan Sumber- sumber Pembiajaan.
 108 Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 11 tahun 1964 tentang Panitia Negara Bappenas 
Urusan Perentjanaan Tenaga Pembangunan.
 109 Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 12 tahun 1964 tentang Panitia Negara 
Bappenas Urusan Standardisasi dan Normalisasi.








to synchronize their views.111 The Bappenas also laid on planning courses, for 
instance, in November 1964, in collaboration with the Asian Institute for Eco-
nomic Development Planning.112
8 Conclusion
The implementation of national planning was initially predicated on the naïve 
and optimistic view that ‘non- experts’ could design and implement national 
plans. The failure of this intention and the economic deterioration resulted in a 
significant revamping of the executive in 1962. At the same time, newly trained 
experts began to pour into Indonesia, especially from American higher edu-
cation. Their influence in various departments and higher learning/ research 
institutes began to be significant by 1963. The reforms initiated by Sukarno ex-
panded the executive. The failure of the Depernas resulted in calls for the great-
er participation of the new generation of experts. Thus, on a national planning 
and bureaucratic level, there was a process of technocratic development. As we 
will see in Chapter 6, the rise of this new generation would be contested by the 
communists, who were also growing in power. The creation of the Bappenas 
was a significant development, for this body would play an important role dur-
ing the New Order. There are obvious differences between the body established 
under the Guided Democracy and the one that existed during the New Order, 
which by then had become highly technocratic, but the structural shift that 
created this body represented an important institutional development that laid 
one of the foundations for the rise of the technocracy.
In the early 1960s, efforts were made to use the social sciences, especially 
scientific management, to understand the problems of the Indonesian bureau-
cracy and to implement measures to create more efficient managers and bu-
reaucrats. These measures were implemented on what I have termed the ‘mi-
cro level’, as opposed to the ‘macro level’, of national planning. The expansion 
of management education and the implementation of retooling and indoc-
trination courses constituted significant attempts to deal with the problems 
at the micro level. The next chapter will investigate this process and examine 
the extent to which the effort to implement knowledge of the social sciences 
affected the bureaucracy.
 111 For instance, the Bappenas/ Baperdep– Bakopda work conference held in September 1964. 
Hasil Konferensi Kerdja Bappenas/ Baperdep– Bakopda Tanggal 22 s/ d 24 September 1964 
(Jakarta: Bappenas, 1964b).
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 chapter 6
The Managers of Social Engineering
 Abstract
This chapter discusses the implementation of scientific management theories in the 
context of the Guided Democracy’s revolutionary effort to remake the Indonesian per-
son. Studies into the administrative problems in the early 1950s has pointed out the 
cultural problem of administration. Classes on such themes as leadership strength-
ened the idea of a cultural pathology rooted in feudal Indonesian culture. Instead, an 
idealized image of the village with its corporatist values of gotong royong became one 
of the mainstay in the discussion of Indonesian administration. This would translate 
in the creation of a series of institution meant to discipline the civil service and wid-
er population. Indoctrination courses, surveillance and retooling were the means to 
which the behavioral problem of the Indonesian man could be rationalized so as to 
support development. The support for this behavioral indoctrination came from both 
scientific management and Indonesian ideas of traditional corporatism. The concept 
of discipline was bifurcated within the divide between the experts and the rest. Thus, 
Indonesian behavioral discipline was often a form of re- traditionalization allowing for 
the expert to take on the authority of tradition. This again highlights the ease with 
which scientific management was reincarnated to support an Indonesian corporative 
order that was illiberal and undemocratic.
 Keywords
cultural pathology  – traditional corporatism  – managerial indoctrination  –  
re- traditionalization
This chapter discusses both the implementation of scientific management and 
the efforts of the government to instil discipline in its civil service with the 
stated aim of eradicating corruption. The policymakers at the national level 
assumed that the problem of corruption was the Indonesian Man himself be-
cause he was, in their eyes, incapable, inefficient, and corrupt. Thus, the best 
way to deal with this was through guided corporatism, which required the re-
structuring of society within the lines of state authority. To allow greater free-
dom at the local, decentralized level would be to acknowledge the relevance 
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of liberalism. Instead, efforts were made to discipline the bureaucracy through 
restricting the authority of the regions by implementing the Bappenas– 
Bakopda– Baperdep planning structure. The focus on control and discipline in-
evitably involved the military. The expansion of the bureaucratic and business 
managerial class enabled the military to join the elite.
‘Leadership’ capabilities, the spatial structure of offices and homes, and the 
very behaviour of managers were to be designed through time- motion studies 
and other scientifically managed planning tools. The management would, in 
turn, impose discipline on the lower levels of productive society. The Training 
Within Industry (twi) programme would teach mid- level managers how to 
control the labour force.1 Typical of twentieth- century ideas on the state, the 
Guided Democracy policymakers believed that they could control and disci-
pline Indonesian society through state institutions. Even as this discipline was 
applied in the 1960s, doubt existed about the success of the exercise. The Guid-
ed Democracy state professed that Indonesian society, history, and culture 
would form the foundation of a new society. Instead, culture was manipulated; 
people were disciplined by social engineering in an effort to push through a 
state- centred modernization project. Social science was used both as a mecha-
nism for that process and to provide the tools to enforce changes.
1 The Cultural Pathology of the Indonesian Manager
National planning would supposedly dispense with the problem of weak gov-
ernment coordination. Yet, that only represented half of the issue. The other 
half had to address how to efficiently and effectively reform the civil service. 
The 1950s’ bureaucracy was largely assumed to be bifurcated, with a small but 
effective centre where the experts congregated, and a large and inefficient, but 
politically active, periphery. The creation of an efficient periphery was a daunt-
ing task, but the aim was to at least expand expertise into a larger portion of 
the government. Yet, management was not confined to the creation of effec-
tive bureaucrats but also embraced the training of effective managers for both 
state- owned and private companies. The implementation of modern scientif-
ic management must be seen as occurring alongside the implementation of 
the ideals of Guided Democracy. Like the failed corporatist national- planning 
project of the Depernas, the introduction of scientific management came 
from the idea of creating a new and modern Indonesian person. The roots of 
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these efforts were firmly planted in the disappointing failure of the Indone-
sian character during the previous laissez- faire period. This was largely related 
to the ‘crisis of leadership’ and culture that had pervaded the parliamentary- 
democracy period.2 Writing in 1955, Soedjatmoko said of the Indonesian ina-
bility for development:
The crisis in which we find ourselves is clearly a crisis of leadership […] 
Herein lies the failure of the old leadership which has guided us to the 
gateway of independence but is unable to disengage from the viewpoint 
which brought the first phase to a successful end and cannot adjust itself 
to the demands of the second.3
Soedjatmoko titled his article in De Nieuwe Stem ‘The crisis in the Indonesian 
culture’. The profound doubt in the capability of the Indonesian to modernize 
was long- standing amongst the colonialists. The idea of a plural society was 
predicated on a perspective that saw a deep chasm between traditional Indo-
nesian society and modern Western society. This can be seen, for instance, in 
Boeke’s theory of dualism, which stressed that Indonesian traditional cultural 
characteristics were not compatible with the rational maximization drive of 
the West.4 This idea was strengthened in the 1950s, when Indonesian labour 
productivity was said to be among the lowest in the world.5
The Guided Democracy’s policy towards this cultural impediment was to 
home in on what it considered the underlying problem: the authority of the 
civil service. The inability of Indonesian managers to give orders to subordi-
nates was a puzzling aspect that had been noted by many Western experts. 
Donald Fagg contended that the Javanese notion of authority required the 
creation of a useful fiction of unanimous support. That the manager’s author-
ity was weak and the clique structure limited his ability to implement action 
 2 Closely related to this is the effect of the doctrine of ‘revolutionary nationalism’ and of Indo-
nesia’s pre- colonial culture on the economy. See Justus M. van der Kroef, ‘Economic Devel-
opment in Indonesia: Some Social and Cultural Impediments’, Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, 4/ 2 (January 1956), 116– 33.
 3 Soedjatmoko, ‘De crisis in de Indonesische cultuur’, De Nieuwe Stem, 10 (1955), 328– 9.
 4 Boeke, Economics and Economic Policy, 10– 20 and 209– 29. Boeke stressed the differences 
between the pre- capitalist village economy and the industrial capitalism of the West. He 
stressed the need to tailor different policies for different economic and population sectors 
(the dual societies), a position that was anathema to the nationalist notion of the ability of 
the Indonesian to become modern.
 5 Edgar McVoy, ‘Some Aspects of Labor and Economic Development in Indonesia’, Ekonomi 










was beside the point.6 That a superior’s command could, without much con-
sequence, be disobeyed was an important indication of the crisis of authority, 
even more so when the superior himself for various reasons was hesitant to use 
his authority. Theories on the failure of vertical authority in the period mostly 
link it to the failure of Javanese culture.7
The Guided Democracy was revolutionary in character precisely because 
of its emphasis on recreating the individual. In a mass meeting in Medan in 
1962, Sukarno stated: ‘Our revolution is a cultural revolution, a historical revo-
lution, a national revolution, a military revolution, yes a revolution “to create 
a new Indonesian man”.’8 What was significant was the extent to which Guid-
ed Democracy as an ideology and scientific management coincided in their 
views on cultural and behavioural change. Garth N. Jones, one of the experts 
sent to work with the lan in the early 1960s, thought that ‘innovations and 
modifications, in a system of public administration, are usually possible only 
if large numbers of people, inside and outside of government circles, change 
and adapt important aspects of their whole cultural complex of believing, 
behaving, acting and doing. Significant development and improvements gen-
erally occur only with cultural changes.’9 Leon Mears termed the process ‘re- 
management’ to emphasize the ‘revolutionary’ character of the process that 
was to build a radically different management structure compared to the one 
before.10
Although practically all expertise in the field of management came from 
American universities, there was a decided, state- control bias towards the 
studies and recommendations made for both planning and management. 
The market and ‘competition’ stayed out of the equation. Post- war views on 
the role of the state were an important component. This modernist perspec-
tive placed trust in the efficacy of the social sciences and this perspective 
 6 Donald Fagg, ‘Authority and Social Structure. A Study of Javanese Bureaucracy’, PhD dis-
sertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1959, 565– 8.
 7 Harry Benda insisted that the roots of Indonesian corruption came from pre- colonial 
Java; see Harry Benda, ‘Decolonization in Indonesia:  The Problem of Continuity and 
Change’, The American Historical Review, 70/ 4 (July 1965), 1058– 73. This may also partly 
have been a result of the fact that many of the most distinguished ‘Indologists’ of the 
period – Benedict Anderson, Clifford Geertz, et cetera – were anthropologists and thus 
there was a tendency to look to the cultural roots of the Indonesian problem.
 8 R. M. Soeparto, ‘Djiwa Pahlawan’, Bulletin Lembaga Administrasi Negara, 9 (1962).
 9 Garth N. Jones, ‘Some Critical Areas concerning Assistance in Public Administration for 
Indonesia’, Bulletin Lembaga Administrasi Negara, 1 (1961), 3.
 10 Mohammad Sadli, ‘Masalah Perusahaan Negara di Indonesia. Laporan Symposium pada 
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 figure 7  A self-critical cartoon on the culture of Indonesian manager published at a 
government magazine
  source: madjalah industri rakjat, no. 1 (ii) january 1963, p. 3
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was shared by both the capitalist and communist worlds. Thus, the fact that 
American social scientists conducted much of the research did not reduce the 
extent of the state’s top- down and expert- based control. By the 1960s, the ex-
periences of technical assistance had become a subject of study in their own 
right. The ‘tools of cooperation’ were already well institutionalized, allowing 
for the transfer of knowledge. These ‘tools’ included general surveys, advisory 
missions, operating missions, service offices, university contracts, private con-
tracts, visiting professors, seminars, conferences and workshops, training cen-
tres, and scholarships for studying and training abroad.11 Even so, there were 
calls for the creation of a specifically Indonesian form of management. As As-
segaff phrased it: ‘It is apparent that our management experts should start re-
searching, unearthing, and looking for a management style that is in line with 
our Indonesian socialism.’12
2 Rationalizing the Manager’s Leadership Position
By the late 1950s and early 1960s, American- trained Indonesian social scien-
tists had begun to study Indonesian culture and to analyse the Indonesian’s po-
tential as a modern person and a good manager. Anthropologists, sociologists, 
and political scientists started to study Indonesia’s political and social culture 
in order to understand the weaknesses of the Indonesian man. Koentjaran-
ingrat studied the village concept of gotong rojong in the early 1960s.13 The 
sociologist Selo Soemardjan studied the changes and development of the civil 
service in the feudal heartland of Yogyakarta.14
Soegito Reksodihardjo, a disciple of management expert Harold Koontz, 
appraised Indonesia’s managerial development by posing the question ‘Is the 
Indonesian fit to become a manager?’ He answered in the affirmative, but in 
order to clinch his argument he had to deal with Boeke’s theory of economic 
dualism. According to Soegito, Boeke’s ‘dissertation was an attack on the tra-
ditional method of dealing with the economic problems of Indonesia, which 
was still based on the deductive approach and very much influenced by the 
 11 Philip M.  Glick, The Administration of Technical Assistance:  Growth in the Americas 
(Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1957), 99– 100.
 12 Assegaff, ‘Aspek Management dalam Pembangunan Semesta Berentjana’, 275.
 13 Koentjaraningrat, Some Social- Anthropological Observations of Gotongrojong in Two 
Villages of Central Java (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961).
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juridical background of the economic curricula in the universities of that peri-
od’.15 Boeke linked cultural values to economic growth. The Indonesian did not 
make this link because his social environment produced cultural values with 
social, not economic, motives. Soegito criticized Boeke’s understanding of the 
economic motive and argued that Indonesian farmers made decisions based 
on sound, rational principles. This rationality depended on how far the person 
had climbed up the ladder of modernity:
With the increase in the general level of education it is to be expected 
that rationality will gain in importance among the broader stratum of 
‘the common people’.  When such is the case, it will also be less difficult to 
make them aware of the importance of such terms as ‘effectiveness’ and 
‘efficiency’, and a ‘rational’ or ‘business- like’ attitude can be eventually 
mastered. As long as the average educational levels are very low, emo-
tional, traditional and/ or social views are more dominant, and although 
not impossible, it nevertheless will require considerably more effort to 
implement a rational or systematic idea.16
By portraying this image of the irrational Indonesian masses as being on a low-
er rung of the ladder, Reksodihardjo positioned the managerial class securely 
as the rational leaders. He continued:
If the economy were left to the masses, the result would probably be that 
either the subsistence level would persist or that the economy would col-
lapse quickly. First of all, the very low level of education does not per-
mit the people to know much about other needs beside those which are 
very basic, and with which they are already familiar by tradition. Second, 
even if they are fully aware of their wants, it is still a question whether 
or not they can do much to alleviate the shortcomings, since the general 
low level of income does not allow any significant capital accumulation. 
Third, even the small proportion of the middle class cannot be entrusted 
with the task of becoming agents for progress.17
 15 Soegito Reksodihardjo, ‘Skills Investment in a Developing Country:  An Appraisal of 
Management Development for Indonesia’, PhD dissertation, University of California, Los 
Angeles, 1963, 170.
 16 Reksodihardjo, ‘Skills Investment in a Developing Country’, 154– 5.








This tension between modernity and tradition was even more explicitly ex-
pressed in discussions on the ‘traditional value’ of gotong rojong or communal 
cooperation. M. Widojoko Notoatmodjo’s dissertation, titled ‘Gotong Rojong 
in Indonesian Administration, a Concept of Human Relations’, defended at 
Indiana University in 1962, sought to understand how the traditional value of 
gotong rojong could be applied to solve Indonesia’s managerial woes. Notoat-
modjo’s discussed three case studies in order to analyse the situations in which 
gotong rojong was used effectively. He found several factors which determined 
the effectiveness of gotong rojong: environmental background, that is, wheth-
er someone was from a rural, semi- urban, or urban background; togetherness, 
that is, the communality of the person’s environment, cultural background, ed-
ucation, profession, or social status; their understanding of gotong rojong; the 
degree of practice of gotong rojong; the degree of rationality, that is, whether a 
person is more inclined to be emotional or rational or both; and the tendency 
for collectivism.18
Like Reksodihardjo’s analysis, Notoatmodjo focused mainly on the divi-
sion between traditional and modern cultural traits. He explained that gotong 
rojong ‘as a social institution has been known and practiced throughout In-
donesia for more than four thousand years, from the time of the population 
immigration from the mainland of Asia about 2000 bc’.19 However, its appli-
cation in the modern period was effective only if the individual had not yet 
been Westernized. Notoatmodjo continued:  ‘The domain of gotong rojong is 
any original and untouched village community in Indonesia, the kind of vil-
lage community in which traditional adat law is a guiding principle for every 
member of the community, and where Western influence has not yet been 
felt in the way of life of the members of that community.’20 He believed that 
gotong rojong could only work among those who had not been tainted by the 
competitive spirit of Westerners, whose individualist tendencies would lead 
to the disintegration of its efficacy. Notoatmodjo saw the application of gotong 
rojong as a compromise to modernity. Instead of implementing full Western-
ization, the elites of Indonesia wanted to maintain a modernized Indonesian 
culture. Thus, the modern idea of gotong rojong was, according to Notoatmod-
jo, a new creation of Indonesian intellectuals who had enjoyed Western edu-
cation and training.21
 18 M. W. Notoatmodjo, ‘Gotong Rojong in Indonesian Administration, a Concept of Human 
Relations’, PhD dissertation, Indiana University, Bloomington, 1962, 196.
 19 Notoatmodjo, ‘Gotong Rojong in Indonesian Administration’, 205.
 20 Notoatmodjo, ‘Gotong Rojong in Indonesian Administration’, 205– 6.
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The modern reinterpretation of gotong rojong was shaped through the re-
interpretation of ancient values.22 Instead of individualism and competition, 
the new Indonesian man was to work within a highly corporatist social system. 
This was at least imagined to be the case. Yet, the push for the incorporation 
of ‘traditional values’ strengthened the idea of the dangers of the masses; they 
were not yet ready and thus had to be led by those who were both rational 
and ready. These rational persons were the managers. In other words, a tension 
existed between the assumptions made about the pathological nature of the 
Indonesian character and the efficacy of the new Indonesian managers. There 
was thus a ready acceptance of values, both modern and traditional, which 
would help the managerial class to achieve control, despite the fact that such 
values kept the Indonesian man in a traditional position.
This bifurcated image of the managers as both rational agents and suffer-
ing from a damaged culture is important in understanding how the manage-
rial ideology developed in Indonesia. It is not merely interested in efficiency, 
it may not even be its main goal. The goal was to imbue the new elite class 
with a modicum of legitimacy as rational, modernizing agents amidst a sea 
of irrational, but soon to be rational Indonesian peasants. Elite production, as 
we have seen, was institutionalized through education. How were managers 
produced?
3 Business Management
Management Week (Pekan Management), which took place in 1959, was the 
first government- sponsored, short- term managerial course. In January 1959, in 
response to the November 1958 Lynton and Caldwell report, the bpn called a 
meeting attended by several ministries, the lan, and the feui. The meeting 
created a working committee whose members included Dr Subroto, Dr Sadli, 
and Drs.23 Panglaykim and Arifin Abdurachman from the lan, and Achmad Ali 
from the bpn. After consulting the bappit and the Trading Companies Man-
agement Board (Badan Urusan Dagang, bud), it was agreed to organize the 
Management Week. It was also decided that top company managers were to be 
 22 In fact, research has pointed to its creation as recent. Javanese farmers themselves first 
heard the term around the mid 1950s. John R. Bowen, ‘On the Political Construction of 
Tradition:  Gotong Royong in Indonesia’, The Journal of Asian Studies, 45/ 3 (May 1986), 
545– 61.
 23 Drs. is short for doctorandus (Dutch) or doktorandus (Indonesian); it is a title formerly 







sent to study on advanced management programmes such as the one in Baguio 
in the Philippines.24 On 20 February 1959, the committee concluded that the 
development of managerial manpower should be divided into three levels: a 
long- term one that involved five years of academic training, a medium- term 
one involving two to three years of semi- academic training, and a short- term 
one of two to three years’ company management training.25
As a continuation of the Management Week, the feui created a Course on 
Development Management (Latihan Pembangunan Ketatalaksanaan, lpk) 
in cooperation with the Ford Foundation and the University of California. 
The programme was initially devised by alumni of the Advanced Manage-
ment Programme Baguio, a Harvard- led programme that provided business 
management training for Asian managers. With Ford Foundation money, the 
alumni approached the feui to start a local programme.26 The programme 
focused first on collecting business case methods and business cases, and Dr 
Rossal J.  Johnson from Northwestern University and Dale L.  McKeen from 
San Francisco State College were sent to Indonesia develop the programme 
for two years.27 The programme accepted high- level managers proposed by 
their company or office, who would work and live together for a period of six 
weeks at a hotel in the highlands of Puncak near Jakarta. The first class on 
the lpk had fifty- eight students: thirteen from state- owned companies, thirty- 
five from private companies, and ten army officers. They discussed fourteen 
Indonesian business cases along with fifty- three foreign business cases. There 
were fifteen teachers, two professors from Gadjah Mada University and the 
rest from the, most of them American professors who were teaching on a Ford 
Foundation– University of California programme. Nine assistants were lent by 
UC to the lpk to help the students with their studies. Each participant was 
given ten books covering topics from accounting to personnel management. 
The programme had a small library containing eighty- seven books, many of 
them used for reading assignments. The classes were usually divided into two 
groups, which changed every two weeks.28
Business management courses had been on offer in Indonesia at the feui 
since the early 1950s and followed the Dutch pattern. To begin with, the faculty 
 24 Ali Budiardjo, ‘Sambutan Mr. Ali Budiardjo berkenaan dengan Pekan Management,’ 
Madjalah Ekonomi, 1/ 2– 3 (June/ September 1959), 163– 4.
 25 Budiardjo, ‘Sambutan Mr. Ali Budiardjo’, 164.
 26 Panglaykim, Report on Business Management Training in Indonesia (Jakarta: n.n., 1959), 
10– 12.
 27 Barli Halim, ‘Latihan Pembangunan Ketatalaksanaan I’, Fortuna, 2/ 14 (May 1961), 85– 9.
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members were mostly Dutch professors. With the deteriorating relationship 
with the Netherlands, their numbers had tapered off by 1954. This was com-
pensated for by an agreement between the University of California, the Ford 
Foundation, and the University of Indonesia to provide teachers and send fac-
ulty members to complete their educations at Berkeley and other places in the 
United States. Until 1963, around twenty American professors were assisting 
with teaching at the feui, while fifty to sixty Indonesians were being trained 
at various American universities. A similar arrangement was in place between 
Gadjah Mada University (Universitas Gadjah Mada, ugm) and the University 
of Wisconsin, whereby the former sent faculty members to Madison for educa-
tion. The ugm also established research cooperation with Yale University. Out-
side the United States, the Colombo Plan provided opportunities for education 
in Australia, Great Britain, and other countries.29
The itb in Bandung created a business management training course in co-
operation with the West Java Council of Trade and Companies (Dewan Perda-
gangan dan Perusahaan Djawa Barat) and, later on, with the Bamunas of West 
Java. By 1962, there were four classes with a total of 323 students.30 Between 
1959 and 1965, at least six hundred businessmen took the two- year course.31
The Ministry of Development (Kementerian Pembangunan) held a Seminar 
on Industrial Management and Business Administration, dubbed ‘simba’, in 
the late 1950s which focused on industrial management. simba cooperated 
with the Bappit.32 The courses arranged by the government sometimes in-
volved cooperation from the universities and constituted a major effort by the 
1950s’ state to increase efficiency, as exemplified by the twi programme and its 
Guided Democracy incarnation, the Productivity Institute (Lembaga Produk-
tiviteit). In addition to courses, the Productivity Institute also arranged pro-
ductivity seminars for the Academy of Company Heads (Akademi Pimpinan 
Perusahaan)33 and other state institutes, such as the Rail Office (Djawatan 
Kereta Api), which covered engineering methods and work- study courses. The 
Productivity Institute also provided a six- week training programme for master 
 29 Herman Johannes, Laporan Tahunan Universitas Gadjah Mada Tahun Pengadjaran 1962/ 
1963 (Yogyakarta: ugm, 1963), 5, 15– 17.
 30 ‘Pendidikan Manager di Indonesia’, Fortuna, 3/ 26 (May 1962), 81– 3.
 31 Sedjarah Perkembangan Pembangunan Daerah Djawa Barat Tahun 1946– 1965 (Bandung: 
Bakopda Djawa Barat, 1965), 232.
 32 ‘Pendidikan Manager di Indonesia’, 83.
 33 The Akademi Pimpinan Perusahaan was a semi- academic, secondary- level institute in 
Jakarta that was intended to develop the capability of young people as candidates for 













trainers. The cost of this course was not covered by the government but had to 
be paid for by the companies that sent the students.34
American corporations dominated these training programmes. The first 
major actor in this area was the oil company Stanvac, which sent Indonesian 
employees on courses designed to enable them to take on managerial and 
supervisory positions. The first scholarships were awarded in 1954, when an 
accountant was sent to Cornell University and a manager to the Graduate 
School of Business Administration at Harvard. Employees were also sent to 
study business administration at the American University in Beirut, Lebanon 
and Stanford University, California. Legal specialists were sent to Leiden Uni-
versity, the Netherlands, among others.35 By 1959, Stanvac had sent fifty- nine 
employees abroad. The United States also provided direct assistance to Indo-
nesian companies. usaid worked with the College of Business Administration 
 34 ‘Program Latihan Pembina/ Dosen Azas2 Management’, Fortuna, 3/ 28 (July 1962), 12.
 35 Benjamin Higgins, United States Business Performance Abroad. The Case Study of Stanvac 
in Indonesia (n.p.: National Planning Association, 1957), 76.
 figure 8  The handing over certificate for students for attending the Training Within 
Industry course in Jakarta






The Managers of Social Engineering 211
of Syracuse University to provide a twelve- month programme for Indonesians 
to study the principles of scientific industrial management and to receive spe-
cialized training. In total, fifteen Indonesians attended the programme. Its 
alumni subsequently developed their own management training in Indonesia, 
working with the Indonesian Chamber of Industries (Kamar Industri Indone-
sia) to set up a one- month management course in 1959.36 It became clear that 
corporate- sponsored management courses produced better managers than 
the university system.37
The Banas and other government- owned companies with a significant army 
presence conducted specialized courses for military personnel. In May 1959, 
the Bappit held its first management course, which catered to professional 
soldiers who had taken on the role of administrator. In the same month, the 
Indonesian Chamber of Industries held a management seminar with partici-
pants attending from various private industries. In July, the Indonesian Cham-
ber of Commerce (Kamar Dagang Indonesia) held a business management 
training course, while the Siliwangi Division laid on a six- month- long army 
middle management training programme, sponsored by the East Java branch 
of Bappit38
The growing relationships between the feui, the Finek, government de-
partments such as the Labour Ministry (Kementerian Buruh), the tax office, 
and the Banas indicate that a community of policymakers and experts was 
coalescing within these groups which spanned the economic sector, the mil-
itary, the bureaucracy, and the universities. Management science provided a 
language that was elitist and professional. It was dominated by an Anglicized 
and scientific culture that determined a specific and elitist white- collar world 
view. It was a language that promoted both the magic of efficiency and effec-
tiveness and feelings of communal solidarity and superiority.
The dual rise of military and state managers blurred the lines between the 
private and public sectors. The private sector had been in decline since the 
start of the Guided Democracy. The disastrous monetary reforms of August 
1959 had effectively attacked both foreign and domestic capital. Many poli-
cymakers thought little of Indonesian entrepreneurs, considering them to be 
speculators and ‘black marketeers’.39 The expansion in management occurred 
in the public sector. By the early 1960s, Nasution could claim that the military 
 36 Panglaykim, Report on Business Management Training in Indonesia, 13– 14.
 37 Panglaykim, Report on Business Management Training in Indonesia, 15.
 38 Panglaykim, Report on Business Management Training in Indonesia, 17– 19.
 39 Benjamin Higgins, ‘Introduction’, in Entrepreneurship and Labor Skills in Indonesian 
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had many people with experience in management and that these people need-
ed to be distributed within the field of development.40
4 Public Management: Lembaga Administrasi Negara
The report of Edward Lichtfeld and Alan C. Rankin, published in 1954, was in-
fluential in the development of Indonesian public administration education. 
One of the main suggestions made was to create a centralized education insti-
tute for public administration specialists. While several were developed, such 
as the ugm’s Balai Pelatihan Administrasi and Pajajaran State University’s Fac-
ulty of Administration, both founded in 1962, and the Interior Ministry’s Local 
Government Training Academy (Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri, apdn) 
in Malang, the lan became the country’s primary institution for public admin-
istration education. It was developed under the Djuanda Cabinet. Although its 
creation was suggested by Lichtfeld and Rankin, the lan prided itself on its 
‘indigenous’ character. The main goals of the institute were to provide train-
ing and supervision of the education of civil servants and/ or candidate civil 
servants, to conduct research in the field of public administration, to provide 
services to improve and perfect government administrative apparatuses, and, 
lastly, to further develop the science of Indonesian public administration.
A committee was set up in July 1954, consisting of Vice President Hatta; the 
head of the bpn, Djuanda; the secretary general of the Ministry of Culture 
and Education, M. Hutasoit; and the secretary general of the Ministry of the 
Interior, Sumarman. This committee agreed that an Indonesian programme 
for public administration education should be created under the guidance of 
Indonesians and that public and business administration science should be 
grouped within a unified faculty. In 1956, Hutasoit, Sumarman, and Ali Budi-
ardjo conducted a series of meetings and presented their findings to the sec-
retary general. A  new preparatory committee was created consisting of the 
secretaries- general of the Ministries of Education and Culture, Interior, Fi-
nance, and Labour, as well as the vice- director of the bpn and the head of the 
Office of Personnel Affairs (Kantor Urusan Pegawai). This committee reported 
to then minister of education and culture Sarino Mangoenpranoto and, at the 
Ministerial Board (Dewan Kementerian) meeting in early 1957, Minister Man-
goenpranoto presented the findings. It was finally agreed that a public admin-
istration institute needed to be formed.





In August 1957, Karnandi Wargasasmita, Sumarman, and M. Ulfah Santoso 
went abroad on a fact- finding mission. At the same time, a delegation from the 
Institute of Public Administration in Manila, led by Carlos N. Ramos, visited 
Indonesia. The lan remained well connected to the wider international public 
administration networks. At a regional conference on public administration 
held in Manila in July 1958, Prajudi Atmosudirdjo and Arifin Abdulrachman, 
both of whom had obtained top positions in the lan, represented Indonesia, 
along with Marsoro and Z. A. Samil. The conference created the Eastern Re-
gional Organization for Public Administration, or eropa. As a follow up by 
the ica to the Lichtfeld and Rankin report, Joseph L. Sutton, an adviser to the 
state administration institute at Thammasat University, Bangkok, was sent to 
Jakarta. The ica focused on two things: importing literature on state admin-
istration to Indonesia and sending young Indonesians to study the science in 
the United States.41
Prajudi Atmosudirdjo was appointed head of the lan on 5 May 1958. He had 
worked as a senior officer in the Department of Industry under the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs42 and had lectured in the Management Faculty of Dwipajana 
University in Jakarta, writing a book on public management in 1956. In 1959, 
the lan set up its first foreign cooperation with Indiana University within the 
Indonesian Public Administration Project, a five- year programme that allowed 
seventy- one Indonesian officials to train in the United States.43 The US provid-
ed funds to the tune of $586,000 for the lan– Indiana University project.44 As 
well as the US, the lan also worked with the UN, West Germany, the Colom-
bo Plan, and Japan. In the period 1959– 1962, the lan sent eighty- nine people 
abroad to study; seventy went to the US, fourteen to the Philippines, three to 
Japan, and one each to West Germany and Australia.45 Staffing remained a 
problem as experienced managers were hard to pry from their comfortable 
jobs, and young people were reluctant to join because of the low pay.46 As well 
as Indiana University, the lan also had links with international organizations 
such as the International Institute of Administrative Sciences and eropa.47
The lan– Indiana University cooperation programme was the institute’s 
most important international relationship. Most of its employees who were 
 41 Buchari, Buku Peringatan Pantjawarsa, 46– 54.
 42 Djojohadikusumo (ed.), The Government’s Program on Industries, 1.
 43 Sondang Paian Siagian, ‘The Development and Problems of Indigenous Bureaucratic 
Leadership in Indonesia’, PhD dissertation, Indiana University, Bloomington, 1965, 245.
 44 Mahajani, Soviet and American Aid to Indonesia, 13.
 45 Buchari, Buku Peringatan Pantjawarsa, 28.
 46 Buchari, Buku Peringatan Pantjawarsa, 12.
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sent abroad for higher education were sent to Indiana University, although 
some went to other US universities. The vast majority of the lan’s books and 
manuals, audio- visual equipment, printing presses, and other equipment were 
given by Indiana University with the financial help of the Ford Foundation, or 
were purchased with the Indiana University courses in mind. In addition to 
Indiana University professors, the lan also regularly invited other foreign pro-
fessors to give talks. They included, in 1960, Harold Koontz, the famous man-
agement professor from the University of California, and John Richard Hicks, 
an economist from Oxford University. Conversely, the lan also sent people to 
attend conferences or give talks abroad, including a visit by Arifin Abdurrach-
man vice principal of lan, and Prajudi Atmosudirdjo, head of the lan, to the 
US, to an iias (International Institute for Administrative Science) conference 
in Lisbon, and to an eropa conference in Tokyo.48
The focus of the lan inevitably gravitated towards education, based on the 
following principle: ‘When Indonesian leaders, political, community and civil 
servants, clearly understand what is meant by the subject of public adminis-
tration, it will be possible to carry out successfully extensive administrative- 
management improvement projects.’49 Various short courses were run in co-
operation with other state institutions, such as the Depernas and individual 
departments. The lan also ran courses for lower- level managers, including a 
course for the 145 lurah (head of subdistrict) in Jakarta working in cooperation 
with the municipality. On average, two hundred to five hundred people attend-
ed these annual courses. The scope of education was significantly widened 
when, on 7 November 1960, the University for the State Public Administration 
Service (Perguruan Tinggi Dinas Ilmu Administrasi Negara) was founded. It 
had the best library on public administration in Indonesia,50 containing the 
latest American books on the subject. In the same year, the lan conducted 
various efficiency surveys in many government departments; produced manu-
als on management, form design, supervision and reporting; and sent out con-
sultation teams to various institutions such as banks, the army and air force 
headquarters, the Department of Justice, and prison offices.
The idea of the lan as the coordinator of civil service administration 
was an essential component in unifying the fragmented civil service corps. 
This fragmentation was a result of political party infiltration and this was to 
be fixed through re- education with proper scientific management courses. 
 48 Buchari, Buku Peringatan Pantjawarsa, 46– 53.
 49 Jones, ‘Some Critical Areas’, 13.








Unfortunately, Prajudi Atmosudirdjo failed to provide the leadership needed 
to enable the necessary educational restructuring to occur. This failure was 
very much a result of the director’s lack of authority with the ministries in-
volved.51 The lan failed to convince the universities to back the restructuring 
and there was competition between the organization and the universities to 
provide public administration courses. Although the lan attempted to reor-
ganize the subject’s curriculum and structure during the 1961 Conference on 
the Teaching of Public and Business Administration at Universities, Institu-
tions of Higher Education, and Academies, it failed to do so.52
5 Guided Democracy Management
Both the Lichtfeld and Rankin and the Caldwell and Timms reports approached 
the institutions of Indonesia’s state and education system with an almost naïve 
lack of political perspective. Naturally, they only met with the most techno-
cratic elements of the Indonesian state: Lichtfeld and Rankin came at the be-
hest of the University of Indonesia, and Caldwell and Timms at the request of 
the bpn. The Guided Democracy changed all that because of the increasingly 
political nature of the formerly less- political decision- making institution. The 
most significant change was the effective reorganization of the Central Bank 
from being an independent organization to being part of one of the president’s 
ministries.53 Another difference between the 1950s and the 1960s within ad-
ministration science was the development of a distinct specialism called de-
velopment administration. The reason for this evolution was that public and 
business administration science had been developed for the American politi-
cal economy and its application to the Third World had required its contextu-
alization. Another reason for its development was the growing awareness that 
administrators and the science it brought forth would have to operate within 
an elite system that differed from that of the West and that lacked the presence 
of a strong state where the rule of law operated.
The roots of development administration germinated in the evolution of 
a comparative approach during the early 1960s. This approach, driven by a 
cadre of American public administration specialists within a group called the 
 51 Djuna Hadisumarto, ‘The Indonesian Civil Service and its Reform Movement’, PhD disser-
tation, Indiana University, Bloomington, 1974, 182– 3.
 52 Hadisumarto, ‘The Indonesian Civil Service and its Reform Movement’, 182– 3.
 53 Radius Prawiro, Indonesia’s Struggle for Economic Development. Pragmatism in Action 
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Comparative Administration Group, or cag, was integral to the emergence of 
development administration. In Asia, the cag formed the Asia Committee, 
which allowed many of the pioneers of comparative- administration science 
to try applying their ideas to real- world problems. Milton Esman of the Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh, for instance, worked in the Development Administration 
Unit of the Malaysian prime minister’s office. Within eropa, the creation of 
a Development Administration Group in 1966 signalled the expansion of this 
relatively tight- knit community of experts. The section was composed of seven 
members, including Dr Sondang Siagian of the lan.54
As part of the reorganization of the Guided Democracy in the early 1960s, to 
allow for the greater participation of experts in the decision- making process, a 
series of congresses (musjawarah) was held across all the sciences. These meet-
ings were meant to integrate the sciences with the nation’s development plans. 
On 1 and 2 December 1961, the Department of Higher Education and Science 
held a congress in cooperation with the bpa, Gadjah Mada University,55 and 
the lan to discuss the influence of higher education on public administration 
and business management within the universities themselves. The seminar 
was biased towards public administration, despite the attendance of several 
business management specialists, such as Barli Halim and Soebroto from the 
feui.56
In an article on development administration, written after the fall of the 
Guided Democracy, Sondang Siagian reiterated the existence of four groups 
of elites: the power elites or political elite, the task elites or top administrators, 
the captains of industry, and the intellectuals. Following the arguments adopt-
ed by Barli Halim in his papers on the rise of the New Order, Siagian stated 
that development administration should focus on pioneering changes: ‘It is an 
overall development that is simultaneously integrated into political, cultural, 
social, and economic development.’57
 54 Sondang Paian Siagian, Administrasi Pembangunan dalam rangka Nation Building (Jakarta: 
Lembaga Administrasi Negara, 1968), 2– 4.
 55 The Balai Pembinaan Administrasi ran courses for over two thousand students from 
various government departments on many topics, including general managerial knowl-
edge, company administration, and efficiency. It also provided consultancy services and 
carried out research for various firms and government agencies in the Central Java area. 
Pantja Warsa Balai Pembinaan Administrasi Universitas Gadjah Mada (Yogyakarta: Balai 
Pembinaan Administrasi- ugm, 1965), 31– 7.
 56 Laporan Musjawarah Ilmu Administrasi Negara dan Niaga (Jakarta: Lembaga Administrasi 
Negara, 1962), 65 and 69.
 57 Tjokroamidjojo, Administrasi Pembangunan, 2. ‘Pioneering dan changes ini menjangkut 










The premise of the Guided Democracy as a managerial revolution was voiced 
throughout the period. In his book, Achmad Sanusi pointed to the need to see 
Sukarno’s Revolusi and the administrative sciences as linked: ‘A group of leaders 
(tokoh) should be created that could push members of society towards a more 
productive and efficient way of working and one that could avoid […] specula-
tion and corruption.’58 Public administration specialists had to develop a model 
that could be used by the Indonesian government to complete its administra-
tive revolution. Sanusi proposed two approaches. First of all, traditional Indone-
sian forms of leadership should be studied, such as the gotong royong element 
of village life and bapakisme59 culture. Improving upon these would develop an 
effective administrative system using models that were already at hand within 
Indonesian society. The second approach should be a comparison of Eastern 
(Russian, Chinese, Yugoslavian, Polish, et cetera), Western (American, English, 
French, Norwegian, et cetera), and non- aligned (Cuban, Brazilian, Indian, et ce-
tera) administrative systems to find the one most suitable for Indonesian use.60
Public and business administration specialists conducted comparative 
studies that increasingly focused on communist countries as a way to main-
tain a level of relevance in society. Achmad Sanusi’s religious background did 
not prevent him from exploring communist societies, including writing arti-
cles with titles such as ‘The Administrative System of Russia: A Comparison 
between the Reign of the Tsar and the Stalin– Khruschev Period’, ‘An Analysis 
of the Five- Year Development Plan of Hungary’, ‘Foreign Trade between Yugo-
slavia and the US’, ‘The Yugoslavian Workers Council’, and so on. Comparisons 
with the American managerial system and its focus on business management 
science contrasted with the Russian focus on engineers and engineering as the 
basis for managerial science.
At the end of the 1960s, Soehardiman, a military manager during the 
Guided Democracy period, wrote:  ‘From the time when the community was 
still in a traditional state to its development as a modern state, the national- 
development administration has had a role as the creator of dynamism, sta-
bility, acceleration, and modernity; it is even the key to changing, creating, 
merupakan totalitas jang terintegrasi daripada pembangunan dibidang politik, kulturil, 
social dan ekonomi.’
 58 Achmad Sanusi, Masalah Administrative Leadership (Bandung:  Universitas Bandung, 
1964), 22– 3. ‘Hendaknja terbentuk satu barisan tokoh2 jang mendorong anggauta2 masja-
rakat kearah bekerdja lebih produktif dan efisien, dan menghindarkan […] spekulasi dan 
korupsi.’
 59 Formal relationship within bureaucracy or companies that mimicked traditional, pater-
nalistic father and son relationship.
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and moving towards a modern society that is in line with the development of 
science and technology.’61 The American modernization ideology had come 
full circle by the time the New Order had begun. The remaining public dis-
course had moved away from socialism and its implied participatory actions; 
instead, the idea of a capable managerial leadership had become the mainstay 
of the Indonesian discourse of modernity. Soehardiman, along with many oth-
ers, considered Suharto’s success to lie in his brilliant management skills and 
strategic capabilities. A collection of articles from seventeen Suharto ministers 
extolling his managerial capability was published in 1996, a year before the 
financial crisis brought down the Indonesian economy.62
6 Tools and Authorities
Both Indonesian and American experts recognized the problem of creating a 
formidable public administration. Joseph M.  Waldman was confronted with 
these problems during the Indiana University project while aiding the lan in 
establishing a national training centre for office administration. He quoted 
several Western experts on the problem of authority: ‘I’m sure we’ve reported 
to you on several occasions that Mr Mintorogo (deputy director) and others are 
very reluctant to make those decisions which involve the fact that they have to 
face up to someone and say “no”, or administer correction, or deprive them of 
what they want to do.’ Further, ‘on occasions, when some operational or pro-
cedural problem had come up and we’ve asked that he (deputy director) clear 
this with the lan and provide us with a pattern for action, he then pleaded that 
I (chief of party) or Joe should take the matter up with the officials involved, 
because we were foreigners and that they would listen to us but would pay no 
attention to him.’63 A reluctance to cooperate with foreign experts had been 
noted since the early 1950s:  ‘Indonesian officials display a touchiness about 
 61 Soehardiman, Kupersembahkan kepada Pengadilan Sejarah, 238. ‘Dari semendjak keadaan 
masyarakat masih dalam taraf yang tradisional hingga perkembangannya pada taraf 
modern sekarang ini, administrasi pembangunan nasional mempunyai peranan sebagai 
dinamisator, stabilisator, akselerator, dan modernisator, bahkan merupakan kunci serta 
daya penggerak untuk merubah, membangun dan mengembangkan kearah modernisasi 
masyarakat sesuai dengan kemajuan ilmu pengetahuan dan teknologi.’
 62 Riant Nugroho Dwidjowijoto, Manajemen Presiden Suharto (Penuturan 17 Menteri) 
(Jakarta: Yayasan Bina Generasi Bangsa, 1996).
 63 Joseph M.  Waldman, ‘Administration Problems Encountered in the Establishment of 
the National Center for Office Administration in Djakarta, Indonesia’, PhD dissertation, 









prerogatives, prestige, self- esteem that is a hyper- reaction against the former 
authority of foreigners, heightened by a frequent sense of insecurity arising 
from feelings of personal inadequacy for the jobs held.’64
Many of the publications and conferences on public administration focused 
on the problems of leadership in, and the decision- making of, the civil service, 
that is, the problem of authority. There were three general themes in the dis-
cussion of public management at the lan and in other places, such as at apdn 
or on feui management courses. One focused on behavioural capabilities, 
decision- making, and the devolution of authority. Sondang Siagian proposed 
changes to create a more active civil service: a better system of recruitment 
with entrance exams; a better classification of positions; efficiency ratings; 
better career planning and a greater flow of civil servants from one agency/ de-
partment to another; better compensation schemes; and, lastly, an improved 
retirement system.65
As in the case cited by Waldman’s study, the problem of authority was seen 
as being much deeper than a question of inadequate remuneration, although 
this was blamed too, to some extent. Another prominent social science that 
often figured in such discussions was that of psychology. Books on psychology, 
offering quick remedies, were available as early as the 1950s. Many ideas on 
leadership rallied around the slogan ‘the right man in the right place’, which 
was a somewhat tacit statement about the difficulty of actually drilling and 
coaching the ‘wrong man’ into being a good manager, despite advances in the 
field of psychology. Even so, the notion of coaching a person into excellence in 
administration was nursed throughout the period.
The second theme related to technical matters of efficiency, especially con-
cerning the office. Many books and articles released by the lan or the apdn 
focused on expounding technical developments concerning both work behav-
iour and office formats. Motion studies – for instance, those developed by the 
American engineer Frank B. Gilberth and his wife Lillian M. Gilberth in the 
late nineteenth century  – technically dissected the movements of a person 
working in an office. Seventeen movements were identified and the extent to 
which they used energy was assessed. These were then linked with time stud-
ies, creating time- motion studies.66 These and other ‘tools’, such as the ‘critical 
 64 ‘Foreign Technical Assistance in Economic Development In a Newly Independent 
Country’, 78.
 65 Siagian, ‘The Development and Problems of Indigenous Bureaucratic Leadership’, 206– 34.
 66 A prominent Gadjah Mada social scientist, Drs. The Liang Gie, was quite adamant about 
promoting these studies. See his article on limiting necessary motion at the office. The 
Liang Gie, ‘Penghematan Gerak dalam Pekerdjaan’, Buletin Lembaga Administrasi Negara, 
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path method’, which was meant to evaluate and estimate the schedule, costs, 
and resource allocation for a particular project,67 were all being taught to gov-
ernment officials through these managerial courses. Like time- motion studies, 
Americans dominated this field.
7 Political Indoctrination and Retooling
No other ‘tool’ of management came to be implemented as widely as that of 
indoctrination, with the exception of the benignly named ‘retooling’, a short-
hand for what amounted to political purges in the offices as shifting influences 
within Sukarno’s inner circle affected those working below them. Similar to 
many tools of modern scientific management, indoctrination focused on the 
matter of control; that is, control of the minds of those working under you. 
Indoctrination had naturally had a history long before the arrival of scientific 
management, but the indoctrination package that was implemented during 
the Guided Democracy was couched within the modern and cheerful language 
of rationality and efficiency. It formed part of Sukarno’s dream of creating a 
New Indonesian Man, which sat at the very heart of the Guided Democracy 
experiment. In his famous and important Independence Day speech of 1959, 
Sukarno said:
In order to overcome all the problems associated with our near- term and 
long- term goals, it is obvious that we cannot use the present systems and 
tools. We must rid ourselves of liberalism; in exchange, we must replace 
it with guided democracy and guided economy. The inefficient arrange-
ment of apparatuses must be taken apart. New arrangements (ordening) 
must be made and re- arrangements (herordening) carried out, so that 
both guided democracy and guided economy can be achieved. This is 
what I meant when I spoke of ‘retooling for the future’.68
 67 Julianto Moeliodihardjo, ‘Perentjanaan dan Pengawasan dengan “Critical Path Method” ’, 
in Tumpal Dorianus Pardede (ed.), Latihan Pembangunan Ketatalaksanaan. Pemikiran 
Pendahuluan Mengenai Management Berdikari 1965 (Jakarta: Fakultas Ekonomi UI, 1965).
 68 ’Maka untuk menanggulangi segala mas’alah2 berhubung dengan tudjuan2 djangka 
pendek dan djangka pandjang tersebut, njatalah kita ta’ dapat mempergunakan sistim 
jang sudah2 dan alat2 (tools) jang sudah2. Sistim liberalisme harus kita buang djauh2, 
demokrasi terpimpin dan ekonomi terpimpin harus kita tempatkan sebagai gantinja. 
Susunan peralatan jang ternjata ta’ effisien dulu itu, harus kita bongkar, kita ganti dengan 
susunan peralatan jang baru. Ordening baru dan herordening baru harus kita adakan, 







As with national planning, scientific management promoted a state– society 
relationship that elevated the ‘experts’ within society as natural leaders. 
These experts occupied positions of importance in several organizations 
and maintained close contact with each other and, importantly, with mem-
bers of the military. The rise of military managers, which Utrecht labelled 
‘military entrepreneurs’,69 within the nationalized companies resulted 
in a large number of army personnel managing relatively sophisticated 
 businesses.
Opening the door for indoctrination coaching in high- level government of-
fices, Djuanda proclaimed that
retooling and indoctrination will not only take place in the lower levels of 
government, but in all state apparatuses from the lowest to the highest, 
including among the ministers. Retooling and indoctrination are needed 
in the whole of society in order to create a just and prosperous society. 
Our retooling and indoctrination efforts will also crack down on private 
and state- owned companies, which will be reorganized so as to work in 
a better and more perfect manner. Not all the leaders/ directors of these 
companies do their work perfectly. As a result, there needs to be a reor-
ganization and screening within these companies.70
Thus ‘retooling’ imagined the disciplining of the body politic on an individu-
al level.
Books on military administration, for instance, were derived from general 
scientific administration publications, discussing the theories of Henry Fayol, 
James Burnham, the podscorb71 approach, and many of the latest ideas that 
had emanated from America. As Herlan phrased it:
Those (administrative) regulations and procedures above, after being 
practised and perfected through the development of the army’s organiza-
tion and procedures, were then published in book form […]. The content 
of the book will be discussed fully in future classes. By ‘indoctrinating’ 
perkataanku mengenai “retooling for the future”.’ Sukarno, ‘Penemuan Kembali Revolusi 
Kita’, in Tudjuh Bahan2 Pokok Indoktrinasi (Jakarta: Dewan Pertimbangan Agung, 1962).
 69 Ernst Utrecht, ‘The Military Elite’, in Malcolm Caldwell (ed.), Ten Years Military Terror in 
Indonesia (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1975), 41– 58.
 70 Nanulaita, ‘Ir. H. Djuanda Kartawidjaja’, 148– 9.
 71 Podscorb is an acronym in the field of management and public administration repre-
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the officers, the army’s ‘new- style’ administration can be implemented 
correctly.72
The role of the military in this reorganization stemmed from Nasution’s anti- 
corruption effort, which had increased military participation in society during 
the second half of the 1950s. The role of the universities and other government 
institutions was also significant.73 The lan provided a platform for people to 
write about the problems of indoctrination, including a piece in its journal 
in 1961:
Indoctrination is part of the pattern of civilization of large countries like 
the United States and the Soviet Union; it is only proper and necessary 
if, in Indonesia, indoctrination is based on the social philosophy of the 
Pancasila. The problem now lies in its implementation, as most of the in-
doctrinators themselves have unwittingly become unpaid propagandists 
for the philosophy of social liberalism as a result of their long exposure to 
education based on this philosophy. It is fortunate that the basic civiliza-
tional pattern of Indonesia is being pioneered by the Universitas Gadjah 
Mada through its Studium Generale, while the Academy for Interior Gov-
ernance in Malang has already ensured satisfactory results for the course 
on Pancasila for the academic year 1959/ 1960.74
 72 Herlan, Administrasi Umum dalam Angkatan Darat Kita: Indoktrinasi Administrasi pada 
Tg. 1 April 1963 (Jakarta: Departemen Angkatan Darat, 1963), 8. ‘Ketentuan2 dan prosedur2 
diatas, setelah mengalami “praktek” beberapa tahun dan disesuaikan dengan perkem-
bangan2 dalam organisasi dan tata- tjara dalam staf AD kita, kemudian dibukukan dan 
dikeluarkan oleh ditadj dalam bentuk [b] uku […]. Isi dari buku tersebut akan diuraikan 
lebih mendalam dalam kuliah2 berikutnja. Maka melalui para pedjabat2 jang telah “ge- 
indoctrineerd” nanti diharapkan administrasi AD dengan “gajabaru” itu dapat dilaksana-
kan dengan sebaik- baiknja.’
 73 University lecturers were required to go through indoctrination coaching; some 
five hundred lecturers underwent such coaching between 1962– 1965. Bachtiar Rifai, 
Perkembangan Perguruan Tinggi, 43.
 74 Ruspana, ‘Quo Vadis Peradaban Indonesia’, Lembaga Administrasi Negara (1961), 42. 
‘Dengan penelitian adanja indoktrinasi sebagai realisasi dasar pola peradaban di negeri2 
besar Amerika Serikat dan Soviet Uni, wadjar dan keharusan serta wadjiblah kalau di 
Indonesia didjalankan indoktrinasi sebagai realisasi dasar pola peradaban filsafat social 
Pantja Sila. Akan tetapi sekarang kesulitannja jaitu dalam bidang pelaksanaan dimana 
sebagian besar pelaksana2 sendiri dengan setjara tidak disadari mereka mendjadi propa-
gandis tanpa bajaran dari filsafat sosial liberalisme, karena memang sudah sekian tahun 
mendapat pendidikan berdasarkan bersumberkan filsafat tersebut diatas. Sjukurlah 
dasar2 pola peradaban Indonesia ini sudah dirintis oleh Universitas Gadjah Mada den-








Retooling also facilitated the spread of the military into the various nooks 
and crannies of society. As Nasution phrased it: ‘There is no field where the 
Karya military force isn’t participating. This shows that the apri (Indone-
sian Army) has succeeded in conducting retooling.’75 A series of profession-
al oaths was created:  Panca Setia for the civil service, Sapta Marga for the 
military, Tri Brata for the police, Panca Wardana for the youth, and so forth, 
signalling the loss of individual responsibility and its replacement with re-
sponsibility to the state.
8 The Bapekan
The State Apparatus Supervision Agency (Badan Pengawas Kegiatan Apara-
tur Negara, Bapekan), created on 17 August 1959, was the brainchild of Gen-
eral Nasution.76 It was a small and centralized organization with forty staff 
members. It studied the problems of decentralization and the stalemates in 
the court system. It sent members to observe the arrangements of the Asian 
Games in 1962, the petroleum industry in Sumatra, and the Rice Centre (Sen-
tra Beras) in Java.77 Its duty was to conduct surveillance and research into the 
working of state apparatuses.78 The organization carried out two basic forms 
of work: passive/ routine- type work and active work. Active work consisted of 
investigations carried out on presidential orders or that were initiated by the 
Bapekan itself. It also investigated complaints sent from the regions.79 One of 
the Bapekan’s weaknesses was that it functioned merely to investigate and rec-
ommend solutions, and lacked enforcement capability.80
The head of the Bapekan was Sultan Hamengkubuwono ix, the former min-
ister of defence. Widely regarded as an upstanding figure, the sultan was an im-
portant symbol of idealism, an outlook that the body wanted to convey to the 
Malang filsafat Pantja Sila telah dimasukkan didalam Curriculum tahun pengadjaran 
1959/ 60 dan ternjata hasilnja memuaskan.’
 75 Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Jilid V, 208.
 76 Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Jilid V, 256.
 77 Notulen Rapat Bapekan, anri, Menteri Negara Ekonomi, Keuangan dan Industri (Menneg 
Ekuin), inv. no. 390.
 78 Nasution claimed that initially Sukarno wanted to give the Bapekan to politicians, but he 
relented so as to maintain the technical nature of the organization, instead of allowing it 
to become highly politicized. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Jilid V, 256.
 79 anri, Bapekan, inv. no. 6.
 80 Peraturan- peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 1 Tahun 1959 tentang Pembentukan 














The Managers of Social Engineering 225
sceptical Indonesian public. His secretary, sociologist Selo Soemardjan, joined 
him.81 Other members of the Bapekan included Semaun,82 an old communist 
who was famous for being banned by the Dutch East Indies; Samadikoen, a for-
mer governor of East Java (1949– 1958); and Colonel Soedirgo, a military man. 
Sukarno pushed for the inclusion of Semaun in order to realize his Nasakom 
ideals.83 Nasution thought that while the composition of the Bapekan was po-
litically strong, it was technically weak.84 However, the selection of its mem-
bers was certainly not based solely on political considerations. Each of them 
had experience with administration, although none was trained specifically 
in the American science of public administration. Between January 1959 and 
July 1959, the Bapekan received 902 cases for investigation, of which 402 were 
reportedly ‘solved’, while the rest remained ‘in progress’. The Bapekan’s recom-
mendations were non- binding.
9 The Paran
The National State Apparatus Retooling Committee (Panitia Retooling 
Aparatur Nasional, Paran) became the other half of the control mechanism 
of the civil service. If the Bapekan functioned as a research and surveillance 
 81 Soemardjan, Social Changes in Jogjakarta.
 82 Semaun was a communist of long standing who was banished by the Netherlands Indies 
government in 1923 for his role in the Union of Railway and Tramway Personnel (vstp) 
strikes. Initially, he lived in the Netherlands and was active in the Anti- Imperialist League 
and the Indonesian Association (Perhimpunan Indonesia), rubbing shoulders with 
Mohammad Hatta and many other Indonesian nationalists before leaving for the Soviet 
Union in the 1930s. He reputedly studied at Tashkent University, Uzbekistan, before mov-
ing to the Institute of Far East Studies in Moscow in 1931, where he studied Soviet rational-
ization in action at the Rail Office of Baku in the Caucasus, in today’s Azerbaijan. He was 
also reputed to have worked for the planning board of the Soviet Republic of Tajikistan. It 
was partially based on this experience that he was given a Doctor Honoris Causa by Prof 
Dr Prajudi Atmosudirdjo, who, aside from being the head of the lan, was also the dean 
of Padjadjaran University. He arrived back in Indonesia in December 1956 with much fan-
fare and to open arms from the nationalist and communist elites of the country, includ-
ing President Sukarno himself. Meanwhile, by his return to Indonesia he had effectively 
renounced communism, whose Stalinist excesses he had personally witnessed during his 
stay in the Soviet Union. Upatjara pemberian gelar Doctor Honoris Causa dalam Ilmu 
Ekonomi kepada Sdr. Semaun pada hari senin tanggal 31 Djuli tahun 1961, djam 20.00 
bertempat di Aula Universitas Padjadjaran djalan Dipati Ukur no.  37, Bandung, anri, 
Bapekan, inv. no. 5.
 83 Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Jilid V, 257; Harian Rakjat, 16 August 1959.










body, the Paran had the duty of fixing the problems it highlighted through 
retooling.85 Nasution was the head of the Paran and Roeslan Abdulgani his 
deputy. The Paran was the brainchild of Nasution, Muhammad Yamin, and 
Abdulgani. As a result, it incorporated the diverse ideas that the three men 
had about retooling. The presence of Abdulgani as Sukarno’s ideological 
right- hand man strengthened the president’s idea of the Paran as an indoc-
trination organ for the wider civil service. As Nasution said, ‘the president 
will deal with the mental- ideological retooling, but what I am dealing with 
is related to organizational order, work order, and personnel problems’.86 
 Nasution thus dealt with the more mundane but important problems of mis-
management.
The first act of the Paran was to continue to carry out the military’s anti- 
corruption policy when, in December 1960, all government ministers were 
required to hand over information about their personal assets. Forms were 
sent to people in key positions of the civil service in order to determine their 
loyalty to the state, especially whether they had sympathies with the various 
rebellions87 or had been loyal to the Dutch. This process was extended to cover 
all civil servants at the F/ IV level or above by March 1961. Nasution was con-
currently the minister of national security. Meetings were held at the army 
headquarters. The Paran created the new Pantja Satia oath of civil service loy-
alty, legalized through Presidential Regulation No. 3/ 1961, which provided the 
guidelines for retooling. A  law was then proposed on the basic principles of 
government employment (pokok kepegawaian).
Nasution reiterated the temporal and ad hoc nature of the Paran, saying that 
it was part of the government’s short- term programme, in line with the other 
Tri Programmes88 of the cabinet. He envisaged the Paran as being transformed 
into a more permanent body, the Body to Manage the Efficiency of the State 
Apparatus (Badan Pembina Effisiensi Apparatur Negara).
 85 Retooling was supported by management specialists when it conformed to the dictates of 
scientific management. Public officials were especially needed because of their function 
as corporate managers. Leon Mears, ‘Some Management Problems in Indonesia’, in Rossal 
J. Johnson, Mohammad Sadli and Subroto (eds), Teachings in Business Administration and 
Economics (Jakarta: Lembaga Penyelidikan Ekonomi dan Masyarakat, 1961), 28– 30.
 86 Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Jilid V, 256. ‘Presiden menggarap retuling mental- 
ideologis, tapi yang saya garap ialah terutama ketertiban organisasi, tatakerja dan 
personal.’
 87 The di/ tii, the prri, Permesta, the Madiun Affair, et cetera, comprising representatives 
of various ideological positions in Indonesia, including Islamist, social democratic, com-
munist, and so forth.
 88 The Tri Programmes were: provision of foodstuffs, supporting a secure environment, and 
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There were three sub- committees under the Paran: the ‘mental’, personnel, 
and organizational sub- committees. The ‘mental’ sub- committee designed a 
uniform and intensified the indoctrination campaign at the central and region-
al levels, working under the supervision of the Committee for the Management 
of the Revolutionary Soul (Panitya Pembinaan Djiwa Revolusi), led by Roeslan 
Abdulgani. In 1961, the committee published the Seven Major Indoctrination 
Doctrines to standardize the process, as instructed by Sukarno on 27 February 
1960, to intensify indoctrination and quicken the retooling efforts.89 The doc-
trines covered documents on the birth of the national ideology, Pancasila; the 
Constitution of 1945; the Political Manifesto (Manipol), which embodied the 
principles of Guided Democracy; Sukarno’s main speeches – the Road to Our 
Revolution (Djalannja Revolusi Kita or Djarek) and Creating the World Anew 
(Membangun Dunia Kembali); the president’s article explaining both Manipol 
and usdek90; and, lastly, the president’s address on the Eight Year Overall 
Development Plan (Rentjana Pembangunan Semesta Delapan Tahun).91 Con-
tained within these documents was a dizzying array of ideas representing 
Guided Democracy. The committee conducted its first coaching session in May 
1961 over a period of five to seven days. There were general coaching sessions 
for both first- (provincial) and second- (regency) level regional governments.
The organizational sub- committee sent queries to and collected ideas from 
departments, conducted on- the- spot surveys, sought expert advice on design-
ing blueprints for organizational/ procedural work, and, lastly, gave technical 
retooling advice to the departments in question. This sub- committee was led 
by Nasution.92 It also worked with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Regional 
Autonomy (Kementerian Dalam Negeri dan Otonomi Daerah) to design a ver-
tical organization of government. On an ideological level, this sub- committee 
had the daunting task of fulfilling Sukarno’s commitment to leave behind the 
Western trias politica (the separation of the executive, legislative, and judici-
ary) in favour of his brand of corporatist unity under the Karya groups.
The idea of retooling was central to the Paran, but it was also highly central 
to the ideology of Guided Democracy itself. ‘Retooling means the dismantling 
 89 Seno Soesanto, Manipol Usdek. Bahan Batjaan bagi Para Peserta Latihan- latihan Djabatan/ 
Kursus- kursus pada Lembaga Administrasi Negara (Jakarta:  Lembaga Administrasi 
Negara, 1962), 2.
 90 The main guideposts of the Indonesian revolution, usdek (Undang- undang Dasar 
1945, Sosialisme Indonesia, Demokrasi Terpimpin, Ekonomi Terpimipin, and Karakter 
Indonesia) is an acronym for the following:  the Constitution of 1945, Indonesian 
Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy, and the Indonesian Character.
 91 Sukarno, Tudjuh Bahan Pokok Indoktrinasi (Jakarta: Pertjetakan Negara, 1961).










of the inefficient arrangement of the apparatus and its replacement with a 
new arrangement. This is planning and rearranging with the long- term goal 
of achieving our revolution.’93 Etymologically, the term was used in scientific 
management for the reorganization of the factory floor, that is, industrial reor-
ganization. Within society, it meant the mobilization of material and spiritual 
forces and society’s recreation as a strijdvaardig and strijdwaardig (combat 
ready) force. Within the government it meant reordering in both the legisla-
tive, executive, and other fields of government. Its official definition was ‘the 
effort to renovate in the soul, arrangement, work procedures, and personnel of 
all State organizations in the legislative, executive and other fields at the Cen-
tre and the Regions so as to conform to the Political Manifesto and usdek and 
to efficiently reach the goals of the State in the short and long term.’94 The civil 
service was to be shaped into an efficient bureaucracy through the application 
of modern management, political education, and purges. A civil servant had to 
be pro- Manipol and usdek.
Instead of professionalizing it, the politicization of the civil service damaged 
it even further. The screening of potentially non- loyal civil servants became 
a major drive to oust people without the backing of political groups. Instead 
of looking at people based on their merits, their political stance and personal 
history became liabilities. For instance, the loyalty issue was highly damaging 
for those who had historically sided or worked with the Dutch during the rev-
olutionary period. This was the problem for the head of customs in the port of 
Tanjong Priok, whose professionalism and capability came second to his past 
political loyalty. Because Indonesia still had a large number of ‘collaborators’, 
that is, former officials of the colonial regime, working for the government at 
that time, such a policy had disastrous consequences for the efficacy of the 
civil service.95
There were two general criteria for determining the acceptability of civil 
servants: positive and negative norms. The positive norms looked at universal 
criteria, such as technical capabilities, general capabilities, morality, charac-
ter, and loyalty. The negative norms looked at the political acceptability of the 
civil servant within the revolutionary period. This necessitated an inquiry into 
the personal histories of civil servants. It was important that people were not 
 93 ‘Retooling adalah pembongkaran susunan peralatan jang tidak efisien dengan penggan-
tian susunan peralatan jang baru. Ini adalah “ordening” baru dan herordening baru, den-
gan maksud agar tudjuan djangka pandjang dari revolusi kita dapat tertjapai.’ Laporan 
Panitia Retooling Aparatur Negara, S.1396/ 9/ 60, A. H. Nasution, anri, Bapekan, inv. no. 5.
 94 Laporan Panitia Retooling Aparatur Negara, anri, Bapekan, inv. no. 345.







The Managers of Social Engineering 229
tainted by historical involvement that could bring into question their loyalty 
to the Republican government, and this included support of the various post- 
independence rebellions against the central government or having worked as 
a Dutch collaborator during the revolutionary war. Three absolute character-
istics had to be present: pro- Manipol and usdek; revolutionary rather than 
counter- revolutionary, using criteria based on Sukarno’s 1960 Independence 
Day speech; and, lastly, able to combine all revolutionary forces within the 
spirit of mutual cooperation (gotong rojong). Civil servants who were weed-
ed out were put into four possible negative categories: anti- Manipol usdek, 
who silently opposed Indonesian socialism; anti- Manipol usdek, who openly 
opposed Indonesian socialism; those who, because of lack of knowledge, op-
posed Indonesian socialism; and, lastly, those who lacked knowledge of Ma-
nipol but did not oppose it. This political labelling and classification of people 
was, to say the least, damaging to the formation of an esprit de corps within the 
bureaucracy.
Instead of announcing Manipol as some sort of international social science 
experiment, the Indonesian government stressed the ancient and traditional 
nature of the values behind the teachings that Sukarno had bestowed upon 
the nation. Thus, the concept of sosialisme à la Indonesia was not to be found 
in capitalist and liberal Europe, but was ‘in fact […] very old in Indonesia […] 
for again it is social justice which is meant here, not merely the implementa-
tion of laws, regulations and other social codes.’96 Guided Democracy was in 
fact ‘only a new statement of something very old in Indonesia. Since ancient 
times, democracy in Indonesia has been what we now call Guided Democracy. 
Since ancient times, Indonesian society has been averse both to dictatorship 
and to the individualism of liberalism. The old system of government was 
based upon musjawarah and mufakat with the leadership of a single central 
authority in the hands of a “sesepuh” or elder, who did not dictate, but led and 
protected.’97
Although the regime claimed indigenous roots for its ideology, one could, 
with little hesitation, support the idea that retooling, indoctrination, and the 
elimination of counter- revolutionaries within the government was in line 
with the demands of management science. The structural and ‘mental’ sub- 
committees basically rehashed the rhetoric of the more ‘scientific’ managerial 
and economic experts, focusing on ‘working procedures’ and ‘organizational 
efficiency’.
 96 Manipol- Usdek in Questions and Answers (Jakarta: Department of Information, 1961), 36.






Nasution’s ambitious goals for the Paran were ineffective. As he himself 
phrased it:  ‘Even the effort to regulate the structure of departments was un-
successful. The ministers maintained their own personal power and obtained 
their authority directly from the President. I also tried to introduce regional 
Paran. Governors close to me immediately formed them, but governors close 
to others at the centre hesitated to do so.’98 The result of these exercises was the 
decidedly military garb that the civil service took on, complete with military- 
style ceremonies, trainings, and indoctrination campaigns.
10 The Inherent Tension of Guided Democracy Control
For most observers, the indoctrination efforts of the Guided Democracy were 
a farce. Retooling meant purging the civil service of unwanted persons. People 
queued to go on indoctrination courses because they feared that there would 
be trouble if they did not take the courses. Most of the teaching materials were 
dull and uninteresting, a list of readings on the state’s ideology. This in turn 
became the standard fare that the New Order state imposed on the rest of so-
ciety. In 1966, a series of indoctrination classes to purge communists began. 
Again, the materials presented were less important than the reinforcement of 
the idea of state control over one’s body and behaviour.
By early 1964, Sukarno had successfully wrested control of the Paran from 
Nasution by creating another body to replace it: the Highest Command for the 
Retooling of Revolutionary Tools (Komando Tertinggi Retooling Alat Revolusi, 
or Kotrar).99 He viewed the Paran as a threat to his capability to bestow lucra-
tive sinecures as a means to support his authority.100 Many military officers 
also saw it as a threat to their position in the economy.101 The Kotrar was head-
ed by Soebandrio, with General Ahmad Yani as chief of staff and Air Commo-
dore Wiriadinata as vice chief of staff. This represented the end of Nasution’s 
 98 Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Jilid V, 259. ‘Untuk penyamaan struktur 
departemen- departemen saja pun kami tak berhasil. Para menteri telah berkuasa sendiri- 
sendiri dan langsung meminta pengesahan dari Presiden. Saya usahakan pula adanya 
Paran di propinsi- propinsi. Gubernur- gubernur yang dekat kepada saya segera memben-
tuknya, tapi gubernur- gubernur yang agak berkiblat kepada tokoh- tokoh lain di pusat, 
enggan melaksanakannya.’
 99 The communists were represented within Kotrar, much to the dismay of the mili-
tary. David Mozinga, Chinese Policy toward Indonesia, 1949– 1967 (Singapore:  Equinox, 
2007), 222.
 100 Penders and Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution, 170.
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effort to implement the managerial sciences within the state structure. As was 
the case with national planning, Sukarno’s politics obstructed efforts to try and 
implement any sort of rational approach to disciplining state apparatuses.
The ideas of social control, social support, and social participation were 
central to Sukarno’s idea of incorporation. This was apparent in the national 
planning carried out by the Depernas, and it was also apparent in the Mup-
penas structure that accompanied the rise of the Bappenas. Social control was 
meant to ‘democratize the political and economic centres of society’. Within 
government- owned companies, the rise of the Company Board, for instance, 
was an expression of the intention to create an economy based on an open- 
management system, one in which the managerial policies of the company 
would be in the hands of the workers as well as the management. There was 
thus a strong focus on participation within the idea of Guided Democracy. 
Social control would lead to a successful state precisely because of the sup-
port of people within society. In connection with the problems of corruption 
and what Benedict Anderson has termed the movement of ‘society into the 
state’,102 the answer was participation as a mechanism to strengthen the legiti-
macy of the revolutionary leadership. The similarity of social ideals and social 
goals between the managers and the workers, between the experts and the 
people, would enable the total support of the people. This was the ideal of the 
Guided Democracy state.
11 Conclusion
Social- science analysis has highlighted a dichotomy in understanding the 
problematized Indonesian Man and the gotong rojong culture. To begin with, 
there were inherent problems concerning decision- making and leadership ca-
pabilities. The traditional cultural values of Indonesia were considered to be 
the foundation of the modern Indonesian people, leaders, bureaucrats, and 
managers. These cultural values were strongest amongst traditional- thinking 
people. The New Indonesian Man had to be both traditional and modern at 
the same time. His values had to transcend the traditional value system but be 
rooted in it nevertheless. The efforts made to discipline Indonesians through 
indoctrination and retooling were modern and rational attempts to create effi-
ciency while simultaneously upholding the traditional values that legitimized 
them as both leaders and revolutionaries.





At the same time, there was a genuine effort to improve the managerial ca-
pability of the bureaucracy through the Bapekan and the Paran. Both bodies 
tried to implement measures to increase efficiency, which included dealing 
with problems of a political nature. Like the intentions behind national plan-
ning, the early Guided Democracy state was earnest in its attempts to try to 
make positive changes. Its failure represented the inability of experts to un-
derstand the effects of the logical actions of scientific management. Perhaps 
the most significant legacy of the Guided Democracy movement was its con-
trolling devices and mechanisms, which would continue to be used during the 
New Order regime.
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 chapter 7
Economic Policymaking in the Guided Democracy 
(1962– 1965)
 Abstract
This chapter explores the economic policy making during the Guided Democracy, 
especially during the late- Guided Democracy period as it neared its end by 1965, and 
the increasing polarization between expert economists and the communist party. It 
looks into communist economic ideas that goes in line with Sukarno’s participatory 
ideas in the economy and how expert economists tried to incorporate socialist mod-
els in the economy through researching the economic institutions of East European 
countries and the Soviet Union. Efforts to integrate liberal economic theories with 
socialist institutions were discussed in the context of continuing economic deterio-
ration of the first half of the 1960s. A series of economic reform programs designed 
by Indonesian economists, often working with expert from the US. While initially 
obtaining support from Sukarno, these economic reforms flounder as a result of 
communist criticism and Sukarno’s unwavering stance to support a more populist 
position when under pressure. The period saw the return home of many of New Or-
der’s main economists after graduating from US universities and their positioning 
into important post in the economic planning and control of the country. It was a 
period which cemented the rise of American- educated economists as major holder 
of Indonesian policy making and the subsequent fall of the Indonesian communist 
model of the economy.
 Keywords
Indonesian socialism – Deklarasi Ekonomi – communist production policy – rise of 
Indonesian technocracy
Economic policymaking during the latter part of the Guided Democracy 
showed increasing polarization between the populist nationalist sentiments 
that Sukarno espoused and the ideas of the economic experts who began to be 
courted by the executive to help design strategies to cope with the deteriorating 
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economic conditions. Both nationalists and communists supported taking a 
stronger stance against what they perceived to be the threat of economic im-
perialism from the Bretton Woods organizations. The communists developed 
their own economic ideas in the form of the production approach and pushed 
for the greater inclusion and participation of labour unions, farmer unions, 
and other economic actors within both the state- owned sector and the reor-
ganized private sector. They supported the nationalization of foreign- owned 
companies, and the trade unions initiated the nationalization of British com-
panies in 1963– 1964.
This chapter looks at the work of the new class of policymakers that 
was created during the 1950s and early 1960s through the provision of in-
ternational and government aid for higher education. This new class of 
economists was pragmatic and open to Sukarno’s state- led socialist ideas. 
Although Sukarno had continued reservations about so- called experts, the 
economists – for instance, Foreign Minister Soebandrio and Minister of In-
dustry Chairul Saleh – gained allies within Sukarno’s inner sanctum. While 
the communists supported the de- concentration of the control of compa-
nies in order to allow the greater participation of labour unions and oth-
er groups, Western- educated economists also supported de- concentration, 
but with the aim of gradually introducing the market mechanism into the 
economy; however, they saw this process as occurring within the confines of 
state control over market forces. The efforts made to rehabilitate the econo-
my after 1963 provide a glimpse of the increasing tension between these two 
economic models.
1 Guided Democracy and Economists
The earliest economists to play a significant role in the Guided Democracy 
state had finished their bachelor’s degrees in the mid 1950s, as the first and 
most important Faculty of Economics had opened its doors at ui in 1951. The 
mid 1950s were propitious times for newly graduated economists because of 
the availability of scholarships at the various old and newly minted foreign 
academic institutions. The first- generation economists, including Mohammad 
Sadli, Sarbini Sumawinata, and Suhadi Mangkusuwondo, had started to find 
their way home to Indonesia by the late 1950s, but it was not until 1962 that a 
significant and increasing number of economists and other social scientists 
started to return to Indonesia from the United States.
Many of these new economists had good revolutionary credentials. During 
the independence struggle, Suhadi Mangkusuwondo had fought in the same 
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student army company as Widjojo Nitisastro.1 As the older generation of econ-
omists faded away, the new generation was able to take up official positions in 
the state. None of them advocated a direct application of the market- based ap-
proach to economic policymaking and, especially during the Guided Democ-
racy, they were quite supportive of the idea of a state- led economy that gave a 
prominent role to state- owned companies. In the words of Mangkusuwondo:
During the period of Guided Democracy and Guided Economy in the 
early 1960s, our attention was focused on the question of how to operate 
a planned economy based on socialist principles, in which state- owned 
enterprises (SOEs) were to occupy the ‘commanding heights of the econ-
omy’ and to be its driving force. As economists, we were concerned that 
the market mechanism be allowed to operate in a planned economy 
based on socialist principles. Hence, Oscar Lange’s views on a socialist 
market economy became the model for our own views on how to run 
Indonesia's Guided Economy.
Keynesianism had to be worded differently so that it conformed to the Revolu-
si ideology. Sukarno had not permitted the teachings of Keynes in Indonesian 
universities since the early 1960s.2
R. Soerjadi, an economist with communist leanings who had worked as the 
Central Bank’s director for economic planning and statistics, presented a pa-
per at a meeting of the Indonesian Scholars Association (Himpunan Sardjana 
Indonesia, hsi),3 a communist- affiliated organization, in August 1963. He fo-
cused on the perceived similarity between the extremes of communist and 
capitalist societies and where socialism existed within the continuum. It was 
assumed by neo- liberal economists such as Von Mises, Ropke, Hayek, and Si-
mons that government intervention was admissible in the economy to control 
the market. In an analysis of the socialist economist Abraham P. Lerner’s The 
Economics of Control, Soerjadi disputed Lerner’s conclusion on the concept of 
pragmatic collectivism: ‘Pragmatic as contracted with domestic collectivism is 
very close to the point of view of the liberal capitalist, who is in favour of state 
activity wherever the liberal capitalist ideal of perfect competition cannot be 
made to work.’4 He then proceeded to quote Dutch economist and politician 
 1 Mangkusuwondo, ‘Recollections of My Career’, 34.
 2 Anwar, Sukarno, Tentara, pki, 15.
 3 The hsi was a communist- affiliated organization of academics and economists.
 4 Quoted by R. Soerjadi,, ‘Sistim Ekonomi Terpimpin dibidang Moneter’, speech given at the 










Jelle Zijlstra in his book Economische orde en economische politiek:  ‘If the 
thoughts of Simons, Hayek, and Ropke, who call for government intervention 
in the economy, are acceded to, then the thoughts of Hayek and Ropke will 
reach the conclusion that the Government must intervene in the matters of 
“work opportunity, monopoly, and the allocation of national income, which 
are the three subjects that according to Lerner require attention within a “con-
trolled economy”.’5
Soerjadi’s paper was meant to show that an economic system was not au-
tomatically tied to an ideology. The overlapping thoughts expressed by social-
ists and neo- liberals showed the fragility of this fallacy: ‘As a result, it can be 
said that a society can have more than one characteristic. This means that, 
for instance, liberal societies cannot be identified by just one characteristic, 
for instance “an economically free society”, nor can a communist society be 
identified by just one characteristic, for instance “a Guided Economy society”.’ 
Instead, he says, ‘one can say that a Guided Economic society is not identical 
to communism. In other words, the guided economic system can be combined 
with other characteristics that do not exist in Russia. This is the case in Indo-
nesia, where the implemented economic system is a guided economic system. 
But its ideology is that of the Pantjasila in a society that is familiar with mus-
jawarah, gotong rojong, ownership rights with social functions, et cetera.’6
2 The Study of Socialist Economies
From 1960, economists at various universities started studying the state- led 
economic models in Eastern Europe and China and tried to develop strategies 
for the Guided Democracy state. The lpem and other research institutions 
 5 Quoted by Soerjadi, ‘Sistim Ekonomi Terpimpin dibidang Moneter’, anri, Roeslan Abdul-
gani, inv. no. 1082.
 6 Quoted by Soerjadi, ‘Sistim Ekonomi Terpimpin dibidang Moneter’, anri, Roeslan Abdul-
gani, inv. no. 1082. ‘Dengan demikian dapat dikatakan, bahwa suatu masjarakat itu mempun-
jai lebih dari satu tjiri sadja. Ini berarti, bahwa misalnja masjarakat Liberal itu, tidak dapat 
kita beri identifikasi, dengan menjebut satu tjiri sadja dari padanja, umpamanja: “masjarakat 
ekonomi bebas”, dan masjarakat Komunis itu tidak dapat kita beri identifikasi dengan men-
jebut satu tjiri sadja daripadanja, misalnja “masjarakat ekonomi terpimpin”. And:  ‘…sistim 
ekonomi terpimpin itu tidak identik dengan komunisme. Dengan pertakaan lain, sistim 
ekonomi terpimpin itu dapat dikombinasikan dengan lapangan2 lain jang sifatnja berlainan 
dengan jang terdapat di Rusia. Demikianlah, di Indonesia telah ditetapkan, bahwa sistim 
ekonomi jang hendak didjalankan, ialah sistim ekonomi terpimpin, dasar negara ialah Pant-
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conducted surveys in various countries abroad and made research visits to far- 
flung parts of the archipelago to obtain the knowledge necessary to develop an 
Indonesianized version of a mixed economy. The edited volume produced, ti-
tled Tata Perekonomian Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesia’s socialist economic sys-
tem), was perhaps one of the most important outcomes; in it, economists from 
the ui compared and analysed the economic system of Indonesia with those 
of its Eastern European equivalents.7 Other significant works included one by 
Widjojo Nitisastro, who conducted a series of interviews with Polish planning 
elites and found that their consumption pattern projections were based on 
West German consumption patterns.8 Panglaykim’s book broadly discussed 
the various managerial approaches of several Eastern European countries and 
the People’s Republic of China,9 Wahju Sukotjo wrote about Yugoslavia’s work-
er’s management council and socialist democracy in an article for the mag-
azine Ekonomi, while another article for the same magazine by Mohammad 
Sadli and Subroto concerned Yugoslavia’s socialist economic system. R. Sardju 
Ismunandar and Soehardiman visited Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland 
and wrote about the economic structure and state enterprises of the three 
countries in the magazine Perusahaan Negara in May 1961.10
Panglaykim’s studies showed that even socialist states entertained ideas of 
implementing capitalist concepts such as private enterprise. His study on Chi-
nese and East German state capitalism explained this as being part of a transi-
tional phase that compromised its socialist ideals through the introduction of 
public and private ownership for government companies. His discussion of the 
Soviet model of national planning occurred after Khrushchev’s proclamation 
of the ussr’s sixth Five- Year Plan (1956– 1960), which focused on efficiency and 
giving greater managerial independence to regional bodies and companies.11 
Widjojo Nitisastro suggested actively importing Western ideas through the 
prism of socialism by looking at what other socialist countries had import-
ed, such as input- output analyses and various programming techniques.12 The 
 7 Suhadi Mangkusuwondo (ed.), Tata Perekonomian Sosialis Indonesia (Jakarta: lpem, 1962).
 8 Mohammad Sadli, ‘Masalah Penentuan Produksi dan Masalah Bentuk Perusahaan dalam 
Sistim Sosialisme Indonesia’, in Suhadi Mangkusuwondo (ed.), Tata Perekonomian Sosial-
is Indonesia (Jakarta: lpem, 1962), 107– 8.
 9 Panglaykim, ‘Beberapa Aspek Struktur Management/ Organisasi pada Beberapa Negara 
Sosialis’, in Suhadi Mangkusuwondo (ed.), Tata Perekonomian Sosialis Indonesia (Jakar-
ta: lpem, 1962), 126– 296.
 10 Sardju Ismunandar and Soehardiman, ‘Struktur Ekonomi dan Perusahaan Negara di 
Jugoslavia, Czechoslovakia dan Polandia’, Perusahaan Negara, 1/ 5 (May 1960), 2– 6.
 11 Panglaykim, ‘Beberapa Aspek Struktur Management’, 125– 82.
 12 Widjojo Nitisastro, ‘Beberapa Persoalan Harga’, in Suhadi Mangkusuwondo (ed.), Tata 














Keynesian Harrod– Domar model of development, which focused on savings 
and foreign investment as being central to the push for economic growth, was 
also studied.13
Papers written by some of the most important technocrats of the New Order 
illustrate the efforts they made to integrate Western theories and socialist in-
stitutions harmoniously. Although Sadli claimed that the prime importance of 
the market was realized later on,14 efforts were made to understand how other 
socialist countries used the market. For instance, the Polish use of the West 
German consumption model showed that even within a relatively developed 
socialist economy, ‘markets and price mechanism still work and determine 
production volume’.15 Sadli and Soebroto attended a seminar on Marxism and 
socialist development in Belgrade from 5 to 22 September 1960 and comment-
ed on the Yugoslavian socialist system: ‘In the 1950s the basic policy of a state- 
led nationalist economy was changed. The Russian model was left behind be-
cause it was considered inefficient and unfit for Yugoslavian characteristics. 
Market and price- based stimuli were reintroduced.’16
The role of private enterprise in various communist countries was also dis-
cussed: in Russia, ‘private enterprise is allowed to exist only in branches of pro-
duction which can be operated as one- man industries’.17 In contrast, in Poland, 
private enterprise ‘is given the widest latitude in the field of production to aug-
ment the available consumer goods, to open new fields of production which 
have never been developed before, to give employment to more people, and to 
pembagian pendapatan, perkembangan berbagai matjam sistim2 ekonomi dsb., arah jang 
ditempuh kiranja ialah pertumbuhan suatu ilmu ekonomi dalam arti political economy, 
jang hanja dapat disusun sebagai suatu usaha inter- disciplinary study diantara ilmu2 
pengetahuan sosial jang ada.’
 13 Kaptin Adisumarto, ‘Scope and Limits of the Harrod– Domar Equilibrium Formula with 
Respects to Various Economic Models and Their Policy Implications’, in Laporan Kongres 
Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia Kedua, 1962, Djilid ix: Seksi E– 3 (Ekonomi) (Bogor: Archipel, 
1962), 209– 32. The focus on domestic savings and foreign investment was central to the 
1956– 1960 Development Plan of the bpn.
 14 Sadli, ‘Recollections of My Career’, 27.
 15 Sadli, ‘Masalah Penentuan Produksi’, 110.
 16 Mohammad Sadli and Soebroto, ‘Tata Ekonomi Sosialis Jugoslavia’, Ekonomi, 84. ‘Dalam 
tahun 1950 dasar kebidjaksanaan negara untuk mengusahakan ekonomi nasional diubah. 
Model Russia ditinggalkan sebab dipandang tidak effisien dan tidak tjotjok dengan 
keadaan2 jang terdapat di Jugoslavia setjara chas. Sistim perangsang dikembalikan den-
gan pengunaan sistim pasar dan harga (bebas).’
 17 Subroto, ‘The Role of Private Enterprise in the Framework of Indonesian Socialism’, 
in Johnson J.  Rossel, Mohammad Sadli and Subroto (eds), Teachings in Business 
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increase the prosperity of the country’.18 What was perhaps the most common 
characteristic in the trope used by feui economists was the assumption that 
the communist and the capitalist worlds represented a difference in degree 
and not in kind.
The focus on studying Eastern European socialism was encouraged by Mo-
hammad Sadli and indicated the need for experts on the subject. Batara Si-
matupang, an assistant lecturer at the feui, was part of the second group of 
economics students from the ui that was sent, along with Emil Salim, to study 
in the United States. Studying at Stanford under, among others, Paul Baran, 
Simatupang examined neo- Marxist ideas that were the precursors to the de-
pendency theory of the 1970s. There was thus a recognition within the feui 
that socialist ideas on economic planning and development should be stud-
ied. Simatupang was then sent to Yugoslavia, where he studied the work of the 
country’s planning board. After that, he went to Poland to pursue his PhD.19
3 Economic Deterioration and Rehabilitation
By 1962, there was a widespread acknowledgement that the economic situa-
tion had become dire. A comparison of the situations in 1961 and 1965 gives a 
vivid picture of the deteriorating conditions. Indonesia’s gdp (constant price 
1960) increased from Rp 390.5 billion in 1960 to Rp 429.7 billion in 1965, with 
annual growth of 2.2 per cent and annual population growth of 2.8 per cent. 
Thus, gdp per capita had an annual negative growth rate of 0.6 per cent. Ex-
ports had fallen from $620 million in 1960 to $462.7 million in 1965, down 30 
per cent. With an increase in the population of about 30 per cent20 in the same 
period, foreign exchange per capita had decreased by a huge 60 per cent. For-
eign debt grew from around $900 million in 1961 to about $2,25 billion by 1966, 
an increase of 250 per cent. For the year 1966 the total debt payment, including 
interest, equalled around $530 million, because some longer- term debts had 
matured. This sum was larger than the entire national- export income. Even 
more uncontrollable was the problem of the deficit. Money in circulation by 
 18 Subroto, ‘The Role of Private Enterprise’, 26.
 19 Batara Simatupang, Otobiografi DR. Batara Simatupang (Jakarta: Del, 2012), 63– 76. After 
the fall of the Guided Democracy, Simatupang was not allowed to return to Indonesia and 
emigrated to West Germany.
 20 This was based on Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo’s calculations. Population growth rates of 2.8% 
would have increased the total population in five years by around 11%. Because of a lack 









July 1966 had an increase of 23,887 per cent. The government deficit grew from 
Rp 6.9 million in 1960 to Rp 5,24 billion in the same period. During the latter 
part of the Guided Democracy, inflation was always above 100 per cent annual-
ly. This situation severely affected consumers, as food prices between 1961 and 
1966 increased forty- fold, and eight- fold in 1965 alone.21
A significant contributor to the economic woes was the reduced efficiency 
of large parts of the state- owned companies that had previously been under 
foreign management. Between 1957/ 1958 and 1960, Dutch nationalized compa-
nies were arranged under a variety of government supervisory bodies, grouped 
according to their industrial field: the bud for commercial enterprises, Bappit 
for industry and mining, and New State Estates Company (Perusahaan Perke-
bunan Negara Baru, ppn- Baru) for industrial estates. These bodies were to be 
government- owned but managed along business lines.22 The Presidential Reg-
ulation (Peraturan Presiden, pp) No. 19/ 1960 integrated all government- and 
non- government owned companies into managerial bodies controlled by the 
state. The pp also required companies to give 55 per cent of their profits to the 
government. It dissolved the supervisory bodies and ‘ambitiously codified the 
behaviour of all state enterprises and rigidly laid down rules governing the re-
lationships between them in different sectors of the economy’.23 Government- 
owned companies were to be integrated according to the type of industry they 
operated in, within what were called bpu. Thus, government- owned compa-
nies had at least three different layers of management: the ministry, the bpu, 
and the company management. This caused problems due to conflicting rules 
and policies.
During the colonial period, state- owned companies had provided a large 
share of total government revenue. In 1929, they had contributed up to 28 per 
cent of revenue, although by 1939 this had decreased to 14 per cent. By 1955, 
the total share of government revenue produced by state- owned companies 
had declined to 8 per cent. In comparison, taxes had climbed from forming 
65 per cent of this total revenue in 1929 to over 90 per cent by 1951.24 It was 
thus somewhat odd for the government to expect increased revenues from the 
 21 Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, ‘Perkembangan dan Evaluasi Tahap Penjelamatan Bidang 
Ekonomi dan Keuangan’, in Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, Tulisan- tulisan Administrasi 
Pembangunan, 1966– 1968, 1– 7.
 22 J. Panglaykim and Ingrid Palmer, State Trading Corporations in Developing Countries. 
With Special Reference to Indonesia and Selected Asian Countries (Rotterdam: Rotterdam 
University Press, 1969), 7– 8 and 16.
 23 Panglaykim and Palmer, State Trading Corporations in Developing Countries, 17.
 24 Douglas Paauw, Financing Economic Development. The Indonesian Case (Glencoe:  The 
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profits of state- owned companies. In fact, after 1960, state- owned company 
contributions to government coffers dipped to a lower level than the credit 
commitments made by the state banks which effectively subsidized the com-
panies. Contributions declined from a level that just broke even with govern-
ment credit to a whopping 1/ 102nd of the credit by 1965, when government 
credit grew to Rp 527,11 billion with a measly Rp 5,13 billion in return contribu-
tions.25 State- owned companies became a liability.
Another reason for the deterioration of the economy was the reduction in 
the authority of the Central Bank as an independent body capable of deter-
mining monetary policies and thus fine- tuning the economy. Sjafruddin Praw-
iranegara, the head of the Bank of Indonesia, had resigned in February 1958 
and joined the prri rebellion. By 1960, the bi had stopped publishing its week-
ly, quarterly, and annual financial reports. In 1961, the naming of Jusuf Muda 
Dalam, a pni Sukarnoist, as the minister for central bank affairs and governor 
of the Bank of Indonesia, spelled the end of the bank’s role as an independent 
monetary policymaker. Instead, the bank was there to support Sukarno’s revo-
lutionary plan.26
4 The Dekon: Deklarasi Ekonomi
At its heart, the Dekon was a rehabilitation measure meant to deal with in-
flation. Thus, monetary policy, that is, the Keynesian fine- tuning of the 
economy, was the main thrust of the rehabilitation process and its main pol-
icy was austerity. The Dekon was vaguely based on the Yugoslavian political- 
economy model,27 although to what extent this was the result of studies by 
Indonesian economists is undetermined. Economists stressed the impor-
tance of austerity:  ‘As long as the government fails to rein in this strong in-
flation, then first, social efficiency will never be met and, second, the tar-
gets of the national plan will never be achieved.’28 Mohammad Sadli said 
 25 Laporan Penelitian tentang Effisiensi Pembelandjaan Perusahaan2 Negara Periode 1960– 
1966 (Yogyakarta: Biro Penelitian Ekonomi fe- ugm, 1968), 3.
 26 Radius Prawiro, Indonesia’s Struggle for Economic Development. Pragmatism in Action 
(Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1998), 3– 4.
 27 Mackie, Problems of Indonesian Inflation, 38.
 28 Mohammad Sadli, ‘Effisiensi Perusahaan dan Effisiensi Perusahaan Negara Dewasa Ini’, 
Madjalah Perusahaan Negara, 3/ 28 (April 1963), 22. ‘Selama pemerintah tidak dapat 
mentjegah inflasi jang keras maka, pertama, effisiensi sosial tak akan pernah tertjapai, 











of the programme that ‘now our price policies are based on more rational 
principles’.29
The Dekon produced two quite different documents: the Deklarasi Ekonomi, 
announced on 28 March 1963, and, one month later, the May Regulations (Per-
aturan Mei), announced on 26 May 1963. The Dekon was a philosophical tract 
concerning the goal of the revolution, while the May Regulations detailed 
austerity measures and the efforts being made to relieve the economy from 
the inflationary spiral. Yet, the resulting Dekon had to accommodate various 
views. This blurring of the focus of the rehabilitation programme allowed for 
a sustained attack by the communists and, by the end of 1964, their influence 
had become quite significant, resulting in a shift of emphasis towards expand-
ing worker participation.
Indonesia had, in fact, started reaching out for international help in 1961 
when the Humphrey Mission conducted a survey of the Indonesian economy. 
An imf loan was procured in August 1961 to the tune of $41 million to help the 
country’s balance of payments. However, Indonesia was refused a loan from 
the World Bank because it was still required to pay indemnities to the nation-
alized Dutch enterprises. Indonesia had had strong inflation since 1952, which 
had accelerated further since 1957 and was lurching towards uncontrollable 
levels by 1961.30 By late 1962, the worsening economic situation was worry-
ing Sukarno’s inner circle. In November, Djuanda approached American am-
bassador Howard Jones to ask for American aid. At the same time, the Soviet 
delegation met with Soebandrio to discuss a trade credit for Indonesia worth 
$100 million.31 Foreign Minister Soebandrio also approached the intellectual 
Soedjatmoko for help in formulating an economic programme for Indonesia.32 
Soedjatmoko was part of a group of Indonesian intellectuals who met regularly 
to discuss the problems facing the country. According to Sarbini Sumawinata, 
he and the others in the group saw this request as an important opportunity to 
draw Sukarno closer to the technocratic group.33
Economists including Sarbini Sumawinata, Mohammad Sadli, and Widjo-
jo Nitisastro34 no doubt contributed to the development of the Dekon. This 
 29 Mohammad Sadli, ‘Stabilisasi Ekonomi sebagai Sjarat untuk Pembangunan Ekonomi jang 
Effektief ’, Madjalah Perusahaan Negara, 3/ 33 (September 1963), 8.
 30 Mackie, Problems of the Indonesian inflation, 2– 3.
 31 Anwar, Sukarno, Tentara, pki, 189– 90.
 32 Soebandrio later disowned this claim and stressed that the Dekon was equally affected by 
communists such as Aidit. Anwar, Sukarno, Tentara, pki, 233.
 33 Sumawinata, ‘Recollections of My Career’, 49.
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attempt to reduce the role of the state and allow the implementation of mar-
ket forces seemed to be a challenge to the socialist experiment of the Guided 
Democracy. That Soebandrio, a senior member of the Guided Democracy elite, 
had now requested the help of the economists was a sobering indictment of 
the failure of the early Guided Democracy experiment. Soebandrio was com-
peting with Djuanda to come up with an acceptable stabilization plan.35 The 
Dekon was launched on 28 March 1963 and in May a series of economic and 
fiscal reforms was announced, price controls were removed, and government 
subsidies were reduced. Sukarno’s projects were halted and the government 
focused henceforth on agricultural and industrial production.36
In late 1962, the usaid mission ramped up its consultations with the econ-
omists in Djuanda’s entourage. On 14 February 1963, an Indonesian delegation 
headed by Sutikno Slamet37 went to the United States for three weeks to ham-
mer out an agreement and discuss debt- rescheduling and loans to Indonesia to 
the tune of $350 million. The delegation succeeded in convincing the authori-
ties there of the sincerity of the Indonesian efforts to make economic reforms 
and acceded to stringent conditions. In March, the imf sent its Indonesian 
executive director, Mr Sumanang, a former member of the Wilopo Cabinet, 
to reassure Indonesia that credit would be granted for the economic rehabil-
itation programme.38 In November, Indonesia requested the presence of an 
imf mission to advise on stabilization measures.39 A team of ten experts was 
sent to draft technical details with their Indonesian counterparts. The report 
was said to have contributed heavily to the May stabilization regulations.40 
The Kennedy Administration was hopeful that the core economic managers 
and technocrats around Djuanda would be able to wade through the politi-
cal muck.41 Debt- rescheduling was an important component of the econom-
ic reforms being proposed. In April 1963, Indonesia discussed the issue with 
the Soviet Union. On 9 December, the United States proposed rescheduling 
Indonesia’s debts to the Development Assistance Committee (dac), a group of 
lender nations within the US orbit of influence,42 and discussed the possibility 
 35 Anwar, Sukarno, Tentara, pki, 223– 4.
 36 John H.  Sullivan, ‘The United States and the New Order’, PhD dissertation, American 
University, Washington DC, 1969, 42– 3.
 37 Chetwynd Jr., ‘The Indonesian Stabilization Attempt’, 41. He was a former director of the 
imf and former financial adviser to President Sukarno.
 38 Duta Masyarakat, 26 March 1963.
 39 Bunnell, ‘The Kennedy Initiatives’, 214.
 40 Chetwynd Jr., ‘The Indonesian Stabilization Attempt’, 41– 2.
 41 Bunnell, ‘The Kennedy Initiatives’, 75.


















of creating a coordinating group for Indonesia.43 This was a precursor to the 
later Inter- Governmental Group on Indonesia formed in 1967. Sukarno was 
convinced that he could get $600 million from America relatively easily.44 Yet, 
after a report by the imf, the government lowered its expectation to $400 mil-
lion from the US, the World Bank, the imf, and other dac members, such as 
the uk, France, West Germany, and Japan.
Between February 1963, when Indonesia contacted the imf, and March 
1963, when the Dekon was announced, three separate committees were creat-
ed in order to design and implement the economic programme. The first, the 
Committee of Five, was formed on 6 February 1963 and headed by Prime Min-
ister Djuanda, Finance Minister Notohamiprodjo, Foreign Minister Soeband-
rio, Minister of Central Bank Affairs Sumarno, and Minister for Basic Industries 
and Mining Chaerul Saleh. The committee published a report that was heavily 
influenced by Djuanda and drafted with the help of his usaid- funded adviser, 
Bernard Bell, a private economic consultant. Djuanda’s staff was successful be-
cause he knew many of the Indonesians working at the prime minister’s office 
and there was a degree of trust.45 Yet, according to Rosihan Anwar, the presi-
dent rejected Djuanda’s plan on 27 February.
In early March, the Committee of Thirteen (Komite Tiga Belas) was creat-
ed, again chaired by Djuanda, which drafted the basic strategic principles for 
future policy guidelines. This committee included more ‘political’ representa-
tion, including Dipa Nusantara Aidit and Muhammad Hatta Lukman of the 
pki, Ali Sastroamidjojo of the National Front (Front Nasional), Idham Chalid 
of the Islamic church Nadhatul Ulama (NU) and various other political ap-
pointments. It was as part of the Committee of Thirteen that Soebandrio ap-
proached the economists and produced what was called the Economic Mani-
festo (Manifes Ekonomi). It was also through this committee that communist 
involvement became significant, allowing the communists to claim that the 
Dekon supported their economic policies. At a later date, the president named 
the last committee, the Committee of Seven (Komite Tujuh), which was to out-
line the government’s economic policy. It was chaired by Dr Johannes Leimena 
and was dominated by political figures.46 The establishment of the Committee 
of Seven resulted in the further erosion of Djuanda’s position, as he was not 
included in the committee.47 Djuanda’s gradual loss of influence paralleled 
 43 Bunnell, ‘The Kennedy Initiatives’, 215.
 44 Anwar, Sukarno, Tentara, pki, 218.
 45 Conversations about George Wood and the World Bank, S.5583, Oral History Transcript, 
World Bank Archives, Bernard Bell, personal archives.
 46 Chetwynd Jr., ‘The Indonesian Stabilization Attempt’, 42– 5.
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Soebandrio’s rise.48 Unlike Djuanda’s plan, Soebandrio’s plan, co- written by 
the feui, was approved.
The rehabilitation programme was abandoned several months later after 
receiving little public support and decreasing international support as Western 
governments gradually lost faith in Indonesia. The 26 May Regulations, which 
were part of the imf- endorsed stabilization programme, had dismantled price 
controls, resulting in increased fares for public transport and other austerity 
measures. Djuanda’s role in coordinating the regulation was central. Other 
key figures included Finance Minister Notohamiprodojo, Central Bank Affairs 
Minister Sumarno, State Budget Minister Arifin Harahap, and executive gover-
nor of the World Bank and former Bank of Indonesia governor Sutikno Slamet, 
a good selection of Indonesian professional experts.49 Prices for postal servic-
es, transport, and electricity rose by between 400 per cent and 600 per cent, 
while the salaries and allowances of civil servants were doubled. A  new set 
of foreign- exchange regulations was introduced: $40 million worth of foreign 
exchange was released as part of the ‘crash programme’ to import spare parts 
and raw materials to support industrial production, and the programme envis-
aged the halving of the 1963 deficit and its complete elimination by 1964.50 The 
reaction from the political class was decidedly negative.
The pki focused its attack on Djuanda and his heinous crime of ‘liberal-
ism’. By 7 September, Sukarno had issued a statement ordering the retraction 
of the rehabilitation measures.51 US ambassador Howard Jones announced 
that if Indonesia created a new cabinet of which the communists were a part, 
or if Indonesia escalated its Konfrontasi,52 the imf deal would be off.53 This 
was due to the fact that, since early 1963, the Russians had been pushing for a 
cabinet that included the pki as part of the debt- rescheduling negotiation.54 
Even so, because of the vague wording of the Dekon itself, its symbolic use 
 48 According to Rosihan Anwar, Djuanda was sour about this and did not attend a state 
meeting on the Dekon. Anwar, ‘Pelopor Teknokrat’, 216.
 49 Chetwynd Jr., ‘The Indonesian Stabilization Attempt’, 39.
 50 Mackie, Problems of the Indonesian Inflation, 39.
 51 Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno. Ideology and Politics, 1959– 1965 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973), 266– 7.
 52 Konfrontasi or the Indonesian– Malayan confrontation was a conflict started by Sukarno 
in opposition to the founding of the Federation of Malaya (Malaysia and Singapore), 
accusing the Federation as a neocolonialist creation of the United Kingdom. The confron-
tation occurred between 1963– 1965 with Indonesian forces infiltrating Malayan Borneo 
and conducting operations in the Malay Penninsula and Singapore.
 53 Anwar, Sukarno, Tentara, pki, 234.















was to continue throughout the period and a variety of people would claim 
to have been the main actors in its inception.55 It is clear that, in the last 
instance, the Dekon document accommodated the wishes of both the pki 
and the military, rendering it somewhat useless as the legal foundation of 
the rehabilitation programme. Its implementation was, according to Sjahrir, 
a ruse by Sukarno.56
On 15 May 1963, Sukarno’s ‘Ambeg Parama Arta’ speech, meaning ‘to prior-
itize essential matters’, declared further changes to government policymaking. 
In it, Sukarno announced a series of sweeping changes for the Guided De-
mocracy state. The speech declared the failure of the corporatist project of 
the early Guided Democracy state and its mascot, the corporatist Depernas 
body. Sukarno announced that the Depernas was to be incorporated within 
the executive government and run by the office of the president, similarly to 
the function of the bpn during the 1950s.
Sukarno’s position on experts seems to have changed, at least briefly, dur-
ing this period. Although he still loathed economists57 and proclaimed to have 
no knowledge of the economy in a speech he gave at the feui in 1964,58 he 
warned members of Parliament that they had no constitutional right to tam-
per with details and ‘matters I  consider too complex’.59 He warned them to 
stay away from discussions of ‘numbers’ and other technical issues: ‘Let those 
matters be in the hands of a specialized apparatus, made exactly for the pur-
pose, in order for the job to be conducted in a perfect manner, because this 
work requires expertise and long work hours.’60 In March 1964, Sukarno asked 
for Hatta’s help in solving the worsening economic situation, especially with 
 55 Anwar, Sukarno, Tentara, pki, 236. The communists considered the Dekon to be the 
work of M. H. Lukman; a member of staff of the bi claimed that it belonged to Djuanda’s 
staff, while an Indian military attaché claimed to have inside information that Prajudi 
Atmosudirdjo, then former head of the lan, was involved. As Prajudi was a follower of 
Sumitro, it was then claimed that the psi was involved.
 56 Anwar, Sukarno, Tentara, pki, 237.
 57 For instance, in 1964 Emil Salim was surprised when he returned to Indonesia after fin-
ishing his doctorate degree to find that Sukarno had forbidden the reading of Western 
economic textbooks. Emil Salim, ‘Emil Salim’, in Thee Kian Wie (ed.), Recollections: The 
Indonesian Economy. 1950s– 1990s, 197– 8.
 58 Soemardjan, ‘Public and Private Enterprise’, 81.
 59 Sukarno, Ambeg Parama Arta, 31.
 60 Sukarno, Ambeg Parama Arta, 32. ‘Biarlah hal itu dikerdjakan oleh suatu Aparatur chusus, 
jang ditugaskan untuk keperluan itu, agar pekerdjaan dapat diselenggarakan dengan 
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regard to the provision of rice. Hatta, in turn, asked for the help of Sarbini, 
Saroso Wirodihardjo, and Soedjatmoko in this quest.61
5 The Dekon’s Economic Measures
As a document drafted by economists, the Dekon was pragmatic in its approach. 
Its focus on inflation control was in line with the measures that it intended 
to take to bring the economy to order. The measures included an austerity 
budget, a focus on rehabilitating the productive sector, the de- concentration 
and relaxation of controls over private and government- owned companies, the 
introduction of market mechanisms, the opening up of foreign participation, 
and increasing social control, that is, the participation of groups such as labour 
unions and farmers in the decision- making processes of companies through 
the implementation of company boards. The austerity measures included the 
elimination of price controls and subsidies, which would result in rising prices 
all round, but especially in transportation, a change that would badly affect the 
urban population with their fixed wages.62 Pushing through the implementa-
tion of these austerity measures would have required considerable strength of 
will from President Sukarno, but it became obvious to many that Sukarno was 
not willing.63
Rehabilitating the productive sector was difficult for a number of reasons, 
one of which being the difficulty of finding sufficient foreign exchange to im-
port productive goods. Another major problem was the constraints that had 
been placed on managerial independence at the company level. Mohammad 
Sadli suggested that the bpus should become a watchdog, part of the social 
control that would help to improve the social efficiency of the economy.64 
Thus rehabilitation was intertwined with the need for de- concentration and 
the relaxation of regulations, allowing companies greater independence to 
determine levels of production, pricing, profit- making, marketing, and so 
forth.65 Companies were free to operate using a business mindset within an 
 61 Anwar, Sukarno, Tentara, pki, 282. Saroso Wirodihardjo was an economist and the uncle 
of Sumitro Djojohadikusumo.
 62 Bunnell, ‘The Kennedy Initiatives’, 381– 2.
 63 Widjojo Nitisastro, The Indonesian Development Experience (Singapore: Institute of South 
East Asian Studies, 2011), xiv. ‘In the short term, a stabilization programme to control 
inflation and a rehabilitation programme to build infrastructure were given particular 
priority.’
 64 Sadli, ‘Effisiensi Perusahaan’, 18.













open environment and without being hampered by regulations of the various 
ministries and departments and the General Management Boards or regional 
officials.66 Although profits were on the increase, there were also increasing 
levels of state taxation.67 The gradual relaxation of control over the economy, 
moving it out of the hands of state bureaucrats, was envisaged. Government 
Regulation No. 7/ 1963 was one of the follow- up measures, which gave full au-
tonomy to state trading corporations.68
Increased managerial independence from the central government, the 
bpus, and the regional governments heralded efforts towards greater de- 
concentration. The central government’s role in the economy was to be grad-
ually reduced. For instance, import and export administration was to be de-
volved from central to regional offices.69
Mechanisms that worked within free- market economies were to be intro-
duced as part of the effort to increase efficiency and productivity. As Sadli 
phrased it:  ‘Obviously, the price mechanism which is used in the interest of 
planning must not be left to its own devices; price mechanisms should be used 
in a guided manner! That is why the nature of competition is also limited, it 
is a guided competition!’70 It was really a socialist competition. The idea of 
incentives was not merely to introduce market mechanisms, but to reach over-
all efficiency. Within a socialist economy, efficiency lay not within a particular 
company but within the overall economy. This was what Sadli termed ‘social 
efficiency’.
Both production- sharing and joint- venture programmes were introduced as 
means to allow forms of foreign direct investment within the country. Devel-
opment financing had become a major problem, only made worse by infla-
tion. Introduced in 1962, it was hoped that it would act as a funnel for foreign 
investment in the extractive sectors of mining and oil. The funds committed 
were rather limited: $72 million for the period 1962– 1966, a small fraction of 
the foreign borrowing Indonesia accrued. The biggest investment came from 
 66 Soenarto Soedibroto, ‘Aktivitas PDN2 dalam rangka Dekon’, Madjalah Perusahaan Negara, 
3/ 34 (October 1963), 13– 15.
 67 In 1960, the profit of state- owned trading companies was at Rp 1.926,9 billion and in 
1961 at Rp 1.425,1 billion. The profits given to the Overall Development Funds totalled 
Rp 503.9  million and Rp 648.3  million. ‘Kolonel Soehardiman dihadapan Wartawan2 
Ekonomi Ibukota tentang Fungsi bpu- pdn dan PDN2 dalam rangka Perpres No. 7, 1963’, 
Madjalah Perusahaan Negara, 3/ 32 (August 1963), 10– 13. By 1965, however, most of the 
companies had become unprofitable.
 68 Panglaykim and Palmer, State Trading Corporations in Developing Countries, 70.
 69 Sukarno, ‘Deklarasi Ekonomi’, Madjalah Perusahaan Negara, 3/ 28 (April 1963), 8.
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the Japanese at over $44 million. Western Europe provided some $15.5 million 
and Eastern Europe over $12 million.71
Lastly, the ideas of social control, social support, and social participation 
became essential components of the reform process. The failure of the Deper-
nas project and its incorporatist forms of national planning had not lessened 
Sukarno’s support for some form of participation that should be extended 
into the wider economy. If national planning had to be returned to within the 
central governing bodies of the Bappenas– Muppenas at the company level, 
the participation of social organizations should be achieved through access 
at the managerial level. The creation of the company boards thus allowed 
for the participation of trade union organizations within the policymaking 
bodies of companies and was an effort to democratize managerial relations 
within companies. The company boards were intended to change the labour– 
management relationship from one of employment to one of human and so-
cial relations, with the aim of increasing the quality of production.72
6 Criticism from the pki
The failure of the Dekon was understood to be the result of the inability of 
Sukarno’s government to maintain discipline. The beginning of the Konfron-
tasi with Malaysia and Singapore shifted the political focus, while austerity 
measures were not maintained. Popular support for the economic rehabil-
itation programme remained low. Bunnell has suggested that the reason for 
this was that the business sector represented only a small percentage of the 
Indonesian urban population. The vast majority of Indonesians were farmers, 
whose lives were less affected by the monetary sector of the urban economy. At 
the same time, the bureaucracy and the military were protected from inflation 
through a combination of government subsidies and corruption.73 The sup-
port for the programme from urban wage earners was understandable when it 
is considered that wages were lagging behind price increases due to the easing 
of price controls and the removal of some government subsidies.74
 71 Joyce Gibson, ‘Production Sharing: Part II’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 4/ 2 
(1966), 75– 100.
 72 Nurdjaman, ‘Dewan Perusahaan sebagai Alat Revolusi dalam kerangka Tata Susunan 
Perusahaan Indonesia’, in Kumpulan Kertas Karya Musyawarah Besar Sardjana Ekonomi. 
Djakarta, 15 Djuli 1964, Jilid I (Jakarta: Jajasan Badan Penerbit, 1964).
 73 Frederick Phillip Bunnell, ‘The Kennedy Initiatives in Indonesia, 1962– 1963’, Thesis, 
Graduate School of Cornell University, 1969, 411– 12.











The pki immediately launched opposition to the May Regulations. The 
Youth Front (Front Pemuda) said that it benefited only the capitalist bureau-
crats, compradors, and corruptors.75 Carmel Budiardjo attacked its Western 
economic viewpoint for failing to link the problem of inflation with the prob-
lems of production.76 The production approach was meant to ‘concretely free 
the productive forces which would push through the basic strategy of the In-
donesian economy’.77 The communists championed this shift from monetary 
policy to production policy because it would provide them with access to the 
so- called bureaucratic capitalist productive economy, which was in the hands 
of the military.78 The process of de- concentration was also attacked. The com-
munists wanted more government intervention, not less. According to Budi-
ardjo, ‘the corruptors, who had to be eliminated through changing the price 
policies, by eliminating price controls, and by letting the price of government- 
owned companies meet market prices, were not eliminated. In fact, they grew 
because their actions were no longer supervised by the government.’79
In other words, according to the communists, the floating of the currency 
and the reintroduction of market mechanisms had no effect on eliminating 
inflation. Budiardjo argued that the only way inflation could be handled was 
through the structural incorporation of the working class in the economy, 
which would allow them to participate in the management of companies and 
the economy. This was what the communists understood by the idea of social 
control: the control of the economy by ‘society’.
7 Communist Views
The international context of the Cold War was well understood by both 
military- leaning and pki- leaning economists and intellectuals. pki sym-
pathizers, such as Carmel Budiardjo and J. B. A. F. Major Polak, a former psi 
 75 ‘Mengobarkan Gerakan Anti- Korupsi dan Menatasi Krisis Sandang- Pangan. Memorandum 
Front Pemuda’, in Perekonomian Nasional, 4/ 47 (December 1964), 21– 3.
 76 Carmel Budiardjo, ‘Melaksanakan Dekon dengan Konsekwen. Kesulitan Ekonomi Dewasa 
Ini Dapat Diatasi’, Perekonomian Nasional, 4/ 47 (December 1964), 9– 11.
 77 Budiardjo, ‘Melaksanakan Dekon dengan Konsekwen’, 9– 11.
 78 Kabir: kapitalis birokrat.
 79 Budiardjo, ‘Melaksanakan Dekon dengan Konsekwen’, 11. ‘Tukang2 tjatut jg mau dibasmi 
dengan mengubah politik harga ketika itu, jaitu menghapus sisteem pengendalian harga 
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politician, openly discussed the Cold War front, the dangers of Kennedy’s shift 
of emphasis to politicized foreign aid, and his obsession with guerrilla war-
fare, as explained by Stewart Alsop.80 The threat of the America- dominated 
Bretton Woods institutions and the Alliance for Progress was voiced after the 
imf- influenced Dekon in 1963. Aidit warned of the dangers of American ne-
ocolonialism through aid and pointed to the case of Brazil.81 In an article in 
the communist newspaper Harian Rakjat, he commented that ‘pragmatism is 
always praised as a “practical” philosophy and that the “practicality” of prag-
matism has an evil but practical role for the imperialist’.82 This was an attack 
against what he saw as Indonesia’s appeasement of the imf and against the 
Indonesian economic reform programme.
The shift towards seeking the advice of experts during the late Guided De-
mocracy highlights a period of intellectual feuding between American- trained 
economists and pki- affiliated economists. Mohammad Sadli commented that, 
‘within feui there was a political struggle with Carmel Budiardjo and oth-
er left- wingers in the Faculty’.83 The hsi became a contender for the lpem, 
publishing works that focused on the dangers of American intervention. It in-
cluded intellectuals such as F.  Runturambi from the Central All- Indonesian 
Workers Organization (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, sobsi), a 
pki- affiliated labour organization, Professor Ernst Utrecht, and Drs. Soerjadi, 
the minister for budgetary affairs.
An examination of Aidit’s speeches and of his paper on the Dekon and the 
economy in general provides a picture of the position of communist ideas vis- 
à- vis those of the experts trained in the US. It was all about the application of 
what they termed a production policy that would work against the monetary 
stabilization advocated by feui economists.84 ‘It has been the case for too 
 80 J. B. A. F. Major Polak, ‘Pembahasan Atas Prasaran Ke- ii’, in Sukirna, Untuk Pelaksanaan 
Dekon. Hasil- hasil Seminar Ekonomi jang Diselenggarakan oleh Lembaga Ilmu Ekonomi 
hsi (Jakarta: Departemen Urusan Research Nasional, 1964), 174– 92.
 81 Harian Rakjat, 29 January 1963.
 82 Harian Rakjat, 27 March 1963. ‘Filsafat imperialis adalah pragmatisme, jaitu filsafat jang 
mengukur segala sesuatu dari sudut apakah akan membawa keuntungan2 bagi saja 
atau tidak.’ Pragmatisme selalu dipudji2 sebagai suatu filsafat jang “praktis” dan ternjata 
bahwa sifat “kepraktisan” dari pragmatisme memang mempunjai peranan jang djahat 
tetapi praktis benar bagi kaum imperialis sendiri.’
 83 Sadli, ‘Recollections of my Career’, 38– 9.
 84 According to Penders and Sundhausen, Abdul Haris Nasution, 164, ‘the pki had nothing 
to gain from an improvement of the living conditions of the masses; this would have 
diminished its opportunity to mobilize them for its purposes and, moreover, would have 
brought the “psi- leaning” technocrats back into positions of economic power’. Even if it 












long that Indonesian economics experts have taken a position of ignorance 
regarding political issues and have tried to present the problems of the econ-
omy as merely a technical matter, with laws that “were assumed to apply in all 
ages”, which stemmed from a subjective viewpoint and ignored the objective 
reality that exists within society.’85 According to the communists, economic 
policymaking should have been derivative of the political process and the 
national goal of the revolution. As Aidit phrased it:  ‘The viewpoint that so-
cialism can be implemented without first dealing with the national demo-
cratic effort, that is, the ending of the residues of imperialism and feudalism, 
is  intolerable.’86
The communists supported two laws introduced in 1960 as heralding the 
ending of imperialism and feudalism in the country:  the Regulation on the 
Agreement of Joint Revenue Sharing (Undang- undang Perdjandjian Bagi Has-
il, uupbh) and the Regulation on Basic Agrarian Principles (Undang- undang 
Peraturan Dasar Pokok Agraria, uupa). According to the communist interpre-
tation, the uupbh would prohibit foreign direct investment by diverting it 
to revenue- sharing projects. This was a victory over imperialism, as it limited 
the role of foreign enterprises. The continued nationalization of British and 
American- owned enterprises during the period 1963– 1965 was also part of this 
anti- imperial strategy. The uupa would destroy what was known as the land-
lord class of the agricultural community through a process of land redistribu-
tion. This land- ownership reform formed the anti- feudal strategy.
The clash between ‘Western’ and communist economists occurred over 
these strategies. Aidit accused Sumitro of siding with imperialists and feudal-
ists because he blamed Indonesian poverty on the population’s lack of savings. 
This was part of the reigning Harrod– Domar model, which saw the root of 
poverty as being a result of the subsistent nature of the economy and the lack 
of reinvestment in production, that is, an acknowledgement that growth can 
only occur when the rate of savings is greater than the capital output ratio 
 85 Dipa Nusantara Aidit, Pemetjahan Masalah Ekonomi dan Ilmu Ekonomi Indonesia 
Dewasa Ini (Jakarta:  Jajasan Pembaruan, 1964), 4.  ‘Sudah terlalu lama kaum sardjana 
ekonomi Indonesia pada umumnja mengambil sikap masa- bodoh terhadap masalah 
politik dan berusaha membahas masalah ekonomi sebagai masalah jang bersifat teknis 
melulu, dengan hukum- hukum “jang berlaku untuk semua zaman” jang bertolak dari 
pandangan- pandangan subjektif dan mengabaikan kenjataan objektif jang hidup dida-
lam masjarakat.’
 86 Aidit, Pemetjahan Masalah Ekonomi, 6. ‘tidak dapat ditolerir lagi pendapat bahwa sosial-
isme bisa diselenggarakan tanpa menjelesaikan lebih dahulu perdjuangan nasional- 
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and the growth of the labour force.87 The solutions they propounded were the 
injection of capital by foreign direct investment or loans and the incentivizing 
of Indonesians to save their incomes.
It was an analysis that, according to the communists, lacked a social com-
ponent and misunderstood the nature of Indonesian rural society. According 
to them, the reason for the lack of savings lay not in the lack of a propensity 
to save among the Indonesian farmers and labourers, but in the rent- seeking 
activities of bureaucratic capitalists, foreign- enterprise owners, and the land-
lords in the villages. The main criticism against Western- educated economists 
was that they harboured apolitical ideas. Aidit continued:  ‘The most signifi-
cant contributor to this evil analysis is Sumitro, a person who is famous and 
well known to be rebellious and traitorous to the Republic, but whose equally 
traitorous and heinous economic theories have not yet been properly disrobed 
and are given an important place in our universities and still colour the think-
ing of the officers that man our economic- policy apparatuses.’88
The pki had always held an ambiguous position in relation to experts and 
intellectuals. In many communist movements outside Indonesia, intellectuals 
represented a major part of the communist movement, yet in Indonesia this 
was not the case. The lack of expertise in the nation meant that the vast ma-
jority of university graduates had an almost assured position in government 
jobs and there was no pool of unemployed intellectuals.89 In the early 1950s, 
the communists still regarded intellectuals as an important part of the move-
ment, but aside from the hsi and the People’s Cultural Institute (Lembaga 
Kebudayaan Rakjat, Lekra) – an artists’ and writers’ organization – there was 
no prominent intellectual organization within the pki. The attack on intellec-
tuals was accentuated by the conservative nature and ‘reactionary’ position 
taken by the apolitical Indonesian economists. As a result, the pki supported 
a non- expert, participatory approach to economic problems. The failure of the 
rehabilitation programme known as the May Regulations supported this idea:
 87 Robert M. Solow, ‘Growth Theory and After’, The American Economic Review, 78/ 3 (June 
1988), 307– 17. In a work published in 1957, Solow contributed to the theory by adding 
technology as a factor that increases productivity growth.
 88 Aidit, Pemetjahan Masalah Ekonomi, 12. ‘jang paling “berdjasa” dalam menjebarkan ana-
lisa jang djahat ini jalah Sumitro, seseorang jang sudah terkenal dan sudah telandjang 
bulat sebagai pemberontak dan pengchianat terhadap Republik, tetapi jang teori- teori 
ekonominja jang sama chianat dan sama djahatnja belum tjukup ditelandjangi, masih 
mendapat tempat dalam perguruan- perguruan tinggi kita dan masih mendjiwai pegawai- 
pegawai tinggi dalam aparatur ekonomi kita.’
 89 Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951– 1961 (Berkeley:  University of 








This signified the triumph of the Indonesian people, because for the first 
time our people can directly and actively determine government policy 
on economic matters, a field that has long been considered to be beyond 
the ken of the people, a field that it was said can only be thought of and 
discussed by certain experts, whose expertise has failed us in dealing 
with the economic and monetary issues at hand.90
The idea of production policy thus belittles the problems of inflation and the 
monetary approach. Keynesianism was the target of recrimination for both 
Sukarno and the communists. Yet, the attacks on Western- educated experts 
such as Sumitro Djojohadikusumo had a strawman- like quality. Carmel Budi-
ardjo’s idea of fair practices for small agricultural producers and better access 
to capital and foreign markets91 was not received particularly poorly by people 
like Widjojo Nitisastro, whose work had also focused closely on small agricul-
tural producers.92 As Runturambi of the sobsi said:  ‘The believers in these 
economic theories ruminate night and day to find a “new theory” that is not 
Russian, not Chinese, not totalitarian and that does not use the formulas com-
monly used by anti- communist and anti- Nasakom lecturers within and out-
side the country. When they find it too hard to call their theories socialist, they 
use the American term “people’s capitalism”.’93 That economic policy meant 
 90 DN Aidit, Dekon dalam Udjian (Jakarta:  Jajasan Pembaruan, 1963), 8.  ‘ini menggambar-
kan suatu kemenangan bagi Rakjat Indonesia, karena dengan ini berarti bahwa untuk 
pertama kalinja Rakjat kita setjara langsung dan aktif ikut menjusun politik Pemerintah 
dibidang ekonomi, jaitu sudatu bidang jang selama ini dianggap sebagai bidang terlarang 
untuk Rakjat, suatu bidang jang katanja hanja dapat difikirkan dan diperbintjangkan 
oleh tenaga- tenaga ahli tertentu jang sudah terbukti sama sekali tidak berhasil mengatasi 
kesulitan- kesulitan ekonomi dan keuangan selama ini.’
 91 Carmel Budiardjo, ‘Perdagangan Luar Negeri: Segi Dalam Negeri (Produksi dan Marketing) 
dan Segi Luar Negeri (Neratja Pembajaran)’, in Sukirna (ed.), Untuk Pelaksanaan Dekon. 
Hasil- hasil Seminar Ekonomi jang Diselenggarakan oleh Lembaga Ilmu Ekonomi hsi 
(Jakarta: Departemen Urusan Research Nasional, 1964), 71– 101.
 92 This, what is now termed a ‘pro- poor’ policy focused closely on rural agricultural devel-
opment, an important component for the success of New Order development. Jan Kees 
van Donge, David Henley and Peter Lewis, Tracking Development in Southeast Asia and 
Sub- Saharan Africa: The Primacy of Policy’, Development Policy Review, 30, s.1 (February 
2012), 12– 16.
 93 Runturambi, ‘Potensi Ekonomi dan Kekuatan Politik sebagai Landasan Pelaksanaan 
Deklarasi Ekonomi’, in Sukirna (ed.), Untuk Pelaksanaan Dekon. Hasil- hasil Seminar 
Ekonomi jang Diselenggarakan oleh Lembaga Ilmu Ekonomi hsi (Jakarta:  Departemen 
Urusan Research Nasional, 1964), 29. ‘[…] penganut teori ekonomi itu seperti siang dan 
malam hanja berfikir bagaimana bisa menemukan “teori baru” jang bukan Rusia, bukan 
rrt, bukan totaliter dan matjam2 rumus jang lazim digunakan oleh lektur anti komunis 
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nothing without political control was understood by both sides; Runturambi’s 
article was titled ‘Economic Potential and Political Power as the Foundation 
for the Implementation of the Dekon’. Along with the belief in an agricultural 
approach to development, it represented ideas that were agreed upon across 
the board. The struggle was a political one for authority and legitimacy as 
much as one of basic economic theory.
8 Regional Development and the Military
The problems related to regional development were apparent to those study-
ing the integration of former rebel areas in places such as Northern Sumatra. 
J. E. Ismael’s visit to the area from October 1961 to February 1962 highlighted 
the enormous problems related to integrating national development planning 
with regional government capabilities:
In Indonesia, the National Overall Development Plan has become a reali-
ty. Various projects will be built throughout the regions; some are not yet 
explicitly detailed, and others will be built to complement other projects. 
As a result, the National Overall Development Plan is functioning as an 
index in its initial phase, similar to Russia’s Gosplan development plan, 
and will ultimately form an ‘integrated regional development plan’.94
Mohammad Sadli observed that ‘regional development was an “ideological 
commitment” of socialism, at least within the socialism that was practised in 
countries ruled by communists’.95
sosialisme dan terpaksa harus menggunakan istilah kapitalisme dipilihlah istilah “kapi-
talisme kerakjatan” model Amerika Serikat.’
 94 J.E. Ismael, ‘Beberapa Aspek Institusionil dalam Pembangunan Nasional dan Daerah’, in 
Sukirna (ed.), Laporan Kongres Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia Kedua, 1962, Djilid ix: Seksi 
E– 3 (Ekonomi) (Bogor: Archipel, 1962), 130. ‘Di Indonesia sekarang ini ppnsb sudah mend-
jadi kenjataan. Projek2 jang akan dibangun tersebar didaerah2, ada jang belum lengkap 
terperintji, dan ada pula jang perlu dikomplemenkan. Dengan demikian maka:  ppnsb 
mendjalankan fungsi sebagai index dalam permulaan proses penjusunan rentjana pem-
bangunan oleh Gosplan di Sovjet Rusia, atas dasar dan sekitar mana daerah menjusun 
rentjana pembangunannja, jang kesemuanja achirnja harus berwudjud mendjadi suatu 
“integrated regional development plan”.’
 95 Mohammad Sadli, ‘Beberapa Segi Masalah Pembangunan Daerah di Indonesia’, in 
Laporan Kongres Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia Kedua, 1962, Djilid ix: Seksi E– 3 (Ekonomi) 







There was a deep realization that the economic problems in socialist socie-
ties were problems related to the political economy. The problem of justifica-
tion within the acuteness of the economic rationality of the economic model 
had to be solved. Mohammad Sadli asked the question:
To an economic expert the problem is a question of conscience (gewetens-
vraag), meaning does he need to find a ‘justification’ for all the deviations 
from resource allocation that matches pure economic considerations in 
a way that the decisions can be accounted for from an economic per-
spective? Or should he consider these deviations as an unwarranted but 
unavoidable aspect of his economy, as part of the social cost of economic 
development, as a necessary waste?96
The answer, according to Sadli, lay in the creation of a development leadership. 
Yet, instead of pointing a finger at the nascent managers, he pointed to the 
obvious leaders of the regions during the period: the military.97
The current military men have power over a wide area. Although they 
admit to the importance of regional development, they are often unable 
to collect the funds and forces needed to start this development. Despite 
this, because they are the most powerful group at present, their potential 
to play a role in development leadership is great. Of course, the mental 
commitment” dari sosialisme, setidak2nja sosialisme seperti jang diamalkan dalam neg-
eri2 jang dewasa ini diperintah oleh kaum komunis.’
 96 Sadli, ‘Beberapa Segi Masalah Pembangunan Daerah’, 94. ‘Bagi seorang sardjana ekonomi 
masalah demikian merupakan suatu “gewetensvraag”, artinja haruskah ia mentjari 
suatu “justification” untuk penjimpangan2 dari resource allocation menurut pertim-
bangan2 ekonomi jang murni sedemikian rupa sehingga achirnja keputusan2 ini dapat 
dipertanggung- djawabkan djuga dari segi ekonomi? Ataukah ia harus bersikap bahwa 
penjimpangan2 ini sebetulnja tidak dapat diharapkan kefaedahan ekonominja tetapi 
harus diterima sebagai bagian dari “social costs of economic development”, jakni jang 
bersifat “waste” (tetapi “necessary waste”).’
 97 According to Mrazek, 1959 was an annus mirabilis during which the military began to 
enter into the politics of various young states and, more importantly, the academic com-
munity began to entertain the possibility of supporting military managers as moderniz-
ers. Mrazek, The United States and the Indonesian military, 14. Peter Dale Scott considered 
1958 to be an important year as this was when new mandarins, including Edward Lansdale 
and Guy Pauker, started selling the military as a possible modernizing candidate. Scott, 
‘Exporting Military- Economic Development’, 210. Bradley Simpson argued that 1963 was 
the important year in this regard, as it was when military modernization theory became 
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capabilities and understanding, the tools and willpower must be attend-
ed to. At the moment, and as has been the case for the last couple of 
years, they occupy a dubious position. They are in charge of security but 
not in direct charge of welfare. But increasingly there has been greater 
awareness amongst them that regional security cannot be separated from 
the welfare of the people and that this cannot be separated from eco-
nomic development. Thus, lately they have been more responsible for the 
welfare and wealth of the regions. Security is a complex issue and is not 
purely a military or police problem. If the problem of security has be-
come such a complex issue then everyone is responsible for general wel-
fare; even during times of military law (SOB), it is not purely the respon-
sibility of the military, as it is not purely the responsibility of civilians 
during peacetime. It requires a collective sense of responsibility, at least 
between military and civilian groups on the matters of security, welfare, 
and economic development. Does that mean that the military and civil-
ian, the green and white shirts should become pioneers of regional de-
velopment? The concept of such leadership is autocratic and may not be 
effective in the long run, but such an autocratic approach may be strong 
enough to create a momentum to kick- start development.98
 98 Sadli, ‘Beberapa Segi Masalah Pembangunan Daerah’, 118– 19. ‘Kaum militer dewasa 
ini sering mempunjai kekuasaan jang tersebar didaerah.  Biarpun mereka ini menga-
kui pentingnja pembangunan daerah, namun sering merekapun merasa tidak mampu 
untuk menghimpun “funds and forces” untuk memelopori pembangunan ini. Biarpun 
demikian, djustru oleh karena golongan ini dewasa ini adalah jang paling berkuasa, maka 
potentiil merekalah jang paling mampu untuk memainkan peranan development lead-
ership ini. Sudah tentu mentale instellingen, begripnja, peralatannja dan kemauannja 
harus dipupuk terus. Pada saat ini, serta djuga dibelakang hari, posisi mereka agak dubi-
eus. Mereka bertanggung djawab atas keamanan, tetapi tidak langsung atas kemakmu-
ran. Akan tetapi, lambat laun telah timbul suatu keinsjafan dikalangan mereka bahwa 
keamanan daerah tidak dapat dilepaskan dari kesedjahteraan rakjatnja, dan ini tidak 
dapat dipisahkan dari pembangunan ekonomi. Maka achir2nja merekapun merasa 
bertanggung djawab atas kesedjahteraan dan kemakmuran ini. Akan tetapi, dengan 
demikian maka soal keamanan mendjadi masalah jang komplex, tidak hanja berupa 
masalah militer atau polisionil. Kalau masalah keamanan mendjadi demikian komplex-
nja maka sebetulnja semua fihak bertanggung djawab terhadap masalah kesedjahteraan 
pada umumnja; dalam masa sob- pun bukan fihak militer sadja, dan dalam masa damai 
bukan fihak sipil sadja. Ini memerlukan rasa tanggung- djawab kolektip, setidak2nja 
antara kaum militer dan kaum sipil terhadap masalah keamanan, kesedjahteraan dan 
pembangunan ekonomi. Apakah lalu kaum militer dan sipil ini, kaum badju hidjau dan 
badju putih bersama2 dapat mendjadi pelopor dalam pembangunan daerah? Konsep 
pimpinan demikian masih tetap otokratis dan mungkin tidak akan effektip untuk masa 
jang pandjang. Akan tetapi approach jang serba otokratis ini mungin tjukup kuat untuk 




The argument that military autocracy was necessary to regulate the immediate 
problems of a political economy was one that was openly expressed by econo-
mists during the period. Sadli’s views were congenial to the military elite; enough 
for Colonel Soewarto of the Seskoad, an old friend of Sadli from his Yogyakarta 
days, to invite him and his economic friends at the feui to teach there.99 Both Sad-
li and Suwarto saw this as a rational solution to an intractable societal problem. 
Economic planning and military leadership, or at least military participation, had 
assumed considerable importance within the Guided Democracy state. It was not 
certain whether the extent of the contribution from the military to corruption 
was understood amongst economists. The reports of the Bapekan, for instance, 
may not have been made available to intellectuals.
Importantly, the idea was not purely of military rule, but of a rule shared 
between the green and white shirts. Thus, Presidential Decision No. 655/ 1961 
on Regional Planning (Keputusan Presiden No. 655/ 1961 tentang Perentjanaan 
Daerah) recreated regional governance within a Tjatur Tunggal system that 
put the military regional commander in power, at least for the duration of the 
military emergency. The ideas of civic action and development were thus very 
much intertwined. Ibrahim Adjie said this of the army’s connection to devel-
opment: ‘War is not the goal of the military; the goal of the military is to uphold 
the welfare and honour of the nation so as to be level with the most advanced 
nations in the world.’100
Where were the managers in this picture, then? Was there such a deep dis-
trust of the capability of Indonesian management that economists such as Mo-
hammad Sadli put their trust in the military men? Panglaykim’s study of the 
Soviet system noted two distinct generations: a politicized managerial elite – 
what Joseph Berliner called the ‘Red Directors’ – who obtained their positions 
through their political affiliations and roles during the revolution, and a new, 
educated elite, who were products of the new education system and had a pro-
fessional attitude to management. In the words of Panglaykim:  ‘In my view-
point, the executives trained during the revolution and those who have had a 
formal education are very different. Those who have had a formal education 
are educated to direct their energy and minds to the service of the state and are 
interested in creating the largest industrial nation on earth. Thus, those with 
education as their capital form a very worthwhile corps.’101
 99 Mohammad Sadli, ‘Mohammad Sadli’, in Thee Kian Wie (ed.), Recollections. The 
Indonesian Economy, 1950s– 1990s, 125.
 100 Adjie, ‘tni dan Civic Mission’, 13.
 101 Panglaykim, ‘Beberapa Aspek Struktur Management’, 172– 3. ‘Menurut pandangan kami 
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9 Conclusion
The series of institutional reforms that was conducted during the Guided De-
mocracy resulted in several significant developments. First, the failure of cor-
poratism in national planning, as exemplified by the Depernas, led to a push 
for the inclusion of experts and managers in the managing of national and 
regional policies. Second, the Bappenas– Baperdep– Bakopda structure offered 
the potential for greater centralized control. The fact that the Bakopda con-
formed to the Tjatur Tunggal structure meant that the regional governments 
were finally recreated under the authority of regional planning agencies in 
which managers  – military and civilian  – were able to partipate. Instead of 
decentralization, the New Order state did away with regional democracy and 
regional government. It instituted a form of national and regional military con-
trol with the cooperation of both the Pamong Praja and the managers.
In the early 1960s, Western- educated economists trained their sights on stud-
ying and understanding the development of socialist institutions in commu-
nist countries. Using the examples available in various communist countries, 
their goal was to create a socialist model that would allow for some inclusion 
of market mechanisms, market incentives, decentralization, de- concentration, 
and a general reduction of state intervention in the economy. The pki attacked 
their focus on the problems of inflation and the usage of monetary and fiscal 
policies, considering it part of a larger Western conspiracy to derail the revolu-
tion. The monetary policy was considered by the pki as merely supporting the 
corruption of ‘capitalist bureaucrats’, the derogatory term used for managers, 
especially military managers. Instead, the communists advocated the greater 
inclusion of workers in what they called production policy.
jang telah memperoleh pendidikan formil. Mereka jang memperoleh pendidikan formil 
memang terdidik untuk mentjurahkan tenaga dan fikiran bagi kepentingan negara dan 
berkehendak mentjiptakan suatu negara industri jang terbesar didunia. Dengan modal 
pendidikan, mereka merupakan suatu corps jang berharga sekali.’
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Conclusion
This book argues that to understand the rise of the New Order state an analysis 
is required of the way in which post- independence elite creation shifted dur-
ing the 1950s as a result of the impingement of the need for state- led develop-
ment: the rise of the so- called managerial state. The rise of a new managerial 
elite prompted Sukarno’s decision to co- opt this new group into a corporatist 
form of developmental state. As we have seen, there was a difference between 
the objective of the new managers to create stable efficiency and Sukarno’s 
tendency to thrive in political crisis whether in nation- building or in a confron-
tation with imperialism, be it in Papua or Malaysia. Yet, this was not so much 
a clash as it was a feature of the Guided Democracy state: counter- insurgency 
institutions to combat separatism and control the Outer Islands had been 
in place since 1957 and continued to develop even after the fall of Sukarno 
with the New Order’s military pacification campaign in Papua, Aceh, and East 
Timor. This combination of managerial efficiency and societal control and 
counter- insurgency appears to have developed during the Guided Democracy 
and continued after its end. Sukarno’s main problem was his inability to create 
the kind of environment that was conducive to development in this new state– 
society relationship. Instead, he maintained his dream of incorporating the 
various elements of society, whether communist or Islamic, and society’s or-
ganization as a means of ensuring society’s participation in the state. The main 
problem with the communists was not that they had the potential to usurp 
state power itself, but that they were a form of non- governmental or non- state 
power locus that destabilized the position of the managers. The managerial 
state had a strong and rigid hierarchy of authority that was, in many ways, an-
tithetical to civil society.
This, perhaps, explains why the rise of the New Order state had an extremely 
violent character. Should we imagine the destruction of the communist party 
as being akin to a military counter- insurgency operation, a tactic that the army 
had deployed to combat separatism and fanaticism since the late 1950s? Should 
we also consider that it was not merely the pki that was the target of destruc-
tion but Indonesian civil society itself and the concept of a non- state power 
locus? Disciplining the population through strategies of control had been on 
the agenda of army and civilian managers since the Guided Democracy period. 
The application of control strategies during Suharto’s reign through indoctri-
nation courses, Civic Action programmes, and counter- insurgency operations 
in far- flung regions like East Timor, Aceh, and West Papua showed the extent to 
which the Guided Democracy model continued to be deployed throughout the 
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remainder of the twentieth century. The 1971 parliamentary (mpr) decision to 
depoliticize Indonesian society and implement the ‘floating mass system’ was 
part of this emasculation of civil society. The killings of gang members in the 
1980s and the dumping of their bodies on the streets as a spectacle of violence1 
were effective because of the indistinguishability of these victims from the rest 
of Indonesian society. The fear of being labelled a communist during this pe-
riod was also based on the lack of a distinctive physical, cultural, and mental 
picture of the ‘enemy’. Its effectiveness lay precisely in this fungible nature of 
the Indonesian. In this context, the enemy of the state could be any Indone-
sian. The New Order actively sidetracked discussions on distinctive identities, 
for instance banning discourses of the ‘sara’ groupings – suku (ethnicity), ag-
ama (religion), ras (race), and antar- golongan (inter- group relations) – as both 
an effort to create a united Indonesian national identity and as a way to ensure 
the blurring of the boundaries between Indonesians: the enemies of the state 
and its citizens became one.2 This was seen as Indonesia’s communist spectre, 
but what really became a spectre was not communism but civil society itself.
Indonesia’s managerial state thus required not engagement with civil soci-
ety but its reduction under a simplified grouping that separated the manag-
ers of the state and the economy from the rest of the population. The deeply 
held suspicion of civil society and representative democracy had its roots in 
Indonesia’s experience of parliamentary democracy in the 1950s, yet I would 
argue that such a viewpoint was also ideologically generated from scientific 
management and public administration science. The proponents of scientific 
management during the period were suspicious of democracy – recollect one 
of the foremost scholars of public administration during the period, Dwight 
Waldo, and his fear that democracy would reduce efficiency.3 In the con-
text of Western society, a strong tradition of rule of law and belief in liberal 
values contained this suspicion, yet in a country that had a strong dislike of 
 1 See James T. Siegel, A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: Counter- Revolution Today (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1998).
 2 M. M. van Bruinessen, ‘Islamic State or State Islam? Fifty Years of State– Islam Relations in 
Indonesia’, in Ingrid Wessel (ed.), Indonesien am Ende des 20 Jahrhunderts (Hamburg:  Ab-
era- Verlag, 1996); Graeme MacRae, ‘If Indonesia is Too Hard to Understand, Let’s Start with 
Bali’,  Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities, 3 (2011), 11– 36; Christian Chua, 
‘Defining Indonesian Chineseness under the New Order’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 34/ 4 
(2004), 465– 79.
 3 Waldo, The Administrative State; Mark J. Gasiorowski, ‘Democracy and Macroeconomic Per-
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liberalism, this suspicion reached greater heights. There were many books in 
the West warning of the dangers of liberalism and a whole panoply of neolib-
eral thoughts originating from European social science, including the Austrian 
School of Economics and stalwarts such as Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von 
Mises, and later its Chicago variant, with the famous Milton Friedman.4 It is 
also worth mentioning that many of the most famous technical experts work-
ing in Indonesia believed in liberal values such as democracy, human rights, 
and the rule of law. We can perhaps see their position as being on a slippery 
slope: scientific management provided legitimation for a bias towards a par-
ticular form of state– society relations, and this was then extended by Indone-
sians with no pretentions of liberal values to its logical conclusion.
This book has tried to present the development of this managerial class 
and the ideology that was carried by them during the transition period of the 
Guided Democracy. It has shown that the rise of the managerial class could 
not be separated from the creation of an international technical- aid structure 
that was built to help newly independent post- colonial nation- states mod-
ernize and develop. The introduction of a series of institutions that catered 
to their position legitimized their role as the elite of the new state: the Five- 
Year Plan, the universities and officer schools, the management classes, and 
so on. Following on from this was the development of new sciences: macroe-
conomics and developmental economics, public and business management 
science, industrial and labour relations, industrial engineering, and so forth. 
Various new tools and technologies, from the calculation of national produc-
tivity through tools such as gdp/ gnp to labour programmes such as Training 
Within Industry, provided an indispensable distinction between the manag-
ers and the general public. Many in the upper echelon of this elite became 
part of the ‘community of scholars’ who had personal relationships with fel-
low scholars and officers in American universities and officer schools. The 
inter- institutional relationships between universities and other institutions 
continued to grow. It was these managers who could read graphs, conduct 
tests, and implement programmes – all of which were essential for the mod-
ernization of society. These managers and their military counterparts became 
the Praetorian Guard for the successful implementation of democratization, 
while at the same time securing access to investment in Indonesia’s massive 
natural resources.
 4 Friedrich August Hayek,  The Fortunes of Liberalism:  Essays on Austrian Economics and the 
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No doubt the implementation of this ideology could be seen as a positive 
move for the welfare of the people. In 1994, a famous World Bank publication 
named Indonesia alongside South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, and oth-
ers as one of the so- called Asian Miracle economies.5 The miracle took the 
form of high economic growth with increasing equity; thus, these economies 
were not only getting richer but also becoming fairer. The managerial state 
replaced parliamentary democracy with a structured programme through 
which the state had extensive control of Indonesian society. This resulted in 
the formation of a relatively strong developmental state that was able to cre-
ate significant economic growth of around 7 per cent per year for much of 
its reign, reducing poverty and integrating Indonesia into the global economy. 
It expanded education and created the basis for a sustained industrialization 
policy. It made pro- rural and pro- poor public- goods investments that resulted 
in a great reduction in rural poverty, particularly in Java, and were seen as a 
continuation of the security idea behind the Civic Action programme of the 
1950s and 1960s. It heralded an expanding middle class in the 1980s and 1990s, 
and saw significant growth in manufacturing after the deregulation actions im-
plemented in the 1980s by a new generation of technocrats that was open to 
neo- liberal ideas.
Yet, it lacked democracy and respect for human rights. It perpetrated vi-
olence against many of its citizens and implemented continued counter- 
insurgency measures in order to quell unrest in the peripheral territories of 
the state. It stymied cultural and intellectual expression, banning the discus-
sion and publication of various ideas related to Marxism. What is particularly 
difficult to understand is that both the developmental state and the counter- 
insurgency state had the same ideological underpinning. Development oc-
curred as a result of violence, not in spite of it. This ideological discourse is 
central to understanding the duality of the New Order:  that it was simulta-
neously beneficial and violent, technocratic and army- dominated. This uncer-
tainty between military and civilian mirrored the uncertainty between enemy 
and citizen. This dual function allowed it to operate within an emasculated 
legal system.
The emasculated role of the legal system is central to understanding the 
kind of post- colonial state Indonesia was burdened with. It was and, to an ex-
tent, remains an illiberal state. The weak courts system resulted in weak rule of 
law. The function of the police force to provide a safe space for public discourse 
 5 Lewis T. Preston, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, Vol. I (Washing-




weakened as a result of its integration within the army in the late 1950s. Sukar-
no’s effort to ‘revolutionize’ the courts, coupled with continued lack of support 
for the judiciary in the form of adequate remunerations and facilities (for in-
stance, the provision of transport for judges), resulted in many members of 
this institution becoming demoralized. The executive’s tendency not to follow 
through with the courts’ decisions effectively led to the slow destruction of 
its authority in the eyes of the government and the people. Suspicion of the 
legal system thus came from both the new managerial class, which saw it as 
a burden that decreased efficiency, and the nationalist politicians, who saw it 
as manifesting continued colonial and imperial tendencies and thus as some-
thing that had to be ‘revolutionized’. It was also seen as suspicious by the com-
munists, who saw the courts in the context of class analysis as an extension 
of capitalist, bourgeois power. In the eyes of the pki, the legal system had to 
be revamped in order to express a clearly pro- proletariat and anti- bourgeoisie 
bias. This was somewhat similar to Sukarno’s revolusi of the legal system, al-
though he analysed it in the context of imperialism rather than class warfare. 
In any case, the legal system received little support from any part of the elite. 
In essence, it was the illiberal nature of Indonesia’s elite that resulted in the 
creation of an illiberal state. Yet, there is no doubt that the role of the managers 
and their ideology was, in a way, very important, because they legitimized and 
cemented in place this illiberal state, which was to continue to exist for much 
of the twentieth century.
This state imploded spectacularly during the late 1990s, taking away many 
of the achievements that it had generated during the previous couple of dec-
ades. Indonesia’s gdp shrank significantly, to levels similar to those of the early 
1970s. Many of its industries and major companies effectively went bankrupt. 
Even worse, its collapse resulted in instances of violence and civil war across 
the archipelago. Yet, what arose from the ashes of the post- New Order collapse 
was a somewhat imperfect liberal order. The civil society that had previously 
been smothered burst forth in an explosion of expressions of political iden-
tities, parliamentary democracy was reintroduced, and the Indonesian state 
underwent a massive decentralization programme. The courts system was 
strengthened, and human rights and the rule of law became values that were 
sought after. In the early 2000s, there was a flowering of various identities that 
was made possible due to the absence of the state from all levels of society. 
The democratic state was messy and corrupt, and its economic growth rate 
was, on average, two percentage points lower than it had been during the New 
Order period; yet there was also the greatest- ever expansion of the Indonesian 
middle class, an explosion of creativity and identity, and the systematized, reg-
ular, and non- violent transfer of power through elections. It was and is, on the 
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whole, a less violent and more stable society. Yet, there was also something of 
a duality between the ideologies that were steadfastly clung on to by many 
Indonesians and the institutional reality that was achieved after the New Or-
der. The constitutional changes that brought about a liberal state in Indonesia 
between 1999 and 2002 were what Donald Horowitz called an ‘inside job’, in 
that they were crafted by politicians and experts within the regime and Indo-
nesian society was not consulted.6 This resulted in the paradoxical creation 
of a liberal order that would be challenged by many groups within society as 
a result of its democratization. This can be seen most noticeably amongst the 
Islamist groups which have noted their dislike of liberalism and its institutions, 
including democracy.
It is difficult to weigh up the total costs and benefits of the managerial state 
and certainly this book has no capability, nor intention, of doing so. What we 
can understand from its rise was its historically contextual nature: the legiti-
macy given by the international Cold War context, alongside the institutional 
support from the West (and East). Another important aspect was the resources 
it required to achieve domestic control. This civil- military dual control must 
have been financially expensive, but it also accrued many expenses in other 
ways. Civil society represents a resource for creativity, the production of new 
ideas, and resilience. Taking that away has impoverished the cultural and intel-
lectual life of the nation and may have made it less resilient to the upcoming 
changes. It may perhaps explain the explosive tendency of the New Order so-
ciety to fall into riots and violence during its rule. If this is the case, perhaps a 
study of the post- New Order violence and whether the presence of democracy 
lessens this tendency is in order. The effects of these changes are not some-
thing that can be easily calculated. The New Order ended in a way similar to 
its rise: in a conflagration of economic collapse and widespread violence. The 
difficulty of maintaining this state is quite understandable. The inability of the 
New Order state to engineer a peaceful transfer of power was indicative of yet 
another aspect of the negative nature of this regime.
The massive costs entailed in ensuring such societal control mean that the 
possibility of creating another managerial state in the future must be rather lim-
ited. Technological development may reduce the cost of control in the future; 
yet, as we have seen recently, these same technologies also create new chal-
lenges for the state regarding the control of society. An example of this is the 
way in which the Internet afforded ordinary people the means to self- organize 





during the political movements of the early 2010s. The experiments of the 
twentieth century can also be read as an omen for the future. Liberal faith in 
democracy and the market place is currently under strain; another round of 
state- led managerialism could replace this, colouring the twenty- first century 
in a way similar to that of the twentieth century. In Indonesia, nostalgia for the 
New Order reared its head in the election campaigns of 2014 and 2019. What 
was remembered was the positive side of the New Order developmental state. 
It is important to be wary of the next get- rich- quick scheme that comes along. 
Indonesian civil society needs to be honest and come to terms with its liberal 
institutional form and the illiberal beliefs of many of its citizens and societal 
groups. This mismatch between liberal forms and illiberal values in some ways 
mirrors the mismatch that existed during the period of parliamentary democ-
racy in the 1950s. Yet, the actions of the Konstituante, the body created to craft 
a democratic and liberal Indonesian constitution, were cut short by Sukarno’s 
Guided Democracy. This was despite the fact that the body had almost finished 
creating Indonesia’s democratic constitution. In the present, efforts have been 
made to trace non- Western forms of ‘liberal values’ as a way of provincializing 
Europe, as, for instance, exists in the ideas of Islam Nusantara7 and others. This 
research has been conducted so as to give legitimacy to the liberal form of the 
Indonesian state. Yet, one might fear that if the core values of Indonesia re-
main illiberal, then the existence of democracy will constitute a slippery slope 
towards illiberal forms and institutions in the future. As we have seen in the 
past, these forms usually result in the spread and consummation of violence 
and the continuing tragedy of the Indonesian people.
 7 A model of Islam based on its contextual development in the Indonesian archipelago. The 
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